STATK OF MYSORE v. H. SUBBA RAO — 1973 DIGILAW 126 (KAR)

CHANDRASHEKHAR, J. ( 1 ) THESE appeas are presented by the Government of Mysore (hereinafter referred to as the Government) under sub-sec. (1) of S. 31 of the Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1954, (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). The respondents have raised a preliminary objection that these appeals are barred by time and are liable to be dismissed in limine. ( 2 ) ALL these appeals have been filed long after the expiry of 3 months from the respective dates of the orders of the Deputy Commissioner under s. 20 of the Act determining compensation. The Government has claimed that these appeals are within time as they have been filed within 6 months from 11-12-1969 on which date the Mysore Inams Abolition Laws (Amendment) Act, 1969, (hereinafter referred to as the Amendment Act) came into force and that the time taken for obtaining certified copies of the orders appealed against, should be excluded in computing the period of limitation of 6 months prescribed in sub-sec. (1) of S. 31 of the Act as amended by the Amendment Act. Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 31 of the Act, as it stood before it was amended by the Amendment Act, read: 31. (1) Any person aggrieved by any order of the Deputy Commissioner made under sub-sec. (1) of S. 20, or by any decision of the Special Tribunal under S. 29 or S. 30 may, within three months from the date of the order or decision or such further time as the High court may for sufficient cause allow, appeal to the High Court; and the High Court shall pass such order on the appeal as it thinks fit. The above sub-section was amended by sub-sec. (6) of S. 2 of the amendment Act which reads : "2 (6 ). In sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 31, for the wordsj brackets and figures "any person aggrieved by any order of the Deputy Commissioner made under sub-sec. (1) of S. 20," the words, brackets, figures and letter "against any order of the Deputy Commissioner made under sub-sec. (6) of S. 2 of the amendment Act which reads : "2 (6 ). In sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 31, for the wordsj brackets and figures "any person aggrieved by any order of the Deputy Commissioner made under sub-sec. (1) of S. 20," the words, brackets, figures and letter "against any order of the Deputy Commissioner made under sub-sec. (1) of S. 20 or S. 20a, the Government may within six months from the date of the commencement of the Mysore Inams abolition Laws (Amendment) Act, 1969, or from the datp of such order whichever is later and any person aggrieved by such order" shall be and shall be deemed always to have been substituted. Sub-section (1) of Section 31 of the Act as amended by the Amendment act, reads : 31. Powers of the High Court.- (1) Against any order of the deputy Commissioner made under sub-sec. (1) of S. 20 or S. 20-A, the Government may within six months from the date of the commencement of the Mysore Inams Abolition Laws (Amendment) Act, 1969, or from the date of such order whichever is later and any person aggrieved by such order or by any decision of the Special Tribunal under S. 29 or S. 30 may, within three months from the date of the order or decision or such further time as the High Court may for sufficient caus,e allow, appeal to the High Court; and the High Court shall pass such order on the appeal as it thinks fit. ( 3 ) ONE of learned Counsel for the respondents sought to assail the validity of sub-sec. (6) of S. 2 of the Amendment Act. But, the learned additional Government Advocate raised an objection that the validity of any of the provisions of the Act or the Amendment Act, cannot be questioned in an appeal under the provisions of the Act. ( 4 ) THE objection of the learned Additional Government Advocate should be upheld in the light of the rulings of the Supreme Court on this point. In Venkataram and Co. v. State of Madras, AIR. 1966 SC. ( 4 ) THE objection of the learned Additional Government Advocate should be upheld in the light of the rulings of the Supreme Court on this point. In Venkataram and Co. v. State of Madras, AIR. 1966 SC. 1089 , the Supreme Court said that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court by S. 66 of the Income Tax act, is strictly limited by the Section conferring the jurisdiction, that the court can only decide such questions of law as arise out of the order of the Tribunal and are referred to it and that the High Court cannot give a decision on the question of ultra vires of a provision of the Act. In Dhulabai v. State of M. P. , AIR. 1969 SC. 78. 89, the Supreme Court said that challenge to the provisions of a particular Act as ultra vires, cannot be gons into by the High Court on a revision or reference from the decision of the Tnbunals constituted under that Act. In B. Shankar Rao v. State of Mysore, AIR. 1969 SC. 453, 456, the Supreme Court observed that the constitutional validity of the provisions of the Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1954, cannot be challenged in the statutory appeals. ( 5 ) ELUCIDATING their preliminary objection, learned Counsel for respondents advanced the following contentions : (i) Sub-sec. (1) of S. 31 of the Act as amended, has no retrospective effect so as to apply to appeals from orders of the Deputy Commissioner made prior to 11-12-1969; and (ii) S. 12 of the Limitation Act has no application to appeals under sub-sec. (1) of S. 31 of the Act and hence the time taken for obtaining certified copies, cannot be excluded in computing the period of limitation for filing appeals. In some of these appeals, learned Counsel for respondents also contended that the Government had not applied for copies of orders of the deputy Commissioner that the copies produced along with memoranda of appeals had not been granted in pursuance of any applications for copies, and that hence exclusion of time requisite for obtaining copies of orders, cannot be claimed in computing the period of limitation. But, the question whether the Government had applied for a copy of the order of the Deputy Commissioner, is one of fact and has to be enquired into in each individual case and that question cannot convenietly be considered in this common order in which we shall deal with only common questions of law. Hence, at this stage we leave open this question of fact which will be considered separately in each individual appeal. ( 6 ) AS our decision on the aforesaid two questions of law will govern the decision on the same questions in a large number of similar appeals under s. 31 (1) of the Act, which are not yet ready for hearing, we permitted learned Counsel appearing in such similar appeals, to intervene in the present appeals. Accordingly, a number of learned Counsel for respondents in such similar appeals, addressed arguments. ( 7 ) ELABORATING their first contention, learned Counsel for respondents argued that the orders under appeal had become final prior to 11-12-1969 on which date the Amendment Act came into force, that sub-sec. (1) of s. 31 of the Act, as amended, cannot be construed as disturbing the finality of those orders, and that the enlarged period of limitation for filing appeals by the Government, as provided in amended sub-sec. (1) of S. 31 of the act. should be construed as being applicable only to those orders of the deputy Commissioner which were or are made subsequent to 11-12-1969, or, at any rate, applicable only to those orders of the Deputy Commissioner which were made within three months next before 11-12-1969 and which had not become final when the Amendment Act came into force. None of learned Counsel for respondents doubted and we think rightly too, the competency of the State Legislature to amend sub-sec. (1) of S. 31 of the Act with retrospective. effect so as to enable appeals being filed against orders which had become final on account of expiry of the period of limitation for such appeals, according to the law as it stood prior to such amendment. All that they contended was that the Legislature had not amended sub-sec. (1) of S. 31 so as to give such retrospective effect. effect so as to enable appeals being filed against orders which had become final on account of expiry of the period of limitation for such appeals, according to the law as it stood prior to such amendment. All that they contended was that the Legislature had not amended sub-sec. (1) of S. 31 so as to give such retrospective effect. They referred to the well known rule of construction that retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right or an obligation otherwise than as regards matters of procedure, unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language. They also referred to another well settled principle of law that a right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but a substantive right. They relied on the observations of the Privy Council in Delhi Cloth Mills v. Income Tax commr. , AIR. 1927 PC. 242 that provisions which, if applied retrospectively, deprive finality of orders which when the statute came into force, were final, are provisions which touch existing rights. They argued that the Legislature could not have intended that orders made by the Deputy Commissioner under S. 20 of the Act several years prior to the date on which the Amendment act came into force, should be re-opened in appeal. It was said that in a large number of cases the Government had accepted the orders of the Deputy Commissioner under S. 20 of the Act and paid, without any kind of protest, the amounts of compensation awarded under those orders, that the Inamdars had already received such amounts of compensation and that if such orders should be re-opened in appeals and the amounts of compensation should be reduced, the Inamdars would have to refund large amounts of compensation which they have already received and perhaps spent and that the Inamdars would be subjected to great hardship. It was argued that an interpretation which leads to such strange and unjust consequences, should be avoided unless compelled by express words or necessary implication and that there is nothing in the language of sub-sec. (6) of S 2 of the Amendement Act which compels a construction that the amendment operates retrospectively so as to enable the State to file appeals against orders which had become final prior to the Amendment act coming into force. (6) of S 2 of the Amendement Act which compels a construction that the amendment operates retrospectively so as to enable the State to file appeals against orders which had become final prior to the Amendment act coming into force. ( 8 ) THOUGH all learned Counsel for respondents proceeded on the common premise that the orders of the Deputy Commissioner against which the present appeals have been filed, had become final, there was divergence amongst them (learned Counsel for respondents) as to the grounds on, which finality was sought to be attached to such orders. Most of them maintained that sub-sec. (1) of S. 31 of the Act, as it stood before it was amended provided for an appeal not only by private persons like Inamdars but plso by the Government. According to them, the words "any person, aggrieved by any order" occurring in that sub-section, are wide enough to include the Government also which may feel aggrieved by an order of the Deputy Commissioner determining compensation. ( 9 ) ON the other hand, Mr. T. Rangaswamy lyengar, one of intervening learned Counsel, submitted that under unamended sub-sec. (1) of S. 31 of the Act the Government had no right of appeal because it cannot be regarded as a person aggrieved and that the right of appeal from an order under s. 20 of the Act, was conferred on the Government for the first time, by sub-sec. (6) of S. 2 of the Amendment Act. Even so, he contended that while conferring on the Government such new right of appeal, the Legislature did not intend to unsettle or disturb the finality of orders made before the Amendment Act came into force. According to him, by the amendment of sub-sec. (1) of S. 31 of the Act the right of appeal was conferred on the Government in respect of orders of the Deputy Commissioner made subsequent to the Amendment Act coming into force i. e. 11-12-1969, and not in respect of orders made prior to that date. ( 10 ) THE learned Additional Government Advocate contended that the amendment of sub-sec. (1) of S. 31 of the Act by S. 2 (6) of the Amendment act, has retrospective effect and that the words "shall be deemed always to have been substituted" occurring at the end of sub-see. ( 10 ) THE learned Additional Government Advocate contended that the amendment of sub-sec. (1) of S. 31 of the Act by S. 2 (6) of the Amendment act, has retrospective effect and that the words "shall be deemed always to have been substituted" occurring at the end of sub-see. (8) of s. 2 of the Amendment Act, makes it clear beyond any doubt that the legislature intended that sub-sec. (1) of S. 31 of the Act should always be read as incorporating the amendment and that the effect of the use of such deeming provision by the Legislature, is to make the amendment retrospective in operation. The learned Additional Government Advocate maintained that when the Legislature has expressly and unequivocally provided for retrospective operation of the amendment, Courts cannot decline to give such retrospective operation to the amendment merely on the ground that such retrospective effect would disturb the finality of orders made prior to 11-12-1969 and may cause hardship to persons benefited by such orders. ( 11 ) IF sub-sec. (6) of S. 2 of the Amendment Act did not contain the deeming provision, i. e. , the words "shall be deemed always to have been substituted", it would have been open to doubt whether the amendment should be construed as having retrospective effect so as to affect the existing rights and obligations by disturbing the finality of orders which had become final before the Amendment Act came into force. But, the deeming provision contained in that sub-section has to be given due effect. In Prabhakar Kondaji v. Emperor, AIR. 1944 Bom. 119, FB, a Full Bench of the Bombay high Court considered the effect of the clause containing the words "shall be substituted and shall be deemed always to have been substituted". Beaumont, CJ. , in his leadnig judgment said thus at page 120 :"the words clearly mean that the new clause is substituted and the old clause from the date of its inception is to be read in the form of the substituted clause. "his Lordship added that one has to read the original clause as having from its inception been in the form of the substituted clause. "his Lordship added that one has to read the original clause as having from its inception been in the form of the substituted clause. When an earlier provision in an Act is amended by incorporating certain words by substitution how the amended provision should be read after such amendment, has been explained thus by Bose, J. , who spoke for the Court in Shamrao v. District Magistrate, Thana, AIR. 1952 SC. 324, 326 :"the rule is that when a subsequent Act amends an earlier one in such a way as to incorporate itself, or a part of itself, into the earlier, then the earlier Act must thereafter be read and construed except where that would lead to a repugnancy, inconsistency or absurdity as if the altered words had been written, into the earlier act with pen and ink and the old words scored out so that thereafter there is no need to refer to the amending Act at all. " ( 12 ) IN the light of the aforesaid decisions it is clear that amended sub sec. (1) of S. 31 of the Act has to be read as if it contained, right from its inception, the words substituted by sub-sec. (6) of S. 2 of the Amendment act. However, learned Counsel for respondents contended that if sub sec (1) of S. 31 of the Act is read as if the words substituted by sub-section (6) of S. 2 of the Amendment Act had been written into it from its inception, there would be an absurdity because when the Act was enacted in the. year 1954, the Legislature could not have foreseen that the Amendment act would be enacted and would come into force at any particular point of time. It was argued that on account of such absurdity sub-section (1) of S. 31 of the Act cannot be read as having, from its inception, the words substituted by sub-see. (6) of S. 2 of the Amendment Act. It is true that when the Act was enacted in 1954, the Legislature could not anticipate whether any amendment would be made to it (the Act) or when the Amendment Act would be enacted or would come into force. But, we do not see how that circumstance would lead to any absurdity in reading sub-sec. (1) of S. 31 as containing, from its inception, the words substituted by the Amendment Act. But, we do not see how that circumstance would lead to any absurdity in reading sub-sec. (1) of S. 31 as containing, from its inception, the words substituted by the Amendment Act. The following observation of Beaumont, cj. , in Prabhakar Kondaji's case, is a complete answer to the above criticism :"the Ordinance is open, I think, to certain verbal criticisms. It says : 'the following clause shall be substituted, and shall be deemed always to have been substituted'. Obviously, if it had always been substituted, then there would be nothing for which it could have been substituted But the words clearly mean that the new clause is substituted, and the old clause from the date of its inception is to be read in the form of the substituted clause. I do not -think that any other meaning can be attached to the words ' shall be deemed always to have been substituted' ". ( 13 ) THE following observations of Mahajan, J. , (as he then was) who spoke for the Court in State of Bombay v. Pandurang, AIR. 1953 SC. 244, 246, are also apposite :"when a statute enacts that something shall be deemed to have been done which in fact and truth was not done, the Court is entitled and bound to ascertain for what purposes and between what persons the statutory fiction is to be resorted to and full effect must be given, to the statutory fiction and it should be carried to its logical conclusion. " ( 14 ) THE object of the deeming provision in sub-sec. (6) of S. 2 of the amendment Act, is, in our opinion, to give retrospective effect to thej substitution by that sub-section, of certain words, in sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 31 of the Act. Hence, we are unable to accept the contention that any absurd result would prevent retrospective substitution of the words in sub-sec. (1) of s. 31 of the Act by sub-sec, (6) of S. 2 of the Amendment Act. The question whether the amendment of sub-sec. (1) of S. 31 has retrospective effect or not, can be considered from another angle. Unamended sub-sec. (1) of S. 31 of fthe Act did not expressly mention about the Government as the party who can prefer an appeal. The word 'person' has been defined in sub-sec. The question whether the amendment of sub-sec. (1) of S. 31 has retrospective effect or not, can be considered from another angle. Unamended sub-sec. (1) of S. 31 of fthe Act did not expressly mention about the Government as the party who can prefer an appeal. The word 'person' has been defined in sub-sec. (28) of S. 3 of the Mysore General Clauses Act as including persons, company or an associated or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not. But, it is doubtful whether the State or the government can be regarded as an association or body of individuals and hence coming within the ambit of the words any person aggrieved occuring in sub-sec. (1) of S. 31 of the Act. None of the provisions of the act and the Rules provides-for the State or the Government being impleaded as a party in proceedings under S. 20 of the Act for determining compensation. In such proceedings, there are ho two parties apart from the deputy Commissioner. In a sense, the Deputy Commissioner represents the interest of the Government also. In such a situation, it is doubtful whether the State or the Government can be regarded as a person aggrieved by any order of the Deputy Commissioner in such proceedings. The learned Additional Government Advocate submitted that before the amendment of sub-sec. (1) of S. 31 of the Act came into force, the Government had not preferred any appeal to this Court from any order of the deputy Commissioner determining compensation under S. 20 of the Act. The Government appears to have understood unamended sub-sec. (1) of s. 31 of the Act as not providing for a right of appeal by the Government against such orders of the Deputy Commissioner. ( 15 ) THE amendment of sub-sec. (1) of S. 31 of the Act by the Amendment act may be construed either as creating a new right of appeal and conferring it on the Government or as a Legislative declaration to remove doubt as to whether the Government has such right of appeal from an order of the Deputy Commissioner made under Section 20 of the Act. The retrospective effect of an explanatory or declaratory Act has been stated thus in Craies on Statute Law, 17th Edn. The retrospective effect of an explanatory or declaratory Act has been stated thus in Craies on Statute Law, 17th Edn. , at page 395 : "where a statute is passed for the purpose of supplying an obvious omission in a former statute, or, as Parke J. (afterwards baron Parke) said in R. v. Dursley, "to 'explain' a former statute", the subsequent statute has relation back to the time when the prior act was passed. Thus, in Att. Gen. v. Pougett ( (1816) 2 Price, 381, 392) it appeared that by a Customs Act of 1873 (53 Geo. 3, c. 33) a duty was imposed upon hides of 9s. 4d. , but the Act omitted to state that it was to be 9s. 4d. , per cwt. , and to remedy this omission ther Customs Act (53 Geo. 3, c. 1065) was passed later in the same year. Between the passing of these two Acts some hides were exported, and it was contended that they were not liable to pay the duty of 9s. 4d. per cwt. , but Thomson CB. , in giving judgment for the Attorney general, said : 'the duty in this instance was in fact imposed by the first Act, but the gross mistake of the omission of the weight for which the sum expressed was to have been payable occasioned the amendment made by the subsequent Act, but that had reference to the former statute as soon as it passed, and they must be taken together as if they were one and the same Act'. ( 16 ) WHERE an Act is in its nature declaratory, the presumption against construing it retrospectively is inapplicable. In Att. Gen. v. Theobald (1890) 24 QBD. 537 ). S. 11 of the Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1889, as to the liabilitv of voluntary settlements to stamp duty, was held retrospective, although the litigation in which its terms were involved had commenced before it was passed. " ( 17 ) IF sub-sec. (6) of S. 2 of the Amendment Act is regarded as a declaratory or an explanatory provision to remove doubt as to whether the government has a right of appeal under sub-sec. (1) of S. 31 of the Act, the amendment must clearly be regarded as having retrospective effect. We shall now examine what legal position will result if the amendment of sub-sec. (1) of S. 31 of the Act, the amendment must clearly be regarded as having retrospective effect. We shall now examine what legal position will result if the amendment of sub-sec. (1) of S. 31 is construed as creating a new right, namely, the right of appeal by the Government, which it did not possess prior to that amendment. If the intention of the Legislature was that such amendment should operate only prospectively and not retrospectivelv and that the Government should be enabled to file appeals against orders of the deputy Commissioner made only subsequent, and not prior, to- the amendment coming into force,, there was no need to provide in amended sub- sec. (1) of S. 31 that the Government may appeal within six months from the date of the commencement of the Amendment Act; it would have been sufficient to provide that the Government may appeal within six months from the date of the order of the Deputy Commissioner made under S. 20 of the Act. As stated by the Supreme Court in J. K. Cotton Spinning and weaving Mills Co. , Ltd. v. State of U. P. ,air. 1901 SC, 1170, 1173 in the interpretation of statutes the Courts' always presume that the Legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and that the legislative intention is that every part of a statute should have effect. That two separate starting points of limitation, i. e. , the date of the order appealed against and the date on which the Amendment Act comes into force, are provided in this sub-section,, and that the later of these two starting points would prevail, lead to an iresistable inference that the Legislature intended that the newly created right of appeal should be available to the Government in respect of orders of the Deputy Commissioner made prior to the Amendment Act coming into force, also, provided the Government avails of such right within six months from the date of the Amendment Act coming into force. ( 18 ) LOOKED at from any angle, the intention of the Legislature was, in our opinion, that the amendment of sub-sec. ( 18 ) LOOKED at from any angle, the intention of the Legislature was, in our opinion, that the amendment of sub-sec. (1) of S. 31 should have retrospective operation so that the Government may appeal from orders of the Deputy Commissioner made prior to the Amendment Act coming into force, also, however long may be the interval of time between the date of making such order and the date of coming into force of the amendment Act. When the intention of the Legislature to give retrospective operation to the amendment of sub-sec. (1) of S. 31 of the Act, is quite clear, the Courts cannot decline to give such retrospective effect merely on the ground that the finality of orders of the Deputy Commissioner made prior to the Amendment Act coming into force, would be disturbed and that vested right would be affected by such retrospective operation. We shall now deal with the question whether S. 12 of the Limitation, act, 1963, is applicable to appeals under sub-sec. (1) of S. 31 of the Act so that the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the order of the Deputy commissioner made under S. 20 of the Act, can be excluded in computing the period of limitation prescribed by sub-sec. (1) of S. 31 of the Act. The Act does not contain any express provisions as to exclusion of time requisite for obtaining a copy of the order appealed against. S. 38 of the Act empowers the Government to make rules to carry out the purpose of the Act. Without prejudice to the generality of the rule making power conferred by sub-sec. (1) of that Section,, sub-sec. (2) of S. 38 of the Act specifies the matters in respect of which rules may provide for. Clause (d) of sub-sec. (2) of S. 38 states, inter alia, that that such rules may provide for the application of the provisions of the Limitation Act to applications, appeals and proceedings under the Act. ( 19 ) HOWEVER, no rule has been made by the Government providing for the application of provisions of the Limitation Act, to applications, appeals or any proceedings under the Act. Rule 26 of the Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition, rules, 1956, provides inter alia, that every appeal must be accompanied by a certified copy ot the order appealed against. Rule 26 of the Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition, rules, 1956, provides inter alia, that every appeal must be accompanied by a certified copy ot the order appealed against. Learned Counsel for respondents contended that the Act must be legarded as a self contained one in regard to limitation for appeals in as much as sub-sec (1) of S. 31 ol the Act has specifically prescribed a period of limitation for appeals thereunder and that as there is no specific provision in the Act for exclusion of the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the order appealed against, in determining the period of limitation for an appeal, such time for obtaining a copy cannot be excluded. The above contention overlooks the eflect of sub-sec. (2) of S. 29 of the limitation Act, 1963, which reads :"29 (2 ). Where any special or local law precribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of S. 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose, of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Ss. 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. " ( 20 ) AS there is no provision in the Act or the rules thereunder expressly excluding the application of Ss. 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act, thtse Sections are attracted by virtue of sub-sec. (2) of S. 29 of the Limitation act, for determining the period of limitation prescribed by the Act for any application, appeal or proceeding. The mere prescription of a period of limitation by a local law or special law, for an application, appeal or proceeding under that law, does not amount to expressly providing for the exclusion of the application of Ss. 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act for determining such period of limitatoin. ( 21 ) MR. M. R. Janardhan, learned Counsel for respondents in some of these appeals, contended that as the Government had not made any rule as contemplated under Clause (d) of sub-sec. 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act for determining such period of limitatoin. ( 21 ) MR. M. R. Janardhan, learned Counsel for respondents in some of these appeals, contended that as the Government had not made any rule as contemplated under Clause (d) of sub-sec. (2) of S. 38 of the Act providing for application of the provisions of the Limitation Act to applications , appeals and proceedings under the Act, the application of Ss. 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act should be regarded as being expressly excluded. We are unable to see how the absence of any rule providing for the application of the provisions of the Limitation Act to applications, appeals and proceedings under the Act, can be regarded as expressly providing for exclusion of the application of the provisions of the Limitation Act. We see no substance in the contention of mr. Janardhan. Mr. T. Rangaswamy lyengar contended that since the Act is an expropriatory enactment, its provisions should be construed strictly and that the period of limitation prescribed by sub-sec. (1) of S. 31 of the Act should not be enlarged by applying the provisions of sub-sec. (3) of Section 12 of the Limitation Act. ( 22 ) THE Act provides for abolition of Inams as well as for payment of compensation to Inamdars. Only those provisions of the Act which relate to abolition of Inams, can be regarded as expropriatory provisions. But, the provisions of the Act for determination of compensation payable to inamdars and for appeals from orders determining such compensation, cannot be regarded as expropriatory provisions. Mr. Rangaswamy lyengar was not able to point out any principle or rule of construction which states that provisions relating to appeals should be construed strictly. An appeal under sub-sec. (1) of S. 31 of the Act from an order of the Deputy Commissioner determining compensation, can be presented not only by the Government but also by an Inarndar or any person aggrieved by such order. If the provisions of S. 12 of the Limitation act are held inapplicable to appeals preferred by the Government under sub-sec. (1) of S. 31 of the Act, it would be illogical to hold that the provisions of S. 12 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to appeals under that subsection preferred by the Inamdars and other persons aggrie ved. (1) of S. 31 of the Act, it would be illogical to hold that the provisions of S. 12 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to appeals under that subsection preferred by the Inamdars and other persons aggrie ved. If S. 12 of the Limitation Act is held inapplicable to appeals under sub-sec. (1) of S. 31 of the Act, serious prejudice may be caused not only to the Government but also to private parties. Suppose the office of the deputy Commissioner takes three months or more to prepare a copy of the order from which a private party desires to appeal. Then he cannot prefer an appeal within the prescribed period of limitation unless the copying time is excluded. Hence, we have no hesitation in rejecting the contention of Mr. Rangaswamy lyengar. ( 23 ) MR. T. S. Ramachandra, one of intervening learned Counsel, pointed out that sub-sec. (2) of S. 29 of the Limitation Act makes Ss. 4 to 24 (inclusive) of that Act applicable for determining the period of limitation prescribed under a local or special law, only when such period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application is different from the period prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act. He argued that as no period of limitation is prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act. For an appeal under sub-sec. (1)of S. 31 of the Act, the Act cannot be regarded as having prescribed for such appeal a period of limitation different from the period of limitation prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act, and that hence sub-sec. (2) of S. 29 of the Limitation Act cannot make Sections 4 to 24 (inlcusive) applicable for determining the period of limitation for an appeal under sub-sec. (1) of S. 31 of the Act. ( 24 ) IT is true that there is no article in the Schedule to the Limitation Act, act, 1963, which prescribes a period of limitation for an appeal under sub sec. (1) of S. 31 of the Act. The only articles in that Schedule which relate to appeals are Arts. 114 to 117 (inclusive ). Arts. 114 and 115 rellate to Criminal appeals. Art. 116 relates to appeals under the CPC. Art. 117 relates to appeals to the High Court from decrees and orders of the same Court. A contention very similar to the one urged by Mr. The only articles in that Schedule which relate to appeals are Arts. 114 to 117 (inclusive ). Arts. 114 and 115 rellate to Criminal appeals. Art. 116 relates to appeals under the CPC. Art. 117 relates to appeals to the High Court from decrees and orders of the same Court. A contention very similar to the one urged by Mr. Ramachandra was considered by the Supreme Court in Vidya Charana Shukla v. Khuchand baghel, AIR. 1964 SC. 1099. There, a question arose whether the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the order appealed against, should be excluded for determining the period of limitation prescribed by the Representation of People act, 1951, for an appeal to the High Court under S. 116a (1) of that Act. It was contended that as no period of limitation had been prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act for an appeal under S. 116a (1) of the representation of People Act, that Act cannot be considered as having prescribed a period of limitation different from the period of limitation prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act and that hence S. 12 of the Limitation Act has no application for determining period of limitation, prescribed by the Representation of People Act for such appeal. In repelling that contention, Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) who delivered a separate but concurring judgment, quoted with approval the following observations of Dixit, CJ. , in Beharilal Chaurasiya v. Regional Transport authority, AIR. 1961 M. P. 75: "a special law may provide a period of limitation and Schedule-I may omit to do. Nonetheless the special law would be different from the Limitation Act. S. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act is not very happily worded. It must be construed so as to avoid absurdity. The expression 'a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule' occurring in S. 29 (2) cannot be construed as meaning that Schedule-I must also positively prescribe the period of limitation. Such a construction would not be in accordance with the intention of the Legislature and would lead to an absurdity. " his Lordship (Subba Rao, J.), held that S. 29 (2) would apply even to a case where a difference between the special law and the Limitation act, arose by the omission to provide for a limitation to a particular proceeding under the Limitation Act. " his Lordship (Subba Rao, J.), held that S. 29 (2) would apply even to a case where a difference between the special law and the Limitation act, arose by the omission to provide for a limitation to a particular proceeding under the Limitation Act. ( 25 ) IN view of the aforesaid pronouncement of the Supreme Court, the contention of Mr. Ramachandra should fail. We hold that sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Limitation Act is applicable for determining the period of limitation for appeals under sub-section. (1) of Section 31 of the Act and that the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the order appealed against, should be excluded in computing the period of limitation for such appeal. As stated earlier, the question whether the Government had applied for a copy of the order appealed against and hence can claim the exclusion of time requisite for obtaining such copy, will be considered separately in each appeal. --- *** --- .