Jitnath Singh v. State Of Bihar — 1973 DIGILAW 106 (PAT)

Judgment Shambhu Prasad Singh, J. 1. The State of Bihar (hereinafter referred to as the State) filed Title Suit No. 16 of 1961 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Hazaribagh (hereinafter referred to as the Court below). The main reliefs claimed in the suit were that the entire property of Raja Kamakhya Narain Singh of Ramgarh including Kedla, Jharkhand and Rauta coal mines (with which we are concerned in these three cases, the civil revision and the two writ applications), vested in the plaintiff-State under the Bihar Land Reforms Act free from all encumbrances and that conveyances by the Raja of Ramgarh in favour of the defendants of the suit including the petitioner of the civil revision (defendant No. 9 in the suit) -- hereinafter referred to as the petitioner -- were fraudulent, sham, colourable and void being in contravention of law and that leases and subleases mentioned in the plaint were also colourable and farzi. A relief for permanently restraining the defendant including the petitioner from working the mines or obtaining any minerals directly or indirectly was also claimed. The State made an application for appointment of a receiver of the suit properties. By order dated 10th of October, 1969, the Court below appointed the State as receiver. The State as the receiver managed the property in dispute including the said three coal mines through its nominee, an Officer of the Commissioners rank. The Officer used to take directions from the Court. On 22nd of August 1970, National Coal Development Corporation (Opposite Party No. 30) and the Union of India (Opposite Party No. 31) issued a notification purporting to be under Sections 4 and 7 of the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957 -- if necessary, hereinafter to be referred to as the 1957 Act -- expressing their intention to acquire the right of mines, quarry etc. and to prospect in the lands mentioned in the notification measuring 2160 acres in Taping Block and 3000 acres in Kedla Block. On 5th of December, 1970, opposite party Nos. 30 and 31 were restrained by the Court below from giving effect to their intention as mentioned in the aforesaid notification dated 22nd of August, 1970. They made an application for withdrawing that order. This application was dismissed by the Court below on 21st of February, 1972. On 5th of December, 1970, opposite party Nos. 30 and 31 were restrained by the Court below from giving effect to their intention as mentioned in the aforesaid notification dated 22nd of August, 1970. They made an application for withdrawing that order. This application was dismissed by the Court below on 21st of February, 1972. Against this order they filed an appeal to this Court which was numbered as Miscellaneous Appeal No. 138 of 1972 which is still pending. 2. This Court admitted Miscellaneous Appeal No. 138 of 1972 and issued an order of ad interim injunction against the receiver restraining him from managing the aforesaid three coal mines. The injunction matter was finally heard by this Court on 22nd of January, 1973, and by the order of that date the Court vacated the ad interim order of injunction. In the meantime Coking Coal Mines (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1971 -- if necessary, hereinafter to be referred to as the 1971 Act -- had been passed and come into force. On 23rd of December, 1972, opposite party No. 30 who had been appointed Custodian by opposite party No. 31 under the 1971 Act, made an application before the Court below for handing over the management of the aforesaid three coal mines to it. It was mentioned in the petition that on 13th December, 1972, the Coal Board had taken a decision that the three mines aforesaid contained coking coal. On 6th of January, 1973, some of the Managing contractors appointed by the nominee of the State-receiver and the petitioner made an application before the Court below praying, inter alia, that hearing of the petition of opposite party No. 30 be stayed pending the decision of the Supreme Court on the vires of the 1971 Act. On 30th of January, 1973, the President of India promulgated an Ordinance, the Coal Mines (Taking Over of Management) Ordinance, 1973 -- hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance --providing for taking over the management of 464 coal mines as detailed in the schedule. Jharkhand and Kedla coal mines were serial Nos. 243 and 255 respectively of the said schedule. Rauta coal mine was serial No. 232 of the schedule. The schedule also indicated the names of the owners. As against serial Nos. 243 and 244 names of owner was not indicated, rather it was mentioned under dispute1. Jharkhand and Kedla coal mines were serial Nos. 243 and 255 respectively of the said schedule. Rauta coal mine was serial No. 232 of the schedule. The schedule also indicated the names of the owners. As against serial Nos. 243 and 244 names of owner was not indicated, rather it was mentioned under dispute1. As against serial No. 232, Bokaro and Ramgur Ltd., one of the main defendants of the suit, was mentioned. R. D. Rai, Opposite Party No. 32, who was appointed as Custodian by the Custodian-General under the provisions of the Ordinance, made an application before the Court below on 1st of February, 1973 praying for a direction to the receiver not to act inconsistently with the provisions of the Ordinance. The Court below passed an order on the very day allowing the said prayer of opposite party No. 32. In pursuance of that order, the nominee of the State-receiver stopped issuing coupons to the petitioner and other managing contractors resulting in total stoppage of sale and despatch of coal and mining operations resumed under the control and supervision of the receiver pursuant to vacating of the order of ad interim injunction by this Court on 22nd of January, 1973, in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 138 of 1972. On 3rd of February, 1973, the petitioner filed an application in the Court below praying to it to refer the matter to the High Court under Sec.113 of the Code of Civil Procedure to decide the question whether the Ordinance was ultra vires, or, in the alternative, to stay hearing of the matter till the disposal of the Miscellaneous Appeal No. 138 of 1972 by this Court. The State filed an application stating that it had no objection to the transfer of management but the assets in possession of the receiver should not be handed over to the Custodian. Two petitions were filed by Bokaro and Ramgur Ltd., defendant No. 1, on that date stating that it had no objection to the management of the Rauta colliery being handed over to the Custodian under the Ordinance and that of Kedla and Jharkhand mines to opposite party No. 30 under the 1971 Act. 3. On 31st of January, 1973, opposite party No. 32 had filed a petition for directing the receiver to hand over possession of Kedla and Jharkhand mines to him forthwith. 3. On 31st of January, 1973, opposite party No. 32 had filed a petition for directing the receiver to hand over possession of Kedla and Jharkhand mines to him forthwith. On 5th and 7th of February, 1973, he filed two petitions for direction to the receiver to hand over possession of Rauta Mines also to him forthwith. On 7th of February, 1973, the Court below passed an order to the effect that by its order dated 1st of February, 1973, it never meant to stop issue of coupons and stoppage of mining operations. On 19th of February, 1973 the petitioner filed a petition that hearing of the question of handing over of management and possession of the three mines by the receiver be stayed pending the hearing of the writ applications by the Supreme Court challenging the vires of the Ordinance. In the meantime the receiver and some of the managing contractors had filed petitions stating that coupons were not being issued to them by the authorities with the result that despatch and sale of coal was completely stopped. On 21st of February, 1973, petitions were filed praying for direction to the Coal Superintendent, Dhanbad, Opposite party No. 33, to issue coupons or that the Court may itself make some alternative arrangement. It was also alleged that the coal authorities had committed contempt of Court and notice may issue to them to show cause why they should not be proceeded with for contempt On 22nd of February, 1973, the Court below passed an order that it was imperative on the coal authorities to issue coupons and their action in not issuing coupons in spite of the order dated 7th of February, 1973 amounted to interference with the administration of property incharge of the receiver. Accordingly it issued notice to the Coal Controller, Govt. of India, Calcutta, Deputy Coal Superintendent, Dhanbad and Assistant Coal Superintendent, Dhanbad (petitioners in C. W. J. C. No. 278 of 1973) to show cause why they should not be proceeded with for contempt of Court. On 24th of February, 1973, the Court below passed an order directing the receiver to hand over the possession of the aforesaid three mines to the Custodian. The civil revision is directed against this order. 4. On 24th of February, 1973, the Court below passed an order directing the receiver to hand over the possession of the aforesaid three mines to the Custodian. The civil revision is directed against this order. 4. The civil revision application was admitted on 1st of March, 1973, and the learned single Judge who admitted it also stayed the operation of the order dated 24th of February, 1973, pending the hearing of the civil revision. The petitioner made an application in the Court below on 2nd of March. 1973 for a direction to the coal control authorities to issue coupons forthwith. On 5th of March, 1973, the Court below passed an order that in view of the stay by this Court of the operation of his order dated 24th of February, 1973, the mining operation including sale and despatch of coal should be resumed till the stay continued and directed the coal authorities including the Deputy Coal Superintendent and Assistant Coal Superintendent, Dhanbad, to issue coupons to the Superintendents of the receiver on necessary amount having been deposited by them and also for the amount already deposited with them. C. W. J. C. No. 278 of 1973 has been filed for Quashing this order. 5. On 8th of March, 1973, the Court below passed an order that the receiver be authorised to issue necessary certificates on the same pattern as issued by the Custodian so that despatch and sale of coal might be resumed. C. W. J. C. No. 278 of 1973 was admitted by a Bench of this Court on 16th of March, 1973. The Bench also granted stay in the following terms: "Till the disposal of this application, the operation of the order of the Subordinate Judge, Hazaribagh, passed in Title Suit 16/61, the extract of which has been given in Annexure 6 shall remain stayed." Then opposite party No. 32, the Custodian, filed an application before the Court below praying that the working and despatch of coal be stopped and the direction for issue of coupons be stayed. This application was disposed of by the Court below by its order dated 23rd of March, 1973. This application was disposed of by the Court below by its order dated 23rd of March, 1973. It has held that in C. W. J. C. No. 278 of 1973 the operation of the order contained in Annexure 6 to that writ application was stayed only in so far as it related to the direction given to the coal authorities to issue coupons to the superintendents of the receiver and the consequences which were to follow on failure on their part in not giving effect to that direction. Accordingly it did not allow the prayer of the Custodian for stopping the working and despatch of coal. Thereafter the Custodian has filed C. W. J. C. No. 363 of 1973 praying for quashing of the orders dated 8th of March, 1973 and 23rd of March, 1973 of the Court below. In the circumstances, the three cases have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common ."judgment. 6. On 31st of March, 1973, the Coal Mines (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1973 -- hereinafter referred to as the Act--was passed. It was also published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary of the same date. The Act supersedes the Ordinance and it has been given retrospective effect with effect from 30th of January, 1973, the date of coming into force of the Ordinance. The provisions of the Act are similar to that of the Ordinance, but with slight changes here and there, fn view of the fact that the Ordinance has been superseded by this Act, learned counsel for the parties have made their arguments with reference to the provisions of the Act and not of the Ordinance. 7. The arguments advanced by Mr. Jagdish Sahay, learned counsel for the petitioner of the civil revision may be classified into two parts. Firstly, he has challenged the vires of the Act. Grounds on which he has challenged the vires of the Act constitute first part of his argument. Secondly he has argued that even if the Act is intra vires, provisions of it are not applicable to and do not affect the petitioner. Grounds urged by him in support of this contention constitute second part of his arguments. Mr. Sahay has challenged the vires of the Act on the following grounds: (a) The Act provides for appropriation of properties of citizen of India without providing for compensation. Grounds urged by him in support of this contention constitute second part of his arguments. Mr. Sahay has challenged the vires of the Act on the following grounds: (a) The Act provides for appropriation of properties of citizen of India without providing for compensation. Though on the face of it, it purports to take away only the management of the properties, really it intends to take away the ownership in the properties itself. It is, therefore, colourable legislation and void. (b) The Act confers indiscriminate powers on executive authority without providing guidelines for their exercise. It is, therefore, bad and ultra vires. (c) The Act offends fundamental rights conferred on a citizen under Article 19 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, ultra vires. (d) The Act does not treat all citizens alike and thus is hit by Artilce 14 of the Constitution of India. It may be stated here that when Mr. Sahay commenced his arguments, he was not aware of the coming into force of the Act and, therefore, he advanced an argument that the Ordinance which was not passed by Parliament but by the President could not amend the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act which it impliedly did by taking over the management of the three coal mines vested in the State of Bihar under the said Act for that was one of the Acts specified in the Ninth Schedule. In support of this argument he referred to Article 31-B of the Constitution of India and contended that the Bihar Land Reforms Act could be amended only by the Parliament and not by the President. There is no substance in this argument. However, in view of the fact that the Act has been passed by the Parliament and the Ordinance stands superseded, I do not consider it neces- sary to discuss further this argument of Mr. Sahay in this judgment. Anticipating that the Union of India may take shelter under Article 31 (2-A) of the Constitution ot India, Mr. Sahay urged that as the State was the owner of the three coal mines or at least there was a dispute as to ownership and the State claimed that it was the owner of the mines, Article 31 (2-A) could not apply. 8. Sahay urged that as the State was the owner of the three coal mines or at least there was a dispute as to ownership and the State claimed that it was the owner of the mines, Article 31 (2-A) could not apply. 8. On behalf of the Union of India it has been urged that as no notice was issued to the Attorney General as required by Order 27-A of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to a s the Code), the vires of the Act cannot be challenged by the petitioner. In my opinion, there is no substance in this contention of learned counsel for the Union of India, inasmuch as the Union of India itself has been made a party to the civil revision application. Rule 1 of Order 27-A of the Code contemplates such cases where Union of India is not a party to the proceeding. It is manifest from Rule 2 of the said Order which provides that the Court may at any stage of the proceeding add the Central Government as a party to the proceeding. In the instant case, as Union of India is already a party to the application, question of adding it as a party does not arise. However, there is substance in the contention of learned counsel for the Union of India that the vires of the Act cannot be challenged by the petitioner on account of the provisions of Articles 31-A (1) (b) and (e) of the Constitution. However, there is substance in the contention of learned counsel for the Union of India that the vires of the Act cannot be challenged by the petitioner on account of the provisions of Articles 31-A (1) (b) and (e) of the Constitution. Article 31-A (1) (b) provided that notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13, no law providing for the taking over of management of any property by the State for a limited period either in the public interest or in order to secure the proper management of the property shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14, Article 19 or Article 31, Article 31-A (1) (e) lays down that in spite of Article 13, no law providing for the extinguishment or modification of any rights accruing by virtue of any agreement, lease or licence for the purpose of searching for, or winning any mineral or mineral oil, or the premature termination or cancellation of any such agreement, lease or licence shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14, Article 19 or Article 31. In my opinion, the Act is protected under both Clauses (b) and (e) of Article 31-A (1) of the Constitution. By the Act. the State has taken over management of the property only for limited period in order to secure the proper management thereof. At best it extinguishes or modifies rights of the petitioner accruing by virtue of an agreement in respect of mineral. 9. It has been contended by Mr. Sahay that there is no agreement in favour of the petitioner for the purpose of searching for or winning any mineral. In my opinion, Mr. Sahay is not right. The agreement in favour of the petitioner is for winning of coal which is mineral. But even if it be assumed that the Act is not protected by Article 31-A (1) (e), it is protected by Article 31-A (1) (b) of the Constitution. There is no force in the contention of Mr. Sahay that the Union of India cannot acquire absolutely or the management of any property belonging to a State. But even if it be assumed that the Act is not protected by Article 31-A (1) (e), it is protected by Article 31-A (1) (b) of the Constitution. There is no force in the contention of Mr. Sahay that the Union of India cannot acquire absolutely or the management of any property belonging to a State. This is against the decision of the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal V/s. Union of India, ( AIR 1963 SC 1241 ). It was held in that case that provisions of 1957 Act under which the Union acquired the coal bearing areas vested in the State of West Bengal were not ultra vires. It was further held that the State of West Bengal was entitled to compensation for the property acquired. Therefore, it is not possible to accept the contention of Mr. Sahay that the Act should be held ultra vires so far it purports to acquire management of the property belonging to the State of Bihar. Further, Mr. Sahay himself has argued that the Act does not purport to acquire management of any property under the management or control of a State and, therefore, it is not applicable to any of the three coal mines. By the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971, the word compensation in Article 31 (2) has been substituted by the word amount. By this amendment the Parliament obviously intended to take away the power of Courts to decide whether the amount paid by the Government for acquisition of a property was adequate or not. A question may arise, whether validity of an acquisition can be challenged if the amount Daid for it is illusory. But. in the instant case, it is not necessary to go into that question as Mr. Sahay has not challenged the vires of the Act or the acquisition of the interest of the petitioner if it has at all been acquired under the Act on the ground that the amount which will be paid to him for the acquisition is illusory. Rather, Mr. Sahay frankly conceded that he was not going to ask this Court to go into the question whether the amount to be paid to the petitioner for acquisition of his interest in the property is adequate or not. 10. Mr. Rather, Mr. Sahay frankly conceded that he was not going to ask this Court to go into the question whether the amount to be paid to the petitioner for acquisition of his interest in the property is adequate or not. 10. Mr. Sahay has not been able to satisfy me that the Act really intends to appropriate property of citizens but as, on the face of it, it purports to take over only the management of the property, it is colourable exercise of legis- lative powers and, therefore, ultra vires. Mr. Sahay has contended that the intention of the Act is to reduce the value of the property of the owners so that when the property is acquired after some time they may not get any compensation. According to him, the property is likely to lose all its value during the management. This could be possible, if at all, only if the Union of India intended to keep the coal mines under its management for a long period, but as it appears from the preamble of the Act the Union of India intends to acquire the coal mines themselves soon. Really judicial notice can be taken of the fact that the Bill for the purpose has already been introduced in the Lok Sabha and passed by it. Mr. Sahay has also not been able to convince me that the Act confers indiscriminate powers over the executive authority without providing guidelines for the exercise of those powers. In my opinion, therefore, on the arguments advanced by Mr. Sahay it is not possible to hold that the Act is ultra vires. 11. In support of the second part of his arguments, Mr. Sahay has urged that the management of the three coal mines, already referred to above, cannot be taken over under the Act, firstly because they are custodia legis and the Act does not amend or modify Order 40 of the Code and secondly that Sec.18 of the Act makes other provisions thereof inapplicable to them. There appears no substance in the contention of Mr. Sahay that the management of the three mines cannot be taken over under the Act on the ground that they are custodia legis. There appears no substance in the contention of Mr. Sahay that the management of the three mines cannot be taken over under the Act on the ground that they are custodia legis. Sec. 6 (4) of the Act lays down that notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court or anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Official Liquidator or any Receiver appointed by any Court or any other person who has, on the appointed day, in his possession, custody or control any coal mine specified in the Schedule or any part thereof, shall forthwith deliver possession of the mine or such part thereof, as the case may be, to the Custodian. This clearly shows that the Act intended to vest in the Custodian management of even such coal mines which were in possession of a receiver appointed by a court. 12. In my opinion, however, there is substance in the second ground urged by Mr. Sahay that the Act is not applicable to the three coal mines aforesaid because of the provisions of Sec.18 of the Act. Sec.18 (i) (a) reads as follows:- - "Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to any coal mine-owned, managed or controlled by Government, or by a Government company or by a corporation which is owned, managed or controlled by Government." If the three coal mines aforesaid are managed and controlled by the Government of Bihar, then the Act cannot apply to them, even if there be a dispute to the ownership of the State over them. However, before discussing the arguments advanced on behalf of the opposite party that the three coal mines are not managed and controlled by the State, I consider it necessary to deal with an argument advanced on behalf of the Union of India that Sec.18 can apply to only such coal mines in respect of which a notification may be issued by the Central Government in future; it does not apply to coal mines specifically mentioned in the schedule to the Act. Reliance in support of this contention was placed on Sec.3 (1) and (2) of the Act which is as follows : "3. (1) On and from the appointed day, the management of all coal mines shall vest in the Central Government. Reliance in support of this contention was placed on Sec.3 (1) and (2) of the Act which is as follows : "3. (1) On and from the appointed day, the management of all coal mines shall vest in the Central Government. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section (i), the coal mines specified in the Schedule shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to be the coal mines the management of which shall vest, under sub-section (i), in the Central Government: Provided that if, after the appointed day, the existence of any other coal mine comes to the knowledge of the Central Government, whether after an investigation or in pursuance of an intimation given to it under sub-section (5), or otherwise, the Central Government shall, by a notified order, make a declaration about the existence of such mine, and on and from the date of such declaration- (i) the management of such coal mine shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to vest in the Central Government; and (ii) such coal mine shall be deemed to be included in the Schedule, and thereupon the provisions of this Act shall become applicable thereto subject to the modification that for the words "appointed day", wherever they occur, the words, brackets and figures "date of the declaration made by the Central Government under sub-section (2) of Sec. 3" shall be substituted." It has been urged that since the management of the coal mines specified in the schedule have specifically been vested in the Central Government on and from the appointed day. Sec.18 cannot be interpreted to refer to any of such mines. Learned counsel for the Union of India had to concede that management of no coal mine owned, managed or controlled by a Government could be taken over by the Central Government under the Act be a subsequent notification issued under the proviso to Sec.3 (2) of the Act. Sec.18 cannot be interpreted to refer to any of such mines. Learned counsel for the Union of India had to concede that management of no coal mine owned, managed or controlled by a Government could be taken over by the Central Government under the Act be a subsequent notification issued under the proviso to Sec.3 (2) of the Act. It is not possible to accept the contention of learned counsel for the Union of India that while Sec.18 will apply to coal mines owned, managed or controlled by the Government which have not been specified in the schedule, it will not apply to coal mines though really they are owned, managed or controlled by a Government but are specified in the schedule, for the proviso itself says that even such coal mines in respect of which a notification may be issued by the Central Government in future shall be deemed to be included in the schedule. Therefore, the Act does not intend to make any distinction between the coal mines specified in the schedule and coal mines in respect of which a notification may be issued in future by the Central Government. Secondly, if such an interpretation is given to the Act, it will be bad in law on the ground of being discriminative. No distinction can be made between different coal mines owned, managed and controlled by a Government only on the ground that some of them have been specified in the schedule to the Act while others are not so specified. There will be no rational differentia between two such mines, one specified in the schedule and another which has not been specified. It is well established principle of interpretation of statutes that provisions thereof are to be given such a meaning as to make them intra vires. If Sec.18 is interpreted to mean that it does not apply to coal mines specified in the schedule to the Act, even though they are owned, managed and controlled by a Government, it shall have to be declared ultra vires. In my opinion, therefore. If Sec.18 is interpreted to mean that it does not apply to coal mines specified in the schedule to the Act, even though they are owned, managed and controlled by a Government, it shall have to be declared ultra vires. In my opinion, therefore. Sec.18 applies to all coal mines owned, managed and controlled by a Government irrespective of the fact whether they are specified in the schedule to the Act or not, and it has to be held that the Act is not applicable to coal mines owned, managed and controlled by a Government even though they are specified in the schedule to the Act. 13. There is another rule of interpretation of statutes, namely, that if two sections of the same statute are repugnant, the last must prevail (see Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edition, Chapter IX at page 187). Even according to this rule, Sec.18 has to prevail over Sec.3. No doubt, there are exceptions to this rule, but in the instant case, those rules of exception are not attracted. Further, for reasons discussed in the preceding paragraph, Sec.18 has to be given an interpretation that it makes the Act inapplicable to all coal mines owned, managed and controlled by a Government irrespective of the fact whether such coal mines are specified in the schedule or not. 14. Now, I would revert to the question whether the aforesaid three coal mines, namelv. Kedla. Jharkhand and Rauta coal mines are managed and controlled bv a Government so as to make the Act inapplicable to them. Even in the schedule to the Act Rauta Jharkhand and Kedla mines are serial Nos. 232, 243 and 244 respectively, as they were in the schedule to the Ordinance. The schedule to the Act also, as was done in the Ordinance, in column 3 gives name and address of owner. In the ordinance as against serial Nos. 243 and 244 in column 3 the words under dispute were mentioned. So is in the schedule to the Act. In column 3 as against serial No. 232, i. e. Rauta coal mine in the Ordinance Bokaro and Ramgur Ltd. was mentioned. The schedule to owner. In the ordinance as against serial Nos. 243 and 244 in column 3 the words under dispute were mentioned. So is in the schedule to the Act. In column 3 as against serial No. 232, i. e. Rauta coal mine in the Ordinance Bokaro and Ramgur Ltd. was mentioned. The schedule to owner. In the ordinance as asainst serial No. 232 mentions "Receiver, State of Bihar through Shri S. K. Sinha, I. A. S. O. S, D., Department of Mines and Geolosv, Government of Bihar, Patna." The schedule to the Act, therefore, admits that Rauta coal mine is managed and controlled bv the State. It has not been disouted before us. and could not be disouted. that Jharkhand and Kedla mines cannot be distinguished from Rauta coal mine in that respect. If the State as a receiver is the owner of Rauta coal mine, then it is also as a receiver is owner of Jharkhand and Kedla coal mines. No doubt, owner-ship of the State is under dispute so far Jharkhand and Kedla coal mines are concerned, but its ownership is similarlv in dispute so far Rauta coal mine is concerned. As stated earlier, the Act came into effect with retrospective effect from 30th of Jan., 1973. Undoubtedly, on that date. the aforesaid three coal mines were managed and controlled bv the State as a receiver. The Act cannot, therefore, apply to the aforesaid three mines. It cannot be made applicable to Jharkhand and Kedla coal mines merely on account of the fact that in the schedule to the Act in column 3 as against these two coal mines the words under dispute are mentioned. 15. Sec.2 (k) of the Act savs that words and exoressions used in the Act and not defined therein have the meanings respectively, assigned to them in the Mines Act. 1952. The Mines Act. 1952, defines owner as follows:- - "2 (i). 15. Sec.2 (k) of the Act savs that words and exoressions used in the Act and not defined therein have the meanings respectively, assigned to them in the Mines Act. 1952. The Mines Act. 1952, defines owner as follows:- - "2 (i). owner, when used in relation to a mine, means anv person who is the immediate proprietor or lessee or occupier of the mine or of anv part thereof and in the case of a mine the business whereof is being carried on bv a liquida- tor or receiver, such liquidator or receiver, and in the case of a mine owned bv a company, the business whereof is being carried on by a managing agent, such managing agent: but does not include a person who merely receives a royalty, rent or fine from the mine, or is merelv the proprietor of the mine, subject to any lease, grant nr licence for the working thereof, or is merelv the owner of the soil and not interested in the minerals of the mine but any contractor for the working of a mine or any Dart thereof shall be subiect to this Act in like manner as if he were an owner but not so as to exempt the owner from any liability." The term owner is not defined in the Act. According to the definition of the term owner in the Mines Act. 1952. which is applicable bv virtue of Sec.2 (k) of the Act, a receiver is owner of a mine the business, whereof is beine carried bv him. The State as a receiver will, therefore, be owner of the aforesaid three mines for the purposes of the Act and even on that around the Act cannot apply to these mines. 16. Mr. Jagdish Sahay has also argued that even if the Act were applicable, the Central Government could not dispossess the petitioner without taking recourse to Sec.15 of the Act. In reply it has been contended on behalf of the Union of India that Sec.15 applies to contracts in favour of, persons other than those whose rights as to management vest in the Central Government under Section 4 of the Act. In this connection while Mr. In reply it has been contended on behalf of the Union of India that Sec.15 applies to contracts in favour of, persons other than those whose rights as to management vest in the Central Government under Section 4 of the Act. In this connection while Mr. Sahav contended that the petitioner was not a managing contractor within the meaning of the term as defined in Sec.2 (f) of the Act learned counsel for the Union of India submitted that he was a managing contractor. We called upon the petitioner to produce the deed under which he claimed tp be in possession of the mines and he did produce it. On going through it, I am satisfied that the petitioner is a managing contractor within the meaning of the term as defined in Sec.2 (f) of the the Act, Therefore, there appears substance in the contention of learned counsel for the Union of India that Sec.15 does not apply to the case of the petitioner. However, as the Act itself has been held not applicable to the three mines aforesaid, it, is not necessary to record a definite finding on the question whether the petitioner can claim advantage of Sec.15 of the Act or not. 17. It has been contended on behalf of the Union of India that no revision lies to this Court against the order of the court below because the order does not decide a case between the parties within the meaning of Sec.115 of the Code. In S. S. Khanna V/s. F. J. Dillon ( AIR 1964 SC 497 ) it has been held that the expression case as used in Sec.115 of the Code is not restricted to a litigation in the nature of a suit in a Civil Court: it includes a proceeding in a Civil Court in which the. iurisdiction of the Court is Invoked for the determination of some claim or right legally enforceable. In the instant case, by the impugned order the Court below has directed the receiver to hand over the possession of the aforsaid three mines to the Custodian. This order was passed on an application filed by opposite party No. 32 for a direction to the receiver for handing over to him possession of the aforesaid three minea. Opposite Party No. 32 made the application as a representative of the Central Government. This order was passed on an application filed by opposite party No. 32 for a direction to the receiver for handing over to him possession of the aforesaid three minea. Opposite Party No. 32 made the application as a representative of the Central Government. He invoked the iurisdiction of the court below for determination of his claim or right to set possession of the aforesaid three mines from the receiver. He claimed that he was legally entitled under the ordinance to get possession of the aforesaid three mines. That claim or right of opposite party No. 32 and of the Union of India through him has been decided bv the Court below. In my opinion, therefore, the Court below has decided a case bv the impugned order within the meaning of Sec.115 of the Code, and there is no substance in this contention of learned Counsel for the Union of India. The petitioner is not only a managing contractor, but is also a party to the suit and whatsoever right he may have in the properties in dispute, that is custodia legis and managed bv the receiver. He is also, therefore, a party aggrieved who can move this Court against the impugned order. The application, therefore, is maintainable. 18. Sec.18 of the Act corresponds to Sec.17 of the Ordinance. While Sec.17 of the Ordinance did not exclude from its operation coal mines owned, managed or controlled bv a Government, Sec.18 does so. Had the Ordinance been alive, it would not have been possible to hold that the management of the three coal mines could not be taken over bv the Central Government. But, as stated earlier, the Ordinance has been superseded bv the Act and the latter is retrospective in its operation with effect from the date the Ordinance itself came into force. In the circumstances, though the Court below was right in passing the impugned order, in view of the change of the law that order cannot be maintained. It is well established now that Courts are entitled and ought to take notice of the change in the law pending litigation. 19. It may be stated here that some of the managing contractors have filed a writ application under Article 32 of the Constitution of India before the Supreme Court challenging the vires of the Act. It is well established now that Courts are entitled and ought to take notice of the change in the law pending litigation. 19. It may be stated here that some of the managing contractors have filed a writ application under Article 32 of the Constitution of India before the Supreme Court challenging the vires of the Act. On that writ application, their Lordships of the Supreme Court bv their order dated 11th of May, 1973 have fixed 23rd of Julv. 1973 for final hearing of the stay matter. They have further restrained respondents to the case before them, their servants and subordinates "from dispossessing the petitioners from Kedla Coal Mine being item No. 244 of the Schedule to the Coal Mines (Taking Over of Management) Act. 1973". A COPY of this order was shown to us bv bringing the case under the head to be mentioned in presence of counsel for the opposite party. In view this order of the Supreme Court also the order of the Court below directing the receiver to hand over possession of the aforesaid three mines to the Custodian cannot be allowed to stand for the present till the matter is finally heard bv the Supreme Court, at least in respect of Kedla Mine. On principle no distinction can be made between the other two mines and Kedla mine. 20. For the reasons discussed in the Preceding paragraphs, the civil revision filed bv the petitioner must succeed and order of the Court below dated 24th of February, 1973 must be set aside. C. W. J. C. 278/73: 21. The main grievance of the petitioners of this writ application, i.e. the Coal Controller, Government of India, Calcutta, the Deputy Coal Superintendent. Dhanbad, and the Assistant Coal Superintendent, Jharia Division, is that the order of the court below dated 5th of March. 1973. for issuing coupons to the superintendents of the receiver on necessary amount havine been deposited by them and also for the amount already deposited with them was illegal inasmuch as it was passed behind the back of the petitioners without any notice to them, Mr. Sahay for the petitioner of the Civil Revision, who is respondent to the writ case has attempted to show to us that the petitioners had notice of the matter and thev were represented by a lawver. Sahay for the petitioner of the Civil Revision, who is respondent to the writ case has attempted to show to us that the petitioners had notice of the matter and thev were represented by a lawver. He does not appear to be correct in his submissions inasmuch as the petitioners had not entered appearance in the Court below. A lawver requested the Court to adiourn the case so that he mav obtain power from them. From that it cannot be inferred that the lawver could represent the petitioners of this writ case before the Court below on the date the matter was heard. Another grievance of the petitioners is that they being not party to the suit and having not submitted to the iurisdiction of the Court below bv making anv application before it for anv orders, that Court could not have passed the order directing them to issue coupons to the superintendents of the receiver. It has been submitted that such a direction may be issued bv this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on a proper application before it but the Court below could not exercise any such right. On the other hand, it has been submitted bv Mr. Sahav that it was the duty of the Court below to see that the receiver who was an officer of the Court could function efficiently and for that purpose it could issue anv direction to anv public authority. It has further been submitted bv him that if, as submitted by him in the civil revision, it is held that the management of the three coal mines aforesaid could not vest in the Central Government under the Act, but would remain vested in the receiver, then the petitioners of this writ application could not refuse to issue coupons to the superintendents of the receiver on necessary amount having been deposited by them and also for the amount already deposited with them. True it is that it has been held in the Civil Revision that the Act is not applicable to the three coal mines and, therefore, their management cannot be taken over by the Central Government and in the circumstances the petitioner cannot refuse issue of coupons to the receiver or his agents without anv rhyme or reason, but, in my opinion, the Court below had no iurisdiction to issue a direction of the nature issued bv it and that too without affording any opportunity of being heard to the petitioners of this writ application. A subordinate court mav call in aid public authorities for execution of orders and decrees passed by it. but it cannot pass an order of the nature passed by the court below treating the public authorities as party to the suit thoueh they are not parties to it in fact. This application is. therefore, fit to be allowed bv quashing that part of annexure 6 by which the Court below has directed the petitioners to issue coupons. (The rest of the judgrnent is not material for Purposes of reporting -- Ed.) Nagendra Prasad Singh, J. 22 I agree.