JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THE petitioner Mahendra Kumar Sharma, who was an Upper division Clerk in the Jiwaji University by this petition under Article 226 of the constitution calls into question the order dated 6th January 1971 passed by the registrar of the University dismissing him from service. ( 2. ) THE petitioner has based his challenge to the order of dismissal on clause 18 of an Ordinance of the Vikram University which provides for conditions of service of University employees. The petitioner claims that this ordinance was adopted by the Jiwaji University as a regulation and that the conditions of his employment were statutorily regulated by the Ordinance read as a regulation. The petitioner contends that the order of dismissal was invalid and void and that he still continues in service because before passing the said order no "proper enquiry" was held into the charges levelled against him as is required by clause 18 of the Ordinance. In support of this contention the petitioner relies upon the case of K. N. Mishra v. The Vice Chancellor, jiwaji University (Mise. Petition No. 47o of 1967, decided on the 23rd April 1970.) which was decided by a Division Bench of this Court. ( 3. ) WHEN the present petition came up for hearing before another Division Bench of which one of us (Raina J ) was a member the correctness of the ruling in K. N. Mishras case was assailed and it was argued on the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court in U. P. S. W. Corporation, Lucknow v. C. K. Tyagi ( AIR 1970 SC 1244 .) that Regulations made by the University laying down conditions of service cannot be said to impose any statutory obligation on the University and the dismissal of the petitioner cannot be held to be void even if it was in breach of any regulation. In view of this argument the Division Bench referred this petition to a larger Bench. This is how the petition has come up before this full Bench. ( 4. In view of this argument the Division Bench referred this petition to a larger Bench. This is how the petition has come up before this full Bench. ( 4. ) BEFORE us the learned Advocate General, who appeared for the University, at the outset contended that the Ordinance of the Vikram University on which the petitioner relied was not adopted by the Jiwaji University either as an Ordinance or a Regulation and that only an administrative decision was taken by the Executive Council of the Jiwaji University to follow the Ordinances and Regulations of the Vikram University until the Jiwaji University made its own Ordinances and Regulations, and that the relationship between the parties being purely that of master and servant the order of dismissal cannot be held to be void even if there was no proper enquiry as contended by the petitioner. To appreciate this contention it is necessary to refer to the relevant statutory provisions and the resolution of the Executive Council. ( 5. ) THE Jiwaji University came to be constituted by the Jiwaji University Act, 1963, which came into force on 25th May 1963. Section 22 of the act deals with the Executive Council which is the executive authority of the university Powers and duties of the Executive Council are enumerated in section 23. The relevant provision in, this section is clause (xxiv) of subsection (1) which reads as follows: "23. (1) Subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by or under the provisions of this Act, the Executive Council shall have the following powers and perform the following duties, namely:- (xxiv) save as otherwise provided by this Act, or the Statutes, to appoint the officers (other than the Chancellor, Vice Chancellor and the Rector), teachers and other servants of the University, to define their duties and the conditions of their service, and to provide for the filling of temporary vacancies in their posts. " Under the aforesaid provision the Executive Council has the power to define the duties and conditions of service of University employees This power is, however, subject to any otherwise provision made in the Act or in the Statutes. Section 35 of the Act deals with Statutes which may provide for the matters specified in the section in its various clauses. The matter specified in clause (d)of the section is: "35. Section 35 of the Act deals with Statutes which may provide for the matters specified in the section in its various clauses. The matter specified in clause (d)of the section is: "35. Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Statutes may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:-x x x x x (d) powers and duties of the Rector, if any, the Registrar, and other officers and servants of the University and the conditions of their service. " A Statute may, therefore, provide for the conditions of service of University employees. Section 37 of the Act deals with Ordinances. Subject to other provisions of the Act and the Statutes, the Ordinances may provide for the matters enumerated in the various clauses of the section. None of the clauses in this section refers to conditions of service of University employees. The authorities and other bodies of the University have been given power by section 40 to make Regulations consistent with the Act, the Statutes and the Ordinances. Sub-section (1) of the section reads as follows : "40. (1) The authorities and other bodies of the University may make Regulations consistent with this Act, the Statutes and the Ordinances- (a) laying down the procedure to be observed at their meeting and the number of members required to form a quo ram; (b) providing for all matters which by this Act, the Statutes or the Ordinances are to be prescribed by Regulations; and (o) providing for all other matters solely concerning such authorities or the committees appointed by then and not provided for by this Act, the Statutes or the Ordinances. " First Statutes and Ordinances of the University were to be made by a committee constituted under section 41 of the Act. All Ordinances except the first ordinance are to be made by the Executive Council under section 38, but as provided in that section every Ordinance made by the Executive Council has to be submitted for approval of the Chancellor and it is only after the Chancellor accords his sanction that Ordinance takes effect. The section reads as follows : "38. (1) All Ordinances except the first Ordinance shall be made by the Executive Council. (2) Any Ordinance made by the Executive Council shall be submitted to the Chancellor for his approval and he may either sanction or disallow it. The section reads as follows : "38. (1) All Ordinances except the first Ordinance shall be made by the Executive Council. (2) Any Ordinance made by the Executive Council shall be submitted to the Chancellor for his approval and he may either sanction or disallow it. (3) Where an Ordinance has been sanctioned by the Chancellor it shall come into effect on the date next following the date of the sanction or such other prospective date as may be specified by the Chancellor in this behalf. (4) Every Ordinance approved by the Chancellor shall be laid before the Court. (5) The Ordinance shall cease to have effect if the Court passes a resolution to that effect by a majority of two third of members present and voting from the date of such resolution. " There is a special procedure laid down by the Act in section 39 for making ordinances on certain subjects which concern the Academic Council. This section reads: "39. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) of section 38, no Ordinance shall be made- (a) affecting the admission of students or prescribing examinations to be recognised as equivalent to the University examinations or the further qualifications mentioned in subsection (1) of section 44 for admission to the degree courses of the University, unless a draft of the same has been proposed by the Academic Council; or (b) affecting conditions and mode of appointments and duties of examiners and the conduct or standard of examinations or any course of study, except in accordance with a proposal of the Faculty or Faculties concerned and unless a draft of such Ordinance has been proposed by the Academic Council; or (c) affecting the number, qualifications and emoluments of teachers of the University paid by the University unless a draft of the same has been proposed by the Academic Council. " xxx xxx xxx sxx xxx first Statute of the University as made under section 41 came into effect on 18th November 1964. We are told that some Ordinances were also made as first Ordinances under section 41 covering certain subjects with which we are not at present concerned. Then on 11th February 1965 the Executive Council passed the following resolution : item No. 33 "considered the proposal that the Ordinance and Regulations, etc of the Vikram University be followed by this University till such time as our Ordinance, etc. Then on 11th February 1965 the Executive Council passed the following resolution : item No. 33 "considered the proposal that the Ordinance and Regulations, etc of the Vikram University be followed by this University till such time as our Ordinance, etc. , are not finalised. Resolved that the Ordinances and Regulations of the Vikram University be followed by this University until the Ordinances, Regulations, etc. of this University are not finalised. " The Ordinances of the Vikram University with which we are concerned is an ordinance Providing for the conditions of service for University employees. Clause 18 of this Ordinance reads : "18 The services of a permanent employee shall not be terminated or he may be dismissed from service unless after proper enquiry, he is found guilty of 1. Wilful neglect of duty. 2. Misconduct including disobedience of the orders of the competent authorities. 3. Physical or Mental unfitness. 4. Abolition of the post. " ( 6. ) 1 he question that arises for decision in the first place is whether the executive Council of the University by its resolution of 11th February 1965 exercised its power of making Ordinances and Regulations under sections 38 and 40 of the Act and adopted the Ordinances and Regulations of the Vikram university (including the Ordinance with which which we are concerned) as its own Ordinances and Regulations or whether the Executive Council only took an administrative decision to follow the Ordinances and Regulations of the Vikram University until its own Ordinances and Regulations were made. It will be seen that the Executive Council being the executive authority of the university has many administrative powers which are set out in form of "powers and duties" in various clauses of section 23 of the Act. The Executive Council has also a sort of quasi-legislative power to make Ordinances under sections 38 and 39 and Regulations under section 40. The making of Ordinances requires a special procedure as set out in sections 38 and 39. Every ordinance must be sent for approval to the Chancellor and in cases falling under section 39 the proposal for the Ordinance must emanate from the Academic Council. It is not disputed before us that the procedure prescribed in these sections was not followed for adopting the Ordinances of the Vikram university as Ordinances of the Jiwaji University. Every ordinance must be sent for approval to the Chancellor and in cases falling under section 39 the proposal for the Ordinance must emanate from the Academic Council. It is not disputed before us that the procedure prescribed in these sections was not followed for adopting the Ordinances of the Vikram university as Ordinances of the Jiwaji University. This is a strong indication suggesting that by the resolution of 11th February 1965 the Executive Council never intended to exercise its quasi legislative power of making Ordinances and that it merely took an administrative decision to follow the Ordinances of the vikram University until its own Ordinances were finalised. Although no special procedure is prescribed for making Regulations yet as the decision to follow the Regulations of the Vikram University is covered by the same resolution of the Executive Council, it must follow that even as to Regulations the resolution was an administrative decision to follow the Regulations of the vikram University until the finalisation of the Regulations of the Jiwaji University, and no quasi-legislative power of making Regulations was exercised under section 40. This inference is supported by the fact that the resolution decides to follow the Regulations of the Vikram University as a whole and not merely those which were made by the Syndicate of the Vikram University. Different authorities of the University as laid down in section 40 can make their own Regulations and the Executive Council has no power to make Regulations concerning other authorities. Wholesale adoption of the Regulations of the Vikram University was, therefore, not within the power of Executive council conferred on it under section 40 and this shows that the intention in passing the resolution of 11th February 1965 was not to exercise the power of making Regulations. Further, the powers and duties of the Syndicate, which is the Executive Authority of the University under the Vikram University Act, 1955, although similar to the powers of the Executive Council under the Jiwaji University Act, 1963, are not identical. For example, the residuary powers of the University in the Vikram University Act are vested in the Syndicate, but in the Jiwaji University Act these powers are vested in the Court. Again, the topics on which the Ordinances and regulations can be made under the Vikram University Act are not the same as in the Jiwaji University Act. For example, the residuary powers of the University in the Vikram University Act are vested in the Syndicate, but in the Jiwaji University Act these powers are vested in the Court. Again, the topics on which the Ordinances and regulations can be made under the Vikram University Act are not the same as in the Jiwaji University Act. For example, under the Jiwaji University Act conditions of service of University employees is not a subject enumerated in section 37, therefore, an Ordinance cannot be made on this subject; this is a subject falling under section 35 which enumerates the subjects on which Statutes can be made. Thus, the Ordinance of the Vikram University on which the petitioner relies and which regulates the conditions of service of University employees could not have been adopted as an Ordinance of the Jiwaji University. When the powers of the Executive Authorities under the two Acts were not identical and when the topics on which Ordinances and Regulations could be made were also not identical in the two Acts, it was impossible for the Executive Council of the Jiwaji University to adopt all the Ordinances and Regulations of the Vikram University as Ordinances and Regulations of the Jiwaji university. Then the language of the resolution is not that the Ordinances and Regulations of the Vikram University shall be the Ordinances and Regulations of the Jiwaji University but merely that they shall be followed until ordinances and Regulations of the Jiwaji University are not finalised. The language used in the resolution is inapt to convey any intention of adopting by reference the Ordinances and Regulations of the Vikram University as Ordinances and Regulations of the Jiwaji University. For all these reasons, we are clearly of opinion that in passing the resolution of 11 th February 1965, the executive Council did not exercise any power of making Ordinances or Regulations and took only an administrative decision to follow the Ordinances and regulations of the Vikram University until finalisation of the Ordinances and regulations of the Jiwaji University. ( 7. ( 7. ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner contended before us that the executive Council has power to define the conditions of service of University employees under section 23 (1) (xxiv) and as it was a matter solely concerning this authority, it could make Regulations on this subject under section 40 (l) (c)and that by the resolution of 11th February 1965 the Ordinance of the Vikram university regulating the conditions of service of employees must be deemed to have been adopted by the Executive Council as a Regulation under section 40 (1) (c ). We are unable to accept this contention. The Executive council has no doubt the power to define conditions of service of University employees under section 23 (1) (xxiv), but it seems doubtful if it has authority to make Regulations on this subject under section 40 (1) (c), because the subject is covered by section 35 (d) which shows that the legislative intention is that if the University desires to statutorily regulate the conditions of service it should be done by Statutes made by the Court and not by Regulations of the executive Council. As the Court can make Statutes on this subject, prima facie, it cannot be said to be a matter solely concerning the Executive Council within section 40 (1) (c ). It is, however, not necessary to go into this point any further for we are satisfied, for the reasons already given, that the Executive Council in passing the resolution of 11th February 1965 did not intend to exercise its power of making Ordinances or Regulations. ( 8. ) IT was also argued that the Ordinance of the Vikram University laying down the conditions of service has been uniformly followed by the Jiwaji university. Even assuming that is so, the conditions of service as laid down in the Ordinance cannot be said to become statutory conditions by implication; they can at best be binding as implied terms of contract between the University and its employees. ( 9. ) OUR conclusion, therefore, is that the relationship between the petitioner and the University was governed purely by contract of employment and there was no statutory restriction on the powers of the University to terminate the petitioners employment. ( 9. ) OUR conclusion, therefore, is that the relationship between the petitioner and the University was governed purely by contract of employment and there was no statutory restriction on the powers of the University to terminate the petitioners employment. Even if the dismissal of the petitioner was without any proper enquiry, a fact into which we need not enter, the dismissal cannot be held to be a nullity or void; Sirsi Municipality v. C. K. F. Tellis ( AIR 1973 SC 855 ). ( 10. ) THE petition fails and is dismissed, but, in the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. The security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition dismissed.