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1973 DIGILAW 117 (KER)

OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR, PALAI CENTRAL BANK LTD. , v. LAND TRIBUNAL, MUKATHALA

1973-04-06

M.U.ISAAC

body1973
Judgment :- 1. This is an application filed by the Official Liquidator of the Palai Central Bank Ltd. (In Liquidation) to quash the proceedings of respondents 1 to 3, who are Land Tribunals constituted under S 99 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, on applications made by respondents 4 to 13 before the said Tribunals under S.80B of the Act to purchase the kudikidappus alleged to be occupied by them. 2. S.80A of the Act confers a right on every kudikidappukaran to purchase the kudikidappu occupied by him and the lands adjoining thereto to the extent provided in the Act. S.80B provides that an application for that purpose has to be filed before the Land Tribunal having jurisdiction for that area, The Palai Central Bank has purchased certain lands in execution of a decree obtained against one of its debtors. Respondents 4 to 13 claim to be kudikidappukars in some of those properties; and they submitted applications under S.80B before the Land Tribunals concerned. Notices were issued by the Tribunals to the Official Liquidator on those applications. He objected to the jurisdiction of the Tribunals on the basis of S.45B of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. But the Tribunals ignored the objections, and passed orders allowing the applications and issued certificates of purchase to the applicants under S.80C (2). 3. The only question for decision is whether in view of S.45B of the Banking Regulation Act, the Land Tribunals have got jurisdiction to deal with the applications made by respondents 4 to 13 under S.80B of the Land Reforms Act. S.45B reads 45B. Power of High Court to decide all claims in respect of banking companies. 3. The only question for decision is whether in view of S.45B of the Banking Regulation Act, the Land Tribunals have got jurisdiction to deal with the applications made by respondents 4 to 13 under S.80B of the Land Reforms Act. S.45B reads 45B. Power of High Court to decide all claims in respect of banking companies. The High Court shall, save as otherwise expressly provided in S.45C, have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and decide any claim made by or against a banking company which is being wound up (including) claims by or against any of its branches in India or any application made under S.391 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), by or in respect of a banking company or any question of priorities or any other question whatsoever, whether of law or'act, which may relate to or arise in the coarse of the winding up of a banking company, whether such claim or question has arisen or arises or such application has been made or is made before or after the date of the order for the winding-up of the banking company or before or after the commencement of the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 1953 (52 of 1953)". If the applications filed before the Land Tribunals amount to claims made against the banking company which is being wound up, the High Court has exclusive jurisdiction under the above section to entertain and decide those claims. It necessarily follows that no other court. Tribunal or authority has jurisdiction to entertain those claims. S.125 of the Land Reforms Act provides that no civil court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any 'question or to determine any matter which is by this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with or to be determined by the Land Tribunal or other authority under the said Act. But this section cannot prevail against the express provision contained in S.45B of the Banking Regulation Act. which is a Parliamentary Legislation on a subject entirely committed to its jurisdiction. It has been so held by a Division Bench of this Court in Devasia v. Catholic Bank of India Ltd 1971 KLT. 933. But this section cannot prevail against the express provision contained in S.45B of the Banking Regulation Act. which is a Parliamentary Legislation on a subject entirely committed to its jurisdiction. It has been so held by a Division Bench of this Court in Devasia v. Catholic Bank of India Ltd 1971 KLT. 933. That case arose out of an application by the debtor of a banking company under the Kerala Agriculturists' Debt Relief Act, 1970 for a declaration that no debt was due from him under the provisions of the asid Act. And the question was whether the provisions in that Act relating to the scaling down of debts would prevail against the provisions of the Banking Regulation Act. I bad occasion to consider the same question in some detail in Varki v. Grand Eastern Bank Ltd. 1972 KLT. 146. That case arose out of a proceeding for settlement of debts in a Munsiff's Court under the Kerala Agriculturists' Debt Relief Act, 1970, wherein a banking company in liquidation was one of the creditors of the applicant. After noticing the conflicting decisions of the various High Courts on this question, I held that the Munsiff's Court had no jurisdiction to deal with application under the Agriculturists' Debt Relief Act, since it involved a claim against a banking company in liquidation. The above view was upheld by the Division Bench in Varki v. Grand Eastern Bank Ltd. 1972 KLT. 584 though it set aside the order in appeal for some reason which is not apparent from the judgment. 4. It was contended on behalf of the respondents that an application under S.80B of the Land Reforms Act does not amount to a claim against the banking company in liquidation within the meaning of S.45B of the Banking Regulation Act. The application is one to enforce the kudikidappukaran's right to purchase a part of the property belonging to the banking company. The question whether the applicant is a kudikidappukaran, and if so to what extent of land he is entitled, and the fixation and apportionment of compensation to be paid for the land are all matters which fall for adjudication in such an application. It is difficult to accept the contention that such an application does not amount to a claim against the banking company. 5. It is difficult to accept the contention that such an application does not amount to a claim against the banking company. 5. It was also contended that the exclusive jurisdiction vested in the High Court under S.45 B of the Banking Regulation Act relates only to matters falling within the jurisdiction of civil courts for adjudication; and it has no application to matters which fall for decision by tribunals and other statutory authorities, such as Income-tax assessments, industrial disputes, proceedings before revenue authorities and numerous other tribunals. The object of S.458 is clear, namely to bring all claims by or against a banking company in liquidation and all other matters mentioned in that section within the exclusive jurisdiction of the winding up court. The language employed in the section is very wide; and it does not permit a differentiation as contended for on behalf of the respondents'. Such a distinction would also defeat the object of that provision. Whether a certain proceeding would fall within the ambit of S.45B of the Banking Regulation Act should depend on the nature of the proceeding;1 have no doubt that an income tax assessment proceeding would not fall under that section. An industrial dispute may come within its ambit, depending on its nature. In my view, there is no warrant for holding that the exclusive jurisdiction vested in the High Court under the above section operates only in respect of matters falling for adjudication by civil courts. 6. The learned Government Pleader appearing for the Land Tribunals relied on the following passage occurring in the decision of the Supreme Court in S. V, Kondaskar v. V. M. Deshpande (AIR. 1972 SC. 878). Dealing with S.446 of the Companies Act, 1956 the court observed (Vide page 880) "Then comes S.446, which has already been set out. The present sub-s. (2) of this section was substituted for the old one in 1960 by Act 65 of 1960 and sub-s. (4) was also added by that Act. Sub-s. (2) is on the lines of S.7 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act 1909, S.4 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 and S.45B of the Banking Companies Act. The object of this sub-section appears to be to empower "the court as in exercise of insolvency jurisdiction to decide all claims made by or against any company and other questions whatsoever so that winding up proceedings might be expedited". The object of this sub-section appears to be to empower "the court as in exercise of insolvency jurisdiction to decide all claims made by or against any company and other questions whatsoever so that winding up proceedings might be expedited". The question in that case was whether an assessment proceeding against a company which is being wound up was a legal proceeding within the meaning of S.446 (1) of the Companies Act, and leave of the winding up court was necessary to commence the said proceeding. The observation quoted above was mads by the court in discussing about the legislative object and the scope of the above section; and the court held that such a proceeding would not fall within the ambit of the said section. The Court had no occasion in the above case to consider the scope and amplitude of S.45B of the Banking Regulation Act, nor has it made even any observation in that respect. S.45B is in a different language, and its sweep is patently much larger than S.446(1) of the Companies Act. The above observation does not, therefore, support the argument of the learned Government Pleader. The same question as the one which arose in the above decision of the Supreme Court has been considered by me is Official Liquidator v, Income-tax Officer (1971 KLT. 717). The discussion in that case was confined to the scope of S.446(1) of the Companies Act; and there is nothing in that decision also to support the argument of the learned Government Pleader. 7. In the result, I come to the conclusion that an application under S.80B of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 to purchase the rights of a banking company, which is being wound up is a claim against the banking company, which falls within S.45B of the Banking Regulation Act, and that Land Tribunals have, therefore, no jurisdiction to entertain such claims. It follows that respondents! to 3 acted without jurisdiction in entertaining the applications of respondents 4 to 13 f under S.80B of the Land Reforms Act, and the proceedings before the said Tribunals and the certificates issued by them are void and illegal. I declare and order accordingly. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Allowed.