T. U. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) THIS Revision Application arises out of the eviction suit filed by the applicant-landlord against the opponent-tenant in the court of Small Causes at Ahmedabad where it was registered as Suit No. 220 The eviction was claimed before the trial court on there grounds namely (1) non-payment of arrears of rent for more than six months (2) acquisition of other suitable premises by the opponent-tenant and (3) bona fide personal requirement of the landlord. The trial court held that the grounds as regards the acquisition of suitable premises by the tenant and personal requirement of the landlord were not proved. However it came to the conclusion that the petitioner-landlord was able to prove that the opponent-tenant was in arrears of rent for more than 6 months. The trial court therefore passed a decree for eviction. Against this the opponent-tenant preferred Appeal No. 361/65 before the Appellate Bench of the same court. The Appellate court held that the case fell within the provisions of sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Rent Act) and since the appellate court further found that the opponent-tenant had deposited arrears of rent before the first date of hearing and even subsequent thereto the tenant is protected by the provisions of clause (b) of sec. 12 (3) of the-Rent Act. Being aggrived by this decision the landlord has preferred this revision application. ( 2 ) THIS revision application is filed on 11th November 1968 The opponent-tenant is served with the notice of this revision application but he has not preferred to appear before the court. It is an undisputable position that pending this revision application the opponent-tenant has not made any deposit of the standard rent including the permitted increases. ( 3 ) SHRI V. B. Shah who appeared on behalf of the petitioner-landlord contended that the facts of the case show that during the course of the pendency of the proceedings before the Appellate Court the tenant has committed many defaults in regular payment of rent and permitted increases as awarded by the trial court and that the appellate court has not taken this aspect of the matter into consideration at the time of holding that the opponent-tenant is entitled to the protection contemplated clause (b) of sec. 12 (3) of the Rent Act. 12 (3) of the Rent Act. Shri Shah also drew my attention to the decision given by the Supreme Court in Shah Dhansukhlal Chhaganlal v. Dalichand Virchand Shroff IX G. L. R. 759 and this court in Ratilal Balabhai Nazar v. Ranchhodbhai Shankerbhai Patel and others (1968) IX G. L. R. 48 had pointed out that a tenant can get protection of clause (1) of sec. 12 (3) of the Rent Act only if he is found to have paid or tendered rent in court regularly till the suit is finally decided. He contended that the suit can be said to have been finally decided only on disposal of this revision application and since the opponent-tenant has not paid or tendered any rent during the pendency of this revision application this court should now pass a decree for eviction on the ground that the opponent-tenant is not entitled to the protection contemplated by clause (b) of sec. 12 (3) of the Rent Act. [ His Lordship after narrating the facts of the case and about various payments made by the tenant further observed: ] ( 4 ) NOW the grievance of Shri Shah who appears on behalf of the landlord is not that the tenant has failed to make the deposit of the amount of arrears of rent which fell due on 15-6-68 but his grievance is that the tenant has failed to make various deposits in the appellate court regularly and therefore in view of the above referred two decisions one of the Supreme Court and the other of this court he cannot claim the protection of sec. 12 (3) (h) of the Rent Act. His further grievance was that tenant would lose the protection of this clause (b) of sec. 12 (3) of the Rent Act even because during the pendency of this revision application he has not made any deposit of rent. ( 5 ) THE first question which arises to be considered is whether the tenant who wants to avail of the protection granted to him by clause (b) of sec. 12 (3) of the Rent Act is obliged to make deposit of the amounts of standard rent and permitted increases on a particular day without any direction of the court. I have already noted above that neither the trial court nor the appellate court has given any directions under clause (b) of sec. 12 (3) of the Rent Act is obliged to make deposit of the amounts of standard rent and permitted increases on a particular day without any direction of the court. I have already noted above that neither the trial court nor the appellate court has given any directions under clause (b) of sec. 12 (3) of the Rent Act either as regards the quantum of rent to be deposited or as regards the day on which the said deposit should be made in the court. The contention of Shri Shah was that on proper construction of clause (b) of sec. 12 (3) of the Rent Act no such directions are necessary to be issued by the court to the tenant and therefore it is the duty of the tenant to make regular deposits of standard rent and permitted increases in court if he wants to avail of the protection envisaged by clause (b) of sec. 12 (3 ). In order to better appreciate this contention of Shri Shah it would be necessary to have a look at the language of this clause. This is as under:" (B) In any other case no decree for eviction shall be passed in any such suit if on the first day of hearing of the suit or on or before such other date as the court may fix the tenant pays or tenders in court the standard rent and permitted increases then due and thereafter continues to pay or tender in court regularly such rent and permitted increases till the suit is finally decided and also pays costs of the suit as directed by the Court. "it should be mentioned here that a Division Bench of this court has held in Ratilal Balabhai Nazar v. Ranchhodbhai Shankerbhai Patel and others (supra) that the expression till the suit is finally decided refers to the decision of the suit in appeal by the appellate court and therefore when an appeal is preferred by the landlord against the decree passed by the trial court dismissing his suit and when then the question arises before the appellate court whether the tenant is entitled to the protection of sec. 12 (3) (b) the appellate court would have to consider whether the tenant has after paying or tendering in court arrears of standard rent and permitted increases on the first day of the hearing of the suit or on or before such other date as might have been fixed by the court continued to pay or tender in court regularly the standard rent and permitted increases till the decision of the appeal. This decision is binding on me sitting as a Single Judge and therefore it should follow that the deposits which are contemplated by clause (b) are required to be made regularly even in the appellate court till the appeal is finally decided. But the question which now arises before me is whether the tenant would lose the protection of clause (b) of sec. 12 (3) if he deposits the rent in an irregular manner in absence of any suitable directions by the court. The proper answer to this question would be found on proper interpretation of the language of clause (b) which is quoted above. This clause (b) does contemplate some directions of the court and that fact is evident by reference to the last words as directed by the court which are found at the end of the clause. The contention of Shri Shah however was that the directions contemplated by those words are the directions relating to the payment of costs and not to the payment or tender of standard rent and permitted increases nor to the regularity of the said payment or tender. In other words his contention is that the courts directions are required only with reference to the costs of the suit and not to any other matter referred to by clause (b ). ( 6 ) ON close scrutiny of the language employed by the Legislature in clause (b) I find that it is not possible to agree with the interpretation canvassed by Shri Shah. Before interpreting this clause and finding out the intention of the Legislature as evidenced from its language one important fact which is required to be borne in mind is that clause (b) applies to those cases wherein there is a dispute either as regards the amount of standard rent or as regards the amount of permitted increases. Before interpreting this clause and finding out the intention of the Legislature as evidenced from its language one important fact which is required to be borne in mind is that clause (b) applies to those cases wherein there is a dispute either as regards the amount of standard rent or as regards the amount of permitted increases. Now in case of such disputes clause (b) contemplates that if the tenant wants to save himself from eviction he should pay or tender in court the amount of standard rent and permitted increases then due on the first day of hearing of the suit. It is obvious that in cases where there is a dispute between the parties either as regards the standard rent or as regards the permitted increases it is difficult to comprehend what amount of standard rent or permitted increases a tenant should deposit in court on the first day of hearing without the directions of the court. The very fact that he is supposed to deposit nothing more than the amount of standard rent and permitted increases suggests that if this amount is in dispute between the parties the intervention of the court is necessary because the fate of a statutory protection cannot be left to the vagaries of the judgment of a litigant interested in the result of the suit. Therefore the directions of the court would be necessary in order to enable the tenant who disputes the amount of standard rent and permitted increases to make a proper payment or tender thereof in court on the first day of hearing. This is one very important reason why the words as directed by the court which appear at the end of the clause (b) should govern the whole of this clause. If it is found that those words cover only the payment of costs as is contended by Shri Shah and if it is believed that it is for the tenant to decide what standard rent and permitted increases he would pay or tender in the court on the first day of hearing then obviously the provisions of clause (b) would be rendered meaningless. ( 7 ) ANOTHER reason which leads me to believe that the words as directed by the court govern the whole of clause (b) is that the tenant is expected to continue to pay or tender the said standard rent and permitted increases regularly in court. The question is what is the standard of regularity contemplated by the clause and the next question is who will determine this standard. Obviously. it is not for the party to a litigation to decide what payment would be considered regular. One answer which is available to this is that the regularity of continued payment in court should be decided with reference to the contract between the parties and therefore if the said contract provides that the rent should be paid on a particular day of every calendar month then the regularity contemplated by clause (b) would be the regularity in paying or tendering the rent in court on that particular day of every calendar month. But I find that this answer does not cover all possible cases and does not also properly carry out the intention of the Legislature. It is likely that in a particular case there is no written contract of lease and the question whether a particular payment is regular or not is required to be determined after looking to the mode of the payment of rent in the past by the tenant to the landlord. In such cases the question whether a particular payment is regular or not cannot be left to the unilateral judgment of a party to the litigation and. therefore obviously the decision of the court would be required to what amounts to a regular payment in such cases. But I find that even in cases where there is a written contract between the parties showing that the tenant is expected to pay the lent on a particular day of every month it is possible to visualise a situation in which as a result of mutual accommodation the landlord would not be insisting on payment of rent by a tenant exactly on the day on which it is required to be paid in terms of the written contract. In such cases regular payment could not necessarily mean the payment exactly on the day on which the contract or lease stipulates it to be paid. In such cases regular payment could not necessarily mean the payment exactly on the day on which the contract or lease stipulates it to be paid. In my opinion therefore the Legislature has wisely used the word regularly which is a word of general import and which is pragmatic in the sense that it leaves a wide scope of adjustment with reference to the peculiar facts of each case. Since what amounts to a regular payment is a question which cannot be determined by any of the parties to the litigation the Legislature has further provided for the directions of the court to be obtained on this question. This is another reason why the expression as directed by the court applies not only to be the payment of costs but also to the payments which a tenant is expected to make under this clause including their regularity. ( 8 ) THE view which I am taking about the interpretation of clause (b) is also found consistent with the intention of the legislature. It cannot be gainsaid that by enacting clause (b) the Legislature wanted to provide a safeguard to the tenants who are ready and willing to pay rent. It was not the intention of the Legislature to punish a tenant who for some genuine financial social or physical trouble finds himself unable to deposit rent in court exactly on the day stipulated by the contract of tenancy. Therefore with a view to avoid any rigidity in the manner of depositing standard rent and permitted increases in court the Legislature has thought it wise to provide that the question as to what amounts to regularity should be within the judicial discretion of the Court. The view that the courts directions are not required either for the quantum of payments or for making these payments regular within the meaning of the clause (b) and that irrespective of some genuine difficulties the tenant should on his own go on depositing the rent exactly on the day on which it falls due and his failure to do so by a clock-wise regularity on a particular month should result in his eviction even though he is otherwise found ready and willing to pay rent is not only too mechanical and unpragmatic to be accepted but is going against the apparent intention of the Legislature. The function of a court is to further the intention of the Legislature and not to frustrate the same by resorting to hair splitting arguments. ( 9 ) UNDER these circumstances I conclude that the expression as directed by the court applies not only to the payment of costs but also to the quantum of rent and permitted increases to be deposited and the day on which the tenant should continue to make that deposit in order to make it regular. Application dismissed. .