JUDGMENT (1.) THESE appeals, heard analogously, are by the defendants against the judgments and decrees of reversal. The connected suits and appeals were heard in the courts below analogously. The facts as stated in the plaints are as follows: (2.) THE plaintiff is the owner of two adjoining plots of land situated within the municipality of Ranaghat. There are two temporary dilapidated rooms on the said two plots and the defendant, it appears, had been a tenant in respect of the said two premises under separate tenancies, according to Bengali Calendar month. The plaintiff determined the tenancies by notices to quit under section106 of the Transfer of Property Act which were also notices of suit under section 13 (6) of the West Bengal premises Tenancy Act, with the expiry of the month of Shravana, 1369 B. S. requiring the defendant to quit and vacate the premises accordingly. The ground for eviction was that the plaintiff reasonably wanted to demolish the said temporary structures under the tenancies and to build pucca building and god own there on for the purpose of residence for himself and his family and also for carrying on his business there. The defendant having failed to vacate the suits were instituted on 5th of September, 1962 for recovery of possession of the suit premises on eviction of the defendant there from. The defendant contested the suits by filling written statements and it was contended that the alleged requirement for own use and occupation after building and rebuilding was not true or genuine and it was further stated that the plaintiff had his valuable residential house in village Patuli where he had been residing with his family having extensive properties nearby and it was not possible for him to live else where. It was also stated that there were lands belonging to the plaintiff adjacent to the suit premises where he could easily build structures for the purpose of his requirement as alleged. There were other usual objections about notice and its service. The defendant submitted that in these circumstances, the suit should be dismissed. (3.) ON trial of evidence before him, the learned Munsif found that the plaintiff had miserably failed to prove that he honestly desired to build. There was no evidence before the trial court about any plan of the proposed building or of the financial resources of the plaintiff. The defendant submitted that in these circumstances, the suit should be dismissed. (3.) ON trial of evidence before him, the learned Munsif found that the plaintiff had miserably failed to prove that he honestly desired to build. There was no evidence before the trial court about any plan of the proposed building or of the financial resources of the plaintiff. The court found that the plaintiff had taken no steps for his proposed building excepting the filing of the present suits. In the absence of any requisite steps for building taken by the landlord, it was held that the plaintiff had failed to prove that he reasonably required the suit premises for building or rebuilding. As to requirement it was also found that there was no evidence to suggest why the plaintiff thought it convenient to live at Ranaghat with his family and the plaintiff only deposed to say that he required the suit premises for his business at Ranaghat. He found that at that point of time the plaintiff had given up his business of Sulphate Amonia and about his other business in cement, no receipt was produced to show that the said business was situated in a rented godown in which it was being carried on ac alleged. Accordingly, the learned munsif found that the plaintiff did not reasonably require the suit premises for his own use or occupation or for the purpose of building or rebuilding. The suits, in the circumstances, were dismissed. (4.) AN appeal was preferred against this decision by the plaintiff and the appellate court was of the opinion that the plaintiff had stated in the plaints that he would build a house and a godown on the lands of the suit premises and thereafter would start and conduct his business from there. The plaintiff had stated that the estimated cost of construction would be Rs. 20,000/- to Rs. 25,000/- and he had the requisite funds. The defendant had, also stated that the financial condition of the plaintiff was sound. Accordingly, the appellate court was of the opinion that the plaintiff's business in cement, which was also admitted by the defendant, required a building for such business being carried on at Ranaghat and such requirement could not be said to be unreasonable. The defendant had, also stated that the financial condition of the plaintiff was sound. Accordingly, the appellate court was of the opinion that the plaintiff's business in cement, which was also admitted by the defendant, required a building for such business being carried on at Ranaghat and such requirement could not be said to be unreasonable. The appellate court thought that it was obvious that the plaintiff had to come to Ranaghat every day covering a distance of two miles in rain and winter and he could not forced to do so when he had his own land or which he intended to build a house for the purpose of his business. He had also stated in his evidence that he had no house to reside or to run the business at Ranaghat The appellate court accordingly was of the opinion that the plaintiff required the premises for the purpose of his business. The appellate court further found that the premises were required for building and rebuilding when the existing structures were insufficient to accommodate the plaintiff or his business and when he had the money with cash sum of about rs. 20,000/- to Rs. 25,000/ -. As he had a cement business, there would be no further difficulty in procuring cement for the purpose. The court was of the opinion that even though there was plan, it would not require much time for obtaining the plan sanctioned, it he was in other respects in a position to build the structures. The appellate court, was also of the opinion that the plaintiff's requirement of the suit premises after building and rebuilding for purposes of his residence therein with his family was reasonable. For all these reasons, the appellate court reversed the findings of the learned Munsif, allowed the appeals and decreed the suits. The present appeals are against these decision. Mr. Bhabesh Ch. Mitter, learned advocate appearing for the plaintiff-respondent has submitted that the evidence on which the court of appeal has decreed the suits are findings of fact and he relied on a decision in (1) Hahneman publishing Company (P) Ltd. v. Dinesh Ch. Ghose, reported in A.I.R. 1972, Cal. 484 in support. In that decision it was held that the reasonable requirement is a question of fact to be determined by evidence and findings thereon are not liable to be interfered with the Second Appeal. Ghose, reported in A.I.R. 1972, Cal. 484 in support. In that decision it was held that the reasonable requirement is a question of fact to be determined by evidence and findings thereon are not liable to be interfered with the Second Appeal. The Supreme court, however, in the decision in (2) Madan Lal Puri v. Sain Dass Berry A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 58 held that whether on the facts proved, the requirement of the landlord is bona fide is a finding of mixed question of law and fact. It was observed that an inference drawn by the Subordinate judge that the requirement of the respondents was not bona fide could not be regarded as conclusive. The High Court in proper cases has ample jurisdiction to interfere with that finding and record its conclusion on the basis of the materials on record. It would appear from the above authority that this Court if it thinks proper, is entitled to examine even in second appeal the question at issue about the reasonable requirement of the plaintiff for his own use and occupation as also for building or rebuilding on the evidence as adduced by the parties. (5.) AS to reasonable requirement, the plaintiff's evidence was that he had a house in village Patuli at a distance of two miles from Ranaghat and he had no house to reside or run his business at Ranaghat. He further stated that he reasonably required the suit premises for the purpose of is occupation and also for building and rebuilding and he had been carrying on the business at Ranaghat in a rented house. The plaintiff, as has been pointed out by Mr. Bankim Ch. Banerjee, learned Advocate for the appellant, did not make further statement except the bare statement that he has no home to reside at Ranaghat or to carry on his business. He had not stated in his evidence the reasons which impelled him to take a decision for new construction for his own residence and business. Mr. Mitter submitted that the inconvenience of living in village without amenities were implicit in the evidence and from that, inference should have been drawn about the reasonable requirement of the plaintiff of the suit premises. Mr. Mitter submitted that the inconvenience of living in village without amenities were implicit in the evidence and from that, inference should have been drawn about the reasonable requirement of the plaintiff of the suit premises. I am afraid, there is no scope for reading in the evidence as implicit the inconvenience of living at village or reasonableness of the requirement which impelled the plaintiff decide for to change his residence in absence of evidence in respect thereof. Unless these facts are stated fully in evidence, there would be no material before the court to come to the finding that the plaintiff had reasonably required the suit premises. There is no doubt that the residential house at Patuli was otherwise suitable for the residence of the plaintiff and if there was compelling or any reason for the plaintiff to change the residence, such facts should have been stated by the plaintiff in court in support of his case. Reasonable requirement connotes an objective state of affairs other than me desire as has been held by the judicial authorities. On the evidence as adduced, it is not possible to hold that a case for reasonable requirement for his residence had been made out by the plaintiff in the suits. About the plaintiff's business, it had been stated that he was carrying on a business in a rented house but no rent receipt had been produced nor any idea had been given to the Court about the extent of requirement that would be necessary for carrying on such business. The plaintiff should have given the court some material for enabling the Court to hold that the plaintiff reasonably required the suit premises for his residence and also for his godown for the business after building and rebuilding. On such evidence as adduced it would not be possible to decide or accept the plaintiff's case as alleged. (6.) THE next question relates to building and rebuilding of the premises after demolishing the existing structures thereon. The plaintiff had filed no plan of the proposed building nor any documentary evidence showing the costs to be incurred or that the bad necessary finance resources. Mr. Banerjee contended that in absence of such evidence it cannot be said that the plaintiff reasonably required the suit premises for building or rebuilding. The Supreme court in the decision of Netaram and Ors v. Jewan Lal and Ors. Mr. Banerjee contended that in absence of such evidence it cannot be said that the plaintiff reasonably required the suit premises for building or rebuilding. The Supreme court in the decision of Netaram and Ors v. Jewan Lal and Ors. reported in A. I. R. 1963 S. C. 499 observed as follows: "the Controller has to be satisfied about the genuineness of the claim. To reach this conclusion obviously the controller must be satisfied about the reality of the claim made by the landlord, and this can only be established by looking at all the surrounding circumstances such as the condition of the building, its situation, the possibility of its being put to a more profitable use after construction, the means of the landlord and so on. It is not enough that the landlord comes forward, and says that he entertains a particular intention, however strongly, said to be entertained by him. The clause speaks not of the bona fides of the landlord, but says on the other hand that the claim of the landlord that he requires the building for reconstruction and re-erection must be bona fide, that is to say, honest in the circumstances. It is impossible, therefore, to hold that the investigation by the Controller should be confined only to the existence of an intention in the mind of the landlord to reconstruct. This intention must be honestly held in relation to the surrounding circumstance. . . . . . . The very purpose of the Kent Restriction Acts (East Punjab Rent Restriction act 3 of 1949) would be defeated, if the landlords were to come forward and to get tenants turned out, on the bare plea that they want to reconstruct the houses without first establishing that the plea is bona fide with regard to all the circumstances, viz., that the houses need reconstruction or that they have the means to reconstruct them, etc. " The claim of the landlord must be bona fide which is distinct from mere bona fide intention of the landlord to build however strong. The bona fide nature of the claim will be evidenced from surrounding circumstances as established by evidence. The West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 provides for reasonable requirement of the landlord to warrant a decree for possession, in substitution of the provision for bona fide requirement in the previous rent Acts. The bona fide nature of the claim will be evidenced from surrounding circumstances as established by evidence. The West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 provides for reasonable requirement of the landlord to warrant a decree for possession, in substitution of the provision for bona fide requirement in the previous rent Acts. Such reasonable requirement appears to be even more stringent than the claim for bona fide requirement. It has to find expression in several acts to be taken in connection therewith, apart from the "must have" element in the requirement. The landlord must show to establish his reasonable requirement that he has taken all essential and necessary steps for the purpose and will start his work of building as soon as recovery of possession is decreed in his favour. This will include a preparation of an estimate with plan of the proposed building, provision for necessary finance as also other essential steps for the purpose. It has been held in the case of (3) Belarani v. Sujit reported in I.L.R. 1967 (1), Calcutta, 549, that in absence of sanctioned plan it could not be possible that the plaintiff reasonably required the suit premises. Mr. Mitter, however, referred to the decision in (4) S. C. Mitter v. Auto Services, 72 calcutta Weekly Notes, 828, in which it was held that sanctioned plan is only a piece of evidence without which the conclusion about the landlord's requirement for building and rebuilding can also be reached, other things being there. It was held that it is not that no sanctioned plan no requirement, but at the same time in that case, the learned Judge came to his conclusion on the plan which was submitted though there were defects in the said plan itself. In the cases we are concerned with, excepting a bare intention to build, assuming the claim in respect whereof might be otherwise bona fide, the plaintiff had not taken any step which would convert the bona fide intention and claim, to reasonable requirement. No steps have been taken for obtaining even any estimate on the basis of a plan and as no plan is there, it could not be said that the plaintiff had taken any serious and positive step to establish reasonable requirement as alleged. No steps have been taken for obtaining even any estimate on the basis of a plan and as no plan is there, it could not be said that the plaintiff had taken any serious and positive step to establish reasonable requirement as alleged. In absence of these requisite essential to establish a reasonable requirement, it is not possible to hold that the plaintiff made out a case of building and rebuilding under ground (f) of section 13 (1). For all these reasons, I am of the opinion that the plaintiff had also failed to prove or establish that he reasonably required the suit premises for building and rebuilding. (7.) IN the result, these appeals are allowed. The judgments and decrees of the court of appeal below are set aside and those of the learned Munsif are restored and affirmed. There will be no order as to costs. Appeals allowed.