JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THE short question that arises in this revision is whether the Magistrate should stay the recovery of the amount of maintenance granted under section 488 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure when, while seeking to execute the maintenance order under sub-seetion (3) of section 488, an objection was raised by the opposite party as to the entitlement of the wife to claim maintenance on the ground that she was leading an adulterous life. ( 2. ) THE non-applicant Kusum Bai was granted a maintenance allowance at the rate of Rs. 40 per month under section 488 (1) of the Code of Criminal procedure. She applied for recovery of arrears of maintenance under subsection (3) of section 488. The applicant resisted the execution on the ground that the non-applicant was living in adultery and urged that the recovery should be stayed pending decision on his objection. The learned Magistrate ordered that the arrears of maintenance amounting to Rs. 480. 00 for the period from 26-3-1969 to 26-3-1970 be paid to the non-applicant and that the ground raised by the applicant as to why the non-applicant should not be paid the maintenance be inquired into. The order of the Magistrate was challenged in revision and the learned Sessions Judge dismissed the same. The revision is against the order of the Magistrate as also the order of the Sessions Judge refusing to interfere with the order of the Magistrate. ( 3. ) THE point involved for consideration in this case is as to the powers of the learned Magistrate to grant interim stay pending inquiry into the objection raised by the other side when the execution of the maintenance allowance was started under sub-section (3) of section 488 of the Code. The High Courts have taken divergent views as to the scope of sub-section (3) of section 488 and the proviso under it. In the instant case, the non-applicant has been granted maintenance under section 488 (1 ). It was found that the applicant contracted a second marriage and thus neglected and refused to maintain his first wife, the present non-applicant. Under sub-seetion (2), the maintenance amount became payable from the date of order and the applicant being in arrears, the non-applicant had applied for execution under sub-seetion (3) of section 488. It was found that the applicant contracted a second marriage and thus neglected and refused to maintain his first wife, the present non-applicant. Under sub-seetion (2), the maintenance amount became payable from the date of order and the applicant being in arrears, the non-applicant had applied for execution under sub-seetion (3) of section 488. It was now tried to be urged that the non-applicant was living in adultery and thus not entitled to receive maintenance allowance. This objection is raised on the assumption that under sub-section (3) he could be permitted to raise all those grounds which he had raised earlier by which he could seek to establish the disentitlement of the non-applicant to the maintenance allowance. The applicant further prayed before the learned Magistrate as also before this Court that since the Court was bound to enquire into the allegations of adultery, the execution should be stayed pending inquiry into the allegations as if eventually he was successful in establishing the grounds, no remedy had been provided under the Code to recover the amount already paid. Therefore, it was urged that in the interest of justice and on considerations of balance of convenience, the Court inquiring into such allegations must stay the proceedings. ( 4. ) SUB-SECTION (3) of section 488 primarily provides for the enforcement of the order made under sub-sections (1) and (2) and indeed this purpose is indicated by the marginal heading prefacing it. This order is to be enforced by issue of a warrant for levy of the amount due in the manner provided for levy of fines. The rigour with which the order is to be enforced is to a great extent softened by permitting the defaulting person to show sufficient cause for non-compliance. The words "fails without sufficient cause" were substituted for "wilfully neglects" by Act 18 of 1923 thus enlarging the amplitude by bringing in other reasons than mere wilful neglect. Though the words "fails without sufficient cause" are of wider import they have to be construed in the context in which they occur and cannot be held to embrace such reasons as had already been raised while the matter was being inquired into under subsections (1) and (2) of the Code. They also cannot be construed to embrace grounds which could defeat the purpose of the section and would stultify an order made under sub-sections (1) and (2 ). They also cannot be construed to embrace grounds which could defeat the purpose of the section and would stultify an order made under sub-sections (1) and (2 ). It was not intended to afford locus penitential to a person against whom an order has already been made under sub-section (1) and thus re-opening the matter over again at the time of the execution of the order. For grounds stated in sub section (4), a wife would become disentitled for maintenance. These grounds could be pressed into service when an inquiry under sub-section (1) was being made or the order of m?intenance itself could be cancelled for reasons stated in sub-section (5) on proof of subsequent disentitlement. But once an order is made under sub-seetion (1), in my opinion, those grounds were not intended to be raised under sub-seetion (3) and thereby preventing the enforcement of the order. The "sufficient cause" contemplated under sub-seetion (3) would not include any of those grounds considered or deemed to have been considered while making an order under sub-section (1) of section 488. ( 5. ) IN Ram Kishore v. Smt. Bimla Devi (AIR l957 All 658.) it was pointed out that the phrase "fails without sufficient cause" does not give a discretion or a right to the person against whom the order is passed to decide whether the original order was justifiable or not. The order passed by a competent Court cannot be contested or challenged. It was observed that the proviso to sub-section (3) is added in the interests of the wife and not the husband. It is to stop a Court from too readily accepting the proposition that as soon as a husband offers to maintain his wife, if she lives, with him, he ceases to neglect or to refuse to maintain his wife. It was noticed in the above decision that the husband by making repeated allegations of adultery against his wife and requesting the court to inquire into them could considerably delay the execution and it would then fail to achieve the purpose behind the section which in the words of Sir james Fizz James Stephen was to provide a mode of preventing vagrancy or at least of preventing its consequences. The learned single Judge relied on the observations of Justice Mahmood in Laraiti v. Ram Dial (ILR 5 All 224.) as under :- "in dealing with the main question raised by this reference, I am of the opinion that the order of the District Magistrate, dated the 2-3-1880, must be taken to have adjudicated upon all the facts antecedent thereto and connected with the objection of Ram Dial as to his wifes leading an adulterous life. Upon the general principles of the rule of res judicata I am of opinion that the Deputy Magistrate was wrong in law in reopening matters already adjudicated upon and his order directing the discontinuance of maintenance on the ground of facts antecedent to the District Magistrates order must be held to be illegal. " The learned single Judge observed as under: - "it, therefore, seems to me that once an order of maintenance has been passed, even if it is accepted that the applicant in his own discretion can refuse to submit to that order, it must be for some cause which arose after the pronouncement of that order. For any cause that existed at the time when the order was passed, it is not open to him to have the same reason considered by the Court again. " ( 6. ) A similar view as to the purpose of the section had also been expressed by Krishnan J. , in Sadashiv Nathu v. Parubai ( 1966 MPLJ 1065 .) Krishnan J. , observed as under :- "it would be remembered that the basic purpose of section 488 is to see that a woman living separately from the husband is not tempted on account of poverty into ways of crime. On that view maintenance due under a valid order has to be paid till it is cancelled. To hold that a cancellation under sub-section (5) would ipso facto nullify the order from the very date on which it is made would be to frustrate that purpose and make it penal. Certainly, when there is a dis entitlement incurred under sub-section (4) even during the period before the cancellation the woman may not get the allowance. But that would be not because of the cancellation under the later sub-section but on the dis entitlement itself which would have to be proved with reference to the earlier period like any other fact. Certainly, when there is a dis entitlement incurred under sub-section (4) even during the period before the cancellation the woman may not get the allowance. But that would be not because of the cancellation under the later sub-section but on the dis entitlement itself which would have to be proved with reference to the earlier period like any other fact. It may even be that the dis entitlement is mentioned in the cancellation order, but that by itself cannot operate retrospectively. " ( 7. ) IT would be observed that the substitution of the words "for sufficient cause" has not been without purpose as after an order of maintenance had been passed there would often arise situations when it would be found that the order itself has exhausted such as in those cases where a child in whose favour the order was passed had attained majority or where the wife married another husband. But sub-section (3) could not be availed of again and again to take up the very grounds which were raised when the order under sub-seetion (1)was made. Thus, it may not be permissible at the time of enforcement of the maintenance order to raise a ground that the wife was leading an adulterous life which disentitled her to maintenance. The remedy in such cases was to seek relief under sub-section (5) of section 488. It was held in Ram Kishores case (supra) that the words "fails without sufficient cause to comply" cannot be stretched to include contentious pleas. It was observed as under:- "only such circumstances which show that the order has exhausted itself can be placed before the Court. In cases where the wife has ceased to be a wife or the child has become a major and is able to maintain itself or a reconciliation has taken place between the husband and wife and she is living with her husband it is open to the husband or the father to place the changed picture before the Magistrate with a view that the application for execution filed by the wife or child be dismissed. But where the tension remains and the order is evaded on the allegation that the wife is living in adultery, it amounts to challenging the order of maintenance and is a refusal and not a failure to comply. But where the tension remains and the order is evaded on the allegation that the wife is living in adultery, it amounts to challenging the order of maintenance and is a refusal and not a failure to comply. The husband cannot be permitted to decide a contention in his own favour and then disobey the order of the Court. Such a plea cannot be heard under sub-section (3) of section 488 Criminal Procedure Code. It is, however, open to him to proceed under sub-seetion (5) praying for a cancellation of the order. " ( 8. ) I fully agree with the view taken in the Allahabad case. The force of decision in Sangayya Gulappa v. Gulappa Kariyappa (AIR 1942 Bom. 258.) is considerably diminished by the subsequent decision in Tejabai v. Shankarrao ( AIR 1966 Bom. 48 .) If it is held that proviso under sub-section (3) must be taken to be a proviso to sub-section (1)then the grounds available to the husband provided by the proviso ware bound to be considered while making the order under sub-section (1 ). It could then not be said that the intention of the legislature had been to give another opportunity to the husband to raise the same grounds at the time of execution of the order. I would respectfully disagree with the decisions in Kamala Sundari Dassi v. Nilmony Das ( AIR 1953 Cal. 343 .) and Hari Narayan v. Mt. Rani Devi (AIR 1952 M B 53.) ( 9. ) THE above discussion would dispose of the question as to the competency of the learned Magistrate to reopen the question of the wife being living in adultery at the time of execution of the maintenance order. Coming to the question of an ad interim stay pending inquiry under sub-section (3), I am of the opinion that in the first place no such power has been expressly given under this section. The order under section 488 (1) imposes an obligation in absolute terms and it would be no defence for the person bound by such obligation to ask the Court to stay its hands to execute the same on considerations of balance of convenience. The order under section 488 (1) imposes an obligation in absolute terms and it would be no defence for the person bound by such obligation to ask the Court to stay its hands to execute the same on considerations of balance of convenience. I have already indicated that the purpose of the section was to prevent vagrancy and to provide for maintenance to the destitute person and any attempt to over-reach the order made under sub-section (1) of section 488 should be discouraged by the executing Court. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the learned Magistrate had no power to grant an ad interim stay to stay the execution of the maintenance allowance pending an inquiry into the sufficiency of the cause for default in the payment. ( 10. ) FOR the reasons stated above, the revision is thus dismissed. Revision dismissed.