JUDGMENT T.C. Raghavan, C.J. 1. The appellant was the first accused before the Special Judge, Ernakulam; and there was another person about 17 years of age who was the second accused. The appellant was charged under section 5 (2) read with section 5(C) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and under section 351 of the Penal Code, while the second accused was charged under the same sections read with section 109 of the Penal Code. The Special Judge convicted both the accused persons and sentenced the appellant to rigorous imprisonment for one year under the first count under the Prevention of Corruption Act and for rigorous imprisonment for three months under the second count under the Penal Code, the sentences to run concurrently. And the Special Judge released the second accused under the Probation of Offenders Act after taking a bond to keep the peace and be of good behaviour for a period of one year. The appellant has filed the appeal; and the second accused has not filed any appeal. 2. When the appeal came before a Single Judge, a new ground was raised, that the sanction given for prosecution was in violation of the principles of natural justice, since the sanction was given without hearing the appellant. Though this ground was not raised in the memorandum of appeal, the Single Judge allowed the ground to be raised and then referred the case to a Division Bench, since our learned brother felt that the question raised was an important one which required an authoritative pronouncement by a Division Bench. And the case has come before us. 3. Before we consider the main question in the case, we shall dispose of one or two minor matters. The counsel of the appellant has stated that on merits he is not arguing the appeal, since he has felt that the evidence and the circumstances of the case would warrant the conviction. 4. The charge against the appellant was that he siphoned out 37 litres of diesel oil from the fuel tank of a bus belonging to the Hindustan Machine Tools, of which vehicle he was the driver, with the assistance of the second accused. P.Ws. 1 and 2, two police officers, and P.W. 3 an officer of the Hindustan Machine Tools who accompanied them, followed the bus in a taxi and witnessed the removal of the oil. P.Ws. 1 and 2, two police officers, and P.W. 3 an officer of the Hindustan Machine Tools who accompanied them, followed the bus in a taxi and witnessed the removal of the oil. They took into custody the oil drawn out and also arrested the accused persons. Their evidence is that P.W. 1, the Inspector of Police, having got information that the appellant used to draw out oil from the fuel tank of the vehicle he was driving and sell it to the petrol bunk where the second accused was working, along with P.W. 2, a Sub-Inspector, and P.W. 3, followed the vehicle in a taxi and witnessed the occurrence. This evidence, along with the other evidence in the case, is quite sufficient to justify the conviction of the appellant. The other evidence is that the fuel tank of the vehicle used to be filled with diesel oil every morning and locked; that the key used to be kept in the office of the Hindustan Machine Tools; and that the appellant opened a screw at the top of the fuel tank and, introducing a plastic tube into the fuel tank, siphoned out 37 litres of diesel oil into two tins taken from the petrol bunk. All these are proved by the oral evidence of the witnesses. Therefore, we feel that, on merits, the conviction of the appellant is justified. 5. The first contention urged by the counsel of the appellant is that there was no formal evidence before the Special Judge to show that the Hindustan Machine Tools was a Government owned company so as to make the appellant a public servant coming within the scope of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 6. The argument has proceeded that, since this fact was not strictly proved, the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act did not apply to the appellant. It will presently appear that this contention has no merit. The first point enunciated for consideration by the Special Judge is whether the first accused is a public servant; and the Special Judge has found that point in the affirmative in paragraph 13 of the judgment. What appears from the evidence is that this fact was not in controversy before the Special Judge, so that there is no justification for raising this objection at this stage. What appears from the evidence is that this fact was not in controversy before the Special Judge, so that there is no justification for raising this objection at this stage. At any rate, when this question has been raised, the prosecution has filed an application for admitting additional evidence by way of affidavit, which has stated that the Hindustan Machine Tools is a Government concern. The counsel of the appellant has not opposed this application; and we have allowed the same too. Therefore, this contention has only to be rejected. 7. Now we come to the main question in the case. Section 6 (1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act provides that no court shall take cognizance of an offence, inter alia, punishable under sub-section (2) of section 5 of the Act, alleged to have been committed by a public servant except with the previous sanction, in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government, of the Central Government. (Of course, in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of the State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, the previous sanction for prosecution should be of the State Government.) We have a provision almost similar to this in section 197 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The difference between the provision in the Prevention of Corruption Act and section 197 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is that, in the latter, the accused person has to be one who stands charged for " any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty"; in the former these words are not there. That difference, if at all, has no relevancy for the question we have to consider, viz., whether, before sanction was accorded by the appropriate authority in a case like this, the accused person should have been given an opportunity to be heard. No direct decision has been brought to our notice on this question by the counsel of the appellant. Still, we feel that there is no difficulty in construing these provisions and deciding the aforesaid question. 8. No direct decision has been brought to our notice on this question by the counsel of the appellant. Still, we feel that there is no difficulty in construing these provisions and deciding the aforesaid question. 8. The sanction contemplated under these provisions is certainly for helping a public servant and preventing harassment and vexatious prosecution against him. At the same time, there is no indication in either of the provisions that the right conferred is on the accused person: what appears is that the right is conferred on the appropriate authority for according sanction. Of course, sanction is a condition precedent; and without a valid and proper sanction, no court shall take cognizance of an offence as contemplated by section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act or by section 197 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We would also add that courts will certainly look into the sanction and see whether the appropriate authority according sanction has applied its mind to the case before sanction is given: in other words, according sanction is not a mechanical process: it should be so done as to achieve its purpose. 9. The attempt of the counsel of the appellant has been to equate the according of sanction under these provisions to the enquiry contemplated by sections 476 and 479A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He has argued that, under sections 475 and 479A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a person against whom prosecution is ordered has to be heard before the order is passed. Section 476 provides that, when any civil, revenue or criminal court is, whether on application made to it or otherwise, of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an enquiry should be made into any offence referred to in section 195, etc., which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that court, such court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary, record a finding to that effect and make a complaint thereof in writing and shall forward the same to a Magistrate of the First Class having jurisdiction. Section 479A provides that, notwithstanding anything contained in sections 476 to 479 inclusive, when any civil, revenue or criminal court is of opinion that any person appearing before it as a witness has intentionally given false evidence in any stage of the judicial proceeding or has intentionally fabricated false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of the judicial proceeding, and that, for the eradication of the evils of perjury and fabrication of false evidence and in the interests of justice, it is expedient that such witness should be prosecuted for the offence which appears to have been committed by him, the court may, if it so thinks fit, after giving the witness an opportunity of being heard make a complaint thereof in writing and forward the same to a Magistrate of the First Class having jurisdiction. The first section mentioned above deals with a case where a court, in the course of a proceeding before it, comes to the conclusion that a prosecution has to be launched against a person involved in (a party to) the proceeding: the section provides for such preliminary inquiry as the court thinks necessary before a prosecution is ordered. The second section mentioned above deals with a case where a witness before a court perjures or fabricates false evidence: and, in such a case, the section provides that the person sought to be prosecuted should be given an opportunity of being heard before a complaint is made against him. In both cases, the intention of the legislature is clear that a person, against whom an order for prosecution is made by the court, should be given an opportunity of being heard before such an order is passed. These provisions cannot bear comparison with either section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act or section 197 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, the decisions on sections 476 and 479A of the Criminal Procedure Code are of no assistance in a case like the one before us. 10. The next argument attempted before us by the counsel of the appellant has been to equate these two sections with section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Advocate-General has to give his consent in writing to a person who wants to file a suit against a public charity. 10. The next argument attempted before us by the counsel of the appellant has been to equate these two sections with section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Advocate-General has to give his consent in writing to a person who wants to file a suit against a public charity. There is a Full Bench decision of our Court in A. K. Bhaskar v. Advocate-General A.I.R. 1962 Kerala 90, where it has been held that the giving of consent by the Advocate-General is not either a judicial or a quasi-judicial act. The correctness of this Full Bench decision has been questioned; and a case involving the same question has been referred to a fuller bench. And the case is pending. The argument of the counsel of the appellant is that this criminal appeal should be kept pending till the decision of the fuller bench becomes available, because the consent contemplated under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the sanction contemplated by the Prevention of Corruption Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure are similar. We do not think that this contention can also be sustained. It may be or may not be that, under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Advocate-General should give an opportunity to the respective parties. But, as we have already indicated, the right conferred by action 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and section 197 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a right on the authority according sanction and it does not create any right in the accused person against whom sanction is given: no question of hearing him before sanction is given can, therefore, arise in such a case, 11. Two or three decisions have been brought to our notice by the Public Prosecutor. The first decision is the old decision of the Madras High Court in In the matter of Kalagava Bapiah I.L.R. 27 Mad. 54. In that case, Bhashyam Ayyangar, J. was considering the question whether sanction under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was null and void for the reason that no notice was given to the accused to show cause why it should not be given. 54. In that case, Bhashyam Ayyangar, J. was considering the question whether sanction under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was null and void for the reason that no notice was given to the accused to show cause why it should not be given. The learned Judge answered the question in the negative and Held further that it was a matter left to the discretion of the Government whether such opportunity should be given to the person concerned before sanctioning the prosecution. The next decision brought to our notice is the decision of a Single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in State v. Hiranand A.I.R. 1958 M.P. 2. The learned Judge has considered some of the relevant decisions on the matter including a decision of Jagannadhadas, J. of the Orissa High Court in Biswabhusan v. State A.I.R. 1952 Orissa 239. In the Orissa decision, Jagannadhadas, J. has observed: "But the safeguard is one for the judgment and responsibility of the authority concerned and is not open to the scrutiny of the courts on its merits, except to the extent of showing that there is no deliberate determination or is patently malafide or amounts to delegation." Jagannadhadas, J. has then considered what considerations the authority according sanction should bear in mind before sanction is accorded; and the learned Judge has concluded: "It is sufficient that the sanction sets out the offence and the essential factual ingredients thereof in such manner as to indicate that taking cognizance of the charge which is before the court is authorised." 12. The Single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, after considering the relevant decisions, has stated that the sanctioning authority has an absolute discretion to grant or to withhold its sanction; and that it is not concerned merely to see that the evidence discloses a prima facie case against the person sought to be prosecuted. The learned Judge has observed, however, that the authority can refuse sanction on any ground which commands itself to it; for example, that, on political or economic grounds, it regards a prosecution as inexpedient. The learned Judge has observed, however, that the authority can refuse sanction on any ground which commands itself to it; for example, that, on political or economic grounds, it regards a prosecution as inexpedient. Of course, the learned Judge has stated further that it cannot be forgotten that the sanction is intended to safeguard against vexatious proceedings; it is meant for the protection of the public servants who, in the strict and impartial discharge of their duties, may offend persons and create enemies: the court must, therefore, be satisfied that the sanctioning authority had, before according sanction, applied its mind to the facts of the case. These are the only decisions which, we find, may be helpful to decide the question before us. 13. In conclusion, we may refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. J.N. Sinha A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 40, where Hegde, J. has indicated the scope of the rules of natural justice. The learned Judge has observed that rules of natural justice are not embodied rules, nor can they be elevated to the position of fundamental rights; that their aim is to secure justice or to prevent miscarriage of justice; that these rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made; that they do not supplant the law but only supplement it; that, if a statutory provision can be read consistently with the principles of natural justice, the courts should do so, but, if a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of any rules of natural justice, then the courts cannot ignore the mandate of the legislature or the statutory authority and read into the concerned provision the principles of natural justice; and that the question whether the exercise of a power conferred should be made in accordance with any of the principles of natural justice or not depends upon the express words of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power conferred, the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of the exercise of that power. As we have already indicated, the purpose of the provisions in section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and section 197 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not to confer any right on the person sought to be prosecuted: we repeat that the purpose of these, provisions is to confer a right on the authority concerned to accord or refuse sanction in the interests of the public servant or even in the public interest. We are, therefore, of opinion that there is no scope for applying the principles of natural justice to a case like the one before us. 14. Lastly, it is urged by the counsel of the appellant that we might treat the case leniently and reduce the sentence. The charge is under section 5(1) (d) read with section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Section 5 (1) (d) lays down as to when a public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct. And section 5 (2) provides that any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year. Thus, it is clear that, if the conviction is under these provisions, the minimum punishment should be one year. Of course, there is a proviso to sub-section (2), which says that the court may, for any special reason recorded in writing, impose a sentence of imprisonment of less than one year. We are not able to see any special reason in this case, which we can record in writing and use in support of reducing the sentence. The conviction and sentence are confirmed and the appeal is dismissed.