Judgment :- VEERASWAMI 1. These cases raise interesting questions. But, eventually, we are of the view that the orders of the courts below will have to be accepted as correct in one of them but reversed in the rest of them. In C.R.P. 2430 of 1969, the question is whether the property, which has been acquired by a minor under a settlement or gift dated 27th August 1955, should be taken into account under S. 5(2) read with the definition of ‘family’ in the Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 in fixing the ceiling area for the family. The Act commenced to operate from 6th April 1960. The notified date, for the purpose of these cases, was 2nd October 1962. The court below took the view that the minors property should not be taken into account for the purpose of S. 5(2). This was on the view that he was a domicile in the French territory of Karaikal and was governed by the Hindu rule of majority, according to which a person who had attained the age of 16 would be regarded as a major. That event happened on 23rd January 1961, the minors birth being 23rd January 1945. The view of the court below was that, since the Indian Majority Act had no application to him and there is nothing in the Ceiling Act in respect of that matter, the minor for the purpose of the Act should be regarded as a major and, that being so he was not a member of the family of his father. 2. In the other civil revision petitions, a Hindu family consists of a father, mother and an unmarried daughter. The unmarried daughter had received a gift from her maternal grandmother of land of an extent of 48 acres and 1 cent equal to 12.002 standard acres. That was on 3rd December 1962. The court below, with reference to the definition of the expression ‘Stridhana land’ in the Act, held that the property obtained by the unmarried grand daughter from her maternal grandmother could not be regarded as s tridhana property. 3. The Ceiling Act is one intended to provide for fixation of ceiling on agricultural land holdings and for certain other matters Connected therewith. The Act extends to the whole of the State. S. 2 defines a number of expressions which occur in the Act. 3. The Ceiling Act is one intended to provide for fixation of ceiling on agricultural land holdings and for certain other matters Connected therewith. The Act extends to the whole of the State. S. 2 defines a number of expressions which occur in the Act. A person is defined to include any trust, company, family, firm, society or association of individuals, whether incorporated or not. The expression ‘family’ in relation to a person means the person, the wife or husband, as the case may be, of such person and his or her minor sons and unmarried daughters and minor grandsons and unmarried grand daughters in the male line, whose father and mother are dead. There is an Explanation which clarifies that, for the purpose of the clause, in the case of persons governed by Hindu law, ‘minor sons’ and ‘minor grandsons’ shall not include sons or grandsons between whom and the other members of the family a partition by means of a registered instrument had taken place or in respect of whose family properties a preliminary decree for partition has been passed before the date of the commencement of the Act. S. 4 gives the Act an effect overriding other laws, custom, usage or contract or decree or order of a court in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. S. 5 fixes the ceiling. Sub-s. (1) of the section provides that subject to the provisions mentioned therein, the ceiling area, in the case of every family consisting of not more than five members shall be 30 standard acres. For every additional member, an additional 5 standard acres shall be added. Then follows Sub-s. (2). “For the purposes of this section, all the lands held individually by the members of a family or jointly by some or all of the members of such family shall be deemed to be held by the family”. This is a strange provision, which on the face of it, appears to be unreasonable if not unjustified, in as much as properties traceable to different titles are brought into the vortex of family properties for the purpose of fixing the ceiling. A suggestion was made that having regard to the drastic nature of the provisions, it might be possible to take the view that the expression ‘lands held individually’ could be interpreted as referring not to ownership. A suggestion was made that having regard to the drastic nature of the provisions, it might be possible to take the view that the expression ‘lands held individually’ could be interpreted as referring not to ownership. But this interpretation does not appear to be sound though it would have tended, in a large measure, towards justice. This is because the expression ‘to hold land’ has also been defined and the definition says that the expression, with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, means to own land as owner or to possess or enjoy land as possessor mortgagee or as tenant or as intermediary or in one or more of these capacities’. These definitions should apply, unless the context otherwise requires. One is at pains to find out what context otherwise requires, so as to give a different meaning to the words lands held individually in sub-s. 2 of S. 5. Though the question was not decided pointedly in Krishnaswami v. State of Madras A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1515, Krishnaraju Reddiar v. Authosised officer 1967 1 N.L.J. 179- 80 L.W. 175 (D.B.) and Jagannathan v. Authorised Officer, Land Reforms, MaduraiA.I.R. 1972 S.C. 425 this court and the Supreme Court would appear to have proceeded on the basis that the definition of the expression ‘all the lands held individually’ should apply to S. 5(2). 4. So far as these cases before us are concerned, we are happy to find that they can be decided on other approach. In C.R.P. 2430 of 1969 there is no dispute that the father of the minor was a domicile of Karaikkal. It follows, therefore, that the minors domicile followed that of his father. The minor being a domicile of Karaikkal, he would be governed by his personal law in respect of his age of majority. There is, again, no dispute that the Hindu rule in this regard governs him, that is to say, he would be a major when he attains the age of 16. The question is whether he should be treated as a major for the purpose of the Ceiling Act. That Act, besides making a reference to a minor, does not attempt to define who a minor is. We have the Indian Majority Act, according to which this minor would be attaining the age of majority only when he completes the age of 18 years and not before. That Act, besides making a reference to a minor, does not attempt to define who a minor is. We have the Indian Majority Act, according to which this minor would be attaining the age of majority only when he completes the age of 18 years and not before. But this Act was extended to Karaikkal only with effect from 18 December 1968. There is, therefore, nothing to stand in the way of this particular minor—we use the expression for the purpose of convenience—being regarded as a major for the purpose of the definition of ‘family’ in the Ceiling Act. That was the view taken by the court below and we accept that to be correct. If follows, therefore, that the petition by the State should fail and it is dismissed with costs. 5. In the other petitions we are of the view that although, the definition of ‘stridhana land’ under S. 3 (42) of the Ceiling Act means ‘any land held on the date of the commencement of the Act by any female member of a family in her own name’ for the reasons mentioned by V. Ramaswami, J. in Valliammal Authorised Officer, Land Reforms Coimbatore 1972 T.W.L.J. 609; 86 L.W. 177 which are persuasive, we are inclined to hold that, notwithstanding the limited definition of ‘stridhana land’ it would apply to land held subsequent to the date of the commencement of the Act by any member of the family, in her own name. The ceiling of the family, of which the unmarried daughter is a member, will have to be worked out on that basis, which means that she is entitled to the benefit and therefore a family under S. 3(14) of the Ceiling Act. The other petitions are allowed with costs in the first of them.