JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THE short question that arises in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is, whether section 271 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Panchayats Act, 1962 is ultra vires the State legislature on the ground that it offends against Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. ( 2. ) THE grievance of the petitioners is that section 271 (I) of the Madhya pradesh Panchayats Act, 1962 is constitutionally void inasmuch as it affects (i) the fundamental right of the petitioner No. 1 Chandra Shekhar Sharma an advocate practising at Barwaha, to carry on his profession guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution; and (ii) the right of the petitioner No. 2 amarsingh who is being tried before the Nyaya Panchayat Barwaha, to be represented by a legal practitioner of his choice. ( 3. ) THE problem before us had to be viewed from two angles; first from the view point of the legal practitioners ; and secondly from that of the litigants. Though the question for consideration, as to whether section 271 (I)of the Panchayats Act offends Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution, is of considerable importance to the litigant public it is general and the legal profession in particular, it is no longer res Integra, it being practically concluded by several decisions of the various High Court, from both the view points noted above. ( 4. ) SECTION 271 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Panchayats Act 1962, reads: "271 (1 ). No legal practitioner shall appear, plead or act, on behalf of any party, in any suit or case or proceeding before a Nyaya Panchayat; provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any party who having been arrested in any criminal case, has been brought for trial before a Nyaya Panchayat. " The contention that an advocate enrolled under the Advocates Act, 1961, has the absolute right to practise before all Courts and tribunals can hardly be accepted. Such a right is no doubt conferred by section 30 of the Advocates act. But unfortunately for the legal profession, section 30 has not been brought into force so far, though the Act has been on the statute book for the last twelve years. There is very little that we can do in the matter and it is for the Bar to take it up elsewhere. But unfortunately for the legal profession, section 30 has not been brought into force so far, though the Act has been on the statute book for the last twelve years. There is very little that we can do in the matter and it is for the Bar to take it up elsewhere. A person enrolled as an advocate under the Advocates Act is not Ipso Facto entitled to a right of audience in all Courts, unless section 30 of that Act is first brought into force. That is a matter which is still regulated by different statutes and the extent of the right to practise must depend on the terms of those statutes. The right of the first petitioner to practise is, therefore, just what is conferred on him by section 14 (1) (a) (b) and (c) of the Bar Councils Act, 1926. The relevant provision reads as follows: "14 (1) an advocate shall be entitled as of right to practise - (a) subject to the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 9, in the High Court of which he is an advocate, and (b) save as otherwise provided by sub-section (2) or by or under any other law for the time being in force in any other Court and before any other Tribunal or person legally authorised to take evidence, and (c) before any other authority or person before whom such advocate is by or under the law for the time being in force entitled to practise. " Under section 14 (1) (b) an advocate is no doubt entitled as of right to practise. But the right is not an absolute right. It is a right "subject to the provisions of any law for the time being in force. " This right is also a privilege as it is limited to those who are admitted to the Bar. The right to practise has throughout been held to be "not an absolute right, but a privilege or a franchise". In view of the various authorities on the subject, we cannot but hold that section 271 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Panchayats Act is not an unconstitutional restriction on advocates to practise their profession. ( 5. ) IN Mulchand Gulabchand v. Mukund Shivram Bhide ( AIR 1952 Bom. In view of the various authorities on the subject, we cannot but hold that section 271 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Panchayats Act is not an unconstitutional restriction on advocates to practise their profession. ( 5. ) IN Mulchand Gulabchand v. Mukund Shivram Bhide ( AIR 1952 Bom. 296 .), the question arose before Chagla C. J. and Gajendragadkar J. (as he then was) with reference to rule 36 framed under the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act which provided that "in proceedings held under Rules 32 to 35, no party shall be represented by a legal practitioner". The point for determination was whether this rule was repugnant to Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution as violating the fundamental right of an advocate or pleader to practise. In answering it in the negative, the learned Judges observed : "it is necessary to consider what is the right that a lawyer has, to practise his profession? is it an absolute might to practise in all Courts, in all tribunals, before all persons who have a right to receive evidence and to decide judicially or is it a right which is regulated and restricted by the very charter, which permits him to practise his profession? If a lawyers right was an absolute right then undoubtedly, rule 36 is a restriction upon that right, because it prevents him from appearing before a domestic tribunal like the tribunal set up under the Co-operative Societies Act and we would then have to consider under sub-clause (6) of Article 19 whether that restriction was a reasonable restriction or not But as I shall presently point out, the right of a lawyer to practise is not an absolute right. The very charter which gives him the right to practise controls, limits and circumscribes his right. " After examining the provisions of the Bar Councils Act the learned Judges proceeded to observe: "it should be remembered that it is not the fact that a man has passed a law examination or has acquired a law degree that entitles him to practise in Courts of law; his right to practise depends upon his being enrolled as an advocate and he is enrolled as an advocate on terms and conditions laid down in the Bar Councils Act. " Examining next the provisions of the Legal Practitioners Act, the learned Judges concluded : "therefore just as in the case of Bar Councils Act, the right of a pleader to practise before a tribunal is not an absolute right. It is a right subject to the provisions of any law for the time being in force. " ( 6. ) THE question next arose before Rajamannar, C. J. and Venkararama Aiyar J. in A. N. Rangaswami and another v. The Industrial Tribunal Fort St. George, Madras ( AIR 1954 Mad. 553 .), with reference to section 26 (4) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950. After reviewing the law on the subject, the learned Judges summed up the legal position thus: "the position, therefore, is that a person who has obtained the requisite legal qualifications is not entitled on that grounds alone to a right of audience in Courts. Ha must further be admitted to the bar, before he could practise. That is a matter which is regulated by statutes and the extent of the right to practise must depend on the terms of those statutes. This right is also a privilege as it is limited to those who are admitted to the bar. It is what the American Jurists aptly described as a "franchise". In this country the matter is governed by the Bar Councils Act and the Legal Practitioners Act. The right of the first appellant to practise is, therefore, just what is conferred on him by section 9 and section 14 (1) (a) (b) and (c) of the Bar Councils Act, neither more nor less, and when the particular right claimed by him cannot be found within the four corners of those sections, then there is nothing in respect of which the guarantee under Article 19 (1) (g) could be invoked That article merely operates to protect the rights which a person otherwise possesses under the law. It does not create any new rights in him. The result then is that the right of the first appellant to appear before the tribunal is under section 14 (1) (b) of the Bar Councils Act subject to any law for the time being in force. Section 36 (4) of the Industrial Disputes Act is such a law and under that section he has a right to appear only when the third respondent consents." ( 7. Section 36 (4) of the Industrial Disputes Act is such a law and under that section he has a right to appear only when the third respondent consents." ( 7. ) IN Digamber Aruk and others v. Nanda Aruk and others (AIR 1967 Orissa 181.), a Division bench of the Orissa High Court, repelling the contention that section 94 of the Orissa Gram Panchayats Act which debarred legal practitioners from appearing before a Panchayat Court, has been an unreasonable restriction on the right of a lawyer to carry on his profession under Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution, held following the view of the Bombay and the Madras High Courts, that section 94 of that Act was undoubtedly a "law for the time being in force" and when it said that an advocate shall not be permitted to appear before a Panchayat Court such a provision would necessarily be a provision expressly taking away the right of an advocate to practise conferred by the opening words of section 14 (1) of the Bar Councils Act. ( 8. ) SO also, in Arun Krishna Chitals v. W. N. Huddar and another (Misc. Petition No. 34 of 1966, D/-18-1-1969 (Indora ).), A Division Bench of this Court has held that section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961, not having been brought into force the right of an advocate to practise is still subject to the provisions of section 14 of the Bar Councils Act, 1926. Therefore the right is subject to the provisions otherwise made under sub-section (2) of section 14, as also subject to any other law for the time being in force. In view of these authorities, it must be held that section 271 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Panchayats Act, 1962 is not ultra vires the State Legislature. ( 9. ) THAT brings us to the second aspect of the matter i. e. the so-called right of litigant to be represented before a Nyaya Panchayat by a legal practitioner of his choice, in matters not covered by the proviso. Now, it is well settled that apart from the provisions of Article 22 (1) of the Constitution, no litigant has a fundamental right to be represented by a laywer in any Court. [n. M. Verma and Co. v. Ambalal ( AIR 1956 Cal. Now, it is well settled that apart from the provisions of Article 22 (1) of the Constitution, no litigant has a fundamental right to be represented by a laywer in any Court. [n. M. Verma and Co. v. Ambalal ( AIR 1956 Cal. 476 .); Nabin Chandra v. State of Orissa (AIR 1957 Orissa 56,); Digambar Aruk v. Nanda Aruk (supra); Tikamchand v. Joint Registrar, Co-operative societies ( 1970 MPLJ 976 - 1971 JLJ 73 .)) The only fundamental right recognized by the Constitution is that under Article 22 (1) by which an accused who is arrested and detained in custody is entitled to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v, shobbar and others (1906 MPLJ 961 (S. C.)= AIR 1966 SC 1910 .)accordingly struck down section 63 of the Madhya Bharat Panchayat Act, 1949 in so far as it denied an accused person the right to be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice as being violative of Article22 (1)of the Constitution. Section 271 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Panchayats Act, 1962 however, does not suffer from the voice of such constitutional infirmity inasmuch as the proviso, in terms protects that right. In all other matters, that is in suits or other proceedings in which the accused is not arrested and detained on a criminal charge, the litigant has no fundamental right to be represented by a legal practitioner. ( 10. ) IN the result, the petition fails and is dismissed. There shall, however be no order as to costs. The petitioner is allowed to withdraw the security amount after verification. We are grateful to Shri W. Y. Pande, Shri G. M. Mehta and Shri S. S. Sharma, Government Advocate, who appeared as amicus curiae for the assistance that they have rendered. Petition dismissed.