Judgement RAMAPRASADA RAO, J. :- In these two writ petitions the petitioner is seeking a writ of Mandamus for a direction to the respondents 1 to 5 not to interfere in any manner with his right to continue to function as Speaker of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly and also for a preventive injunction restraining the first respondent, the Deputy Speaker of the Assembly, from functioning as Speaker thereto, and by way of a consequential relief asks for the quashing of the notification published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette Extraordinary No. 403 dated 2-12-1972 in Memo No. 22223/72-1 T. N. L. (B) Legislative Assembly III No. 676(a) of 1972, notifying the petitioner as having been removed from the Office of the Speaker of the Tamil Nadu legislative Assembly. 2. Before the relevant facts as reflected in the affidavits filed by the parties are dealt with, certain events anterior to the controversial date, when the petitioner claims that his right to occupy the seat as Speaker of the Assembly has been taken away, have to be noticed. During the General Elections in 1971 the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam as a party was returned to power with a strength of 185 in the House of the Tamil Nadu Assembly as against the total strength of 235. The petitioner was one of the officers of the State Legislature chosen by the Assembly of the State to be the Speaker thereto and the first respondent as the Deputy Speaker thereof. In October, 1972, due to a rift in the party, some members including Sri M. G. Ramachandran, left the party and formed a new party known as Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam party. As early as 30-10-1972, two members of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam party gave notice of removal of the Speaker soon after the rift as above in the party. On 13-11-1972, the Assembly met in its usual session with the petitioner in the Chair as its Speaker. There were inter alia two motions which were to be discussed on that day. One such motion was a no confidence motion against the Government and the other for the removal of the Speaker himself. But the petitioner as such Speaker adjourned the Assembly to 5-12-1972. There were inter alia two motions which were to be discussed on that day. One such motion was a no confidence motion against the Government and the other for the removal of the Speaker himself. But the petitioner as such Speaker adjourned the Assembly to 5-12-1972. On the same day it appears that 183 members belonging to different political parties requested by means of a signed petition that the Speaker should resign at once since he had already lost the confidence of the majority of the Assembly. By then the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam party was of the confirmed view that the speaker was actively participating with Sri M. G. Ramachandran, who for all practical purposes left the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam party by then. In view of the pendency of the several important legislative businesses including financial matters, the Governor, exercising his powers under Art. 174 (2) of the Constitution of India, prorogued the Assembly on 14-11-1972, obviously for the purpose of enabling him to issue an urgent Ordinance. The petitioner apprehending inconvenience filed on 16-11-1972 W. P. No. 2968 of 1972 challenging the order of prorogation on the ground of lack of good faith. Two other members of the Assembly thereafter joined the petitioner in such a common cause and questioned the right of the Governor to prorogue the Assembly. After the prorogation, on 16-11-1972, Sri N. Veerasami and a few others gave notice of resolution for the removal of the speaker to the Secretary of the Legislative Assembly, which was admittedly received by the petitioner. Whilst this was the position, the Governor on 28-11-1972, in exercise of his powers under Article 174 of the Constitution summoned the Assembly to meet on 2-12-1972. On 29-11-1972, the Governor sent a message to the Assembly under Art. 175 (2) listing the business to be transacted by the Assembly and requiring the Assembly inter alia to consider with all convenient despatch any other business for which notice had been given under the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly Rules. I have already referred to one such notice of resolution for the removal of the Speaker given by some members on 16-11-1972. The writ petitions filed by the petitioner and some of the other members of the Assembly came up for hearing before a Full Bench of this Court and judgment was reserved thereon on 30-11-1972. I have already referred to one such notice of resolution for the removal of the Speaker given by some members on 16-11-1972. The writ petitions filed by the petitioner and some of the other members of the Assembly came up for hearing before a Full Bench of this Court and judgment was reserved thereon on 30-11-1972. As the Assembly was summoned by the Governor on 2-12-1972, the matter was set for being spoken to and in the presence of all parties the learned Judges of the Full Bench made it clear that the reservation of the judgment in the earlier Full Bench case did not preclude the Assembly from meeting on 2-12-1972, but such proceedings would however be subject to the result of the judgment in that case. The Full Bench subsequently dismissed the writ petitions. On 2-12-1972, a notice of censure motion was given as against the Ministry. An attempt was made by the leader of the House to dispense with the question hour, but he could not succeed. At about 12 o'clock on 2-12-1972, when the petitioner announced that the question hour was over, the petitioner's case is that he permitted Sri M. G. Ramachandran to speak on the censure motion which was admittedly not a motion included in the message sent by the Governor and which could not have been included as the notice was itself given only in the morning of 2-12-1972. The case of the contesting respondents however is that at 12 noon, when the question hour was over, Sri N. Veeraswami stood up and wanted that his motion for the removal of the Speaker be taken up as such a motion came within the purview of item 8 in the message sent by the Governor as above. As by then the House was aware that nearly 183 members of the Assembly were not in favour of the Speaker occupying the office, the leader of the House moved a resolution in accordance with Art. 181 to the effect that the Deputy Speaker should preside over the House as the House has taken up the resolution for the removal of the Speaker from his office and the same was under consideration. At the behest of the leader of the House, the Deputy Speaker, who has been made a party to these proceedings but who has not chosen to file a counter affidavit but raised a privilege in himself not to be subjected to the jurisdiction of this Court, occupied the Chair and obtained a mandate from the House enabling him to occupy it. It was at this stage that the leader of the House moved another motion under Rule 344 of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly Rules, for the suspension of the latter part of Rule 53, namely, the circulation of the resolution of removal of the Speaker by the Secretary to all the members of the Assembly, together with an intimation about the date appointed for its discussion. It is claimed that this resolution was also carried by an overwhelming majority. Thereafter the Deputy Speaker sought the leave of the House to move the resolution for the removal of the Speaker given notice of by Thiru Veerasami and others and obtained the leave of the House to consider the same. It is said that Thiru Veerasami spoke on the resolution. After this speech it is claimed that no member stood up or requested the Deputy Speaker to permit him to speak on the motion, nor did the petitioner or any of the members of the Opposition Parties seek the leave of the Deputy Speaker to speak on the motion of Thiru Veeraswami. It was in such situation that the motion was put to vote and was carried by a voice vote. The result was that the resolution for the removal of the Speaker which was taken up for consideration and which was ultimately moved and discussed on the floor of the House as a resolution to remove the speaker was accepted by the Assembly and the Speaker is said to have been removed from his office. 3. The above sequence of events are not accepted by the petitioner. According to him, there was no valid notice of motion for his removal on the date when the Assembly met, which could be tabled for consideration by it. His case is that he allowed a no confidence motion against the Ministry, given notice of by Thiru M. G. Ramachandran and others, to be discussed, as, according to him, they sought leave under Rule 55 to move the same. His case is that he allowed a no confidence motion against the Ministry, given notice of by Thiru M. G. Ramachandran and others, to be discussed, as, according to him, they sought leave under Rule 55 to move the same. As already stated, the censure motion was given notice of only on 2-12-1972. This was not one of these motions which could be taken up for consideration as it did not squarely and patently come within any one or the other of the subjects of discussion itemised by the Governor in his message. Nevertheless the petitioner allowed the belated censure motion moved by Thiru M. G. Ramchandran and is said to have obtained the leave of the House to move the same and permitted the mover to speak thereon. There was pandemonium at that stage and it was only during such a confusion that Thiru Veerasami referred to a Memorandum sent to the Speaker as having been given by 184 members and his own resolution for the removal of the Speaker and wanted that it should be given preference and that the said resolution for the removal of the Speaker should be set for consideration forthwith. The petitioner's case is that the 3rd respondent (leader of the House) interrupted and claimed that the Ministry was not afraid of the censure motion, but in view of the fact that a majority of the members were for the resignation of the Speaker as also a specific motion for his removal was under consideration, the petitioner should not occupy the Chair and the Deputy Speaker should be placed therein. There was an uproar and loud protest when the Deputy Speaker occupied the Chair and started contemporaneously along with him and when factually Thiru M. G. Ramachandran was on his legs and was speaking on the censure motion. His case is that the Deputy Speaker strategically occupied the Chair without lawful authority and the subsequent resolution allowed to be moved by him to dispense with a part of R. 53 would be tantamount to a parallel proceeding undertaken by the Deputy Speaker when the Speaker was lawfully functioning and occupying the Chair as an officer for the State Assembly. The petitioner would complain that during the tense situation as above there was nothing but uproar and pandemonium inside the Assembly and no one including the Secretary of the Legislative Assembly would listen to the directions of the petitioner. According to the petitioner, it was all a pre-arranged scheme by the members of the Ruling party and the motion for his removal was not even put to vote as is normal. His case is that on 2-12-1972, after having been apprised of the proposed resolution for his removal from the office he had convened the Business Advisory Committee to meet at 1-30 p. m. on that date so as to fix a date for discussion on the resolution for his removal. It is said that the petitioner continued to occupy the Chair and was functioning as Speaker and he directed the expunging of the various proceedings illegally conducted by respondents 1 to 3. Lastly the petitioner's case is that as nothing but pandemonium prevailed inside the House he had to adjourn it to Monday 4-12-1972 and retire from the Assembly along with Thiru M. G. Ramchandran and others. The petitioner sets up a conspiracy between respondents 1 to 3 and is emphatic that there were two parallel proceedings inside the Assembly and that whilst he was functioning as Speaker the first respondent as Deputy Speaker could not constitutionally functions as the Officer in charge of the Assembly as if a vacancy or absenteeism has occurred in that office. The petitioner having learnt that a resolution for his removal which was under consideration ripened into a discussion and that he was ultimately removed resulting in the Gazette Extraordinary dated 2-12-1972 being issued confirming such removal, has come up to this Court with these writ petitions challenging the entire proceedings, the conduct thereof and the resultant decisions arrived at therein as being irregular and illegal and constitutionally ineffective and therefore prays for the rules under Art. 226 as already stated. 4. Mr. N. C. Raghavachari counsel for the petitioner, raised several contentions which we desire to catalogue for purpose of convenience. 4. Mr. N. C. Raghavachari counsel for the petitioner, raised several contentions which we desire to catalogue for purpose of convenience. He would say that there was at no time any vacancy in the office of the Speaker nor was there a physical absence of the Speaker from the sitting of the Assembly on 2-12-1972, that the resolution for the removal of the Speaker from his office could be deemed for any purpose to be under consideration only when the prescribed rules of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly framed under clause (1) of Art. 208 of the Constitution of India are complied with; that in particular there has not been a strict or substantive compliance of the rules in Chapter IX of the Assembly Rules which provides for resolution for the removal of the Speaker or Deputy Speaker; that in the absence of a date and time being fixed by him in consultation with the Leader of the House for the discussion of such a notice of resolution, the resolution moved by Thiru N. Veerasami and others cannot be said to be a valid resolution at all for the removal of the petitioner from his office, nor could it be said that such a resolution was under consideration at any time on 2-12-1972. His second contention is, if an Assembly is prorogued at the mandate of the Governor and if he resummons the same in exercise of his powers under Art. 174 (1) and since a message under Art. 175 (2) within such a session is a special one and the Speaker as the supreme authority entitled to preside over such a session has the sole and exclusive right to transact the business as mandated in the message, to commence the same as he desires and to conclude it as he wishes, and if once the Speaker in such a Session commences business in a manner deemed fit by him, no other member of the Assembly including the Leader of the House has the right to intercept the conduct and flow of such proceedings; that in the context when the speaker allowed Thiru M. G. Ramachandran to move the subject on the censure motion against the Ministry, any pegging into such a process either at the instance of the Leader of the House or any other member of the House is illegal and in consequence the resultant decisions taken by such an intercepted but illegal activity is also void and has to be corrected by judicial process. Furthering his contention it was urged that every act of the Deputy Speaker, commencing from the moment when he purported to occupy the Speaker's chair as if there was a vacancy or absenteeism for the purpose of conducting that day's proceedings, including the allowance of the resolution for the removal of the Speaker, securing the leave of the House for its consideration and ultimately securing a resolution from the House to remove the Speaker, are all in the hotchpot of illegality and therefore null and void. Thus highlighted it is said that the entire proceedings are not protected under Art. 212 of the Constitution or from judicial scrutiny by virtue of a due process taken and initiated by the aggrieved party under the normal rule of law. Learned counsel for the petitioner further said that item 8 of the message sent by the Governor itemising the subjects to be discussed on 2-12-1972 could not include the motion for removal of the Speaker and for a greater reason it could not engulf a motion which requires a date to be fixed in accordance with Chapter IX of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly rules. It is for the Speaker to control the business to be undertaken by the House and he cannot be persuaded to take up the agenda in accordance with the wish of the House, may it be at the instance of the majority members assembled in the House. According to the petitioner, there was no valid notice of motion for his removal, and even if there was one, it lapsed by efflux of time. In any event, the non-observance of the prescription in R. 53 of the Legislative Assembly Rules would amount to a violation of the intention of Art. 179 (c) read with the proviso thereto. It was also said that the expression 'the then members of the Assembly' in Art. 179 (c) has a special signification and that a resolution of far-seeking importance ought to have been accepted by a majority of all the members of the House whether present or not. Lastly it was said that the Speaker was not allowed to speak and take part in the proceedings of the Legislative Assembly while the resolution for his removal from office was considered by it. 5. Countering these contentions Mr. M. K. Nambiyar, appearing for the contesting respondents, after tracing the powers, privileges and immunities of the Legislature and referring to the specific powers of the Governor in the matter of prorogation and summoning of the Assemblies, forcibly contended that every contention of the petitioner in so far as it has an impact on the proceedings inside the Assembly, is beyond the judicial review and Art. 212 of the Constitution places such subjects beyond the pale of questionability by any authority including a Court on the basis of any alleged irregularity of procedure therein. He would state that the office of Speaker is a creature of the Assembly and as all questions in the Assembly have to be decided by a majority and as in a democratic process the rule of majority has to prevail on any subject, and if the mandate of the House is that the Speaker was no longer acceptable to them and cannot hold the office, and as the office itself is held during the pleasure of such majority, the petitioner cannot even be said to be an aggrieved or affected person who can agitate the same under Art. 226 of the Constitution. On the merits, it was said that there was a valid resolution which could be taken up by the Assembly after being summoned at the behest of the Governor and such a valid resolution for the removal of the Speaker was considered after securing the leave of the House and on such consideration the resolution to remove the speaker was made at the instance of the majority of the members present in the Assembly that the majority of all the then members of the Assembly, referred to in Art. 179 (c), obviously would refer to those members present in the Assembly when the resolution is discussed. He would also state that Rule 53 is subject to Art. 175 (2) of the Constitution and that if under the message tabled by the Governor for discussion by the Assembly includes a subject which in turn takes into its fold a notice of motion for the removal of the Speaker, then to that extent the application of Rule 53 and the fixation of a date for discussion of the motion by the Speaker would sink into insignificance and non-adherence to such a rule which is basically and foundationally procedural would not affect the decision taken by the majority of the members in the Assembly on such a subject. In any event it was stated that the House as the ultimate repository of power to frame their rules touching the conduct of the business inside the Assembly, has the power to deviate thereafter and any such deviation could only be characterised as an irregularity which would not in any manner vitiate the proceedings. Factually it was said that the message issued by the Governor was scrutinised by the Speaker himself and should be therefore deemed that the petitioner as Speaker had notice of such resolutions of which notice has been given under the Legislative Assembly Rules. It was said that one such notice of motion which was validly received and which could be discussed in the Assembly on 2-12-1972 was a resolution for the removal of the speaker. He therefore seeks for the discharge of the rule nisi. 6. It is convenient at this stage to refer generally to the powers and privileges of State Assemblies and the characteristics inhered in the office of the speaker chosen by such an Assembly. He therefore seeks for the discharge of the rule nisi. 6. It is convenient at this stage to refer generally to the powers and privileges of State Assemblies and the characteristics inhered in the office of the speaker chosen by such an Assembly. Article 189 (1) enables the House of the Legislature of a State to determine all questions arising before it at any sitting by a majority of votes of the members present and voting, other than the Speaker or a person acting as such. Regarding the Speaker or the person acting for him he shall not vote in the first instance, but shall have and exercise a casting vote in the case of an equality of votes. There is however an exception to this rule which envisages the contingency of a contrary provision in the Constitution itself. Article 208 (1) dealing with the general procedure, enables a House of the Legislature to make rules for regulating subject to the provisions of the Constitution, its procedure and the conduct of its business. It is in exercise of such powers that the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly Rules have been framed. Article 174 compels the Governor to summon from time to time the House of the Legislature of the State to meet at such time and place as he thinks fit, but the intermittent period not exceeding six months. He has the right to prorogue the House or dissolve the Assembly under Art. 174 (2). Under Art. 196 (3), a pending Bill in the Legislature of a State shall not lapse by reason of the prorogation of the house. This is a departure from the English convention inasmuch as the prorogation of the House does not affect the business pending before the Legislature at the time of prorogation (Purushothaman v. State of Kerala, AIR 1962 SC 694 at p. 700). "Session" has been defined in the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly rules as the period of time between the first meeting of the Assembly upon the summons of the Governor under Art. 174 (1) of the Constitution and its prorogation or dissolution under Cl. (2) thereof. "Session" has been defined in the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly rules as the period of time between the first meeting of the Assembly upon the summons of the Governor under Art. 174 (1) of the Constitution and its prorogation or dissolution under Cl. (2) thereof. Rule 13 while stating that the session of the Assembly is terminated by prorogation, also lays down that on the prorogation of a session, all pending notices and businesses shall lapse except bills which have been introduced, and resolutions which have been moved and are pending in the House; provided that fresh notice shall be given for motions in regard to such Bills. Article 178 refers to officers of the State legislature, who are the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker and they are chosen by the Members of the Legislative Assembly itself. The office of Speaker being obviously an office resulting from election or choice, the person so chosen holds the office during the pleasure of the majority. As a Speaker is expected to be a friend of every member and be circumspect in all respects, it is an office of reverence as total impartiality is the basic requisite of the office. The Speaker is undoubtedly a servant of the House, not its Master, and the authority transmitted to him by the House is the authority of the House itself which he exercises in accordance with the mandates, interests and well being of the House. He is always cloistered in the shell of the will of the House. Article 179 provides for vacancy, resignation and removal of a Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A member holding the office as Speaker may be removed from his office by a resolution of the Assembly passed by a majority of all the then members of the Assembly; provided that no resolution for the purpose shall be moved unless at least fourteen days notice has been given of the intention to move the resolution. Such a notice under the rules could be given under Rule 26 (2) even when the Assembly is not in session. Article 180 in general provides for the substitution of the Deputy Speaker when a vacancy arises in the office of Speaker. Article 180 (2) says that during the absence of the Speaker from any sitting of the Assembly the Deputy Speaker shall act as Speaker. Article 180 in general provides for the substitution of the Deputy Speaker when a vacancy arises in the office of Speaker. Article 180 (2) says that during the absence of the Speaker from any sitting of the Assembly the Deputy Speaker shall act as Speaker. Article 181 (1), which is very relevant for our purposes, may be extracted : "181 (1) At any sitting of the Legislative Assembly while any resolution for the removal of the Speaker from his office is under consideration, the Speaker, or while any resolution for the removal of the Deputy Speaker from his office is under consideration, the Deputy Speaker, shall not, though he is present, preside, and the provisions of clause (2) of Art. 180 shall apply in relation to every such sitting as they apply in relation to a sitting from which the Speaker or, as the case may be, the Deputy Speaker, is absent. (2) The Speaker shall have the right to speak in, and otherwise to take part in the proceedings of, the Legislative Assembly while any resolution for his removal from office is under consideration in the Assembly and shall, notwithstanding anything in Article 189, be entitled to vote only in the first instance on such resolution or on any other matter during such proceedings but not in the case of an equality of votes." Article 194 (3) provides for two parts. The first part enables the House of the Legislature to make a law defining its powers, privileges and immunities and the second part says that until such a law is passed, such powers, privileges and immunities shall be those of the House of Commons of the Parliament of the United Kingdom at the commencement of the Constitution. Article 212 says that the validity of any proceedings in the Legislature of a State shall not be questioned on the ground of any irregularity of procedure. Sub-clause (2) of the said Art. 212 provides that no officer or member of the Legislature of a State in whom powers are vested by or under the Constitution for regulating procedure or the conduct of the business, or for maintaining order, in the Legislature shall be subject to the jurisdiction of any Court in respect of the exercise by him of those powers. The force of the language in Art. 212 shall be considered later. The force of the language in Art. 212 shall be considered later. Chapter IX of the Rules refers to resolution for the removal of the Speaker or Deputy Speaker and the procedure to be adopted to achieve such an object. Under Rule 52 a resolution of the kind as above may be moved in accordance with Art. 179 (c) of the Constitution with the leave of the House; provided that no resolution for the purpose shall be moved unless at least 14 days notice has been given to the Secretary of the intention to move the resolution. 7. Rule 53 which looms large in this case may be extracted - "On receipt of notice of such a resolution the Speaker shall, in consultation with the Leader of the House, appoint a date for its discussion. The Secretary shall cause the resolution to be circulated to all the members of the Assembly, together with an intimation about the date appointed for its discussion." 8. Rule 54 provides that not less than 35 members should rise when a resolution to remove the Speaker or the Deputy Speaker is read out in the House for the first time and it is only on such rising of members that leave to move the resolution has to be presumed. If there is no such co-ordination the Speaker is bound to inform the member giving notice of the resolution that he has not the leave of the Assembly to move it. A reference may be made to Rule 21 which speaks of 'list of business and papers placed on the table' and Clause (2) therein says that except as provided in the rules, no business not included in the list of business for the day shall be transacted at any sitting except business of a formal or ceremonial nature. Rule 22 provides for question hour, which is the first hour of every sitting unless the House unanimously resolves otherwise. Rule 244 is a non obstante rule which enables any member, with the consent of the Speaker to move that any rule may be suspended in its application to a particular motion before the House and if the motion is carried by three-fourths of the total number of members present and voting at the meeting, the rule in question shall be suspended for the time being. With the above background of the relevant provisions of the Constitution and the rules the relevant contentions of the parties can be weighed. 9. We shall first take up the contention whether there is any speciality in the session of the House of the Legislature of the State summoned by the Governor after prorogation. 'Session' is defined in Rule 2 (q) of the Rules. It connotes the actual time between the first meeting of the Assembly and its prorogation or dissolution. It is common knowledge that a session is terminated by prorogation. But on such prorogation all pending notices and businesses excepting Bills which have been introduced and resolutions which have been moved, shall lapse. No doubt, such Bills could be taken up on fresh notice. We have already noticed Art. 196 (3), in consonance of which, Rule 13 (b) of the Rules has been framed. We have referred to these aspects only to demonstrate that the summoning of the Assembly by the Governor after prorogation by itself does not create the impression that it is a session other than the normal. The observations of the Supreme Court in M. S. M. Sharma v. Shree Krishna Sinha, AIR 1960 SC 1186 are apposite in this connection. The Court said - "The prorogation of the Assembly does not mean its dissolution. The House remains the same; only its sessions are interrupted by prorogation of the House according to the exigencies of public demands on the time and attention of the members of the Assembly and the volume of business of the Assembly itself. The effect of the prorogation only is to interrupt the proceedings which are received on a fresh motion to carry on or renew the proceedings." The argument proceeds that in view of the alleged speciality in the session, no one member of the Assembly can intercept or interrupt the proceedings and it is for the Speaker as the supreme authority within the forum of the Assembly to transact the set items of business seriatim. It was also said that it is for the Speaker to man the proceedings inside the House and he is the supreme head to decide as to the manner and method by which the itemised subjects could be dealt with. We are not impressed with this argument. It was also said that it is for the Speaker to man the proceedings inside the House and he is the supreme head to decide as to the manner and method by which the itemised subjects could be dealt with. We are not impressed with this argument. There is nothing to indicate either in the provisions of the Constitution or in the rules framed under Art. 208 to gain the conclusion that the Assembly if summoned after prorogation would be clothed with a special garb of identification, nor would it impress it with a badge of singularity apart from normal. Article 175 (2) of the Constitution of India does not create any such special situation. One of the Constitutional responsibilities of the Governor of a State is to summon an Assembly after he prorogues it. This is an event which must necessarily follow the initial prorogation and as such summoning in the peculiar circumstances is the responsibility of the Governor of the State, he issues a message which is practically equal to the agenda of the session which has to be transacted in the summoned session of the Assembly. No provision of acceptable law has been brought to our notice, nor any such practice prevailing in the British Parliament warrants the presumption that there is any distinctiveness or speciality about a summoned Assembly. No doubt, it is for the Speaker to preside over it and transact the business. But that is not an indicia to sustain the extraordinary case of the petitioner that no one member present in the Assembly has the right to intercept his scheme of conduct of the proceedings, which is even contrary to the mandate issued by the Governor under Art. 175 (2) when resummoning the Assembly after prorogation. The censure motion against the Ministry, which is not a formal subject, allowed by the petitioner to be moved was not within the periphery of the message sent by the Governor and so normally could not be taken up for discussion under Rule 21 (2). The message of the Governor, which is a directive to all concerned, is at once a mandate and a mandate pregnant with details as to the subjects to be discussed in the Assembly session. The message of the Governor, which is a directive to all concerned, is at once a mandate and a mandate pregnant with details as to the subjects to be discussed in the Assembly session. As it is common ground, as we shall presently refer to that such an agenda contained in the message was notified to all concerned including the Speaker and the Assembly reassembled to transact such notified businesses, it follows that the proceedings to be conducted therein are subject to the usual norms and principles which govern the conduct of such proceedings of a Legislative Assembly of a State and generally in accordance with the rules framed under Art. 208 of the Constitution, such rules, unless there is cause for deviation and it is so desired by the house are ordinarily understood to be the magna carta for the conduct of the proceedings of the Assembly. There is therefore no peculiar significance attached to the session of the Assembly which is summoned after the prorogation. 10. The next point to be considered is what was the scope and content of the message given by the Governor under Article 175 (2) and what were the motions which were alive and which could be discussed in the session and whether the seriated items in the message are to be strictly followed inside the House without any deviation or departure therefrom even in the matter of taking up one item therein in advance over other stated items. We have looked into the files and we are fairly satisfied that the draft agenda as contained in the message was seen by the petitioner and approved by the leader of the House. The list of businesses for the meeting of the Assembly to be transacted at 11 a.m. on Saturday, 2-12-1972, was circulated to all members after the petitioner was informed about it and it contained the following items - "1. Discussion on the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board's annual Financial statement for 1972-73 and Supplementary Financial statement for 1971-72. 2. Presentation and Discussion on the second supplementary statement of expenditure for the year 1972-73. 3. Ratification of the Constitution (13th Amendment) Bill, 1972, as passed by both the Houses of Parliament; 4. The report of the Select Committee on the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Income-tax (Amendment) Bill, 1972 (L. A. Bill No. 37 of 1972); 5. 2. Presentation and Discussion on the second supplementary statement of expenditure for the year 1972-73. 3. Ratification of the Constitution (13th Amendment) Bill, 1972, as passed by both the Houses of Parliament; 4. The report of the Select Committee on the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Income-tax (Amendment) Bill, 1972 (L. A. Bill No. 37 of 1972); 5. A Bill to replace the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Income-tax (Amendment) Ordinance, 1972 (Tamil Nadu Ordinance No. 3 of 1972); 6. A Bill to replace the Tamil Nadu Betting Tax (Second Amendment) Ordinance 1972 (Tamil Nadu Ordinance No. 4 of 1972); 7. The Tamil Nadu District Police (Amendment) Bill, 1972; 8. Any other business for which Notice has been given under the Legislative Assembly Rules." We have already expressed the view that item 8 in the message forwarded by the Governor of the State included any other business for which notice has been given under the Legislative Assembly Rules. Our Constitution has made a departure from the English practice in the matter of cessation of business which was pending consideration before the House at the time of prorogation. Whilst in England prorogation puts an end to all businesses which were so pending, under our Constitution the principle is governed by Art. 194 (3) read with Rule 13 of the Rules. There is a lapsing of pending notices and businesses excepting Bills on the prorogation of a session. But our Constitution is silent about such notices and motions given after the prorogation. In the instant case, whatever may be said of the notice of motion given by some members of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam party on 30-10-1972 and whatever may be the implication of the memorandum sent by 183 members of the Assembly on 13-11-1972, requesting the petitioner to resign since he has lost the confidence of the House, there was a notice of motion given by Thiru Veerasami and three others on 16-11-1972, which was indeed after the date of prorogation of the House by the Governor's prerogative on 14-11-1972. This notice of motion was certainly alive and was available for discussion on 2-12-1972, when the Assembly was resummoned. It satisfies the prescription as to time provided in the proviso to Clause (c) of Art. 179. This notice of motion was certainly alive and was available for discussion on 2-12-1972, when the Assembly was resummoned. It satisfies the prescription as to time provided in the proviso to Clause (c) of Art. 179. It is not disputed that such a notice was given in writing addressed to the Secretary and left at the office of the Assembly as prescribed in Rule 26 (1) and the petitioner also was aware of such a notice as is seen from the counter affidavit filed by the Secretary of Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly. He would state that on 16-11-1972, he received four notices of resolution for the removal of the Speaker from Thiru Anbuchezhian, Thiru Durai Murugan, Thiru V. Krishnamurthi and Thiru N. Veeraswami. After affixing the date seal on receipt of such motions and after entering the same in the register, these notices were submitted to the petitioner on the same day itself. The fifth respondent would state that the petitioner did not sign any of these papers in token of having seen them or indicating the course of action to be adopted. Subsequently too several similar notices were received and it appears that the petitioner signed one such notice on 22-11-1972 in token of acknowledgment. The case of the fifth respondent is that on 2-12-1972, the petitioner brought all these papers and left them behind in his Chambers. It is significant to note that the petitioner did not controvert that 183 members belonging to different political parties requested by a written petition that the speaker should resign at once since he had already lost the confidence of the majority of the Assembly. In the context of events as above, the censure motion moved by Thiru M. G. Ramachandran and others on the morning of 2-12-1972 was sought to be given a preference by the Speaker. Such a motion in the conspectus of event as above cannot be characterised as one which was a motion which could be brought in and allowed to be discussed on that day as being within the compass of the message. This motion squarely comes within Rule 55. Rule 55 (b) prescribes that the member seeking for such leave to move a motion of no confidence must before the commencement of the sitting of the day, leave with the Secretary a written notice of the motion which he proposes to make. This motion squarely comes within Rule 55. Rule 55 (b) prescribes that the member seeking for such leave to move a motion of no confidence must before the commencement of the sitting of the day, leave with the Secretary a written notice of the motion which he proposes to make. It is not suggested that the procedure prescribed in Rule 55 was followed. Even otherwise, the agenda having been prescribed by the Governor in the message as above, it was not open to the Speaker to bypass the same and introduce an irregular censure motion and cause it to be taken up out of time at that particular juncture. If the Speaker took the motion of no confidence of Thiru M. G. Ramachandran in the first instance as claimed and if the House resented the said action because of its out of context introduction, into the House of the Assembly and since it ran repugnant to the written mandate of the Governor under Art. 175 (2), then the petitioner can have no basis for complaint. It cannot be said that the petitioner was ignorant of the nature and content of the subjects that are to be discussed on 2-12-1972. In so far as 2-12-1972 is concerned, it is peculiar in the sense that in the session which began on that day the itemised subjects set out in the message are to be discussed willy-nilly and the Speaker, though the presiding officer therein, cannot, for reasons which are more personal in the instant case, attempt to make a deliberate deviation therefrom so as to cloud the agenda by the introduction of non-discussable items on the floor of the Assembly. The petitioner himself was aware of the notice of motion of no confidence, given by members on 16-11-1972. He has also felt the pulse of the majority of the members of the Assembly even on 13-11-1972, when a memorandum signed by 183 members of the Assembly was sent asking the Speaker to resign. The Secretary of the Assembly, whose statement as to facts we have no reason to brush aside, states that the petitioner was aware of such a notice of motion dated 16-11-1972, which was sent to him for information. There was therefore a subject which would squarely come within item 8 of the message of the Governor. The Secretary of the Assembly, whose statement as to facts we have no reason to brush aside, states that the petitioner was aware of such a notice of motion dated 16-11-1972, which was sent to him for information. There was therefore a subject which would squarely come within item 8 of the message of the Governor. When after the question hour this motion was sought to be taken up at the instance of the movers of the resolution, any overt act on the part of the Speaker to ignore such a legitimate move on the part of the members of the Assembly can only be understood as a self serving one to buttress the events and to set up a contention which is prima facie not acceptable. The censure motion said to have been forwarded on 2-12-1972 by Thiru M. G. Ramachandran and others is one which is not includible under one or the other of the heads of the message. But the petitioner thought that he could seek the leave of the House and even allow discussion on it when he could not. It is this attitude which is sought to be characterised by the Leader of the House as proof of the partisan spirit which the Speaker was exhibiting since in the circumstances as above he accepted an irregular motion but would not allow a regular discussable motion to be taken up before the House at the appointed time. Thus we are of the view that the motion of Thiru N. Veerasami and three others was in order and could be discussed after question hour on 2-12-1972. 11. At this stage it is convenient to refer particularly to the incidents which happened on 2-12-72, inside the House. No doubt, the version of the petitioner is totally denied by the respondents. The petitioner concedes that he received the message from the Governor required by Art. 175 (2), which included item 8 therein. We have also expressed our opinion that under item 8 the notice of motion, of which notice was issued on 16-11-1972, was in order and could be taken up for discussion on the resummoned day. The petitioner concedes that he received the message from the Governor required by Art. 175 (2), which included item 8 therein. We have also expressed our opinion that under item 8 the notice of motion, of which notice was issued on 16-11-1972, was in order and could be taken up for discussion on the resummoned day. After the question hour was over, according to the petitioner, the five notices of no confidence motion against the Ministry given notice of on that day under Rule 55 by Thiru M. G. Ramachandran, Thiru K. T. K. Thangamani, Smt T. N. Ananthanayaki, Dr. Hande and Mr. James were sought to be moved. He took up that motion, and, according to him, he secured the necessary leave of the House and consequent thereto he allowed Thiru M. G. Ramachandran to speak on it. But he concedes that there was shouting inside the House and in spite of his attempt to call the House to order there was confusion. The petitioner's case is that it was in this state of affairs the notice of motion of Thiru N. Veerasami, of which notice was given on 16-11-1972 was moved and the members insisted that that motion should be taken up first. The petitioner concedes that as the said motion involved the consideration of a resolution for the removal of the speaker, the Leader of the House wanted the Deputy Speaker to occupy the chair as eo instanti when the resolution for the removal of the Speaker is under consideration, a deemed vacancy is said to arise within the meaning of Clauses (1) and (2) of Art. 180 of the Constitution. The petitioner's case is that he would not heed to the request of the member to move the resolution for his removal and he directed the expunging of all the speeches in connection thereto. According to him, during all the time, Thiru M. G. Ramachandran was addressing the House. We would also refer to the removal of the mike in front of Thiru M. G. Ramachandran and occupation of the Chair by the Deputy Speaker. According to him, during all the time, Thiru M. G. Ramachandran was addressing the House. We would also refer to the removal of the mike in front of Thiru M. G. Ramachandran and occupation of the Chair by the Deputy Speaker. The Deputy Speaker sought the leave of the House to occupy the chair, occupied it and, at the instance of the Leader of the House, accepted the resolution to dispense with R. 53 and the petitioner claims that in such parallel proceedings the leave of the House is said to have been secured for such dispensation. According to him, he directed expunging of all these proceedings as well. He concedes that there was continuous shouting and disturbances all the time, whilst he would say that Thiru M. G. Ramachandran was continuously addressing the House on his original notice of motion of no confidence against the Ministry. The petitioner would also refer to the bell on his table being taken away by the Chief Whip of the Government and placed on the table of the Deputy Speaker. Certain minor incidents such as taking away of the records and breaking of his spectacles are all referred to. Thiru N. Veerasami was allowed by the Deputy Speaker, who was then occupying the Chair and who obtained the leave of the House in due form to move the resolution and it was put to the House and the Deputy Speaker declared that the motion was carried with a voice vote. Thereafter the business of the House was conducted in accordance with the mandate of the Ministry. The petitioner still would say that he asked the permission of the House for extension of the proceedings beyond 1-30 p. m. as the House was to break at 1-30 p. m. and allowed Thiru M. G. Ramachandran and others to speak on the no confidence motion against the Ministry till 2 p. m. He would claim that he had already advised the Business Advisory Committee to meet at 1-30 p. m. to discuss the fixing of the date for discussion of motion for his removal. This is expressly denied by the third respondent. The Speaker would also add in his supplemental affidavit that he was not given an opportunity to speak in the proceedings for his removal from office, and he would add that, there was preplanned conspiracy to usurp his functions. This is expressly denied by the third respondent. The Speaker would also add in his supplemental affidavit that he was not given an opportunity to speak in the proceedings for his removal from office, and he would add that, there was preplanned conspiracy to usurp his functions. The above particular facts are relevant for consideration in these writ petitions. 12. Countering these facts the Leader of the House, Thiru V. R. Nedunchezhian, would say that on 2-12-1972, 183 members belonging to different political parties expressed that the Speaker had already lost the confidence of the majority of the Assembly and it was in that atmosphere the Assembly met after being summoned by the Governor. He made an attempt to dispense with the question hour, but he was not successful. Immediately after the question hour was over, according to the third respondent, Thiru N. Veerasami stood up and wanted that the removal notice given by him and others must be taken into consideration and given preference. He supported the mover having regard to the saturated atmosphere in the Assembly which was against the Speaker continuing in office. As the resolution for the removal of the Speaker was taken up for consideration, the moment it was moved by Thiru N. Veerasami, the third respondent moved that the Deputy Speaker should preside over the House. The House agreed and it was only thereafter that the Deputy Speaker occupied the Chair. Rule 53 was thereafter dispensed with by invoking R. 244 of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly rules. The leave of the House was secured to take up the resolution to remove the Speaker and after some speeches by the members and when the petitioner did not express his anxiety to participate in the discussion or speak against it, the Deputy Speaker put the motion to vote and it was carried by a large majority. The third respondent therefore says that the resolution of Thiru N. Veerasami was moved immediately after the question hour and the no confidence motion against the Ministry which the Speaker allowed Thiru M. G. Ramachandran to move and speak on cannot be one of the subjects, which could be discussed at all on that date as it ran contra to the catalogued items in the message. It is claimed that the petitioner did not participate in the proceedings conducted by the Deputy Speaker nor did he desire to speak or vote on the motion for his removal. The third respondent is emphatic that no sooner the motion of no confidence against the Speaker was tabled in the House, the Speaker had no right to occupy the chair or strike the bell and thereby disturb the proceedings of the House. The bell was removed since he had no authority to strike it. The resolution to remove him was validly moved and passed. There was no necessity for the Business Advisory Committee to meet and fix a date for the resolution as item 8 of the message of the Governor itself included the resolution for the removal of the Speaker within its pale and the motion of Thiru N. Veerasami became a valid discussable motion on the floor of the house on 2-12-1972. 13. The Secretary of the Legislative Assembly says that there were no such parallel proceedings as contended by the petitioner and he denies that any of the papers of the petitioner were removed as contended. According to him the debates in the Assembly on the crucial date were duly printed and it contains a correct replica of the events that happened and it was published on 15-12-1972, after consolidating such discussions. The debates are reflective of the correct position. Thirumati T. N. Ananthanayaki and Thiru M. G. Ramachandran and Thiru K. T. K. Thangamani have filed supporting affidavits that the notice of no confidence motion against the Ministry was taken up first and that it was only later that the motion of Thiru N. Veerasami came up for consideration. To counteract this, 145 affidavits have been filed by the members of the Assembly duly sworn which in all respects support the version of the third respondent. 14. What emerges from the versions of the events that happened on 2-12-1972 is that there was undoubtedly pandemonium and confusion during the session. The petitioner who was presiding over the Assembly was aware that there was a resolution for his removal which was to be considered at that session. This is because the draft message of the Governor and the business to be undertaken by the Assembly was seen by him and approved by him. The petitioner who was presiding over the Assembly was aware that there was a resolution for his removal which was to be considered at that session. This is because the draft message of the Governor and the business to be undertaken by the Assembly was seen by him and approved by him. He should therefore be deemed to be conscious of the fact that there was a certain possibility of such a resolution for his removal being taken up for consideration by the House on 2-12-1972. With this consciousness he occupied the Chair and he has therefore to face the limitations of such occupancy. The motion of Thiru M. G. Ramachandran which was given notice of on that date, no doubt, was an item which could be discussed normally in normal situations. But in view of the fact that the agenda of the summoned Assembly has been fixed by the Governor under Art. 175 (2), it was the primordial duty of the Speaker as the holder of office under the Constitution to obey such a mandate and act in accordance with the itemised agenda therein. In our view, he ought not to have allowed the no confidence motion against the Ministry to be moved at that stage before he began transacting the other business as set in the message. Even so, he had not the requisite control and authority to allow Thiru M. G. Ramachandran to move or discuss about the no confidence motion against the Ministry when he could not preside over the House. A vacancy in the office of the speaker is created by Thiru N. Veerasami's rising after question hour and moving the resolution for removal of the Speaker. There was no occasion or necessity for him to fix up a date for the discussion of the resolution for his removal from office. The date has already been fixed by himself giving assent to item 8 of the agenda which included one such resolution of which valid notice was given on 16-11-1972. In our view, it was not even necessary for the Leader of the House to seek for a dispensation of Rule 53 by invoking Rule 244. Apparently the Leader of the House by way of abundant caution sought for its dispensation. That by itself would not make any difference in the eye of law or in the wake of the constitutional provisions. Apparently the Leader of the House by way of abundant caution sought for its dispensation. That by itself would not make any difference in the eye of law or in the wake of the constitutional provisions. The undeniable fact is that there was a resolution for the removal of the Speaker which could be validly taken up for consideration on 2-12-1972, and it was this which was sought to be done immediately after the question hour. The petitioner, for reasons better known to himself, did not allow such a motion. Under Art. 181 (1), if at any sitting of the Legislative Assembly while, any resolution for the removal of the Speaker from this office is under consideration, the Speaker shall not, though he is present, preside. In such contingency, the provisions of Art. 180 (2) shall apply in relation to every such sitting as if the Speaker is absent. It is in those circumstances that the deemed vacancy was appreciated by the House and the Leader of the House in consequence thereof sought the leave of the House through the Deputy Speaker for the latter to occupy the chair and conduct the proceedings thereafter. We are of the opinion that the attitude of the petitioner in not having allowed the resolution of Thiru N. Veerasami and others to be moved when it was sought to be moved was not in order and it was repugnant to the Constitution and its duly set norms. His attempt to continue to occupy the Chair when a resolution for his removal was under consideration is yet again a constitutional violation. The expression 'for the removal of the Speaker' has to be given its full significance. The resolution for the removal of a Speaker is undoubtedly elastic in its content and somewhat different from a resolution to remove a Speaker. A resolution for the removal of the Speaker becomes operative when a notice of motion for the removal of the Speaker is given and is taken up for consideration. Eo instanti when such a resolution comes up for consideration there is a deemed vacancy under the provisions of the Constitution and the Speaker even though he is physically present is said to be constitutionally absent and cannot therefore be the Presiding Officer of the Assembly from that moment. Eo instanti when such a resolution comes up for consideration there is a deemed vacancy under the provisions of the Constitution and the Speaker even though he is physically present is said to be constitutionally absent and cannot therefore be the Presiding Officer of the Assembly from that moment. It was this position that was correctly understood by the Leader of the House and the majority of the members when they allowed the Deputy Speaker to occupy the Chair. The minor incidents that followed such a switching off of the mike and the removal of the bell are all matters which happened inside the Assembly. Whether this Court can review such events, we shall consider presently. On a reasonable review of the events that happened inside the Assembly we have no hesitation to hold that there was vacancy in the office of the Speaker when Thiru N. Veerasami and others moved the resolution and the occupation of the Chair by the Deputy Speaker was in order. The proceedings as reflected in the printed book published by the Legislative Assembly department on 15-12-1972, gives the indelible impression that the motion of no confidence against the Speaker moved by Thiru N. Veerasami, was moved, discussed and decided upon in a manner provided for both under the Constitution and under the rules. Firstly, in accordance with the text as contained in the printed leaflet the leave of the House was sought and it was obtained. There was a further discussion thereon in which the petitioner did not participate, nor does it appear that he was anxious to speak on it. Ultimately, by a voice vote the majority resolved to accept the mover's resolution. Even otherwise, the 145 affidavits filed by the Assembly members reiterating what is reflected in the printed pamphlet regarding the debates that ensued in the Assembly on 2-12-1972, which are accepted by us, prompt us to hold that the resolution to remove the Speaker was carried with a majority and that it is an effective, valid and a legally implementable resolution. 15. Thus highlighted by the events that happened on 2-12-1972, the order of the petitioner to expunge certain proceedings from the debates is without power. He ceased to be a Speaker when the motion for his removal was taken up for consideration. 15. Thus highlighted by the events that happened on 2-12-1972, the order of the petitioner to expunge certain proceedings from the debates is without power. He ceased to be a Speaker when the motion for his removal was taken up for consideration. It therefore follows that anything done by him in the capacity as Speaker, when he could not occupy the constitutional office during the time when the motion for his removal was under consideration, is a nullity and has no legal force or recognition. If the Deputy Speaker who was occupying the Chair did not permit him to use the mike, there is nothing unnatural about it. The Speaker failed to realise that the constitutional machinery of Government in our country has the phase of a democratic set up. As McIver says "democracy is not a way of governing, whether by majority or otherwise, but primarily a way of determining who shall govern and, broadly, to what ends" (The Web of Government page 198). After all the Ruling Party and the power in a democratic forum of Government go hand in glove. It is here the force of majority demonstrates and asserts itself. As the eminent author Philip Laundy says in his book. 'The Office of Speaker' 1964 Edn. at page 102 - "The moving of a resolution of censure against the Chair is necessarily a distasteful procedure, but the right to do so is indispensable to the machinery of a free Parliament. If such a resolution is carried a Speaker would have no alternative but to resign ............ In fact, in these days, he would probably feel compelled to do so if the motion receives the support of a substantial majority. He would find it difficult to fulfil the functions of the Chair knowing that he lacked the confidence of a sizeable body of opinion in the House." It is axiomatic that without the support of the House a Speaker can do nothing; with the support there is little he cannot do. Under our Constitution, he has to step down from authority if a resolution for his removal is taken up for consideration. We accept the debates as printed and exhibited before us and hold that the petitioner ought to have so stepped down when Thiru N. Veerasami and others moved such a resolution. Under our Constitution, he has to step down from authority if a resolution for his removal is taken up for consideration. We accept the debates as printed and exhibited before us and hold that the petitioner ought to have so stepped down when Thiru N. Veerasami and others moved such a resolution. He has also visibly lost the confidence of the majority and this was exemplified by the voice vote given by the majority of the members of the Assembly. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner would say that the motion to remove the Speaker has to be passed by a majority of all the then members of the Assembly. Reliance was placed on Art. 179 (c) of the Constitution. The decision on such a subject by a voice vote is said to be not permissible. It can only be determined by a division or counting the members who were in favour or who were against. Here again there is a fallacy. In this Court 145 members have filed solemn affidavits that they were present in the Assembly and voiced for the resolution. This by itself is a sufficient decisive majority for the resolution. It is nobody's case that a specific demand for division or poll was sought. Again, the majority referred to in Art. 179 (c) cannot, in our view, refer to the majority amongst all the members present or not inside the House. The expression 'all the then members of the Assembly' referred to in Art. 179 (c) means the members present in the House. There can be no two opinions on this. Even if the contention of the petitioner is accepted, the majority of the members of the Assembly were against him and the result of the situation cannot by any stretch of imagination be helped. 17. The next situation hesitantly put forward is that the petitioner was not allowed to speak or otherwise take part in the proceedings of the Legislative Assembly when the resolution for his removal from office was under its consideration. Excepting for a bare assertion, the petitioner did not bring home the contention with any acceptable material. The records and the debates do not support this extreme contention. As a matter of fact, the petitioner would set it out only in a supplemental affidavit filed when he sought the rule nisi. Excepting for a bare assertion, the petitioner did not bring home the contention with any acceptable material. The records and the debates do not support this extreme contention. As a matter of fact, the petitioner would set it out only in a supplemental affidavit filed when he sought the rule nisi. We are not persuaded to accept this contention which stands barely as an assertion. 18. We now advert to the objection of Mr. M. K. Nambiyar that even if the proceedings of the Assembly are vitiated by any procedural irregularity, the resultant decision of the Assembly as reflected by the majority decision is binding on all including the petitioner and the propriety of such proceedings is beyond the pale of questionability by a Court of law. Reliance was placed by Mr. N. C. Raghavachari to a considerable extent on the decision of the Supreme Court in re under Art. 143 of the Constitution of India in AIR 1965 SC 745 . The question, however, is whether Art. 212 of the Constitution enables a Court to justiciate such a subject-matter. 19. The Legislative Assembly of a State is undoubtedly the fountain source of its power and the rules framed under Article 208 of the Constitution being the creatures of such power are succeptible to modification or deviation at the discretion of the majority of the members of the Assembly. The power to make a rule implies a power to deviate from the rule if the exigencies of circumstances require and if the party vested with the power is inclined to so act. B. W. Ridges in his book "Constitutional Law of England" dealing with the subject 'What is the precise meaning of the term 'proceedings in Parliament' would say - "Another collective right of the House is to settle its own code of procedure. This is such an obvious right-it has never been directly disputed-that it is unnecessary to enlarge upon it except to say that the House is not responsible to any external authority for following the rules it lays down for itself, but may depart from them at its own discretion ......... This holds good even where the procedure of a House or the right of its members or officers to take part in its proceedings is dependent on statute. This holds good even where the procedure of a House or the right of its members or officers to take part in its proceedings is dependent on statute. For such purposes the House can 'practically change or practically supersede the law'." The same author dealing with "jurisdiction of courts of law in matters of privileges" at page 176, 18th Edn. observes - "The problem thus became one of reconciling law of privilege with the general law. The solution gradually marked out by the courts is to insist on their right in principle to decide all questions of privilege arising in litigation before them with certain large exceptions, in favour of parliamentary jurisdiction. Two of these, which are supported by a great weight of authority, are the exclusive jurisdiction of each House over its own internal proceedings, and the right of either House to commit and punish for contempt." It is therefore well settled that over its own internal proceedings the jurisdiction of the House was exclusive and absolute and cannot be interfered with by Courts. Again, another learned author, Hood Phillips in his 'Constitutional and Administrative law' 3rd Edn. at page 184, dealing with 'exclusive right to regulate its own proceedings' says- "The courts must presume that so august an Assembly as the House of Commons discharges its functions lawfully and properly. They will therefore not take cognisance of matters arising within the walls of the House, and they will accept the interpretation put by the Commons upon a statute affecting their internal proceedings." 20. The petitioner's case is that the dispensation of Rule 53 by invoking Rule 244 is a specific departure from the set procedure. But if the House is prompted to deviate from the rules of procedure for purposes of managing its internal affairs as the situation requires it, then it is clear that the hands of the process of Court cannot extend so as to catch the alleged impropriety therein and deal with it as if it is justiciable. But if the House is prompted to deviate from the rules of procedure for purposes of managing its internal affairs as the situation requires it, then it is clear that the hands of the process of Court cannot extend so as to catch the alleged impropriety therein and deal with it as if it is justiciable. It is this that is reiterated in firm terms in Article 212 (1) which is extracted for ready reference : "The validity of any proceedings in the Legislature of a State shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure." We shall now succinctly refer to the decision of the various High Courts in our country which lend support to the above irrefutable proposition of law. In Rajnarain v. Atmaram Govind, AIR 1954 All 319 the Court said - "It is settled law that the House of Commons is not responsible to any external authority for following the rules it lays down for itself for the transaction of its own business. It is open to the House to depart from them at its own discretion. Even where the procedure of the House or the right of its members to take part in its proceedings is dependent on statute the House is immune, from scrutiny by courts as to the manner in which it interprets them. It follows from this that for such purposes the House can practically change or supersede the law." In Piarelal Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1955 Nag 11 (FB) the Court dealing with the efficacy and force of the rules framed under Art. 208 said - "The provisions of Art. 208 are merely enabling ones. Moreover, they relate only to procedural matters. Where a body has been given complete powers to regulate its own procedure, it has by implication also the power to waive or condone the breach of its procedural rules..........Apart from that, the irregularity had occurred in the proceedings before the Assembly. The validity of those proceedings cannot, by virtue of Clause (1) of Art. 212, of the Constitution, be called in question before a Court of law on the ground of irregularity in procedure". The validity of those proceedings cannot, by virtue of Clause (1) of Art. 212, of the Constitution, be called in question before a Court of law on the ground of irregularity in procedure". A Full Bench of the Punjab High Court in Jaisingh Rathi v. State of Haryana, AIR 1970 Punj and Har 379 at p. 387 (FB) accepted the preliminary objection that the Legislative Assembly is supreme and has exclusive control and jurisdiction in all its internal affairs and is the sole judge of the lawfulness of its own proceedings, so that no part of its proceedings concerning the suspension of the petitioners is justiciable in Court. 21. In AIR 1960 SC 1186 , the Supreme Court, considering the scope of Art. 212 and the power of interference by courts into the validity of the proceedings inside the Legislature of a State laid down the following dicta - "The validity of the proceedings inside the Legislature of a State cannot be called in question on the allegation that the procedure laid down by the law had not been strictly followed. No Court can go into those questions which are within the special jurisdiction of the Legislature itself, which has the power to conduct its own business. The Legislature has the jurisdiction to control the publication of its proceedings and to go into the question whether there has been any breach of its privileges, and the Legislature is vested with complete jurisdiction to carry on its proceedings in accordance with its rules of business. Even though it may not have strictly complied with the requirements of the procedural law laid down for conducting its business, that cannot be a ground for interference by the Supreme Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution. Courts have always recognised the basic difference between complete want of jurisdiction and improper or irregular exercise of jurisdiction. Mere non-compliance with rules of procedure cannot be a ground for issuing a writ under Art. 32 of the Constitution." 22. We shall now proceed to illustrate with reference to decided cases of the Supreme Court as to whether interference is possible at all in the matter of certain proceedings of a State Assembly and the decisions taken in it by the majority. We shall now proceed to illustrate with reference to decided cases of the Supreme Court as to whether interference is possible at all in the matter of certain proceedings of a State Assembly and the decisions taken in it by the majority. In State of Bihar v. Kameswar Singh, AIR 1952 SC 252 , the short facts were that the original Bill relating to the Bihar Land Reforms Act (30 of 1950) signed and authenticated by the Speaker was produced before the Court, and it contained an endorsement by the Speaker that the Bill was passed by the Assembly on 5-4-1950. The endorsement was signed by the Speaker on 10-5-1950. The official report of the proceedings appears to have been prepared on 21-6-1950 and was signed by the Speaker on 1-10-1950. When he signed the report the Speaker did not apparently notice the omission as to the motion having been put and carried. In the wake of such facts, the Supreme Court said : "Such omission cannot, in the face of the explicit statement by the Speaker endorsed on the bill, be taken to establish that the bill was not put to the House and carried by it. In any case, the omission to put the motion formally to the House, even if true, was, in the circumstances, no more than a mere irregularity of procedure, as it is not disputed that the overwhelming majority of the members present and voting were in favour of carrying the motion and no dissentient voice was actually raised." 23. In Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works v. State of Mysore, AIR 1963 SC 589 , it was held : "Even assuming that it is a taxing measure its validity cannot be challenged on the ground that it offends Arts. 197 to 199 and the procedure laid down in Art. 202 of the Constitution. Article 212 prohibits the validity of any proceedings in a Legislature of a State from being called in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure............" In State of Punjab v. Satya Pal Dang, AIR 1969 SC 903 , the provision of Art. 199 (4) was held to be directory by the Court. That was a case where the Deputy Speaker certified the Bill instead of the Speaker. That was a case where the Deputy Speaker certified the Bill instead of the Speaker. The Court, after referring to the facts of that case, was of the view that the Speaker in his then mood might have declined to certify the act. In those circumstances, non-compliance with the provisions of Art. 199 (4) was held to be directory and not imperative. Proceeding further the Supreme Court said that even if it is an irregularity, it is saved by Art. 212 (1). 24. The principles laid down by the Supreme Court and by other courts in our country as above are indeed a pointer to the sovereignty of our Legislatures. Such plenary powers are countenanced in the various Articles of the Constitution including Art. 212. The course of such power and the manner in which it is channelised by the source of authority cannot either be stemmed or interfered with by a process of Court even under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Such a collective privilege contemplated under the provisions of the Constitution, which has to be liberally interpreted and not with a sense of pedantism, prompts us to hold that when the motion for the removal of the Speaker was taken up for consideration in the instant case and when at that moment of time the Deputy Speaker was put in office as a substitute for the Speaker and if the Deputy Speaker thereof conducted the proceedings resulting in the challenged resolution of the Assembly; they are all matters which the Assembly has the privilege to deal with and decide upon. They are therefore neither illegal nor unconstitutional. As the accredited parliamentary practice enables the House to decide what it will discuss and how it will settle its internal affairs and what code of procedure it intends to adopt, it follows that it may even depart if it is so compulsive from the rules of procedure laid down by itself, and this it could do at its discretion and as Prof. Erskine May says, such a departure will not render its responsibility to be scrutinised by any external authority for not following the rule which is laid down by itself. 25. We may at once notice In re under Art. 143 of the Constitution, AIR 1965 SC 745 cited by Mr. Erskine May says, such a departure will not render its responsibility to be scrutinised by any external authority for not following the rule which is laid down by itself. 25. We may at once notice In re under Art. 143 of the Constitution, AIR 1965 SC 745 cited by Mr. N.C. Raghavachari to support his contention that this Court could interfere with the legislative process if any irregularity in it is brought to the notice of the Court. The above decision was rendered by the Supreme Court in its advisory jurisdiction under Art. 143 (1) of the Constitution. On a perusal of the advice given by the Supreme Court there is no doubt whatsoever that the courts in India have the power to set right any decision of the Legislature if there is an illegality or infringement of the constitutional provisions. But the Supreme Court itself has made it clear in the said judgment that it was an advisory opinion rendered by them in that reference and it is not adjudication properly so called and would bind no parties as such. It also expressly pointed out that they were not dealing with any matter relating to the internal management of the House in that case. With special reference to the power of the Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution as against State Legislatures the Supreme Court accepted in principle that the legislatures have undoubtedly plenary powers but those powers are controlled by the basic concepts of the written Constitution itself. If the Legislatures step beyond the Legislative fields assigned to them, or acting within their respective fields, they trespass on the fundamental rights of the citizens in a manner not justified by the relevant articles dealing with the said fundamental rights, their legislative actions are liable to be struck down by courts in India. No such situation has arisen in the instant case. All that is said against the State Assembly is that an irregular procedure was adopted which is not warranted under the rules and the singular manner in which the affairs were steered through ought to be corrected by the issue of a judicial process. This is not possible even according to the Supreme Court in that very case and as spoken to by them in the other cases cited above. This is not possible even according to the Supreme Court in that very case and as spoken to by them in the other cases cited above. We are therefore of the view that even if there has been any irregularity in the procedure adopted by the House in its deliberations on 2-12-1972, as contended by the petitioner such a scheme not having any impact upon the competency of the Legislature to act and decide or on any fundamental right of a citizen or the substantive law spoken to through its articles in the Constitution, is beyond the purview or scrutiny by a Court under Art. 226. In the light of this conclusion, it is unnecessary to go into the further question raised by Mr. M.K. Nambiyar, whether the petitioner is an affected party and whether he could seek a rule under Art. 226 at all. 26. Before parting with this case we are constrained to point out that though the first respondent claimed privilege that he would not submit himself to the jurisdiction of this Court, yet, as the person who was piloting the affairs of the Legislature on that date, could have certainly given the best of assistance to the Court if he gave some hypothesis or material on the facts of the case. Immunity from appearance in courts is certainly the highest privilege which could be availed of by a citizen or a person in authority. But when events in a particular situation compel him to assist the Court by affording such material which is exclusively to his knowledge, it would be in the best interests of the society at large and the Government in particular to render such assistance. Unfortunately this has not been done. 27. Again, we are rather surprised that the Secretary of the Legislative Assembly has also claimed such an immunity and privilege. When he was summoned under the rule nisi to appear and answer the writ, the situation did not contemplate the infraction of any powers vested in such an officer by or under the Constitution. It is only in a case where the officer of the Legislature of a State in whom powers are vested by or under the Constitution for carrying on regulating procedure or conduct of business he shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of any Court in respect of the exercise by him of those powers. It is only in a case where the officer of the Legislature of a State in whom powers are vested by or under the Constitution for carrying on regulating procedure or conduct of business he shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of any Court in respect of the exercise by him of those powers. In the instant case the Secretary of the Legislature is exercising certain ministerial functions inside the House and he has been summoned under the writ to state what happened inside the Legislature and it cannot be said as urged by the learned Advocate General that in the exercise of such official duties he was one who was exercising powers vested in him by the Constitution for regulating the procedure or conduct of business or for maintaining order therein. 28. For all the reasons stated above, the petitioner is not entitled to the absolution of the two rules asked for in these writ petitions. They are therefore dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.