LODHA, J.—This is a plaintiffs appeal against the appellate judgment and decree by the Additional Civil Judge, Ajmer dated 1-4-1966 whereby the learned Judge set aside the judgment and decree of the Munsiff, Ajmer City dated 31-8-1965 and dismissed the plaintiffs suit for recovery of Rs. 1500.73 paisa. 2. The plaintiffs case is that his tender for laying 3/4" thick pre mix carpet on Bijai Nagar Deolia Kalan road was accepted vide letter dated 16 5-1957 by the Executive Engineer, P.W.D. (B&R), Rajasthan, Ajmer Division, Ajmer. The appellant started the work and while the work was in progress the Assistant Engineer, In-charge asked the plaintiff to lay seal coat and mix 1 cubic foot of sand with 7 Lbs. of hot bitumen. It is alleged that the work of laying seal coat was not included in the original tender and, therefore, the plaintiff first refused to carry out the additional work but on an assurance having been given by the Assistant Engineer that the payment would be made for extra labour charges and the material, the plaintiff agreed to lay seal coat. The plaintiff has further alleged that he informed the Assistant Engineer, Ajmer by his letter dated 28-3-1958 that an extra sum of Rs. 1.50 per 100 sq.ft. would be charged for the additional seal coat work. On completion of the work the plaintiff charged for the seal coat work at the rate of Rs. 1.50 for 100 sq.ft. in the bill, but the Govt. paid him at the rate of .25 paisa per 100 sq.ft. only. The plaintiffs case is that he was paid Rs. 1500.70 less for which after serving a notice under sec. 10 Civil P. C. he filed the present suit in the Court of Munsiff, Ajmer City, Ajmer. The suit was resisted by the defendant, State of Rajasthan on a number of grounds, but the only ground which now survives for decision of this Court is whether the suit was barred by limitation ? 3. After recording the evidence produced by the parties the learned Munsiff over-ruled all the pleas raised by the defendant including the bar of limitation and decreed the plaintiffs suit in full Dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of the trial court the State filed appeal which was allowed and the suit was dismissed. Hence this second appeal by the plaintiff. 4. Hence this second appeal by the plaintiff. 4. It may be observed at the outset that the only point canvassed before me is regarding limitation. All other objections raised on behalf of the State were over-ruled by the learned Additional Civil Judge and no argument has been advanced before me in respect of them by the learned counsel for the State. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant has urged that the present suit is governed by Art. 120 of the Limitation Act and not by Art.56. It is not disputed on behalf of the State that if Art. 120 is applied then, ofcourse, the suit is within limitation. The question that arises for decision therefore is whether the present case is governed by Art. 56 or Art. 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908. 6. Now, there is no controversy about certain dates. The work was completed on 14-6-1958, as mentioned in para 13 of the plaint. Bill for final payment was prepared on 10-9-1959. Notice under sec. 80 Civil P.C. was given on 21-10-1961 and the suit was filed on 10-2-1962. 7. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the claim is not for price of work done or arising out of contract. It is submitted that the claim is for extra work not covered by the terms of the contract and therefore the suit is not governed by Art. 56 of the old Limitation Act which is equivalent to Art. 18 of the Limitation Act of 1963. In support of his contention learned counsel has relied upon Gannon Durkerley & Co. vs. Union of India (l) and State of Bihar vs. Rama Bhushan(2). 8. On the other hand learned Deputy Government Advocate has submitted that the plaintiffs claim arises out of the terms of the contract entered into between the parties and the suit is for work done and therefore the case would come under Art. 56. In support of his contention he has relied upon Bhawani Shanker vs. State(3) and Tajsingh vs. State of Rajasthan (4). It may be mentioned here, that State of Bihar vs. Rama Bhushan(2) was brought to the notice of the learned Judges in the latter decision of this Court but the view taken in the earlier case in Bhawani Shanker vs. State (3) was adhered to. It may be mentioned here, that State of Bihar vs. Rama Bhushan(2) was brought to the notice of the learned Judges in the latter decision of this Court but the view taken in the earlier case in Bhawani Shanker vs. State (3) was adhered to. Thus I have no hesitation in saying that if the claim is for the price of the work done and arises out of the terms of the agreement the suit would fall under Article 56. 9. The question then is, does the plaintiffs claim not arise out of the contract with the result that the claim cannot be covered by any specific article and must fall within the terms of Art. 120. In Gannon Dunkerley & Go. vs. Union of India (1) the appellant Company had undertaken under the terms of the contract to carry out specific construction work at basic rates and the Engineer-in-Charge was, by the terms of the agreement, competent to give instructions for work not covered by the terms of the contract, and remuneration was to be paid at the rate fixed by the Engineer-in-Charge for such additional work. The appellant Company made a claim for payment at an additional rate over the stipulated rate in view of change in circumstances in respect of Additional work done at the request of the Engineer-in-Charge. The suit was filed beyond 3 years of the date on which the work was done. It was held that the suit was not governed by Art. 56 as the claim was for payment at an additional rate over the stipulated rate in view of change in circumstances, and not for price of addi-tional work done by the appellant Company, at the request of the Engineer-in-Charge. It was further observed that the additional work directed by the Engineer-in-Charge . when carried out might be deemed to be done under the terms of the contract; but the claim for enhanced rates did not arise out of the contract; it is in any case not a claim for compensation for breach of contract. In these circumstances the claim was held not to be covered by any specific Article and therefore Art. 120 applied. 10. It may be pointed out that Cl. (12) of the agreement relied upon by the learned Dy. G. Advocate was there in the case before their Lordships of the S. C. also. In these circumstances the claim was held not to be covered by any specific Article and therefore Art. 120 applied. 10. It may be pointed out that Cl. (12) of the agreement relied upon by the learned Dy. G. Advocate was there in the case before their Lordships of the S. C. also. Not only that it is a strange coincidence that word to word it is the same. The appellant had undertaken under the terms of the contract to do the specific construction work at the agreed rates. The Engineer-in-charge was, by the terms of Cl. 12 of the agreement, competent to give instructions for the work not covered by the terms of the contract, and it was provided that remuneration shall be paid at the rate fixed by the Engineer-in Charge for such additional work. It is common ground that the claim made by the appellant was not covered by the agreement. In the words of their Lordships in Gannon Dunkerley & Go. "A suit is governed by Art. 56 if it arises out of a contract to pay the price of work done at the request of the defendant". The claim in the present case is for payment of additional work though done at the request of the Engineer-in-Charge. In this view of the matter I am of opinion that the case on hand would not fall under Art. 56 but would come within the terms of Art. 120. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant also argued that the work in the present case may be deemed to have been done when the final bill was prepared. I am however not prepared to accept this contention because in my opinion the phrase "when the work is done it must be taken to mean when the work is completed. It cannot mean the work checked by the Engineer-in-Charge for which the bill is prepared. However, this point would not have any significance now in view of the fact that I have come to the conclusion that the case is governed by Art. 120 of the Limitation Act. 12. In the result, I allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the learned Additional Civil Judge, Ajmer and restore the judgment and decree of the trial court and hereby decree the plaintiffs suit for Rs. 1500.70 paisa. 12. In the result, I allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the learned Additional Civil Judge, Ajmer and restore the judgment and decree of the trial court and hereby decree the plaintiffs suit for Rs. 1500.70 paisa. However, I make no order as to costs of this appeal. 13. Learned Deputy Government Advocate asks for leave to appeal to Division Bench. I do not consider it a fit case for grant of leave. Leave is refused.