Judgment LALIT MOHAN SHARMA, J. 1. This application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed for quashing the order of the Collector, Muzaffarpur (Annexure 1) passed in a departmental proceeding permanently reverting the petitioner to a lower grade by way of punishment and the appellate order (Annexure 2) and the revisional order (Annexure 3) passed in the same matter. 2. The petitioner was a confirmed clerk in the Lower Division in the Muzaffarpur Collectorate and, on promotion, was working as a clerk in the Upper Division with effect from 20th June, 1958. He was served with a charge-sheet under an order dated the 26th July, 1962 passed by Respondent No. 4 (Collector) and there were eight charges framed thereunder. The petitioner was asked to show cause as to why he should not be dismissed, discharged, removed from Government service or otherwise suitably punished. The Joint Magistrate, Muzaffarpur, one Sri Chaturvedi, was appointed Enquiring Officer to conduct the proceeding and to submit his finding and, on account of certain administrative changes, another Officer Sri B. M. Prasad was appointed Enquiring Officer in place of Sri Chaturvedi. The petitioner filed an application on the 5th February, 1962, before the Enquiring Officer praying that copies of a number of documents should be handed over to him, but as he did not get any reply thereto promptly, he filed his show cause on the 12th March, 1962. He has not attached to this writ application a copy of his show cause but has asserted that in the same he had made a prayer that the Block Development Officer, Goroul should appear before the Enquiring Officer for examination by the petitioner and that a similar prayer was made in respect of some other persons also. It is also said that he renewed his prayer for delivery of copies of some documents. On the 4th June, 1962, the petitioner made a fresh prayer calling for 9 items of documents enumerated therein and it appears from the order sheet of the Enquiring Officer that he examined the prayer carefully and decided that only the documents referred to against items 8 and 9 of the list could be relevant for the purpose of the proceeding and the other documents were irrelevant. A direction was given on 7th July, 1972, to the Block Development Officer to produce the same. A direction was given on 7th July, 1972, to the Block Development Officer to produce the same. However, on the 7th July, 1962, the case had to be adjourned on account of absence of the Block Development Officer, Goroul who was busy in some official work. The case was adjourned to the 26th July, 1962 and on this date the Block Development Officer, Goroul, was present. Nine witnesses were produced, examined and discharged who deposed in support of the charge. However, the Block Development Officer failed to produce the documents mentioned above. On the 3rd August, 1962, to which date the case was again adjourned, the Block Development Officer, Goroul was again present. As the case against the petitioner was closed, the petitioner examined three witnesses and, thereafter, the defence case was also closed. It appears from the order sheet that on this date nobody remembered about the documents directed by the Officer to be produced and the Enquiring Officer submitted his report, a copy whereof is made Annexure (9) to this writ application, holding that the charges Nos. 1, 2, 5 and 8 were established against the petitioner and the Charge No. 3 was partly established. The report was submitted to the Collector (Respondent No. 4) who by his order dated the 5th October, 1962, a copy whereof is annexed to the writ application as Annexure 11, recorded his findings agreeing with the conclusions arrived at by the Enquiring Officer and holding that the petitioner was guilty of gross misconduct and serious indiscipline. He was asked to show cause by 1-11-1962 why he should not be permanently reverted to the lower division. Out of 8 charges, it appears that Charge No. 8 was very serious. It was said that the petitioner "attended his office in drunken state and unhesitatingly abused his higher authorities with the intention to lower them in the estimation of the public" and, as said above, the report of the Enquiring Officer which was accepted by Respondent No. 4 was to the effect that this charge had been established against the petitioner. 3. The petitioner filed his second show cause and thereafter Respondent No. 4 by his order dated the 15th November, 1962 passed the impugned order (Annexure 1). 4. 3. The petitioner filed his second show cause and thereafter Respondent No. 4 by his order dated the 15th November, 1962 passed the impugned order (Annexure 1). 4. The petitioner filed an appeal before the Commissioner, Tirhut Division (Respondent No. 3) who dismissed the same on the 27th December, 1966 by his order, a copy whereof is annexed as Annexure 2 to the writ application. A revision application thereafter taken by the petitioner to the Member, Board of Revenue, was also dismissed by Respondent No. 2, Additional Member, by order dated the 2nd February, 1968, a copy whereof is Annexure 3 to this writ application. This writ application was filed belatedly in 1971 and was admitted. However, as I do not find any objection taken on behalf of the respondents on the ground of unreasonable delay, I do not think that the writ application should be rejected on account of delay. 5. Mr. Sarojendu Mukherjee. learned Counsel for the petitioner has raised several points in support of the petitioners prayer. He has firstly argued that a punishment of permanent reversion to a lower grade is illegal and ultra vires and is not contemplated by rules applicable to the petitioner and on this ground alone the order of permanent reversion of the petitioner is bad and fit to be quashed. The enquiry has been held under the Bihar and Orissa Subordinate Services Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1935. Rule 2 of the said Rules reads as follows: "2. The following penalties may, for good and sufficient reasons, be imposed upon any member of a Subordinate Service, viz.: X X XX X X XX (iii) Reduction to a lower post or time-scale or to a lower stage in a time scale." X X XX X X XX It is suggested that the word reduction does not mean permanent reduction in rank. The petitioner contended that in case of punishment of permanent reduction in rank to be inflicted upon a person, it will mean that in future even if he works efficiently to the full satisfaction of his higher officers, he will not be in a position to be considered for promotion and this is not reasonable. The petitioner, however, did not challenge the above quoted rule as ultra vires and argued that the above quoted Rule does not authorise the respondents to permanently reduce the petitioner in rank. The petitioner, however, did not challenge the above quoted rule as ultra vires and argued that the above quoted Rule does not authorise the respondents to permanently reduce the petitioner in rank. He submitted that the petitioners rights guaranteed under Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution have been violated by the impugned orders and he cited the decision in Krishna Chander Nayar v. The Chairman, Central Tractor Organisation, AIR 1962 SC 602 in support of his contention. In that case, the services of the appellant before the Supreme Court were terminated in accordance with Rule 5 of the Central Civil Service (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, and, thereafter, the appellant learnt that "the respondents had placed a ban" on his "being overtaken into Government service." Their Lordships referred to the reply on behalf of the respondent in some detail and pointed out that the nature of the ban and the justification therefor had not been indicated anywhere, not even in the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the Supreme Court. It was also pointed out that there did not appear to have been any proceeding taken against the appellant giving him an opportunity of showing cause against the proposal of such a ban. Their Lordships further said that the ban imposed by Government should have a reasonable basis and must have some relation to his suitability for his employment or appointment to an office. On these grounds, it was held that the ban had deprived the appellant of his constitutional right and equality of opportunity as contained in Article 16 of the Constitution and the respondents were directed to remove the ban against the petitioner. It is clear that the Supreme Court did not consider, as illegal and ultra vires, a ban against re-employment and emphasised that the nature of the ban should have been indicated in the first instance. If a servant working in a particular department is found not suitable and his services are terminated, it does not necessarily mean that he cannot work efficiently in a different department where the nature of work is wholly different. In this light, their Lordships emphasised more than once in that decision that the nature of the ban should have been indicated and the same should have a rational relationship to the question of the appellants suitability of employment or appointment to an office. In this light, their Lordships emphasised more than once in that decision that the nature of the ban should have been indicated and the same should have a rational relationship to the question of the appellants suitability of employment or appointment to an office. The second reason for the decision was that reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed ban was denied to the appellant. In view of the facts of the present case, the Supreme Court decision is wholly irrelevant. 6 I do not agree with the contention of Mr. Mukherjee that the words reduction in rank do not include permanent reduction in rank. There is no qualification put on the word reduction in Rule 2, mentioned above, and there is no reason why a restricted meaning should be given to the word. There is no suggestion either directly or indirectly in the above rule that the punishment of reduction in rank had to be temporary in nature. Mr. Mukherjee argued that the punishment of permanent reduction will be tantamount to a continuing and recurring punishment inflicted on the petitioner till the date he retires from the Government service which will be wholly unconstitutional. He submitted that if the order (Annexure 1) was not set aside, the petitioner would be suffering innumerable punishments at the rate of one each day. If this argument were to be accepted, it will have to be held that in a case of temporary reduction, say for three months, a delinquent servant is inflicted with about 90 punishments. It will not be correct to interpret the punishment (whether it is in the nature of permanent or temporary) in the way in which the petitioners counsel has attempted to do. The punishment in either case is a single one and does not appear to be beyond the authority granted under R. 2 quoted above. There does not appear to be any valid reason for putting a limitation on and circumscribing the scope of the powers of a punishing authority by giving a restricted interpretation to the words "reduction in rank". I, therefore, reject this argument as unsubstantial. 7. The petitioners Counsel next contended that as the chargesheet served on the petitioner called upon him to show cause against the punishment mentioned therein, the chargesheet was rendered wholly illegal and consequently the entire proceedings and the orders passed therein are all vitiated. Mr. I, therefore, reject this argument as unsubstantial. 7. The petitioners Counsel next contended that as the chargesheet served on the petitioner called upon him to show cause against the punishment mentioned therein, the chargesheet was rendered wholly illegal and consequently the entire proceedings and the orders passed therein are all vitiated. Mr. Mukherjee relied upon three decisions reported in 1968 Serv LR 625 at v. 626 = (1968 Lab IC 735 (Cal)); AIR 1969 Andh Pra 234 and 1970 Serv LR 494 = (1970 Lab IC 1090 (Punj)). In each of these cases, the charge on the respective delinquent servant mentioned the specific punishment proposed to be given in the proceeding, and his Lordship in each of the said cases, held, that it appeared, that the punishing authority had already prejudged the issue and had formed an opinion about the guilt against the servant concerned and the decision punishing the servant suffered from serious bias on the part of the authority concerned. There cannot be any dispute that in case the punishing authority prejudges the issue and suffers from a prejudice against a delinquent Government servant, the order of punishment which is ultimately passed is bound to be illegal as being not the product of an impartial enquiry. It is not correct to say, as has been contended by Mr. Mukherjee that on account of the solitary fact that the chargesheet served on a delinquent servant mentions punishment also, which could be inflicted on him in case he was found guilty on enquiry, unconnected with other circumstances, renders the proceedings null and void. The question whether a punishing authority has suffered in a particular case from any bias or that it has prejudged an issue in the proceeding is essentially a question of fact and has to be decided on the basis of facts and circumstances in every case. A general rule cannot be laid down that, divorced from the evidence, facts and circumstances, in such cases, an inference of bias is irresistible. If the above-mentioned three cases be interpreted to hold otherwise, as suggested by Mr. Mukherjee, I am, with great respect to the learned Judges who decided the said cases, not in agreement with that view. 8. A general rule cannot be laid down that, divorced from the evidence, facts and circumstances, in such cases, an inference of bias is irresistible. If the above-mentioned three cases be interpreted to hold otherwise, as suggested by Mr. Mukherjee, I am, with great respect to the learned Judges who decided the said cases, not in agreement with that view. 8. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the circumstances of this case to find out whether actually the petitioner has sufferred on account of any prejudice or bias against him on the part of the authority concerned. The copy of the chargesheet which has been annexed to the writ application does not show that any specific punishment proposed to be given to the petitioner was mentioned. All the punishments contemplated by the rules were mentioned there, and it cannot, therefore, be suggested that Respondent No. 4 had decided to inflict a particular punishment on the petitioner, especially when permanent reduction in rank was not mentioned specifically. It was included in the last clause, referring to any other punishment, meaning thereby any other suitable punishment. Respondent No. 4, immediately after mentioning the punishments in the charge-sheet, proceeds further with the details of the enquiry to be conducted. It has not been suggested that Respondent No. 4 had chosen a particular officer of his special choice for holding the enquiry who was suspected to be in collusion with him for making a colourable report. There is no assertion of any other fact or circumstance which could indicate mala fide on the part of Respondent No. 4 himself. The further fact that when Sri Chaturvedi, the Officer originally appointed to hold enquiry, became otherwise busy, another person was appointed in his place is also not indicative of any mala fide in the matter. 9. Mr. Mukherjee further contended that it was the duty of the punishing authority to have reconsidered the report of the Enquiring Officer and to record his own findings on the charges before passing an order of punishment on the petitioner. He placed the order of Respondent No. 4 as contained in Annexure 1 and argued that there was no attempt on the part of Respondent No. 4 to scrutinise and come to his own decision regarding the correctness or otherwise of the enquiry report. He placed the order of Respondent No. 4 as contained in Annexure 1 and argued that there was no attempt on the part of Respondent No. 4 to scrutinise and come to his own decision regarding the correctness or otherwise of the enquiry report. He also contended that the enquiry report indicates that charge No. 3 was not proved; at the worst for the petitioner, it was held to have been partially established and if this aspect had been properly considered by the authorities a lenient view might have been taken against the petitioner in connection with the nature of the punishment. Mr. Mukherjee relied upon a decision in State of Assam v. Bimal Kumar Pandit, ( AIR 1963 SC 1612 ) in support of his contention. This argument overlooks the fact that Respondent No. 4, before issuing the second notice accepted the findings of the Officer as correct, as is evident by his order dated 5-10-1962, a copy whereof is annexed to the writ application as Annexure 11. The Collector clearly held that he agreed with the findings of the Enquiring Officer in respect of the five charges. This means that the Collector was in agreement with the Enquiring Officer regarding charges Nos. 1, 2, 5 and 6 as also charge No. 3. The Collector does not say that he has interpreted the findings of the Enquiring Officer to say that charge No. 3 has been fully proved. The agreement with the report on charge No. 3 means that Respondent No. 4 also held the view that charge No. 3 had been partly established at the enquiry. I do not, therefore, find any force in the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner. 10. In the Supreme Court case referred to above, the punishing authority had issued a second notice calling upon the delinquent Officer Bimal Kumar Pandit to show cause as to why the suggested punishment should not be imposed on him. Before this was done, the punishing authority did not expressly hold that he agreed with the findings of the Enquiring Officer and it was contended on behalf of Sri Pandit, who was the respondent before the Supreme Court, that the provisions of the second clause of Art. 311 of the Constitution had been violated. This argument was not accepted. Before this was done, the punishing authority did not expressly hold that he agreed with the findings of the Enquiring Officer and it was contended on behalf of Sri Pandit, who was the respondent before the Supreme Court, that the provisions of the second clause of Art. 311 of the Constitution had been violated. This argument was not accepted. The Court ruled that it was desirable that the punishing authority should indicate about its agreement with the enquiry report expressly before issuing the second notice, but mere omission to do so could not vitiate the proceedings, inasmuch as, it was manifest from issuance of the second notice that the punishing authority was in agreement with the enquiry report. The present case has no similarity with the aforesaid Bimal Kumar Pandits case inasmuch as, here Respondent No. 4 expressly held in Annexure 11 that he agreed with the findings recorded in the enquiry report. The punishing authority in the present case acted in the way, which has been indicated in the reported case, as the proper procedure. There is, therefore, no substance in this point also. 11. Mr. Mukherjee in his last point contended that the entire departmental proceeding was rendered illegal on account of certain serious irregularities committed by the Enquiring Officer, which has resulted in great prejudice to the petitioner. He submitted that the Enquiring Officer, after dealing with the prayer of the petitioner for calling for certain documents, directed that the two documents referred to in the petitioners list as Item Nos. 8 and 9 should be produced by the Block Development Officer. But in spite of this order, the aforesaid two documents were never produced in the proceeding. He also Contended that the petitioner had requested that the Block Development Officer should be examined as a witness in the proceeding and this was also not done. He argued that for both these reasons the enquiry cannot be said to have been properly conducted. I am afraid, I do not agree with the argument. The petitioner had called for the aforesaid two documents in relation to the charge made against him for approaching the Collector directly and not through proper channel of official correspondence. The charge said that by so doing the petitioner had committed an act of indiscipline and insubordination. I am afraid, I do not agree with the argument. The petitioner had called for the aforesaid two documents in relation to the charge made against him for approaching the Collector directly and not through proper channel of official correspondence. The charge said that by so doing the petitioner had committed an act of indiscipline and insubordination. The two concerned documents were relevant only for proving that some of the allegations of the petitioner against the Block Development Officer were correct, they were not relevant at all for the purpose of defence to the charge of indiscipline and insubordination for moving the Collector directly without adopting the prescribed channel of official correspondence. I, therefore, do not agree that the non-production of these two papers had any vital effect on the proceeding itself. Presumably, this must have been the reason why no further reminder was given on behalf of the petitioner on the subsequent dates in the enquiry for the production of the documents. Regarding the examination of the Block Development Officer also, the argument has no force. The Block Development Officer was present on the 3rd August, 1962 and if the petitioner wanted to examine him, he could have certainly done so. Mr. Mukherjee, however, submitted that the Block Development Officer should have been examined in the proceeding not as a witness of the petitioner and that the petitioners suggestion to the Enquirying Officer was that the Block Development Officer should be examined on behalf of the Department. There is no valid reason given by Mr. Mukherjee in support of this point. If the evidence of the Block Development Officer could be helpful, the petitioner should have examined him and, he having failed to do so, cannot be permitted to say that the entire proceeding was vitiated on account of non-examination of the Block Development Officer. I, therefore, reject this last contention also. 12. I, therefore, dismiss this application, but there will be no order as to costs.