V. I. Poulose v. T. Krishnankutty Menon — 1973 DIGILAW 127 (MAD)

Order.- This revision is by the accused in the case, and is directed against the order of the Sessions Court in revision reversing; the order of discharge passed by the Additional First Class Magistrate. 2. One Kunjavara had sent Exhibit P-10 petition dated 1st April, 1971 to the Chief Minister of Kerala bringing to his notice that large quantities of export size rosewood and teak logs were being illicitly removed from the reserve forest in Parambikulam, and stacked in the sub-depot of accused Nos. 1 and 2 at Parambikulam, and the private depot of the first accused at Kalady. The Government through the Chief Conservator of Forests, Trivandrum started an enquiry into the matter, and also deputed the Flying Squad to make a search of the timber depots of the accused. In pursuance of the search conducted on 7th May, 197.1 by the Flying Squad, P.W.2, seized some logs from the sub-depot of accused Nos. 1 and 2 at Parambikulam under Exhibit P-3 mahazar out of which 6 logs are specified in the present complaint, and P.W. 4 seized 137 logs on 14th August, 1971 and 15th August, 1971 under Exhibits P-8 and P-9 mahazars from the private depot of the first accused at Kalady, all the logs being either teak or rosewood of export size and quality, according to the prosecution version. 3. The prosecution, against all the three accused, who are the revision petitioners, was for offences punishable under section 27 (1) (d) and (g) of the Kerala Forest Act. Before the Additional First Class Magistrate as many as 29 witnesses were examined and 64 exhibits were marked in support of the prosecution case. On the side of the accused Exhibits D-1 to D-9 were marked. The learned Additional First Class Magistrate after having considered the evidence of the prosecution witnesses has summed up his conclusion, in paragraph 59 of the order in the following; words: "Taking all these circumstances into consideration I have no hesitation to find that P.Ws. 2 and 14 (sic) did not effect any seizure of illicit timber from the accused. Of course it is evident that P.Ws. 2 and 14 effected search in the sub-depot of A-1 and A-2 at Parambikulam and in the timber depot of A-1 at Kalady respectively. But the timbers seized by P.W.2 and P.W.14 as. 2 and 14 (sic) did not effect any seizure of illicit timber from the accused. Of course it is evident that P.Ws. 2 and 14 effected search in the sub-depot of A-1 and A-2 at Parambikulam and in the timber depot of A-1 at Kalady respectively. But the timbers seized by P.W.2 and P.W.14 as. per Exhibits P-3, P-8 and P-9 are not illicitly removed from a reserve forest by the accused. Those timbers are legally transported under cover of valid permits issued by the competent authorities.‘‘ Taking the view that the prosecution did not succeed to make out a case against the accused, which if, unrebutted, would warrant their conviction, the learned Additional First Class Magistrate passed an order discharging the accused under section 253 (1), Criminal Procedure Code. This was the order that was challenged in revision before the learned Sessions Judge; and the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge reversing the order of discharge by the Additional First Class Magistrate is the subject matter of this revision. 4. Before proceeding with the discussion regarding the merit of the case as revealed by the evidence on record, I should at this stage like to dispose of the contention raised by the learned State Prosecutor with respect to jurisdiction of this Court to interfere with the order that has been passed by the learned Sessions Judge in revision. Reliance has been placed by the learned State Prosecutor on the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Sesha Reddy v. China Pullaiah1, where the view taken is as follows: "Where an order is made by the Sessions Judge in the exercise of the discretion vested in him under section 436, Criminal Procedure Code, it is only where the order is shown to be manifestly unjust or perverse that the High Court can possibly interfere in its revisional jurisdiction." The circumstances in which a revisional Court can interfere under section 436 of the Criminal Procedure Code have been indicated by Velu Pillai, J. In Kochukutta Menon v. Vareed2, as follows: "The scope of interference in revision with an order of discharge is very limited. A revisional Court may interfere with an order of discharge if it is patently foolish or perverse or perfunctory. A revision is competent when the order of discharge is manifestly unreasonable or foolish or prima facie incorrect or perverse. A revisional Court may interfere with an order of discharge if it is patently foolish or perverse or perfunctory. A revision is competent when the order of discharge is manifestly unreasonable or foolish or prima facie incorrect or perverse. If the Magistrate has not applied his mind to the case, the revisional Court can interfere." In Varkey George and others v. K.P. Vasu Pillai3, Raghavan, J., as he was then, has observed- "An order of discharge can be interfered with in revision only if the order is preverse or illegal or has resulted in miscarriage of justice." The stage at and the circumstances in which an order of discharge is to be passed have been indicated by the Supreme Court in Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co., Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra4, where, in paragraph 16 of the judgment, Dua, J., has observed as follows: "..........The argument that the Court at the stage of framing; the charges has not to apply its judicial mind for considering whether or not there is a ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the asccused is not supportable either on the plain language of the section or on its judicial interpretation or on any other recognised principle of law. The order framing the charges does substantially affect the person’s liberty and it is not possible to countenance the view that the Court must automatically frame the charge merely because the prosecuting authorities, by relying on the documents referred to in section 173, consider it proper to institute the case. The responsibility of framing the charges is that of the Court and it has to judicially consider the question of doing so. Without fully adverting to the material on the record it must not blindly adopt the decision of the prosecution." 5. The contention of the learned State Prosecutor is that when the revisional Court on facts of the case has taken a view, it is not open to the High Court in revision to set aside that finding and substitute its own finding. It is further contended by the learned State Prosecutor that for framing a charge in would be sufficient if a prima facie case appears against the accused on the evidence let in by the prosecution. Sub-section (1) of section 253, Cr. P. Code, reads as follows: "253. It is further contended by the learned State Prosecutor that for framing a charge in would be sufficient if a prima facie case appears against the accused on the evidence let in by the prosecution. Sub-section (1) of section 253, Cr. P. Code, reads as follows: "253. (1) If, upon taking all the evidence referred to in section 252, and making such examination (if any) of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary, he finds that no case against the accused has been mad; out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction, the Magistrate shall discharge him.“ The sub-section in terms does not speak anything about a prima facie case. The real test in terms of the sub-section seems to be whether or not the prosecution has made out a case for conviction of the accused. If the Magistrate finds on a consideration of the evidence adduced by the prosecution that no case against the accused, which, if unrebutted, would warrant a conviction, has been made out, the Magistrate has to pass an order of discharge in favour of the accused. The propriety of the order that has been passed by the Additional First Class Magistrate on the one hand and that of the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge on the other has to be determined, and the question whether there is a case for interference by this Court in revision under section 439, Criminal Procedure Code, has to be decided, on a careful examination of the material placed before this Court to see whether or not the requirements under section 253 (1) in the light of the observations contained in the judgment of the Supreme Court referred to above, have been made out. It is with this view in mind that I enter upon the discussion in the following paragraphs. I may at once add that I do not find any merit in the contention of the learned State Prosecutor that the learned Additional First Class Magistrate was in error in having discharged the accused without questioning them under section 342, Criminal Proedure Code. I do not think that there is any mandatory provision in the Code which requires that the accused are to be questioned under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code, before an order of discharge is passed. I do not think that there is any mandatory provision in the Code which requires that the accused are to be questioned under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code, before an order of discharge is passed. It is a matter in the discretion of the Court as is evident from the wording in sub-section (1) of section 253. In a case where the court is satisfied that the evidence adduced by the prosecution does not disclose for conviction of the accused, it is totally unnecessary for the Court to examine the accused under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code. 6. We may also look into the relevant provisions of the forest Act under which the accused are proceeded against. Section 27 of the Kerala Forest Act provides for penalties for trespass or damage in Reserved Forests and acts prohibited in such forests. In terms of section 27 (1)- “Any person who- * * * * (d) knowingly receives or has in possession any major forest produce illicitly removed from a Reserved Forest; * * * * (g) fells, girdles, marks, lops, taps, uproots, burns, saws, converts or removes, any tree the value of which exceeds one hundred rupees, or strips off the bark or leaves from or otherwise damages the same, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extent to three years and with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, in addition to such compensation for damage done to the forest as the convicting Court may direct to be paid. Explanation.- For the purpose of this sub-section the forest produce enumerated in the schedule shall be deemed to be major forest produce.“ Items 1 and 2 in the Schedule to the Act are respectively teak and rosewood. Explanation.- For the purpose of this sub-section the forest produce enumerated in the schedule shall be deemed to be major forest produce.“ Items 1 and 2 in the Schedule to the Act are respectively teak and rosewood. Under section 69 of the Act there is a presumption that- “When, in any proceedings taken, under this Act, or in consequence of anything done under this Act, a question arises as to whether any forest produce is the property of the Central or State Government, such produce shall be presumed to be the property of the Central or State Government, as the case may be, until the contrary is proved.” The material allegations in the complaint read as follows: “The 6 pieces of rosewood and teak included in, the seizure made on 7th May, 1971 and all the 137 rosewood and teak logs seized on 14th and 15th August, 1971 and referred to above were all illicitly secreted and obtained by accused one, two and three. Accused one, two and three have in the illicit secreting and removal of the said pieces fit for depot Supply acted in concert. They have knowingly received and illicitly removed from the supply coupe No V. and kept in their possession the said piece which are major forest produces. The accused have by their acts contravened the provisions contained in section 27 clause 1 sub-clause "d" and "g" of Kerala Forest Act of 1961 and are punishable under the said sections. The pieces of rosewood and teak suitable for depot supply seized from accused one, two and three will under a modest estimate be worth at least Rs. 32,000. The Government have sustained a loss of Rs. 32,000 by the said illegal acts of the accused............The Officers of the Forest Department who by their acts of omission and commission have either facilitated or connived at the removal of the major Forest produce referred to above are being proceeded against separately and suitable and appropriate action will be taken against them in accordance to law." I think clause (g) of sub-section (1) of section 27 has been added by the complainant only by way of abundant caution, because the allegations made in the complaint do not warrant the application of that clause. The learned State Prosecutor also concedes this position. The learned State Prosecutor also concedes this position. It is, therefore, sufficient to examine whether the prosecution has made out a case for conviction of the accused under section 27 (1) (d) of the Forest Act. 7. It may be noted that the prosecution case is, as is clear from the passage quoted above from the complaint, that the source of the logs seized under Exhibits P-3, P-8 and P-9 by P.Ws. 2 and 4 from the accused has to be traced to Supply Coupe No. V. In fact the definite case of the prosecution is that " they (meaning the accused) have knowingly received and illicitly removed from the Supply Coupe No. V and kept in their possession the said pieces which are major forest produces". The prosecution has failed to establish that these are logs the source of which could be traced to Supply Coupe No. V. There is really total absence of evidence on this point. Sri S. Eswara Iyer, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, submits that the order of discharge passed by the learned Additional First Class Magistrate has to be upheld for this reason alone, though there are other valid grounds also to support the order of discharge. 8. While fairly conceding that there is hardly any evidence to establish that the source of these logs could be traced to Supply Coupe No. V the learned State Prosecutor contended that a combined reading of sections 69 and 27 (1) (d) would make it clear that the accused are liable in this case. The contention is that the seizure of the logs under Exhibits P-3, P-8 and P-9 is not in dispute, and being major forest produce the presumption is that they are the properties of the Government. The counsel for the revision petitioners, however, submits that this argument based on the presumption under section 69 of the Act proceeds on, the misconception of the legal position. It is, submitted that this presumption arises only with respect to the title to the forest produce. It is also submitted that this is a presumption which could be rebutted, and that the accused were successful in doing so. 9. It is, submitted that this presumption arises only with respect to the title to the forest produce. It is also submitted that this is a presumption which could be rebutted, and that the accused were successful in doing so. 9. In order to appreciate the respective contentions of the parties it would be worthwhile here to note the background of the case with particular reference to the scheme of the working of the Coupes, for the purpose of replantation of teak in the reserve forest in the Teak Plantation Division, Parambikulam, the existing trees were worked down by giving, what is styled as ‘Supply Contracts’. The entire area intended for plantation in this division was subdivided into six Supply Coupes and contracts given for working down the marked trees by the Forest Department. These contractors were to work down the trees, transport them and give delivery of the timber at the specified Government depots. It may be noted that the contract with respect to the working of the Supply Coupe is in the nature of works contract, with out passing any right to property in favour of the contractors. In other words, the contractors do the work for the Forest Department for payment received or to be received, without in any way being; entitled to appropriate the logs or other materials. 10. The working of the Supply Coupes appears to be in this way: The trees to be cut down are marked first enumerating the trees in a “Marking List”. The contractors cut down the marked trees and then the logs and firewood to be transported will be registered after check up by the departmental officers. Later the departmental officers take charge of the supply coupe preparing what is known as a “charge list” or “mahazar”, showing the felling of all marked trees,, noting also the defects, if any. It is only later the liability report of the contractor will be prepared by the department. The contractor’s security will be released on satisfactory settlement of his liability. 11. When the Supply Coupe operations are completed to the satisfaction of the Forest Officers, the next stage is reached, namely, that of the Sale Coupes. The Supply Coupes are divided into Sale Coupes. The enumeration of standing trees in each sale coupe will be made by the officers. 11. When the Supply Coupe operations are completed to the satisfaction of the Forest Officers, the next stage is reached, namely, that of the Sale Coupes. The Supply Coupes are divided into Sale Coupes. The enumeration of standing trees in each sale coupe will be made by the officers. Then there will be an abstract and valuation statement of the trees and the firewood available in the Sale Coupes after the working of the Supply contract. When these preliminary works are completed, there will be a notification for auction of the residual growth with all the rejections. 12. The significant fact to be noted is that there cannot be any depot delivery quality teakwood or rosewood available in the Sale Coupe, if the Supply Coupes were worked thoroughly and strictly in accordance with the marking done. Therefore, the deciding factor in this case would be whether there is proof in this case as to whether the supply coupes were so worked as to exclude the possibility of having any depot delivery quality of teak-wood or rosewood remaining there; and whether the contract entered into by and between the accused on the one hand and the Forest Department on the other prevents the cutting and removal of depot delivery quality teak and rosewood from the sale Coupes. 13. The entire area, as has already been stated, was divided into six Supply Coupes. Except for the allegation in the complaint that the seized logs have the source in Supply Coupe No. V which allegation, it has already been found, has not been established in this case, what is relevant for consideration is the working of Supply Coupe Nos. II, III and IV. Supply Coupe No. II is divided into Sale Coupe Nos. 158, 159 and 160, Supply Coupe No. 111 into Sale Coupe Nos. 161, 162 and 163 and Supply Coupe No. IV into Sale Coupe Nos. 1,64, 165 and 166. 14. Let us first examine whether these Supply Coupes had been worked fully and satisfactorily. In respect of Supply Coupe No. II Exhibit P-14 is the marking List prepared by P.W.24 (Forester Narayanan) and countersigned by P.W.7 (Range Officer Cheru). In respect of Supply Coupe No. 111 Exhibit P-15 is the Marking List proved by P.W.8 (Range Officer K. M. Mohammed). Let us first examine whether these Supply Coupes had been worked fully and satisfactorily. In respect of Supply Coupe No. II Exhibit P-14 is the marking List prepared by P.W.24 (Forester Narayanan) and countersigned by P.W.7 (Range Officer Cheru). In respect of Supply Coupe No. 111 Exhibit P-15 is the Marking List proved by P.W.8 (Range Officer K. M. Mohammed). Exhibit P-26 is the Marking List in respect of Supply Coupe No. IV and it is proved by P.W.19 (Forester Kesavan). The Marking Lists Exhibits P-14, P-15 and P-26 would only show that there were trees marked for cutting and removal by the Supply Coupe Contractors, but would not show conclusively that those trees were actually cut and removed. The evidence of P.Ws. 7, 8 and 19 would go to show that they are not in a position to state whether complete extraction was done as per the Marking Lists, Exhibits P-14, P-15 and P-26. The evidence of P.W.22 (Hussain) and P.W.24 (Narayanan) also will not be of much help. In this context the evidence of P.W.15, Conservator of Forests, Trichur, who is considered to be an expert, is of great significance. He has stated in his evidence that property mark will be assigned only after proper verification. This implies that if the logs bore property marks it would mean that proper verification was done and it was only after being satisfied that the marks were assigned. It may be noted that in this case timber logs were given log numbers and departmental hammer marks at the workspot and were also covered by the transport passed in Form No. I for transportation to sub-depot at Parambikulam, by the departmental officers. Further for the transport from Parambikulam sub-depot to private depot of the first accused at Kalady, Form No. I Red Pass - Export licence-also was issued because the timber was to be transported through check-posts in Madras State. Transport of timber logs lying in the sub-depot at Parambikulam as per Form No. I pass, all at a time not being possible, as per the Timber Transit Rules, bandyman passes in Form No. IV were also given specifying the number of logs transported at a time with reference to Form No. I export pass. From time to time logs were transported with bandyman passes and were checked with Form No. I, export passes. From time to time logs were transported with bandyman passes and were checked with Form No. I, export passes. On reaching the private depot of the first accused at Kalady he had applied for property mark registration which was also given after due verification as spoken to by P.Ws.3, 4, 5 and 15. 15. Enumeration lists, Exhibits P-15, P-25 and P-36 have not been properly proved in this case. Exhibit P-34 is the mahazar prepared by M. A. Mohammed, Range Officer, for having taken charge of Supply Coupe No. II after completion of work, but he has not been examined in this case. The attempt of the prosecution was only to examine P.W.28, Palanimalai, an Upper Division Clerk, who is not competent to speak either about the preparation of the list or the working of the coupe. At best he can only identify these mahazars. Exhibit P-27 mahazar for taking charge of supply coupe No. IV was prepared by Forester K.P. Narayanan Nair and verified by Range Officer P. A. Poulose. Both of them have not been examined. Exhibit P-24 mahazar for taking charge of supply coupe No. 111, according to P.W.17, was prepared by P.W.18. The evaluation lists, Exhibits P-37, P-41 and P-42 also have not been properly proved. Viewed these facts in the context of the admission made by P.W.22 that hammer marks were affixed in the presence of Range Officer M. A. Mohammed after satisfying that the logs to be transported have their source in coupe No. 158, we have to conclude that teakwood and rosewood logs were available in the sale coupes in question. He also swears that he has affixed hammer marks on teak and rosewood logs after taking their measurements, and species etc., are noted in the transport passes. Though he (P.W.22) asserted that the logs were not of depot delivery quality, much weight need not be attached to this inasmuch as the prosecution has no case that logs other than with hammer marks with measurements noted in the passes were transported by the accused. In other words, the prosecution relates not to logs which do not have hammer marks or to logs which have no measurements noted in the passes. The logs seized are those covered by passes and capable of being identified with the aid of measurements and other details given in the passes. 16. In other words, the prosecution relates not to logs which do not have hammer marks or to logs which have no measurements noted in the passes. The logs seized are those covered by passes and capable of being identified with the aid of measurements and other details given in the passes. 16. Further, it may be noted that the enumeration list is not infallible. According to P.W.15, the expert, estimates of forest growths are subject to variation and evaluation of such growths is purely for departmental purposes. This estimate will not be given to the sale coupe contractor. The actual collection made by the sale coupe contractor is bound to vary from what is estimated by the department, depending upon the accuracy or inaccuracy of the estimation and by the mode of collection by the contractor. He further swears that property marks are given only after satisfying that proper account is maintained for he timber. Only on proof that the articles are obtained legally, the passes will be issued. Unless there is anything to the contrary such timber will be considered as regularly transported. 17. The prosecution has examined P.Ws. 11 and 12 who are the contractors in respect of Sale Coupe Nos. 160 and 159 respectively in an attempt to prove that teak and rosewood were not available to them. However, the evidence of these two witnesses is not positive on this point. P.Ws. 11 and 12 would say that such logs were available, but they were not of depot delivery quality. P.W.11 did not know what was meant by depot delivery quality and, therefore, his evidence that depot delivery quality teak and rosewood were not available in his coupe is not of much value. P.W.12 would only say that he did not receive big size teak and losewood from this coupe. There is no evidence as to the size of the logs received by P.Ws. 11 and 12 from their respective coupes. As it is, we are left without the measurements, species and qualities of the teak and rosewood extracted by them from their coupes. 18. One other important circumstance to be roted is that Exhibits P-43 to P-46 contracts relating to the sale coupes do not in terms prohibit the cutting and removal of teak or rosewood from these coupes. The prosecution has not let in the best possible evidence. 18. One other important circumstance to be roted is that Exhibits P-43 to P-46 contracts relating to the sale coupes do not in terms prohibit the cutting and removal of teak or rosewood from these coupes. The prosecution has not let in the best possible evidence. As has already been stated, M. A. Mohammed in whose presence P.W.22 affixed the hammer marks has not been examined. So also the persons who prepared the enumeration lists also have not been examined. Exhibits P-36 and P-40, enumeration list and abstract of sale coupe No. 163, have not been proved by the person who prepared them, and have only been identified by P.W.28 who is only an Upper Division Clerk. Yet another factor to be noted is that in sale notification, 50 tonnes of teak and rosewood noted as firewood, created suspicion in the mind of P.W.23, Conservator of Forests, who was in charge of Parambikulam Division. It would go to show that he himself was aware to teak and rosewood being available in the sale Coupes. According to him, he did not inspect the Sale Coupes though, when he examined the sale notification, he had some doubt with respect to the quantity of teak and rosewood shown as firewood. The evidence of P.W.9 and 10, who are examined to prove that Supply Coupe Nos. 3 and 4 have been worked properly and thoroughly, does not establish that. As a matter of fact, P.W.10 who worked Sale Coupe No. 161 on behalf of his father-in-law, P.W.9, would admit that he had obtained teak and rosewood from the coupe, and that they were seized op suspicion, but released later. On 28th April, 1972 he applied for passes to transport these logs and that was allowed soon after he was summoned as a witness in this case. In any event, his evidence also goes to show that teak and rosewood timber of depot delivery quality were available in these coupes. 19. The contention of the State Prosecutor that many of these officers who were intimately connected with the prepartion of the mahazars and statements and who were responsible for supervising and checking the working of both the Supply Coupes and Sale Coupes were not available for examination as they were placed under suspension, does not advance the case of the prosecution. The contention of the State Prosecutor that many of these officers who were intimately connected with the prepartion of the mahazars and statements and who were responsible for supervising and checking the working of both the Supply Coupes and Sale Coupes were not available for examination as they were placed under suspension, does not advance the case of the prosecution. It is also contended by the learned State Prosecutor that the contention of the accused that transporting was done after hammer marks and property marks were given, and with the necessary passes under Timber Transit Rules, do rot by themselves prove that they are the owners of the logs. The observation of the trial Court that they were removed under valid permits is under attack at the hands of the State Prosecutor. The State Prosecutor submits that the trial Court could have only found that there were permits, or what are purported to be permits, but there was no basis for holding them to be valid permits. I do not think that it is necessary for this Court to examine the validity of the permits issued so long as the prosecution has no case that these are not permits issued by the department. The prosecution’s only case is that these permits have been obtained in connivance with the officials. Apart from having such a bald statement in the complaint, and suggestions here and there, there is no positive evidence on this point. In fact, the prosecution has not revealed the names of persons, in collusion with whom accused secured the permits, and how the permits have been obtained. On the other hand, the evidence on record would go to show that there is no satisfactory proof that the Supply Coupes were worked effectively and fully, so much so that no teak or rosewood of depot delivery quality was left in the Sale Coupes. The presumption under section 114 (e) of the Evidence Act that official acts, so far as they relate to the affixing of log numbers, hammer marks and property marks, and issue of passes, has not been rebutted. 20. The contracts, Exhibits P-43 to P-46, did not prohibit the removal of rosewood and teak (whatever be the quality) from the Sale Coupes. 20. The contracts, Exhibits P-43 to P-46, did not prohibit the removal of rosewood and teak (whatever be the quality) from the Sale Coupes. It may incidentally be noted that in the notification there was a departure in not including the usual condition that teak and rosewood are reserved to the Government. The learned Counsel appearing for the revision petitioners has a suggestion that this omission was deliberate, and was intended to defraud the Government. His argument is that the Supply Coupes were not properly worked, and this has resulted in two-fold loss to the Government: (1) for the portion of the work which has not been carried out by the Supply Coupe Contractor the Government has been made to pay; and (2) all the marked trees which were supposed to have been transported and delivered to the Government depots did not reach those depots. There may be possible cases where the Supply Coupe Contractor himself successfully bids in Sale Coupe Contract auction, and thus takes logs of valuable trees. No doubt, there is grave suspicion about the under-hand dealings of the contractors with the connivance of the officials of the Forest Department. However, it is not necessary for me in this revision to examine in detail the proximity of these suggestions made by the learned Counsel for the revision petitioners to truth. Suffice to say, so long as Exhibits P-43 to P-46 do not have a stipulation that rosewood and teak found in the sale coupes are reserved with the Government (whatever may be the reason or motive for this departure from the practice previously followed), no criminal liability can be cast on the accused even if they are found to be in possession of depot delivery quality teak and rosewood, particularly in view of the fact that they were bearing log marks, hammer marks and property marks, and also were covered by necessary passes under the Forest Act and the Timber Transit Rules. It would appear that there is a circular defining what “Depot Delivery Quality” is. That has not been produced in this case. 21. The substance of the prosecution case is that the revision petitioners were found to be in possession of teak and rosewood of delivery quality, which are major forest produce, illicitly removed from a reserve forest, namely, Supply Coupe No. V in Parambikulam Forest Division. That has not been produced in this case. 21. The substance of the prosecution case is that the revision petitioners were found to be in possession of teak and rosewood of delivery quality, which are major forest produce, illicitly removed from a reserve forest, namely, Supply Coupe No. V in Parambikulam Forest Division. The evidence does not establish that the 143 logs seized have their source in the Vth Supply Coupe in that Forest Division. Inasmuch as the prosecution has failed to establish that all the Supply Coupes were throughly and effectively worked and no teak or rosewood of depot delivery quality was available in the Sale Coupes, and Exhibits P-43 to P-46 sale contracts do not have a reservation of the teak and rosewood, if any, in favour of the Government, whatever might have been derived by the contractors who worked the sale contracts. which are in the nature of purchases, should be deemed to have been the property rightly belonging to the contractors. The proverbial neglect of the forest wealth by those who are charged with the duty to conserve them is there, and there are indications to suspect the involvement of the forest officials. For want of evidence on those points we are not also directly concerned with that aspect of the matter - I do not propose to pronounce anything on that aspect. 22. Having examined the evidence adduced by the prosecution the trial Court found that no case warranting a conviction has been made out and passed an order of discharge under section 253, Criminal Procedure Code. I do not find any illegality impropriety or irregularity about this order. I have, therefore, absolutely no hesitation in holding that the learned Sessions Judge has acted in a perverse and unjust manner, causing miscarriage of justice, in setting aside that order and sending back the case to the trial Court for disposal in accordance with law. In the light of the foregoing discussion, this revision is allowed, the order of the Sessions Court is set aside and the order of discharge passed by the Additional First Class Magistrate is confirmed. M.C.M. ----- Petition allowed; order set aside.