JUDGMENT : S.K. Ray, J. - This is a tenant?s application for a writ of certiorari to quash the order of eviction passed against him in the proceeding initiated u/s 7 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. The house, from which eviction has been ordered, undisputedly belongs to Pratihari Nijog. It was let out to Petitioner No. 1 for the purpose of holding a shop therein as a monthly tenant, at a monthly rental of Rs. 60/-. This tenancy was to commence from 1-1-1960. In evidence and acknowledgement of his induction as a tenant into the house, the Petitioner No. 1 executed a document (Annexure-B) dated 1-1-1960 in favour J, of the Secretary of Pratihari Nijog. Petitioner No. 2, is the brother-in-law of Petitioner No. 1 and is stated to be in charge of the management of the shop held by the Petitioner No. 1. 3. Opposite party No. 1 filed an application u/s 7 of the Act for eviction of both the Petitioners on two grounds, namely, that (a) the Petitioner is a wilful defaulter and (b) that the landlord requires the house for his own use and occupation. This application was resisted by the Petitioner on a number of grounds. The House Rent Controller framed 11 issues of which the issues Nos. 1, 2 and 4 have a direct bearing on the principal issue regarding maintainability of the application for eviction u/s 7 of the Act at the instance of Opposite party No. 1. The House Rent Controller on a consideration of evidence held that both the grounds for eviction had been made out and, consequently, passed an order (Annexure-1) directing that the landlord be put in possession of the house forthwith. The Petitioners carried an appeal to the A.D.M. from the order of the House Rent Controller. The A.D.M. by his order dated 10-8-1971 (Annexure-2) dismissed the appeal. Thereafter, the order for eviction is being executed in execution case No. 240 of 1970 in the Court of the Munsif, Puri, and the said execution case is pending. 4. The sole contention raised here by Mrs. The A.D.M. by his order dated 10-8-1971 (Annexure-2) dismissed the appeal. Thereafter, the order for eviction is being executed in execution case No. 240 of 1970 in the Court of the Munsif, Puri, and the said execution case is pending. 4. The sole contention raised here by Mrs. Padhi is that the Secretary of the Pratihari Nijog had no locus standi to institute the proceeding for eviction u/s 7 of the Act, in as much as, he was the Petitioner, " landlord" as defined in the Act, and, as such, the House Rent Controller lacked inherent jurisdiction to entertain the application for eviction, and, therefore, all subsequent stages in the proceeding including the appellate? order are without jurisdiction and bad in law. Thus, Annexures 1 and 2 are liable to be quashed. 5. One of the issues framed by the House Rent Controller was whether the Plaintiff (O.P. No. 1) had locus standi to institute the proceeding for eviction. That issue directly covered the present contention but it was not pressed before the House Rent Controller. He found that the Petitioner was a wilful defaulter and that the Opposite party No. 1 had cause of action to institute a proceeding for eviction on behalf of the Pratihari Nijog Committee as its elected Secretary and was entitled to the relief of eviction as prayed for by him. Before the A.D.M. where the Petitioner had presented his H.R.C. Appeal No. 27 of 1970 from the order of eviction passed by the House Rent Controller, the question of maintainability of the eviction proceeding was however raised, but in a different form than the one in which it is now couched, namely, that the Applicant for eviction, i.e. O.P. No. 1 was not duly elected Secretary of the Pratihari Nijog and, as such, he was not competent to maintain the eviction proceeding. The A.D.M. on analysis of the evidence including an admission of the Petitioner came to the conclusion that the O.P. No. 1 was duly elected Secretary of the Pratihari Nijog. He, therefore, rejected that contention regarding maintainability of the Petitioners. The A.D.M. on analysis of the evidence including an admission of the Petitioner came to the conclusion that the O.P. No. 1 was duly elected Secretary of the Pratihari Nijog. He, therefore, rejected that contention regarding maintainability of the Petitioners. Since the contention now raised, which involves disputed questions of facts, was not raised either before the House Rent Controller or before the A.D.M. it would not be either proper, fair or just to allow this contention to be raised for the first time in the High Court in exercise of its power under Articles 226 and 227. On this ground a lone the contention is liable to be rejected. Filmstan (P) Ltd. v. Balkrishna Bhiwa and Ors. 6. However, even on merits I do not think it can be sustained. Apart from the finding of the A.D.M. that O.P. No. 1 was duly elected Secretary of the Pratihari Nijog, it also appears from the averments of paragraph 5 of the additional written statement of the Petitioners in the House Rent Control case which is appended as Annexure-A to the counter affidavit filed unbehalf of the O.P. No. 1 coupled with Annexure 4 and Ex. 3 series that the Secretary for the time being of the Pratihari Nijog was entitled to receive rent and was, in fact, receiving rent and it is to the Secretary that the Petitioners were remitting the monthly rent. This amounts to an acknowledgment on behalf of the Petitioners that O.P. No. 1, in his capacity as Secretary of the Pratihari Nijog, was entitled to receive and was, in fact, receiving rent in respect of the suit house. u/s 7 of the Act, a landlord may initiate a proceeding for eviction of his tenant. This amounts to an acknowledgment on behalf of the Petitioners that O.P. No. 1, in his capacity as Secretary of the Pratihari Nijog, was entitled to receive and was, in fact, receiving rent in respect of the suit house. u/s 7 of the Act, a landlord may initiate a proceeding for eviction of his tenant. The landlord has been defined in Section 2, Sub-section (4) as follows: "landlord" includes any person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a house whether on his own account or on behalf of another or on behalf of himself and others; It is an inclusive definition which means that apart from retaining any strict or narrow meaning of "landlord" as defined in other tenancy laws or other laws for the time being in force, the expression "landlord" in House Rent Control Act would bring within its sweep also a person who is, in fact, receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of the house, whether on his own account or on behalf of another. In the instant case, the Applicant u/s 7 of the Act who is the Secretary of the Pratihari Nijog, as already indicated above, has been, in fact, receiving the rent from the Petitioner No. 1 and he was so receiving not on his own account, but on behalf of the Pratihari Nijog. In that view of the matter, the O.P. No. 1, who came within the ambit of the definition of landlord, was entitled to initiate a proceeding u/s 7 of the Act for eviction of the tenant. The main contention, therefore, fails. 7. Mrs. Padhi raised another point here which was never raised anywhere during the evection proceeding either before the House Rent Controller or before the A.D.M. The point is that the Pratihari Nijog being an unregistered body, its Secretary, cannot prosecute the petition for eviction u/s 7 of the House Rent Control Act, which is a civil proceeding. Reliance, in this connection, has been placed on the case of Brahmani Club Vs. State of Orissa and Others. Reliance, in this connection, has been placed on the case of Brahmani Club Vs. State of Orissa and Others. This contention, however, would not stand the Petitioners in good stead, because the person, who had applied u/s 7 of the House Rent Control Act, as has already been stated above, is the landlord as defined u/s 2(4) of the Act, and as such landlord he is empowered under the House Rent Control Act to present an application for eviction thereof and to prosecute the same. 8. For the aforesaid reasons, I am of opinion that the tenant has been rightly evicted and the present writ application has no merit, and is, accordingly, dismissed with costs. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 100/-. K.B. Panda J. 9. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed