Judgment :- 1. The petitioner is the Bishop of the Diocese of Kothamangalam. It is a Corporate Educational Agency having 18 High Schools, 2 Training Schools and 69 Primary Schools. The Bishop is the manager of all these schools. They are educational institutions established and administered by the Reman Catholic Community, which is a religious minority entitled to the protection under Art.30 of the Constitution of India. The schools under the management of the petitioner are admittedly "minority schools" as defined is S.2(5) of the Kerala Education Act, 1938, hereinafter referred to as the Act. 2. Respondents 3 and 4 have been peons in different high schools under the management of the petitioner. The third respondent has a longer service than the fourth respondent, When a vacancy arose in the post of a clerk in the school in which the third respondent has been working, he was appointed in that vacancy. He was reverted to his original post, when that vacancy ended. Subsequently a similar vacancy occurred in the school in which the fourth respondent has been working. Then he was appointed in that vacancy; and in the usual course the petitioner sought the approval of the first respondent, the District Educational Officer, Muvattupuzha, who by bis order, Ext. P3 dated 3181970 declined to grant the approval for the reasons stated therein. One of the reasons stated is that the third respondent bad preferred a complaint that his claim for preferential appointment was overlooked in appointing the fourth respondent. Ext. P3 has also referred to R.7 in Chapter XXIV (8) of the Kerala Education Rules, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) as amended by the Government Notification dated 2-12-1969. This amendment nukes applicable to the non-teaching staff in aided schools the provisions contained in Chapters XIV(A) and XIV(C) of the Rules relating to teaching staff regarding transfer, probation, discipline, maintenance of service records, confirmation, promotion, seniority and maintenance of seniority list. Before the amendment the provisions contained in the said chapters were applicable to the non-teaching staff only in respect of transfer, probation and discipline. 3. There are three rules in Chapter XIV (A) of the Rules which are particularly relevant for this case. One is R.35, which" provides that all schools belonging to one educational agency shall constitute one unit, and that a common seniority list of the staff shall be prepared for all those schools. 3. There are three rules in Chapter XIV (A) of the Rules which are particularly relevant for this case. One is R.35, which" provides that all schools belonging to one educational agency shall constitute one unit, and that a common seniority list of the staff shall be prepared for all those schools. The next rule is R.43, which provides that vacancies in any higher grade of pay shall be filled up by promotion of qualified hands in the lower grade according to seniority, if such hands are available. The last rule is R.51 A, which provides that qualified persons who have worked earlier in a school shall have preference for appointment in future vacancies. As a consequence of the application of the above rules, to non-teaching staff the third respondent is senior to the fourth respondent, though they have been working in different schools under the same educational agency, and the third respondent claimed preferential appointment in the vacancy in which the fourth respondent was appointed both under R.43 and R.51A. It is on this ground that the first respondent declined approval for the appointment of the fourth respondent. 4. The petitioner contends that the right guaranteed under Art.30 (1) of the Constitution for a religious minority to establish and administer educational institutions of its own choice include the right to appoint teaching and non-teaching staff, and that, while the State can prescribe qualifications for appointment of teachers in the interest of efficiency of institution, it cannot in any manner interfere with the right of the management to appoint non-teaching staff. According to the petitioner, the amendment of R.7 in Chapter XXIV (B) of the Rules which made applicable to non-teaching staff the rules contained in Chapters XIV (A) and XIV (C) of the Rules relating to teachers is violative of Art.30 (1) of the Constitution. He has, therefore, filed this writ petition to quash the said amendment, and the first respondent's order, Ext. P3, refusing to grant approval for the appointment of the fourth respondent as clerk in one of the petitioner's schools, and also to direct the first respondent to grant approval for the said appointment. 5. In support of the above contention, counsel for the petitioner referred me to the decision of the Supreme Court in Kerala Education Rules In re (AIR. 1958 SC. 956), Sidhrajbhai v. State of Gujarat (AIR. 1963 SC. 5. In support of the above contention, counsel for the petitioner referred me to the decision of the Supreme Court in Kerala Education Rules In re (AIR. 1958 SC. 956), Sidhrajbhai v. State of Gujarat (AIR. 1963 SC. 540) and State of Kerala v. Mother Provincial (1970 KLT. 620). Reliance was also made on the decisions of this Court in Rt. Rev. A. M. Patron v. Kesavan and others (1964 KLT. 791), State of Kerala v. Manager Corporate Management of Schools, Diocese of Palai (1970 KLT. 106) and State of Kerala v. Corporate Management, Archdiocese, Changanacherry (1970 KLT. 232). If I may say so with respect, the leading decision of the Supreme Court which contains a very instructive and detailed discussion and a clear elucidation of the scope and extent of the fundamental right guaranteed under Art.30 (1) of the Constitution for a religious minority to establish and administer educational institutions of its choice is the Gujarat case. Counsel for the petitioner relied on the following passage appearing in Para.10 of the judgment in that case. "Unlike Art.19. the fundamental freedom under clause (1) of Art.30, is absolute in terms', it is not made subject to any reasonable restrictions of the nature the fundamental freedoms enunciated in Art.19 may be subjected to. All minorities, linguistic or religious have by Art.30(1) an absolute right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice, and any law or executive direction which seeks to infringe the substance of that right under Art.30 (1) would to that extent be void. This, however, is not to say that it is not open to the State to impose regulations upon the exercise of this right. The fundamental freedom is to establish and to administer educational institutions, it is a right to establish and administer what are in truth educational institutions institutions which cater to the educational needs of the citizens, or sections thereof. Regulation made in the true interests of efficiency of instruction, discipline, health, sanitation, morality, public order and the like may undoubtedly be imposed. Such regulations are not restrictions on the substance of the right which is guaranteed: they secure the proper functioning of the institutions, in matters educational." He also relied on the following passage in Para.15 of the above judgment "The right established by Art.30 (1) is a fundamental right declared in terms absolute. Such regulations are not restrictions on the substance of the right which is guaranteed: they secure the proper functioning of the institutions, in matters educational." He also relied on the following passage in Para.15 of the above judgment "The right established by Art.30 (1) is a fundamental right declared in terms absolute. Unlike the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by Art.19 H is not subject to reasonable restrictions. It is intended to be a real right for the protection of the minorities in the matter of setting up of educational institutions of their own choice. The right is intended to be effective and is not to be whittled down by so called regulative measure conceived in the interest not of the minority educational institution, but of the public or the nation as a whole. If every order which while maintaining the formal character of a minority institution destroys the power of administration is held justifiable became it is in the public or national interest, though not in its interest as an educational institution the right guaranteed by Art-30 (1) will be but a "teasing illusion" a promise of unreality. Regulations which may lawfully be imposed either by legislative or executive action as a condition of receiving grant or of recognition must be directed to making the institution while retaining its character as a minority institution effective as an educational institution. Such regulation must satisfy a dual test the test of reasonableness and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution and is conductive to making the institution an effective vehicle of education for the minority community or other persons who resort to it." 6. I do not think that it is necessary to extract from any of the other decisions cited by the petitioner's counsel as they do not contain anything more in support of his contention than what is stated in the passages quoted above. I do not also propose to deal with the contentions of the petitioner's counsel against the constitutional validity of the extension of the applicability of the rules contained in Chapters XIV (A) and XIV (C) of the Rules to the non-teaching staff as a whole. I do not also propose to deal with the contentions of the petitioner's counsel against the constitutional validity of the extension of the applicability of the rules contained in Chapters XIV (A) and XIV (C) of the Rules to the non-teaching staff as a whole. The question whether any of the rules contained in the above two Chapters in its application to non-teaching staff would be violative of Art.30 (1) of the Constitution has to be examined individually with reference to the impact of each one of them on the fundamental right guaranteed under the above article. In the instant case, approval for the appointment made by the petitioner was refused on the basis of the alleged non-compliance with R.43 and 51 A in Chapter XIV (A), I need, therefore, deal with these two rules alone. 7. R.43 in Chapter XIV (A) reads: "43. Subject to R.44 and 45 and considerations of efficiency and any general order that may be issued by the Government, vacancies in any higher grade of pay shall be filed up by promotion of qualified hands in the lower grade according to seniority, if such bands are available. Note: A teacher in a lower grade of pay in one category of post is eligible for promotion to a higher grade of pay in another category of post provided: (i) he has the prescribed qualifications; and (ii) there is no teacher with the prescribed qualifications, in the lower grade of pay of the category of post to which promotions are to be made." The right created by the above rule is for promotion of "qualified hands in the lower grade" to "vacancies in any higher grade of pay" consists of three classes, namely the teaching staff, the administrative staff such as 'clerks, accountants, cashiers, correspondents etc. and the menial staff such as peons, watchers, sweepers, scavengers, etc, Promotion means in the absence of any express provision to the contrary, raising to a higher grade. The question of 'grades arises only in the case of posts falling in a particular class or category. Therefore, the above rule does not entitle a member of the menial staff to be promoted as a teacher, since the posts belong to different classes; and the application of that rule to non-teaching staff does not naturally entitle a peon to be promoted to any vacancy in the post of the administrative staff. Therefore, the above rule does not entitle a member of the menial staff to be promoted as a teacher, since the posts belong to different classes; and the application of that rule to non-teaching staff does not naturally entitle a peon to be promoted to any vacancy in the post of the administrative staff. I am not pepared to say that a provision compelling the management of a minority school to appoint a menial servant of that school as a teacher, by reason of the mere that he has acquired the qualification for appointment to such a post would not offend Art.30(1) of the Constitution. A provision to promote a menial staff to the administrative staff may also suffer the same fate. I refrain from expressing any view on this question since in my opinion R.43 does not entitle a member of the menial staff to be promoted to the teaching or administrative staff. 8. The next is R.51A which reads: "51A. Qualified teachers who are relieved as per R.49 or 52 or on account of termination of vacancies shall have preference for appointment to future vacancies in schools under the same Educational Agency provided they, have not been appointed in permanent vacancies in schools under any other Educational Agency." The passages which, I have quoted from the decision of the Supreme Court In the Gujarat case are authority for the proposition that, though the fundamental right under Article, 30(1) is absolute unlike the fundamental rights under Art.19, it is open for the State to impose regulations upon the exercise of that right without really affecting that right. The State can impose as a condition for granting aid or recognising the instructions imparted in such institutions, reasonable regulations "in the true interests of efficiency of instruction, discipline, health, sanitation, morality, public order and the like". In my view, the provision Contained in R.51A to the effect that a person who has previously held the post of a teacher in a school should be preferred for appointment in a future vacancy arising in that post falls in the above category. Experience is a contribution for efficiency. Fixity of tenure for the office and recognition of past services for future appointment are necessary for the contentnfent-of the staff and consequently for the well-being of the institution. Experience is a contribution for efficiency. Fixity of tenure for the office and recognition of past services for future appointment are necessary for the contentnfent-of the staff and consequently for the well-being of the institution. The staff in the aided schools who are paid from the State revenue is entitled to an equality of treatment like the staff in Government schools; and the minority schools cannot claim any exemption, so long as the regulation's made in that respect do not violate the fundamental right guaranteed under Art.30 (1) of the Constitution. It is a protection granted to the minorities and they are not entitled to claim any special privileges or higher right than the majority community by virtue of the above article, except to the limited extent provided by that Article. It is also undesirable, if not dangerous. If R.51A in Chapter XIV (A) of the Rules is good in respect of the teaching staff, I do not find any reason why its application to the non-teaching staff is not also good. The same considerations apply to both cases. 9. In the result, I come to the conclusion that the objection raised to the validity of the above rule as violative of Art.30 (1) of the Constitution cannot succeed, and the first respondent was right in refusing to accord approval for the appointment of the fourth respondent in preference to the third respondent. Accordingly this Original Petition is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.