JUDGMENT K.N. Seth, J. - The above noted writ petitions have been filed by the Aligarh Muslim University for quashing the proceedings in suit No. 437 and suit No. 438 of 1972 of the court of Munsif Koil, Aligarh, and for a direction to opposite party No. 1 not to proceed with the aforesaid suits. A common question of law arises in both the petitions and they can be conveniently disposed of by a common judgment. 2. Anil Kumar was admitted to 1st year M.B.B.S. class of the University in the academic session 1972-73. He made a written report to the Dean Faculty of Medicine alleging that Wasi Ahmad Farooqi and Zafrul Islam, who were students of B.U.M.S. of the University, made indecent assault on him in room No. 36 of the Mumtaj Hostel in the night of 19th August, 1972. An enquiry into the incident was conducted by the warden of the Mumtaj Hostel. He recorded the statement oil Wasi Ahmed Farooqi and Zafrul Islam. The Proctor of the University also made a report of the incident to the Registrar with a request to place the matter before the Committee of Discipline. The Committee of Discipline in its meeting held on 22-8-1972 resolved to serve a notice on Wasi Ahmad and Zafrul Islam (Opposite Parties No. 2) asking them to show cause why their names be not removed from the rolls of the University and why they should not be debarred from taking admission in the University and its maintained institutions in future. The Committee authorised the Registrar to serve the show cause notices on opposite parties Nos. 2. The Registrar served the show cause notices. A copy of the minutes of the meeting of the Committee of Discipline was appended to the notices. Opposite parties No. 21 made applications praying for one months' time to prepare their defence and file a reply to the charges levelled 3 against them. The Committee granted an extention upto 11-9-1972. It further resolved that if no explanation was received by the said date and the opposite parties No. 2 failed to appear before the Committee, ex parte orders would be passed. Opposite parties No. 2 again requested the Registrar on 11-9-1972 for further time on the ground that copies of statements of witnesses sought to be examined against them had not been supplied. The Committee of Discipline again met on 12-9-1972. Opposite parties No. 2 again requested the Registrar on 11-9-1972 for further time on the ground that copies of statements of witnesses sought to be examined against them had not been supplied. The Committee of Discipline again met on 12-9-1972. Wasi Ahmad Farooqi and Zafrul Islam had neither filed any explanations nor they were present before the Committee. Anil Kumar was present for cross-examination on the said date. The Committee of Discipline passed a resolution removing the name of the name of the aforesaid two students from the rolls of the University and directing that they should not be admitted in the University and the institutions maintained by it until 16-7-1974. 3. Wasi Ahmad and Zafrul Islam filed suit Nos. 437 and 438 of 1972 in the court of Munsif Koil, Aligarh, for a declaration that the resolution of the Committee of Discipline dated 12-9-1972 was void. They further prayed for an injunction against the defendants restraining them for giving effect to the said resolution. Applications for an interim injunction were also made. The defendants filed objections to the said applications and after hearing the parties the learned Munsif issued an injunction by his order dated 27-10-1972 restraining the defendants from giving effect to the impugned order dated 12-9-1972. It was further directed that the plaintiffs shall be allowed to be treated alike in every respect with the other regular students provided the plaintiffs abide by the law and the directions of the authorities concerned. Thereafter the present petitions were filed by the University for the reliefs mentioned earlier. 4. The principal question for consideration in the petitions is whether the civil suit is maintainable. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Aligarh Muslim University Act provides complete machinery for the redress of the grievance of students against an order taking disciplinary action against them and the jurisdiction of the civil court in such cases is barred. 5. The Aligarh Muslim University Act by Section 3 constitutes the Chancellor. The Pro-Chancellor and the Vice-Chancellor and the members of the Court, the Executive Council and the Academic Council as a body corporate known as the Aligarh Muslim University. Sec. 19 lays down the powers and duties of the Vice-Chancellor who is made the principal executive and academic officer of the University and is authorised to exercise general supervision and control over the affairs of the University. Sec. 19 lays down the powers and duties of the Vice-Chancellor who is made the principal executive and academic officer of the University and is authorised to exercise general supervision and control over the affairs of the University. Sec. 27 provides for Statues for various matters including procedure for appeal to the Executive Council by any employee or student against, the action of any officer or authority of the University. Statute 35 provides that all powers relating to discipline and disciplinary action in relation to students shall vest in the Vice-Chancellor. Clause (2) provides that the Vice-Chancellor may dalegate all or any of his powers as he deems proper to the Proctor and to such other officers as he may specify in this behalf. Sec. 36-A reads as follows : "(1) Any student or candidate for an examination whose name has been removed from the rolls of the University by the orders or resolution of the Vice-Chancellor, Discipline Committee or Examination Committee, as the case may be, and who has been debarred from appearing at the examinations of the University for more than a year, may within ten days of the date of receipt of such order or copy of such resolution by him, appeal to the Executive Council and the Executive Council may confirm, modify or reverse the decision of the Vice-Chancellor or the Committee, as the case may be. (2) Any dispute arising out of any disciplinary action taken by the University against a student shall at the request of such student be referred to a Tribunal of Arbitration and the provisions of Sub-sec. (2) of Section 36 shall, as far as may be, apply to the reference made under this sub-section." Sec. 36-B also confers on every employee and student a right of appeal to the Executive Council against the decision of any officer or authority of the University. 6. In Sub-sec. (2) of Section 36 it is provided that any dispute arising out of a contract between the University and of its employee shall, at the request of the employee concerned, be referred to a Tribunal of Arbitration. It is also provided that the decision of the tribunal shall be final, and no suit shall lie in any civil court in respect of the matters decided by the tribunal. By virtue of Sub-sec. It is also provided that the decision of the tribunal shall be final, and no suit shall lie in any civil court in respect of the matters decided by the tribunal. By virtue of Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 3G-A this provision is made applicable to any dispute arising out of any disciplinary action against a student. 7. In view of the aforesaid provision it was contended that the Act and the Statute provide a complete remedy and the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain a dispute of the present nature is barred. Reliance has been placed on Dhulabhai Etc. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1969 S.C. 78 wherein the principles regarding the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil courts have been laid down. The principle No. 1 says : - "Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the civil court's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure." As mentioned earlier the various provisions of the Aligarh Muslim University Act provide complete machinery for the redress of the grievance of a student. On the show cause notice being issued, the opposite parties could place their case before the Committee of Discipline. They had also a right to challenge the correctness of the order of the Committee of Discipline before the Executive Council which had power to confirm, modify or reverse the decision of the Committee. Sec. 36-A further empowered the student to have the dispute referred to a Tribunal of Arbitration. The Act not only provides a right of appeal against the order of the Committee of Discipline but gives a further right to have the dispute decided by a Tribunal of Arbitration. Various Tribunals under the statute provide forum for determination of all disputes between the University and the students in respect of the rights and liabilities created under the provisions of the Act. Sub-sec. (2) of Section 36 makes the order of the Tribunal final and further lays down that no suit shall lie in any court in respect oi the matter decided by the Tribunal. Sub-sec. (2) of Section 36 makes the order of the Tribunal final and further lays down that no suit shall lie in any court in respect oi the matter decided by the Tribunal. By virtue of Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 36-A finality attaches to the order of the Tribunal of Arbitration in a disciplinary. action against a student and a civil suit to challenge the order of the Tribunal is expressly barred. 8. The exception engrafted in principle No. 1 referred to above would also be not attracted in the present cases. The opposite parties No. 1 were duly served with notices issued by the Committee of Discipline and they were asked to submit their explanation and appear before the Committee on 11-9-1972. A copy of the minutes of the meeting of the Committee of Discipline was also appended to the notices. Similarly a copy of the statement of Anil Kumar, the complainant, who was the only witness in support of the complaint, was also sent to the opposite parties. Opposite parties No. 2 made applications for one months time to prepare their defence and to file a reply to the charges levelled against them. The Committee, however, granted them time upto 11-9-1972. It was made clear that if no explanation was received by the aforesaid date and the opposite parties failed to appear before the Committee ex parte orders would be passed. On 12-9-1972 the Committee of Discipline met again. On that date Anil Kumar was present for cross-examination but the opposite parties neither filed a reply to the charge-sheet nor appeared before the Committee of Discipline to cross-examine and controvert the evidence of Anil Kumar. It is thus clear that a reasonable opportunity was given to the opposite parties to put forward their case before the Committee of Discipline. In the circumstances it could not be said that the provisions of the Act had not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal had not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. The Committee of Discipline, exercising the delegated powers of the Vice-Chancellor, was competent to take a decision on the basis of the material before it. The opposite parties could have no grievance against the procedure adopted by the Committee of Discipline when they themselves failed to file any explanation or appear before that Committee. The Committee of Discipline, exercising the delegated powers of the Vice-Chancellor, was competent to take a decision on the basis of the material before it. The opposite parties could have no grievance against the procedure adopted by the Committee of Discipline when they themselves failed to file any explanation or appear before that Committee. The exception provided in rule mentioned above is thus not attracted and the suits filed by the opposite parties would not be maintainable. 9. A similar question for consideration came up before a Bench of this Court in Vijai Bahadur Singh v. The Vice-Chancellor of University of Allahabad, S.A. No. 245 of 1972. D/d. 8.5.1972. In this case the appellant was refused admission to one of the hostels of the University. He preferred an appeal to the Vice-Chancellor but that was dismissed. Thereafter he instituted a suit praying that the University authorities be directed to admit the appellant to the hostel. He also obtained an interim injunction directing the University authorities not to evict him from the hostel. Thereafter the University authorities instituted a writ petition in this Court challenging the competent of the civil court to entertain the suit. The writ petition was allowed and it was held that the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and on this ground the proceedings in the suit were quashed. Relying on the second part of principle No. 2 in Dhulabhai's case the Bench affirmed the view taken by the learned Single Judge. 10. Learned counsel for the opposite parties contended that the University should have raised the question of jurisdiction when it filed objections to the applications for an interim injunction and as that was not done this Court should not interfere in the exercise of its extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution. It was also contended that against the order of the learned Munsif the University has preferred appeals which are pending and the question which is sought to be raised in the present petitions can also be raised and decided in the appeals. The University should have raised objections at the initial stage when it put in appearance in response to notices issued by the trial court. However, the failure to raise this plea at that stage would not be fatal to the maintainability of the present petitions. The University should have raised objections at the initial stage when it put in appearance in response to notices issued by the trial court. However, the failure to raise this plea at that stage would not be fatal to the maintainability of the present petitions. No useful purpose would be served by declining to interfere on this technical ground. The scheme of the Aligarh Muslim University Act bars the cognizance of the suit by the civil court and would be in the interest of all the parties concerned that the proceedings in the suits should be quashed at this initial stage when even the written statements have not been filed in the suits. 11. I accordingly allow these petitions and quash the proceedings in suits Nos. 437 and 438 of 1972 of the court of Munsif Koil, Aligarh. The learned Munsif is directed not to proceed with the hearing of the aforesaid suits. In the circumstances of the case the parties are directed to bear their own costs.