JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was delivered by GOVINDAN NAIR, AG. C.J. - The questions raised on behalf of the revenue are : "A. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the sale proceeds of the shade trees (timber) of the respondent (company) is not exigible to tax under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 ? B. Is not the reasoning and conclusion of the Appellate Tribunal, holding that the sale proceeds are not exigible to tax under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963, vitiated in not giving due effect to section 2(vi), 2(viii), 2(xxi) and 2(xxvii) of the Act ? and C. Are not the decisions reported in State of Gujarat v. Raipur Manufacturing Co. Ltd. ([1967] 19 S.T.C. 1 (S.C.)) and Southern India Tea Estates Company Limited v. State of Kerala ([1967] 20 S.T.C. 397) distinguishable ?" 2. The Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal found that the assessee was not carrying on the business of selling and therefore was not a dealer within the meaning of that term as defined in the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 (hereinafter called the Act). That in order to become a "dealer" as defined in most of the Sales Tax Acts, at any rate, as it stood sometime ago, a person must carry on the business of selling or buying is clearly established. We need refer only to the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. Raipur Manufacturing Co. Ltd. ([1967] 19 S.T.C. 1 (S.C.)) and the decision of this court in Southern India Tea Estates Company Limited v. State of Kerala ([1967] 20 S.T.C. 397). Velu Pillai, J., in dealing with the question whether a purchaser of rubber when he sells the latex prepared from the rubber produced was carrying on the business of selling held after referring to a number of decisions that such a person cannot be said to be carrying on the business of selling and ruled therefore that the turnover represented by the sales effected were not exigible to tax. If matters stood as they were when this decision was rendered we would have dismissed these tax revision cases holding with the Tribunal that the assessee was not a dealer under the Act. If matters stood as they were when this decision was rendered we would have dismissed these tax revision cases holding with the Tribunal that the assessee was not a dealer under the Act. Since then, however, amendments have been made to the Act and the Act now contains provisions which seem to us to indicate that the sale proceeds of "timber" can be assessed to sales tax. 3. Turning to section 2(viii) of the Act, it has to be noticed that after defining "dealer", in what we may say, the conventional manner, as a person carrying on the business of buying or selling, an inclusive part of the definition has been added and under section 2(viii)(e), "a person who sells goods produced by him by manufacture, agriculture, horticulture or otherwise" has also been included within the definition of the term "dealer". We may also take note of section 2(viii)(b) which takes in within the purview of the definition "a casual trader". It appears to us that the intention is evident that persons who do not normally fall within the definition of the term "dealer" which incidentally states "dealer means", are sought to be roped in within the ambit of the section. Apart from the indications the provisions of the section provide, the general rule of inter-pretation is that when a definition speaks of "includes", it must normally be taken to embrace those that may not otherwise fall under the definition. An early decision of the Privy Council, if we may say so with respect, as usual, deals with this matter succinctly and in language which is precise : "Section 2 is, beyond all question, an interpretation clause, and must have been intended by the legislature to be taken into account in construing the expression 'charitable devise or bequest,' as it occurs in section 3. It is not said in terms that 'charitable bequest' shall mean one or other of the things which are enumerated, but that it shall 'include' them. It is not said in terms that 'charitable bequest' shall mean one or other of the things which are enumerated, but that it shall 'include' them. The word 'include' is very generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute; and when it is so used these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such things as they signify according to their natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include." This decision of the Privy Council has been noted by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 12th edition, at page 270, and there is the following passage : "Sometimes it is provided that a word shall 'mean' what the definition section says it shall mean : in the case, the word is restricted to the scope indicated in the definition section. Sometimes, however, the word 'include' is used in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute; and when it is so used these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such things as they signify according to their natural import, but also those things which the inter-pretation clause declares that they shall include. In other words, the word in respect of which 'includes' is used bears both its extended statutory meaning and its ordinary, popular, and natural sense whenever that would be properly applicable." By applying the above principles, section 2(viii) of the Act must be understood as taking within its ambit persons who sell goods produced by them by manufacture, agriculture, horticulture or otherwise. The goods sold in these cases are shade trees which had to be severed from the ground and can be said to be goods produced by agriculture or horticulture. So the assessee in these cases was a dealer. 4. Sale is defined in section 2(xxi) of the Act and though the definition states that in the case of a sale there must be transfer of property in goods by one person to another in the course of trade or business, explanation (1) to section 2(xxi) includes transfers made not only in the course of trade or business but "otherwise". Sale is defined in section 2(xxi) of the Act and though the definition states that in the case of a sale there must be transfer of property in goods by one person to another in the course of trade or business, explanation (1) to section 2(xxi) includes transfers made not only in the course of trade or business but "otherwise". In these cases, therefore, even if the assessee was not carrying on the business of selling, there will be a sale as defined in section 2(xxi) because the commodity that is sold is said to be "timber" coming within explanation (1) to section 2(xxi) of the Act. We must guard ourselves at this moment by stating that there has been no decision by the Tribunal on the question whether the wood from the shade trees can be said to be timber. This point was raised before the Tribunal by the assessee but in the view that the Tribunal took that the assessee was not a dealer, it did not consider the question as to whether the wood from the shade trees is or is not timber. 5. The only other definition that we have referred to is that contained in section 2(xxvii) of the term "turnover". Here again though the proceeds of the sale by a person of agricultural or horticultural produce, grown by himself or grown on any land in which he has an interest, whether as owner, usufructuary mortgagee, tenant or otherwise shall be excluded from his turnover, clause (ii) of explanation (1) to that definition states that "agricultural or horticultural produce shall not include tea, coffee, rubber, cardamom or timber". If therefore the wood from the shade trees is timber, the sale proceeds of such trees would be turnover within the meaning of section 2(xxvii). 6. The questions that are referred to us cannot therefore be answered by this court without a determination whether the wood of the shade trees or the trees themselves can be said to be "timber". The question can be answered only in this manner : If the shade trees are "timber", the sale proceeds of such trees would be assessable under the Sales Tax Act. The question can be answered only in this manner : If the shade trees are "timber", the sale proceeds of such trees would be assessable under the Sales Tax Act. If, on the other hand, the shade trees do not form "timber", the sale proceeds of such shade trees will not be turnover as defined in the Act and therefore not assessable to tax taking into account the charging section, section 5 of the Act. We answer the question accordingly. 7. As we indicated earlier the assessee has a contention that the shade trees are not timber. This question has to be determined. Therefore we set aside the order of the Tribunal and remit the case back to the Tribunal for determination of this question. It will be open to the Tribunal to take evidence for determining this question and the parties will be given sufficient opportunity to state and prove their respective cases. The Tribunal will dispose of the cases in the light of what we have stated in this judgment after entering a finding on the question whether the shade trees are timber or not. 8. These tax revision cases are disposed of on the above terms. There will be no order as to costs.