PRAKASH NARAIN, J. ( 1 ) THE appellant in this case filed an application under Order 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure for being permitted to sue as pauper. The claim made in the application was valued at Rs. 36,250. 00. A learned Single Judge of this Court by his order dated July 24, 1969 declined the permission and gave to the present appellant four months time to make up the deficiency in court-fee. It was further ordered that in case the deficient. court-fee was not deposited within the time fixed, the application for permission to sue as a pauper shall stand rejected. The appellant did not deposit the requisite court-fee but instead filed the present appeal. ( 2 ) THIS appeal came up before Hardayal Hardy, C. J and myself when it was observed that in view of a decision of this Court in F. A. O. (O. S. 6 of 1968: University of Delhi v. Hafiz Mohd. Said dated March 2, 1972 no such appeal as filed was competent. The learned Counsel for the appellant then urged that the appeal may be treated as one under clause X of the Letters Patent of the Lahore High Court which, he contended, was applicable to the Delhi High Court. As he wanted time to make submissions on this aspect the matter was adjourned. It has now come before us for determination of the question as to whether the appeal can be entertained under clause X of the Letters Patent. ( 3 ) THE Lahore High Court was established and constituted by the Letters Patent dated March 21, 1919 made by George the 5th, then King Emperor of India. These Letters made Patent by the King superseded Act XXIII of 1865 of the Governor General of India in Council by which the Chief Court of Punjab had been established for the then provinces of Punjab and Delhi. The new High Court constituted by the Letters Patent for the provinces of Punjab and Delhi was conferred with Extraordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction (Clause IX), Ordinary Original Criminal Jurisdiction (Clause XV), Extraordinary Original Criminal Jurisdiction (Clause XVII) and various types of appellate jurisdictions. After partition of Punjab in 1947 the East Punjab High Court, later the Punjab High Court continued to be governed by these Letters Patent. After partition of Punjab in 1947 the East Punjab High Court, later the Punjab High Court continued to be governed by these Letters Patent. The Union Territory of Delhi continued to be under the jurisdiction of the Punjab High Court till October 31, 1966. On this date the Delhi High Court Act, 26 of 1966 came into force and the High Court of Delhi came into existence. By virtue of Section 5 of this Act the High Court of Delhi was declared to have, in respect of the Territories for the time being included in the Union Territory of Delhi, all such original, appellate and other jurisdictions as, under the law in force immediately before October 31, 1966, was exercisable in respect of the said territories by the High Court of Punjab. In addition the High Court of Delhi was also given in respect of the Union Territory of Delhi (and at that time the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh also) Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction in every suit the value of which exceeded Rs. 25,000. 00. This jurisdiction was an additional jurisdiction conferred on Delhi High Court and which the Punjab High Court did not possess. By Section 10 of the said Act the powers of judges were defined. It will be advantageous to read this section in extenso. It reads as under: "10. (1) Where a Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi exercises ordinary original civil jurisdiction conferred by sub-section (2) of section 5 on that Court, an appeal shall lie from the judgment of the single Judge to a Division Court of that High Court. " (2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (1), the law in force immediately before the appointed day relating to the powers of the Chief Justice, single Judges and Division Courts of the High Court of Punjab and with respect to all matters ancillary to the exercise of those powers shall, with the necessary modifications, apply in relation to the High Court of Delhi. " ( 4 ) IT is not disputed, that so far as relevant, the Letters Patent of Lahore High Court also applied to the High Court of Delhi. The only relevant clause of these Letters is Clause X which may also be read. " ( 4 ) IT is not disputed, that so far as relevant, the Letters Patent of Lahore High Court also applied to the High Court of Delhi. The only relevant clause of these Letters is Clause X which may also be read. It lays down: "and we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature at Lahore from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge or any Division Court, pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act, and that notwithstanding anything hereinbefore provided an appeal shall lie to the said High Court from a judgment of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act, made on or after the first day of February, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-nine in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court where the Judge who. passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal; but that the right of appeal from other judgments of Judges of the said High Court or of such Division Court shall be to Us, Our Heirs or Successors in Our or Their Privy Council, as hereinafter provided. " ( 5 ) INASMUCH as the original jurisdiction was newly conferred upon this Court question arose as to the interpretation of Section 10 (l) mentioned above, for appeals were being filed from all orders passed by single Judges of this Court sitting on the original side. In University of Delhi and another v. Hufiz Mohd. " ( 5 ) INASMUCH as the original jurisdiction was newly conferred upon this Court question arose as to the interpretation of Section 10 (l) mentioned above, for appeals were being filed from all orders passed by single Judges of this Court sitting on the original side. In University of Delhi and another v. Hufiz Mohd. Said and Others, AIR 1972 Delhi 102 a full Bench of five Judges of this Court held that Section 10 (1) deals with the forum of appeal and does not specify the orders which are appealable. In that view of the matter it was held that the term judgment as used in Section 10 (1) of the Act means the same thing as the expression judgment as defined in Code of Civil Procedure. It was also observed that the word judgment in Section 10 (1) of the Act cannot be interpreted by reference to tests given in various decisions construing the word judgment under the Letters Patent. ( 6 ) IN an earlier case. Begum Aftab Zamani v. Shri Lal Chand Khanna, AIR 1969 Delhi 85 a full Bench of three Judges of this Court was also concerned with the meaning to be assigned to the word judgment as used in Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act. In that case also the controversy was whether the words judgment and decree as defined in sub-sections (2) and (9) respectively of Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure were to hold the field or whether the word judgment has to be construed similarly as it had been construed with reference to clause X of the Letters Patent. It was held that the scheme of section 10 of the Act was clearly different and quite obviously the definitions of the Code could not have any direct bearing inconstruing the word judgment used in the Act. It was observed that "the Letters Patent, when providing for appeals from judgments, in our view, contemplate judgments which have both the effect of a decree as defined in the Code and of such order as may affect the merits of a controversy between the parties by determining some disputed right or liability. A judgement may thus be either final or preliminary or interlocutory. A judgement may thus be either final or preliminary or interlocutory. In order to decide whether an adjudication should be treated as a "judgment" within the meaning of clause 10 of the Letters Patent, we feel that regard should be had not to the form of the adjudication but to its effect upon the suit or the civil proceeding in which it is made. If its effect, whatever its form and whatever the nature of the proceeding in which it is made, is to put an end to the suit or proceeding, or if its effect, if not complied with, is to put an end to the suit or proceeding, the adjudication is indisputably a "judgment" within the meaning of this clause. " After noticing the decisions of various High Courts the Supreme Court and even the Privy Council, some of which have been also cited before us, the learned Chief Justice observed : "we have arrived at this conclusion on the plain reading of section 10 of the Act in the background of the statutory scheme. In our view, the draftsman could neither have intended to restrict the right of appeal only to final judgments disposing of the entire suit, nor could he have intended it to extend to all orders made during the course of trial, however, ministerial or procedural in their nature or ineffectual on the rights of the parties. " ( 7 ) HAVING come to this conclusion the full Bench then went on to construe the order in the case as to whether it attracted full court-fee or fixed court-fee. It was noticed that the competency of the appeal was not in question and the only question was whether that appeal was from a judgment having the force of a decree or from a decree or whether it was an appeal from a judgment which is neither a decree nor an order having the force of a decree. ( 8 ) IN the case of University of Delhi and another Hafiz Mohd. ( 8 ) IN the case of University of Delhi and another Hafiz Mohd. said and others ), the earlier full Bench decision in the case of Begum Aftab Zamani was noticed and it was observed as follows: "we were REFERRED TO to Begum aftab Zamani v. Lal Chand Khanna (A. I. R. 1969 Delhi 85) (FB) and it was urged that that case had decided that the term judgment in Section 10 (1) of the Act cannot be restricted to those orders mentioned in Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code. In our view that case is clearly distinguishable. In that case the question whether the appeal was competent or not was not even in dispute as is clear from the following observations:- It may be observed that in the case in hand the competency of the appeal is not in question, and indeed it is common ground that the judgment is appealable. The only question which arises for our consideration is whether the present is an appeal from a decree or from an order having the force of a decree or whether it is an appeal from a judgment which is neither a decree nor an order having the force of a decree. In that case the only question that arose was about the court-fee payable on appeal presented by an aggrieved party under Section 10 (1) of the Act against the judgment of a learned single judge of this court given in the exercise of ordinary original civil jurisdiction. The bench ultimately held that the judgment of a single judge contained all the criteria of a decree and, therefore, it fell within the purview of Art. 1. Sch. 1 and was subject to payment of ad valorem court-fee. The question which orders are appealable under Section 10 (1) of the Act and what is the meaning to be given to the term judgment were not even canvassed in that case. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the contention that that case lays down the proposition that the term judgment in Section 10 (1) has to be interpreted by applying the tests laid down in various judgments given under the Letters Patent. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the contention that that case lays down the proposition that the term judgment in Section 10 (1) has to be interpreted by applying the tests laid down in various judgments given under the Letters Patent. " ( 9 ) THUS, though the earlier decision was not specifically overruled yet from the tenor of the later judgment it is manifest that the earlier view that the scheme of Section 10 (1) of the Act was different and the definitions of the Code could not have any direct bearing in construing the word judgment did not find favour with the larger bench of five Judges. It was urged that there is a conflict in the views taken by the two full benches but, in our opinion, there is no conflict. The observations about the definitions in the Code not having any direct bearing in construing the word judgment were made in the context of the matter before the bench which heard the case of Begum Aftab Zamani. The meaning given to the word judgment while construing that word as used in Letters Patent was not accepted and this word was sought to be interpreted independently on a plain reading of the word in Section 10 of the Act in the background of the statutory scheme. As was observed in the speech of the learned Chief Justice all orders made during the course of trial could not be regarded as appealable orders nor could the right of appeal be regarded as restricted to appeals from final judgments disposing of the entire suit. In other words the full bench laid down a negative proposition but did not specify the orders against which appeals could be preferred TO. What the three learned Judges had left as unspecified was specified by the five learned Judges who were party to the decision in Universify of Delhi and another v. Hafiz Mohd. Said and others. It was in this view of the matter that the bench had passed an order on April 12, 1972 that the present appeal was not competent under Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act. ( 10 ) THE only question agitated before us that Clause X of the Letters Patent is independent of Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act. ( 10 ) THE only question agitated before us that Clause X of the Letters Patent is independent of Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act. In other words an aggrieved party has a right of appeal under two distinct provisions. Such a contention cannot be accepted. Clause X of the Letters Patent is attracted in fields where there is no other law. If there is a specific provision under which appeals in particular proceedings can be preferred TO that provision would exclude any other general provision. ClauseX of the Letters Patent has to be read. in the context of the jurisdictions that were conferred by Letters Patent and the appeals that were contemplated under those Jurisdictions. As noticed earlier, the Punjab High Court did not have Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction and so, the question of providing for appeals from judgments in proceedings on the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction side did not arise. If such a jurisdiction has been conferred subsequently the provisions of Clause X of the Letters Patent cannot be invoked for the provision conferring the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction has also provided for the forum of appeal in such proceedings and that is found in Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act. Reference, therefore, to Clause XV of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta or Bombay High Court is irrelevant for decisions construing the word judgment in Clause XV of those Letters Patent were obviously in the context of the Ordinary Civil Jurisdiction conferred on those High Courts by Clause XII of their Letters Patent. It will be an anomalous situation if there are two provisions under which a right of appeal is claimed. The legislature cannot be regarded as having been oblivious of the existence of the Letters Patents of the Bombay and Calcutta High Courts and the Punjab High Court. It was because Clause X of the Letters Patent of the Punjab High Court could not be regarded as affording appellate powers in respect of judgments rendered in original proceedings contemplated by Section 5 (2) of the Delhi High Court Act that provision was made in Section 10 for appeals. It was because Clause X of the Letters Patent of the Punjab High Court could not be regarded as affording appellate powers in respect of judgments rendered in original proceedings contemplated by Section 5 (2) of the Delhi High Court Act that provision was made in Section 10 for appeals. If Clause X of the Letters Patent was sufficient to provide the forum of appeals against judgments rendered in original jurisdiction contemplated by Section 5 of the Delhi High Court Act, the legislature would not have enacted Section 10 at all in the Delhi High Court Act. We, therefore, hold that Clause X of the Letters Patent is not attracted in respect of judgments given by single Judges of this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 5 (2) of the Delhi High Court Act. ( 11 ) THE view that we have taken makes it unnecessary tor us to refer to all the decisions that were cited to us construing the word judgment in Clause XV of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta, Bombay and Madras High Courts. ( 12 ) THE appeal is, accordingly, dismissed but in the circumstances of the case we make no orders as to costs.