( 1 ) THE respondents filed an application under S. 42 of the Mysore Land reforms Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for recovery of rent from the petitioners. The learned Additional Munsiff, Sagar made an order on the 28th of January, 1971 in favour of the respondents. Against that order, the petitioners preferred an appeal on the 20th of September, 1971 to the District Court at Shimoga under S. 118 of the Act. The petitioners also filed an application I. A. No. I for condonation of delay in preferring the appeal in the Court of the District Judge. The learned District judge dismissed I. A. No. I and consequently dismissed the appeal also as teing Lerred by limitation. Hence, this tevisoin petition. ( 2 ) SHRI B. Veerabhadrappa, learned Counsel for the petitioner, contended that the learned District Judge committed an error of law in holding that the appeal filed by the petitioners ni the District Court is barred by limitation. S. 122 of the Act which prescribes the period of limitation, reads as follows : " Limitation:- Every appeal under this Act shall be filed within a period of sixty days from the date of the order of the Court of the deputy Commissioner or the Tahsildar or the Asst. Commr when the party or the legal practitioner appearing on his behalf is present at the time the order is pronounced, and in other cases within a period of sixty days from the date on which the order is communicated to the party by post. The provisions of S. 4, 5, 12 and 14 of Limitation act, 1963, shall be applicable to such appeal. " it is clear from the S. 122 of the Act that the period of limitation prescribed for preferring appeals against the orders of the Court is 60 days. But, there are two dates for the commencement of the said period of limitation. If the party or the legal practitioner appearing on his behalf is present at the time the order is pronounced, the period of 60 days shall commence from the date of pronouncement of the order. If, however, the party or his legal practitioner was not present at the time the order was pronounced, the period of 60 days shall commence from the date on which the order is communicated to the party by post. If, however, the party or his legal practitioner was not present at the time the order was pronounced, the period of 60 days shall commence from the date on which the order is communicated to the party by post. It may also be useful at this stage to advert to sub-sec. (3) of S. 115 of the Act which prescribes that in every enquiry in which the parties are heard before orders are passed, the orders shall be pronounced in open Court after notice to the parties and the decision of the Court or the Deputy Commissioner or other officer, intimated to the parties concerned by post. Sub-sec. (3) of S. 115 of the Act requires that in addition to pronouncement of the order in open court, notice of the decision of the Court is also required to be intimated to the parties concerned by post. ( 3 ) THEREFORE, in every case where the question arises as to whether the appeal has been presented within the prescribed time, the appellate court has necessarily to determine as to whether the party or his legal practitioner was present at the time of the pronouncement of the order and if the party or his legal practitioner was not present at the time of pronouncement of the order, to determine the date on which the order was communicated to the party by post. Such determination becomes necessary in view of the plain language of S. 122 of the Act. ( 4 ) SO far as the facts of the present case are concerned, the same can be gathered from paragraph 5 of the order passed by the learned District judge. The learned District Judge has observed that the case was finally posted to 22-1-1971 and that on the said date the Advocate who appeared for the petitioners was absent and it is only the arguments of the respondents' counsel that were heard and the case was posted for pronouncement of orders on the 28th of January, 1971. On the 28th of Jaunary, 1971, the order was pronounced in open Court. The Counsel for the petitioners was not present in Court when the order was pronounced. That is clear from the observations made by the learned District Judge that after the case was adjourned on the 18th of November, 1970 finally to 22-1-1971 for arguments, the Counsel for the petitioners was absent all throughout. The Counsel for the petitioners was not present in Court when the order was pronounced. That is clear from the observations made by the learned District Judge that after the case was adjourned on the 18th of November, 1970 finally to 22-1-1971 for arguments, the Counsel for the petitioners was absent all throughout. The petitioners have also asserted in their affidavit that they were not aware of the pronouncement of the order by the Court of first instance on the 28th of january, 1971. They have also asserted that they have not received any intimation of the decision of the Court by post. These averments made by the petitioners in their affidavit filed in the Court of the District Judge have to be accepted in the absence of any satisfactory material to the contrary. As, in my opinion, neither the petitioners nor their Advocate were present on the 28th of January, 1971 the date on which the order was pronounced by the Court of first instance in open Court, the period of limitation for preferring an appeal cannot commence from 28th January, 1971. That date can only commence from the date of receipt of intimation by the petitioners by post of the decision of the Court of first instance. As already mentioned, the decision of the Court of first instance was not intimated to the petitioners by post, as provided by sub-sec. (3) of S. 115 of the Act. The petitioners could have waited till they Deceived the intimation of the decision of the Court of first instance by post and then preferred an appeal within 60 days from the date of receipt of such intimation. In these circumstances it is not at all possible to agree with the conclusion of the learned District Judge that the appeal filed by the petitioners was barred by limitation, in as much as the petitioners have preferred the appeal within a couple of days after they otherwise came to know of the decision of the Court of first instance. ( 5 ) FOR the reasons stated above, this revision petition is allowed, the order passed by the learned District Judge is set aside and the case is remitted back to the District Judge, Shimoga with a direction to register the appeal and to hear the same in accordance with law. No costs. --- *** --- .