JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THE petitioner firm has moved this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the order of the Central Government dated the 11th April, 1968 (Annexure e ). ( 2. ) FACTS may be briefly stated. The petitioner firm applied to the State government on 24-7-1965 for a mining lease for extraction of Die spore and pyrophyllite over an area of 15. 25 acres in mouza Khera, Tahsil Jatara, district Tikamgarh. The application remained unconsidered for over a period of nine months. Under the Mineral Concession Rules, ly60, an application for grant of mining lease is required to be disposed of within nine months from the date of its receipt and rule 24 (3) says that if the application is not disposed of within the specified period, it is deemed to have been rejected. On 22-10-1966, the petitioner firm gave a reminder to the State Government that their application dated the 24th July 1965 may kindly be disposed of or in the alternative it may be treated as a fresh application. In fact, the communication dated 22-10-1966 was not a fresh application since it was not accompanied by various prescribed documents and fees. Before the receipt of the reminder dated the 22nd October 1966, the state Government finding the period of nine months having expired and being yet inclined to grant mining lease to the petitioner firm, wrote to the Central government on 12-10-1966 to exercise their jurisdiction to revise the order of deemed rejection under section 30 of the Mines and Minerals Act, 1957 and permit the State Government to grant mining lease to the petitioner-firm. The state Government wrote to the Central Government that the petitioner-firms application was the sole application in respect of the area involved. By letter dated the 7th November, 1966, the Central Government acting on the letter of the State Government dated the J 2th October, 1966, revised the order of deemed refusal and in exercise of powers conferred by section 30 and all other powers enabling in that behalf, directed the State Government to consider the application of the petitioner firm dated the 24th July, 1965. On 30-11-1966, the State Government informed the petitioner-firm with reference to their application dated the 24th July, 1965 that they have been granted the mining lease and may contact the Collector, Tikamgarh, in that connection. On 30-11-1966, the State Government informed the petitioner-firm with reference to their application dated the 24th July, 1965 that they have been granted the mining lease and may contact the Collector, Tikamgarh, in that connection. The petitioner-firm contacted the Collector, executed the necessary documents and were delivered possession of the mining area. ( 3. ) RESPONDENT No. 3 M/s. Jailal Bharatlal had also applied for a mining lease over an area of 32. 65 acres which included the area covered by the petitioners application. The respondent No. 3s application is dated the 26th July, 1966. It was presented to the Collector, Tikamgarh and remained in his Office till 18-11-1966 on which date it was forwarded to the State government (para 3 of Annexure d may be seen ). It would be pertinent to note that on the 12th October, 1966, when the State Government wrote to the Central Government for revising the order of deemed refusal in respect of the petitioners application dated the 24th July, 1965, they were not apprised of the respondent No. 3s application (which was pending before the Collector and came to be forwarded to them on 18-11-1966 ). The State Government had, therefore, written to the Central Government that the petitioner-firm was the sole applicant. The Central Government also revised the order of deemed refusal relating to the petitioners application under section 30 of the Act before the respondent No. 3s application was received by the State Government. On 5-6-1967, the respondent No. 3 submitted a revision application to the Central Government (Annexure d) making a grievance that the State government could not grant the mining lease in favour of the petitioner-firm whose application dated 24-7-1965 had lapsed after a period of nine months and could not, therefore, be acted upon and that the petitioners second application dated the 22nd October, 1966 was later in point of time to the respondent No. 3s application. The Central Government by their order dated the 11th April, 1968 (Annexure e) set aside the grant in favour of the petitioner-firm accepting the contentions raised by the respondent No. 3 that the petitioner-firms application dated the 24th July, 1965 should be deemed to have been refused on the expiry of nine months i. e. on 23-4-1966 and they not having come in revision under rule 54 within the prescribed period of limitation, their application lapsed; that their second application was later in point of time to respondent No. 3s application and therefore, the respondent No. 3 should have been preferred for the grant of lease. It is this order of the Central Government which is sought to be quashed. ( 4. ) ON careful perusal of the record, we are of the opinion that the impugned order of the Central Government must be quashed. The order of the Central Government is ex facie defective in as much as no reasons have been recorded why the Government reviewed their own order dated the 7th november, 1966, where under they had set aside the deemed refusal of the petitioners application, directing the State Government to consider it over again. No reference to that order has been made in the impugned order. The impugned order could not be passed unless the Government set aside the earlier order. By necessary implication, the order dated the 7th November, 1966, had been set aside. The question to consider is whether the Central government could review their own order passed on the 7th November, 19661 there appears no provision in the Act or Rules which confers powers in the central Government to review their own order, and the law is well settled that unless the powers of review are specifically conferred by the Statute, the authority acting quasi judicially cannot review its own order. Please see Patel chunibhai Dajibha v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar ( AIR 1965 SC 1457 , paras 23 and 24.) and Thakur Himmat Singh v. Board of Revenue (1966 MPLJ 170. ). Please see Patel chunibhai Dajibha v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar ( AIR 1965 SC 1457 , paras 23 and 24.) and Thakur Himmat Singh v. Board of Revenue (1966 MPLJ 170. ). Firstly, therefore, it was beyond the jurisdiction of the Central Government to review their own order dated the 7th November, 1966, which the impugned order did by implication, and secondly because the impugned order did not indicate the grounds on which the earlier order was sought to be set aside which it was incumbent on the Central Government to do, the impugned order must be quashed. The earlier order was very much brought to the notice of the Central Government which authorised the State government to act on the petitioners application dated the 24th July, 1965. But the Central Government deliberately declined to look into it, refused to take notice of it and made no reference to it in the impugned order and obviously gave no reasons whatsoever why they thought the order to be illegal. The impugned order thus was not a speaking order. ( 5. ) THE learned Advocate General argued that the earlier order dated the 7th November, 1966 was an illegal and void order and could be ignored by the Central Government without assigning reasons. The Central Government had exercised the revisional powers under section 30 of the Act of its own motion but the revisional powers did not extend to revive a dead application and to confer jurisdiction on the State Government to consider it after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed by the Act itself, which was nine months from the date of its receipt by the State Government. We are unable to accept these arguments. In interpreting a provision creating a legal fiction, the Court must ascertain the purpose for which the fiction is created and in ascertaining the purpose, the Court must assume all facts and consequences which are incidental and inevitable corollaries to the giving effect to the fiction. The purpose of the fiction of deemed refusal has been stated thus by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Assam and others v. Om prakash Mehta and others ( AIR 1973 SC 678 .) : "let us assume that in a case like the present rule 24 (2) did not exist. The purpose of the fiction of deemed refusal has been stated thus by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Assam and others v. Om prakash Mehta and others ( AIR 1973 SC 678 .) : "let us assume that in a case like the present rule 24 (2) did not exist. Let us assume that the officer or authority dealing with the application for renewal simply sleeps over it for years. The applicant will then be in a worse position. Apparently the idea was that the officer or authority dealing with an application for renewal must dispose of it quickly and if he did not it should be deemed to have been refused thus giving an opportunity to the aggrieved party to approach the Central Government to exercise its powers of revision under rule 54. Under rule 55 the Central Government can call for the records from the State Government and after considering any comments made on the petition by the State Government or other authority, may confirm, modify or set aside the order or pass such other order in relation thereto as the Central Government may deem just and proper. It also provides for an opportunity to the applicant to make his representation against the comments, if any, received from the State Government or other authority. Thus the fact that the application for renewal is deemed to have been refused as a result of rule 24 (2) does not prohibit the Central Government from passing any order it may deem just and proper including an order granting renewal. " Having ascertained the purpose, "full effect must be given to the statutory fiction and it should be carried to its logical conclusion". On deemed refusal of the application after the expiry of nine months, the applicant could approach the Central Government in revision and the Central Government could in the exercise of its revisional powers, either make the grant itself or direct the state Government to make the grant. Obviously, setting aside the deemed refusal would mean the revival of the lapsed application for consideration. The application then is bound to be considered after the expiry of nine months of its receipt. A like situation would arise even when the application is rejected on merits and the order of rejection is set aside by the Central Government in revision. Obviously, setting aside the deemed refusal would mean the revival of the lapsed application for consideration. The application then is bound to be considered after the expiry of nine months of its receipt. A like situation would arise even when the application is rejected on merits and the order of rejection is set aside by the Central Government in revision. That application again receives consideration after the expiry of nine months. It logically follows that the Central Government have powers to lift the embargo of limitation sitting as a revisional authority and as soon as the embargo is lifted, the State Government could consider the application if so directed. Section 30 of the Act permits the exercise of revisional powers by the Central Government of its own motion for which no period of limitation is prescribed. ( 6. ) ON this ground alone the impugned order deserves to be set aside. As stated above, the respondent No. 3s application had not reached the State government when the petitioners application dated the 24th July, 1965, was revived for consideration. The grant was made on the basis of that application which was prior in point of time to the respondent No. 3s application. ( 7. ) WE need not consider the other technical, procedural objections raised by the petitioner-firm that they were impleaded as parties to the revision preferred by the respondent No. 3 after the period of limitation. ( 8. ) IN the result, we quash the order of the Central Government dated the 11th April, 1968, (Annexure E ). There shall be no order as to costs. The security amount be refunded to the petitioner. Slngh, J. ( 9. ) I need not repeat the facts which have been succinctly stated by Malik, J. In the impugned order the Central Government held that the petitioners application of 24th July 1965 was deemed to be rejected after expiry of nine months on 23rd April 1966, that the lease was granted to the petitioner by the State Government on another application made by it on 22nd October 1966, and that the respondent No. 3s application being of 26th july 1966 the action of the State Government in granting the petitioners later application was not in accordance with law. In holding so the Central government refused to take notice that the deemed refusal of the petitioners application dated 24th July 1965 was set aside in exercise of suo motu powers of revision under section 30 by their order of 7th November 1966 and that the state Government had granted the lease to the petitioner on that application which was earlier in time to the application made by the respondent. Omission to take notice of a fact which is obvious and which goes to the root of the matter is an error of law apparent on the face of the record completely vitiating the order. ( 10. ) SHRI Gulab Gupta, who appeared for the Central Government to support the order, did not contend that the earlier order was reviewed by the impugned order. Indeed, as pointed out by my learned brother there is no power of review conferred by the Act on the Central Government to vary their own orders passed in revision under section 30. All that Shri Gupta urged was that from the nothings in the Secretariat file it appeared that the earlier order was an administrative order and not an order under section 30, and, therefore, it could be ignored by the Central Government. It is difficult to accede to this argument, for the order expressly recites that it was made in exercise of the powers conferred under section 30 and the subject-matter and the terms of the order also show that it was made in exercise of that power. We cannot delve into Secretariat files to construe an order which is clear and unambiguous. The order was clearly an order under section 30 and it could not be ignored. ( 11. ) THE learned Advocate General who appeared for respondent No. 3 did not dispute that the order of the Central Government dated 7th November 1966 was an order under section 30 made in exercise of suo motu powers of revision. He, however, contended that the order was void and was rightly ignored. ( 11. ) THE learned Advocate General who appeared for respondent No. 3 did not dispute that the order of the Central Government dated 7th November 1966 was an order under section 30 made in exercise of suo motu powers of revision. He, however, contended that the order was void and was rightly ignored. The grounds that he urged in support of this contention are (1) that the fiction created by the explanation to rule 54 is only for the purpose of that rule which is limited to revisions at the instance of an aggrieved party and, therefore, the power of suo motu revision under section 30 cannot be exercised with the help of that fiction ; (2) that a deemed refusal of an application cannot be said to be an order in the exercise of any power conferred by or under the Act within the meaning of section 30; (3) that even if revision lies against a deemed refusal of an application the Central Government cannot remand the application for disposal to the State Government; and (4) the central Government in passing the said order had not noticed the respondent and, therefore, the order was against the principles of natural justice. ( 12. ) THE first two grounds urged by the learned Advocate General ignore the provision made in rule 24 (3) which creates a fiction similar to that created by the explanation to rule 54. Rule 24 (1) provides that an application for the grant of a mining lease shall be disposed of within nine months. The result of non disposal of the application within the prescribed time is provided in rule 24 (3 ). In terms of that provision if any application is not disposed of within the period specified in sub-rule (1), it shall be deemed to have been refused. The words "it shall be deemed to have been refused" imply that we must assume that an order has been made by the State Government refusing the application in the exercise of its power conferred by the rules after expiry of nine months from the date of the receipt of the application. It is only by assuming these facts that full effect can be given to the fiction created by rule 24 (3 ). The explanation to rule 54 and rule 24 (3) partly operate in the same field. It is only by assuming these facts that full effect can be given to the fiction created by rule 24 (3 ). The explanation to rule 54 and rule 24 (3) partly operate in the same field. But in certain aspects the explanation is wider; for example, it covers the case of an application made for renewal of a mining lease which remains undisposed of after the prescribed time but to such an application rule 24 (3) does not apply after its amendment in 1963; further, the explanation fixes the starting point of time from which the limitation for an application for revision by an aggrieved party has to be reckoned, but rule 24 (3) does not do so. However, in another aspect the explanation is narrower, for the fiction created by it is limited for the purposes of rule 54, i. e. for revisions at the instance of an aggrieved party, but the fiction created by rule 24 (3) is not so limited. The order of refusal resulting from the fiction enacted in rule 24 (3)is therefore, open to suo motu revision by the Central Government under section 30. ( 13. ) AS regards the contentions that the Central Government cannot remand the application for grant of a mining lease where the revision is against a deemed refusal, I find no such limitation either in section 30 or anywhere in the rules. After the fictional order of refusal of the application is set aside, the application can be sent back for disposal to the State Government or it may be disposed of by the Central Government itself. The argument of the learned Advocate General is that after remand of the application there will be no obligation on the State Government to dispose it of within any particular time and the application may remain pending for years. Hence power of remand should be construed to be excluded. It is not possible to accede to this argument which assumes that the State Government will not comply with the order of remand and will not consider the application within a reasonable time. Further, while making an order of remand the Central Government may also fix a time within which the State Government should dispose of the application as was done in the case of Seshanna v. Union Government ( AIR 1967 AP 94 at p. 97. ). Further, while making an order of remand the Central Government may also fix a time within which the State Government should dispose of the application as was done in the case of Seshanna v. Union Government ( AIR 1967 AP 94 at p. 97. ). This case fully supports our conclusion that a deemed refusal of an application for grant of a mining lease is subject to suo motu revision under section 30 and the Central Government can remand the application for disposal to the State Government. ( 14. ) AS regards the point that the respondent was not noticed by the central Government while setting aside the deemed refusal of the petitioners application, it must be noticed that at the stage when the petitioners application was deemed to be refused the respondent had not filed any application for grant of lease in his favour and, therefore, it was not necessary to hear him in revision. Rule 54 (2) indicates that only a person to whom the mining lease is granted is to be impleaded as a party in a revision against refusal of an application for grant of mining lease. This will show that persons who were not even applicants at the stage when the deemed refusal took place have no right to be heard in a revision against deemed refusal. ( 15. ) THE order of the Central Government dated 7th November 1966 reviving the petitioners earlier application was valid. The lease to the petitioner was granted by the State Government on that application which was prior in time to the application of the respondent. The Central Government was patently wrong in setting aside the order of the State Government. For these reasons, I agree that the petition be allowed as proposed by my learned brother. Petition allowed.