JUDGMENT : K.B. Panda, J. - The Firm M/s. Kailash Chandra Mahesh Kumar (Petitioner-1) and Atmaram Agarwalla (Petitioner-2) have preferred this revision against their conviction u/s 20(e) of the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952 (Act 74/52), hereinafter referred to as the Act, wherein each is sentenced to pay a consolidated fine of Rs. 2000/-, or in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for 3 months passed by the Additional District Magistrate (Judicial), Cuttack. On appeal, the Sessions Judge, while dismissing the same, has recommended enhancement of sentence. 2. Initially prosecution was launched against the present Petitioners along with Raghunath Rai Agarwalla, partner of the Petitioner-Firm. The trial Court while acquitting Raghunath, held him jointly and severally liable to pay the fine awarded against Petitioner-1, or, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for 3 months. Raghunath did riot prefer any appeal. Petitioner-2 is the manager of the Petitioner-firm. 3. The allegation against the Petitioners is that they had entered into Forward Contracts (Exts. 8/1 8/2 and 8/3) prohibited under the Act with two Firms, namely, M/s. Sitaram Bajranglal and M/s, Mahabir Stores in respect of several tins of groundnut oil, which came to light in consequence of a surprise raid. On 1-2-1967 the Dy. Supdt. of Police, Vigilance, Cuttack, Sri S.N. Das (p.w. 1) reported to the S.P. Vigilance. Cuttack, that he learnt confidentially that' the Petitioner-firm and many other Firms in Malgodown at Cuttack were doing forward trading in groundnut oil prohibited under the Act. The S.P. in his turn, directed Inspector Sri H. Rasid (p.w. 7) to take up investigation treating the report of p.w. 1 as F.I.R. p.w. 7 drew up formal F.I.R. (Ext. 1) and deputed Sri B.K. Ghosh, S.I. Vigilance (p.w. 8) to search the premises of the Petitioner-Firm. It was done and certain documents and khatas were seized of which the material book is souda bahi (Ext. 8). Ext. 8 was sent to Expert for examination and on receipt of the report of the Forward Markets Commission, charge-sheet was submitted against the two Petitioners and Raghunath Rai Agarwalla u/s 20(e) and 21(a) and (c) of the Act ending in the conviction of the Petitioners as aforesaid. 4. Petitioner-2 on his behalf and on behalf of Petitioner-1 while generally pleading not guilty stated in his examination u/s 342, Code of Criminal Procedure that he had not done any illegal transactions. 4. Petitioner-2 on his behalf and on behalf of Petitioner-1 while generally pleading not guilty stated in his examination u/s 342, Code of Criminal Procedure that he had not done any illegal transactions. Accused Raghunath Rai stated that at the relevant time he was not looking after the business. 5. The prosecution examined 7 witnesses and the defence none though took several adjournments for the purpose. The trying Court as well as the Appellate Court found it as a fact that Exts. 8/1, 8/2 and 8/3 envisaged Forward Contracts prohibited under the Act and hence convicted the Petitioners. The learned Sessions Judge, while dismissing the appeal, held the sentence passed by the learned Additional District Magistrate (Judicial) to be inadequate inasmuch as it was less than the minimum fine of Rs. 1000/- prescribed under the Act. So while setting aside the consolidated sentence of fine, he has made a reference for enhancement of sentence. The revision and the reference are disposed of by this common order. 6. To the Superintendent of Police. p.w. 1 had reported against 18 parties who had been indulging in forward trading in groundnut oil and groundnut. So the premises o several Firms in Malgodown. Cuttack were raided by different batches at one and the same time on 1-2-1967 between 4 to 5 p.m. and several documents, khatas and registers were seized. In all these cases the trying Court imposed a fine less than the minimum of Rs. 1000/- and hence references for enhancement of sentence by the Appellate Court. In these batches of criminal revisions and references one set of argument was advanced by the learned advocates appearing for the Petitioners in different cases on points of law excepting in one case. Therefore, the facts of search and seizure should be taken as concluded. 7. 1000/- and hence references for enhancement of sentence by the Appellate Court. In these batches of criminal revisions and references one set of argument was advanced by the learned advocates appearing for the Petitioners in different cases on points of law excepting in one case. Therefore, the facts of search and seizure should be taken as concluded. 7. The points of law, some of which had been advanced before the forums below but negatived are thus: (i) There is no legal evidence of any sort of contract and therefore, the question of any Forward Contract does not arise; (ii) Section 2(i) of the Act is capable of double inter petition and therefore the one favourable for the accused should be taken; (iii) Notification under Sections 15(1) and 18(3) of the Act has not been proved and therefore the conviction cannot be sustained; and (iv) The presumption available for search and seizure u/s 22-B of the Act cannot be extended to seizures made under the general law, that is, Code of Criminal Procedure, as has been done in the instant case. 8. The three impugned transactions in this case are: (i) Ex. 8/1 on 18-10-1966 a sale of 300 tins of ground nut oil ' Rs. 180/- per tin to M/s. Sitaram Bajranglal-Delivery January, 1967. (ii) Ex. 8/2- on 13-10-1966 a sale of 300 tins of ground not oil to the same party ' Rs. 175/- per tin-Delivery January, 1967. (iii) Ex.8/3- on 12-11-1966 a sale of 300 tins of ground nut oil ' Rs. 190/- per tin to M/s. Mahabir Stores-Delivery January, 1967. The question is if these transactions establish Forward Contracts. Admittedly they find place in the 'souda bahi' of the party. About its seizure from the business premises of the Petitioner Firm there is no challenge. What is under challenge is the nature of the three transactions. 9. Mr. Mohanty for the Petitioners elaborating on the first legal plea contended that a reading of Section 2(c) along with Section 2(i) of the Act would indicate that before any transaction be styled as Forward Contract it must initially be a 'contract'. The Act does not define 'contract' and therefore, the definition given in the Indian Contract Act has to be adopted. u/s 2(h) of the Contract Act, 'contract' has been defined as an agreement enforceable by law. According to Mr. Mohanty, Exs. The Act does not define 'contract' and therefore, the definition given in the Indian Contract Act has to be adopted. u/s 2(h) of the Contract Act, 'contract' has been defined as an agreement enforceable by law. According to Mr. Mohanty, Exs. 8/1, 8/2 and 8/3 are three mere scriblings or jottings which do not show that there were two parties; that they entered into agreements; that there was offer by one side and acceptance by the other; that there was passing of consideration and lastly that such a contract was really translated into action. His further contention was that according to the prosecution, this being a written contract, it should be estopped from bringing in oral evidence prohibited u/s 91 of the Evidence Act. In this context, the provisions of Sections 34 and 39 of die Evidence Act were also relied upon in support of the argument that entries in the books of account are not sufficient to establish the transaction mentioned therein nor can the entries alone be taken as sufficient evidence to charge any person with liability. Incidentally it was submitted that if the prosecution thought fit under the provisions of Section 34 of the Evidence Act to bring in just 2/3 entries from the 'souda bahi', which do not make any sense or give the complete picture of a full-fledged contract, the prosecution must suffer and not the accused. 10. Section 91 of the Evidence Act excludes secondary evidence or oral evidence relating to the terms of a contract when the same is reduced to the form of a document except in certain circumstances. In the instant case there is no document of contract with terms as is ordinarily done between two parties entering into an agreement. In fact also, no oral evidence has been tendered in this case touching upon the contract far less its terms. Hence Section 91 of the Evidence Act obviously has no application. Mr. J.H. Modi (p.w. 6) of the Forward Markets Commission (F.M.C.) has deposed that scrutiny of the entries in the books of account 'souda bahi' had revealed illegal Forward Contracts which are the subject-matter of consideration in this case. Hence Section 91 of the Evidence Act obviously has no application. Mr. J.H. Modi (p.w. 6) of the Forward Markets Commission (F.M.C.) has deposed that scrutiny of the entries in the books of account 'souda bahi' had revealed illegal Forward Contracts which are the subject-matter of consideration in this case. This F.M.C. is a statutory body of Exports who are called upon to examine accounts and give their opinion and advice to the Central Government in matters of Forward Contracts as provided under different sections of the Act see Raghubar Dayal Jai Prakash Vs. The Union of India (UOI) and Others, . The opinion of such a Research Officer as Mr. Modi was objected to in certain cases; but that question is no more ambulatory. It has been held in M.R. Pillai v. M. Vrijbhukhandast A.I.R 1970 SC 324 that there is no substance in this contention. As a fact also, Mr. Modi has not adduced any evidence as to the terms of any contract but has only opined that the transactions revealed from Exs seized from Petitioner-Firm's premises are illegal Forward Contracts. Section 34 of the Evidence Act lays down that entries in books of account, regularly kept in course of business, are relevant whenever they refer to a matter into which the Court has to enquire, but such statements should not alone be sufficient evidence to charge any person with liability. So the contention of the defence was that even Exs. 8/1, 8/2 and 8/3 could not by themselves saddle the Petitioners with liability. The answer to this can be found in Section 22-B that was later introduced into the Act to facilitate giving effect to its object, which speaks about presumption to be drawn in certain cases. Section 22-B(1) and (2) of the Act run thus: (1) Where any books of account of other documents are seized from any place and there are entries therein making reference to quantity, rates, months of delivery, receipt of payment of differences or sale or purchase of goods or option in goods, such books of accounts or other documents shall be admitted in evidence without witnesses having to appear to prove the same; and such entries shall be prima facie evidence of the matters, transactions and accounts purported to be therein recorded. (2) In any trial for an offence punishable u/s 21, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that the place in which the books of accounts or other documents referred to in Sub-section (1) were seized, was used, and that the persons found therein were present, for the purpose of committing the said offence. Thus the section provides a special rule of evidence both on the manner of proof and the matters to be proved. It not only dispenses with the general rule of evidence providing proof of books of accounts seized but also attaches a presumption of correctness and genuineness of the matter and transactions purpoted to be recorded in the books of accounts seized. Obviously in the above quoted section there is no pre-requisite that the accounts should have been kept in regular course of business as is laid down in Section 34 of the Evidence Act. It follows, therefore, that this special rule of evidence contemplated under the Act will override the general provisions of Section 34 of the Evidence Act. The attack made by the defence with reference to Section 39 of the Evidence Act is not germane to the issue and so needs no discussion. 11. I would, therefore, repeal the first contention advanced on behalf of the defence on the following grounds: (i) The books of account have been seized from the business premises of the Petitioner-Firm which fact has not been challenged. The forums below have come to the concurrent finding about the existence of such contracts which were not challenged before them. The only defence contention so far was no Forward Contract in the absence of notification u/s 2(i) of the Act. (ii) The three exhibits clearly indicate transactions of Forward Contracts between two parties over a particular commodity of which quantity the rates were fixed. Regarding delivery, it was obviously beyond 11 days of the entering into contract. In their examination u/s 342, Code of Criminal Procedure the Petitioners only stated that they had not entered into any illegal transaction. In other words, it means that the natural inference that could be drawn from Exts. 8/1, 8/2 and 8/3 does not speak of a Forward Contract. This assertion in the light of facts and circumstances of the case, I would hold, will not prevail. In other words, it means that the natural inference that could be drawn from Exts. 8/1, 8/2 and 8/3 does not speak of a Forward Contract. This assertion in the light of facts and circumstances of the case, I would hold, will not prevail. The view I have taken in this case is supported by an unreported Division Bench case of the Bombay High Court the judgment whereof was delivered by Palekar, J. in State v. Chandulal Kantilal and Ors Crl. App. Nos. 753. 797 to 801 of 1963. The facts of that case are almost identical with the case now at hand. There in the course of a raid, a number of books were attached from the premises where M/s. Chandulal Kantilal were doing business and many people were found there also. Those books were scrutinised by p.w. 4 a Senior Research Assistant of the Forward Markets Cum mission and in his opinion the books contained transaction in Teji, Mandi or Teji-mandi. In some of these cases, very small note books were seized. So whether the accused persons had conscious possession of these note books became doubtful for which benefit was given to these accused. But in some other cases where mere chits of paper were found from their person and it was opined that they contained teji-mandi transactions, that is, transactions in option in goods, even if they denied seizure of those chits from their person, yet their Lordships disbelieving the defence plea, solely on the basis of those chits convicted them. (iii) It was contended in this connexion that a mere scribbling of certain figures by parties in the nature of a Forward Contract without sincerity to carry that into effect, or anything written just on a frolic of one's own, would not constitute Forward Contract. True, it is so, but in that case the onus would be on the person from whose business premises the paper had been seized to explain in what circumstances he had made the same. It is definitely to his personal knowledge as to the circumstances in which he made the scribbling, if it were really so and the prosecution cannot legitimately be called upon to adduce evidence to thwart the same in anticipation. Necessarily, therefore, the burden would be on the accused from whose possession such papers were seized to explain the circumstances in which these came into existence. Necessarily, therefore, the burden would be on the accused from whose possession such papers were seized to explain the circumstances in which these came into existence. In the instant case those are not mere scraps of paper wherein certain jottings have been made but found in a bound impressive regular 'souda bahi' and, therefore, I would hold that the criticism is not available to the defence at this stage to turn round and assert that those are scribbling, signifying nothing. In fact also they do not create an impression just to be nothing but in fact forward speculative contracts. In M.R. Pillai v. M. Vrijbhukhandas A.I.R 1970 SC 324, it has been held that even though the Petitioners only settled the differences to be paid or received and hence although in some of the statement of accounts delivery dates are indicated, the contracts were not ready delivery contracts as they neither provided for the delivery of goods nor the payment of price therefore either immediately or within a period not exceeding eleven days after the date of the contract. (iv) Lastly I would hold that if the submission of the defence is accepted, the provisions of Section 22-B of the Act, which raised a presumption not only with regard to evidentiary value of entries made in the papers seized from the business premises of a party, but also regarding guilt of the accused person present at the place from where the account books were seized for offence u/s 21 of the Act, that is for owning and keeping such premises for commission of offence punishable u/s 21 of the Act, would be rendered nugatory. It is in view of the far reaching consequences of such acts, the detection of which is not possible according to the ordinary rule of procedure that these stringent and special procedures have been made for search and seizure with a presumption available to the prosecution to prove its case. 12. Coming to the second point raised on behalf of the defence, it is based on an interpretation given to Section 2(i) of the Act. It is, therefore, necessary to extract Clauses (c) and (i) of Section 2 of the Act: 2(c)-"Forward Contract" means a contract for the delivery of goods at a future date and which is not a ready delivery contract. It is, therefore, necessary to extract Clauses (c) and (i) of Section 2 of the Act: 2(c)-"Forward Contract" means a contract for the delivery of goods at a future date and which is not a ready delivery contract. 2(i)-"Ready delivery contract" means a contract which provides for the delivery of goods and the payment of a price therefore, either immediately or within such period not exceeding 11 days after the date of contract and subject to such conditions as the Central Government may by notification in the official gazette, specify in respect of any goods, the period under such contract not being capable of extension by mutual consent of the parties thereto or otherwise. The interpretation given on behalf of the Petitioners is that Section 2(i) provides for a notification to be made by the Central Government wherein they are to restrict the freedom of extending the contract in relation to any goods by mutual consent or otherwise. In other words, according to defence, this provision means, unless the Central Government does not specify any contract to goods not capable of extension beyond 11 days by mutual consent, a person charged with violating the terms of Forward Contract can plead mutual extension. Therefore, according to the defence, this notification is a restrictive one and unless that is done, the freedom to enter into contracts and by mutual consent to extend them beyond 11 days are not offences. In substance, the defence couched it to be "a restrictive notification" and not "a permissive one" and, therefore, in the absence of any such notification parties are free to extend the period beyond 11 days by mutual consent. Lastly it was submitted on behalf of the defence that whether the interpretation given by the prosecution or that given by the defence is correct, the language being such that it is capable of dual interpretation, the one favourable for the accused should be adopted and the accused be given benefit of doubt. It was further urged on behalf of the Petitioners that looking at the notifications under Sections 15(1) and 18(3) of the Act the language of the notification always follows the section and therefore, if a notification is to be made u/s 2(i), then it is to be a "restrictive notification" and, therefore, the interpretation advanced on behalf of the Petitioners is reasonable and should be accepted. I do not think, the contention of the defence has any legs to stand upon. The trend of decisions reported in State of Gujarat Vs. Manilal Joitaram and Co., ; Miryala Venkateswarlu and Co. and Others Vs. Battula Venkata Peraiah and Venkateswarlu and Co. and Another and M.R. Pillai v. M. Vrijbhukhandas, does not support the contention of the defence. In the above Supreme Court case has it been laid down that a ready delivery contract is one in which delivery and payment of price should either be immediate or within a period which is not to exceed 11 days even by consent of parties or otherwise. In the above Andhra Pradesh case the goods were to be delivered before 25-11-1955 though the contract was entered into on 11-11-1955. Their Lordships held that under the terms of the contract the delivery of goods was to take place beyond 11 days; hence the contract was held to be illegal and void. The reasoning was that even though the seller had an option to deliver the goods before 25-11-1955 the buyer had no right to do so within 11 days. In the Bombay case it was held that the contracts were not ready delivery contracts as they neither provided delivery of goods nor the payment of price therefore either immediately or within a period not exceeding 11 days after the date of the contract. From those decisions as well as the plain reading of the section it is clear that the Central Government may impose any condition in respect of any goods; but the absence of such further conditions by notification does not affect or vary the statutory period of 11 days from the date of the contract within which the delivery of the goods and payment of price therefore are to be made. It follows, therefore, that the transaction provided for delivery of r goods beyond a period of 11 days from the date of the transaction is not ready delivery contract but Forward Contract. In the instant case, all the transactions provided for delivery of goods after a period of 11 days and hence there is no difficulty in holding them to be outright Forward Contracts prohibited under the Act. 13. In the instant case, all the transactions provided for delivery of goods after a period of 11 days and hence there is no difficulty in holding them to be outright Forward Contracts prohibited under the Act. 13. So far as third point of law is concerned, namely, that notifications under Sections 15(1) and 18(3) of the Act have not been proved and, therefore, the conviction cannot be sustained, I do not think, this will avail the Petitioners. Developing this argument it was contended by the defence that the existence of a notification, though orally 'demonstrated' by way of filing typed copies, it was not proved as provided under Sections 56, 57, 63 and 81 of the Evidence Act and, therefore, it cannot be accepted as a material before the Court on which a conviction can be sustained. In that context it was further submitted that filing of a typed copy of a notification of getting it attested by the Bench Clerk or filing of an affidavit by the Investigating Officer at the stage of revision cannot give it the strength of a legally admissible document to support a conviction. The record reveals that in the trial Court Sri Modi (p.w. 6) filed the original notifications. He deposed in Court with reference to these notifications (Notification No. 3370 dated 15-9-1964 published in the Gazette of India u/s 15 of the Act which prohibited Forward Contracts in respect of groundnut and groundnut oil in the whole of India). In exercise of powers u/s 18(3) of the Act it was declared by the Government of India Notification No. 2548 dated 10-8-1965 published in the Gazettee of India that the provisions of Sections 5, 14 and 15 of the Act should apply to nontransferable specific delivery contracts in respect of groundnut and groundnut oil in the whole of India except Gujrat. This has not been challenged in the cross-examination. As it appears, copies of these notifications also were taken by the defence advocates. Para 4 of the trial Court's judgment shows that the defence did not dispute that forward trading in respect of ground nut oil had been prohibited under Sections 15 and 18 of the Act. The above two notifications have been referred to in the judgment of the trial Court. Para 4 of the trial Court's judgment shows that the defence did not dispute that forward trading in respect of ground nut oil had been prohibited under Sections 15 and 18 of the Act. The above two notifications have been referred to in the judgment of the trial Court. In the appeal memo the existence of such notifications was admitted and it has been referred to in para 6 of the judgment of the Appellate Court. In the revision petition in this Court also, prohibition of Forward Contract in respect of groundnut oil is admitted. The Paper Book filed by the defence contains the copies of the notifications. As it appears, true copies of the notifications were retained by the trial Court under the endorsement and signature of the Bench Clerk. Here in this Court also they were shown and affidavits filed as .to how they had also been produced at the trial stage. I do not think, in view of all this, it is yet open to the defence to contend that the notifications were not produced and, therefore, the Courts below have committed any error of law in taking into consideration these notifications. 14. So far as the fourth point raised on behalf of the defence is concerned, namely, that presumption contemplated u/s 22-B of the Act will not be available to documents not seized thereunder, the matter has been decided at least by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, followed by the Bombay High Court. In M.R. Pillai v. M. Vrijbhukhandas A.I.R 1970 SC 324, it has been held that Section 22-A of the Act does not debar police officers from exercising powers to search and seizure u/s 165, Code of Criminal Procedure. This followed the unreported Division Bench decision of the said High Court dated 6-4-1964 in the case of State v. Chandulal Kantilal and Ors. Crl. App. Nos. 753. 797 to 801 of 1963, already referred to, wherein it was held that the search conducted by the police officers after information was given of a cognizable offence was a search authorised by law and thereby repelled the contention on behalf of the defence that the search was illegal because there was no search warrant issued by the Presidency Magistrate as required by Section 22-A of the Act. Summing up, their Lordships observed: Both the Research Assistants have prepared scrutiny reports explaining how the documents seized contained entries which relate to transactions in option in goods. The learned Magistrate has found no difficulty in accepting the evidence of these Research Assistants. Undoubtedly, they have experience of forward markets. They also know how clandestine transactions are carried on in the market in contravention of the law. Indeed, certain articles have been exployed by these accused for the purpose of concealing the nature of the transactions, but those Research Assistants have been able to unravel the transactions, and they have' conclusively shown that these transactions relate to option in goods. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that these entries are prima facie evidence of the transactions in option in goods. We have also no difficulty in holding that the two Research Assistants are experts in their line, and, therefore, their scrutiny or interpretation of the document is Correct. This view of their Lordships of the Bombay High Court dissented from the case law reported in The Bullion and Agricultural Produce Exchange Private Limited Vs. The Forward Markets Commission, Bombay and Others (Single Judge), This Allahabad case was very much relied upon by the defence; but it will not come to its assistance since the same has been overruled in a Division Bench of the said High Court in Special Appeal No. 930 of 1968 wherein their Lordships have held that S. 165, Code of Criminal Procedure will be available to police officers investigating an offence created under the Act. Their Lordships have further held that Section 165, Code of Criminal Procedure is not inconsistent with but really supplementary to Section 22-A of the Act, and Section 22-A does not override Section 165, Code of Criminal Procedure and it is therefore, open to the police officers investigating a cognizable offence created by the Act to search and seize documents without search warrant. No contrary decision, as has already been indicated has been brought to my notice on behalf of the defence. In view of these decisions without traversing the same field once again but concurring with them, I would hold that the presumption contemplated u/s 22-B will be available to the prosecution in respect of books seized for the offence under the Act. 15. In view of these decisions without traversing the same field once again but concurring with them, I would hold that the presumption contemplated u/s 22-B will be available to the prosecution in respect of books seized for the offence under the Act. 15. To conclude, therefore, the fact of search and seizure not having been challenged no explanation having been given for how the entries could come about in the papers seized from the business premises of the Petitioners which unmistakably indicate existence of the impugned Forward Contracts in this case the legal objection taken on behalf of the Petitioners having failed, the revision has to be rejected. 16. So far as the criminal reference is concerned punishment provided is thus: 20(e)(i)-For the first offence, with imprisonment which may extend to one year, or with fine of not less than Rs. 1000/- or with both. The learned A.D.M.0. has awarded a consolidated fine of Rs. 2000/- for the two accused Petitioners for three instances of Forward Contracts. 17. All Forward Contracts are not condemnable; for they have their useful role in tempering price fluctuations in morden business. To the extent they enable producers consumers, manufacturers or traders to protect themselves against the uncertainties of the future, they no doubt confer a boon on the society. To that extent it minimizes the risk of production and distribution thus bringing about a greater stability of prices and supplies. But unfortunately experience shows that many unscrupulous businessmen with poor means or inadequate knowledge of market conditions gamble in it with the rosy prospect o becoming rich without effort or investment. The result is that it assumes unhealthy dimensions and becomes a definite been to the community at large. Hence the necessity of careful regulatory measures so that the wider interests of the community are not jeopardised. The genesis of the act may be traced to demonstrate the propriety or otherwise of the sentence awarded by the trying Court in these batches of cases. Like black-marketing that raised its head in the last World War, Forward Contract sank into such degrading levels that the Central Government had to step down and issued orders under Rule 81 of the Defence of India Rules prohibiting Forward Contracts in certain essential commodities. Like black-marketing that raised its head in the last World War, Forward Contract sank into such degrading levels that the Central Government had to step down and issued orders under Rule 81 of the Defence of India Rules prohibiting Forward Contracts in certain essential commodities. After the lapse of D.I. Rules, Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 took its place and now (The Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952 governs the field. Within six years of its operation it became patent that the provisions of the Act were inadequate to deal with excessive speculation and other malpractices now prevalent in some of the Forward Markets. Persons indulging in illegal forward trading cannot be prosecuted for want of ample documentary evidence. Further persons found guilty of violation of the provisions of the Act often got away with a light punishment. Hence the Amending Act 62 of 1960 to ensure stricter control over forward trading activities. 18. Cuttack Malgodown is the nerve centre of business for the bulk of Orissa State. The parties there are not unsophisticated indigent businessmen remaining in privitive conditions unacquainted with the march of law, speculation in business or forecasting in price of commodities. Therefore, the reason given by the learned A.D.M. (J) that these are first offences of its kind and so a lenient view is to be taken is hardly convincing. True, the dictum "Justice should be tempered with mercy" is quite wholesome; but there is one danger which should be kept in view in that it is not misplaced, or else, it would not only defeat its noble purpose but work more harm than good. The mulct which is ruinous to a labourer is easily borne by a tradesman and is absolutely unfelt by a millionaire. It is impossible to fix any limit to the amount of a fine which will not either be so high as to be ruinous to the poor, or so low as to be no object of terror to the rich. If fear of punishment vanishes or its sting viewed either with indifference or very little uneasiness, every thing society, law, order and civilization will crumble to pieces in no time. This is not peculiar to this Act but to all laws in all times and all climes. If fear of punishment vanishes or its sting viewed either with indifference or very little uneasiness, every thing society, law, order and civilization will crumble to pieces in no time. This is not peculiar to this Act but to all laws in all times and all climes. Giving my anxious consideration to the matter of sentence, I consider that in such anti-social acts a deterrent sentence of rigorous imprisonment is called for in the absence of any mitigating circumstances. Accordingly, while maintaining the conviction of the Petitioners, I would convert the sentence of fine awarded by the trying Court on Petitioner-2 Atmaram Agarwala to one of rigourous imprisonment for six (6) months-two months for each deal. Petitioner-1 is also held guilty of the charge since Ex. 8 belongs to it where its name appears and is sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 1300/- (thirteen hundred) for each deal-thus Rs. 3900/ (three thousand and nine hundred) in all without any defaulting sentence Anathabandhu Samant v. Corporation of Calcutta ILR 1954 Cal. 403 and State of Maharashtra Vs. Syndicate Transport Co. (P) Ltd. and Others to be realised as per the provisions of Section 386 Code of Criminal Procedure. The trying Court has acquitted partner Raghunath Rai Agarwalla; but for the fine imposed on Petitioner-1 Firm, it has held the said Raghunath jointly and severally liable and has awarded defaulting sentence. This Raghunath is not before me. He has been acquitted on the plea that he does not look after the business of the Firm. Petitioner-2 has taken the entire responsibility on his head. There cannot be any question of joint and several liability in a criminal case. Therefore, the order passed against Raghunath Rai Agarwalla is set aside. The notice for enhancement was served only on the Petitioners. So the case of the said partner of the Firm. Raghunath Rai Agarwalla, does not arise for consideration particularly in view of the fact that there has been no appeal by the State against his acquittal. 19. In the result, the revision is dismissed and the reference is accepted as above. Before leaving this judgment I must say that Shri S.N. Das. p.w. 1 has done a good job but should not have remained content with reporting these three instances only as test cases.