NANDKISHORE v. SARJUDEVI — 1973 DIGILAW 128 (MP)

JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) IN this Letters Patent Appeal upon a certificate granted by a learned Single Judge of this Court under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, the question raised is as to the interpretation of section 12 (1) (f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961. It is directed against the decree, dated 9-4-1973, passed by the learned Single Judge in Civil Second Appeal No. 274 of 1971, arising out of the decree, 14-10-1971, passed by the Additional District Judge, Ujjain, in Civil First Appeal No. 11-A of 1971, arising out of the original decree, dated 16-11-1970 passed by the 1st Civil Judge, Class I, Ujjain, in Civil Suit No. 192 A of 1969. ( 2. ) THE relevant facts for understanding the question involved in this appeal are as follows. The respondent is the landlord of house bearing Municipal No. 1/302/b, situated in the city of Ujjain. The predecessor of the appellants, Pannalal, was the tenant, who held two different portions of the house as a tenant on a monthly rent under two separate contracts of tenancy. One of them related to the residential accommodation, while the other related to the non-residential accommodation for business purposes. The monthly rent of the residential accommodation was Rs. 5/- while that of the non-residential accommodation was Rs. 7/- per month. The respondent filed a suit for eviction on 16-10-1968, for evicting the tenant from both the portions. The learned Civil Judge, by judgment, dated 16-11-1970, dismissed the entire suit for residential as also for non-residential accommodation. The respondent, therefore, being aggrieved by that judgment filed Civil First Appeal no. 11/a/ of 1971, which was partly allowed. The learned Additional district Judge decreed the respondents claim in respect of non-residential accommodation, but dismissed it with respect to the residential accommodation. The legal representatives of the tenant, therefore, filed Second Appeal no. 274 of 1971 and the respondent landlord filed Second Appeal 298 of 1971. A learned Single Judge of this Court dismissed the tenants appeal and allowed the landlords appeal. As such, the decree in respect of residential accommodation in favour of the landlord has become final and in the present appeal we are only concerned with the decree relating to nonresidential accommodation, which the legal representatives of the original tenant challenged on the grounds to be discussed presently. ( 3. As such, the decree in respect of residential accommodation in favour of the landlord has become final and in the present appeal we are only concerned with the decree relating to nonresidential accommodation, which the legal representatives of the original tenant challenged on the grounds to be discussed presently. ( 3. ) IT may be relevant to reproduce the provisions of clause 13 (3) (vi) of the C. P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949, which is as follows: "13 (1 ). No landlord shall except, with the previous written permission of the. . . . . . of the Controller,- (a) Give notice to a tenant determining the lease or determine the lease if the lease is expressed to be determinable at his option; or (b) Where the lease is determinable by efflux of the time limited thereby, require the tenant to vacate the house by process of law or otherwise if the tenant is willing to continue the lease on the same terms and conditions. (2 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . (3 ). If after hearing the parties the Controller is satisfied- (i ). . . . . . . . . . . . (ii ). . . . . . . . . . . (iii ). . . . . . . . . . . (iv ). . . . . . . . . . . (v ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (vi ). . . that the landlord needs the house or a portion thereof for the purpose of- (a) his bona fide residence, provided he is not occupying any other residential house of his own in the city or town concerned; or (b ). . . . . . . . . . . (c) a bona fide business of his own which he intends to start or is already carrying on in the city or town concerned or-He shall grant the landlord permission to give notice to determine the lease as required by sub-clause (1 ). ( 4. ) THEREAFTER the Madhya Bharat Accommodation Control Act, 1955, was applied to the entire area of Madhya Pradesh, including the Mahakoshal region, with effect from 1-4-1959. ( 4. ) THEREAFTER the Madhya Bharat Accommodation Control Act, 1955, was applied to the entire area of Madhya Pradesh, including the Mahakoshal region, with effect from 1-4-1959. Before that the Madhya Bharat Accommodation Control Act, 1955 was in force in the Madhya Bharat region. Section 4, sub-section (g) of the Madhya Bharat Act, which later became the madhya Pradesh Act, was as follows: "s. 4-No suit shall be filed in any civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds :-(a ). . . . . . (b ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (c ). . . . . . . . . . . . (d ). . . . . . . . . . . . . (e ). . . . . . . . (f ). . . . . . . . . . . . . (g) in the case of residential accommodation, that the landlord genuinely requires the accommodation for his own residence or that of the any person of his family bona fide residing or to reside with him and there is no other accommodation of his own in the city or town concerned for such residence; (h) in the case of non-residential accommodation, that the landlord genuinely requires the accommodation for continuing or starting his own business or that of any person of his family bona fide residing or to reside with him and that he or the aforesaid person of his family is not in occupation of any other accommodation in the city or town for that purpose and if he was in occupation, has for sufficient reasons vacated it after the Act has been extended to that city or town;" ( 5. ) IT is to be noted that in respect of residential as also non-residential accommodation under the Madhya Bharat Accommodation Control Act, 1955, which later on was termed as the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control act, 1955, it was provided that the landlord could seek eviction of a tenant for his own residence or that of any person of his family. The words member of the family were not defined by the said Act. ( 6. ) HOWEVER, the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, provides as follows: "s. 12 (1 ). The words member of the family were not defined by the said Act. ( 6. ) HOWEVER, the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, provides as follows: "s. 12 (1 ). Restriction on eviction of tenants-Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds, only, namely :- (a ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (b ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . (c ). . . . . . . . . . . . . (d ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . (e ). . . . . . . that the accommodation let for residential purposes is required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned : (f) that the accommodation let for non-residential purpose is required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned. " ( 7. ) IN the C. P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949, the landlord alone had the right to seek eviction if he needed the accommodation for his bona fide residence or for bona fide business. There was no mention of the word family. However, in a series of cases the Nagpur High court ruled that the need of the landlord would also include the need of members of his family, who might be dependent on him. There was no mention of the word family. However, in a series of cases the Nagpur High court ruled that the need of the landlord would also include the need of members of his family, who might be dependent on him. In this connection reference might be made to the observations of a division Bench to the Nagpur high Court in V. M. Deshmukh v. K. M. Kothari (AI R 1951 Nag. 51), wherein the Division Bench made the following observations: "we have no doubt that in this case the allegations made by the applicant clearly make out that the house was intended for the purpose of starting a maternity home. Under sub-clause (vi) (c) to clause 13, a landlord is entitled to eject a tenant if he wants to locate his business in a portion of his house which is in the occupation of the tenant. It is, however, argued that the Maternity Home was to be run not by the applicant himself but by his wife and that, therefore, the house could not be said to have been required for the purpose of the business of the applicant himself. There is no doubt that the words used in sub-clause are "business of his own". The word his occurs at several places in sub clause (vi) and it must be interpreted throughout the sub-clause in the same way. It is not disputed that the words "his residence" occurring in the sub-Clause at two places include a residence of all the members of the landlords family. We have no doubt that that would be appropriate way of interpreting the word his. As observed in Smith v. Penny (1946 2 All. E R 672 at page 673) :-"the family is the unit of our civilisation. To keep the family together is of high public importance. " This supports our view that the word his must be interpreted so as to include the family and not in a narrow way. This word is used in the last part of that clause in conjunction with the word own. The question is whether the word own is used along with the word his to show that the business must be one which the landlord himself is carrying on. This word is used in the last part of that clause in conjunction with the word own. The question is whether the word own is used along with the word his to show that the business must be one which the landlord himself is carrying on. We do not think that that is the purpose of using the word own, In our opinion, such an interpretation would be in conflict with the meaning accorded to the word his in the clause. It would appear that what is meant by the word own is something in which the landlord or his family have pecuniary interest. Looked at this way the business of running Maternity Home would clearly fall within sub-clause (vi) of clause 13. " ( 8. ) LATER on another Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court in balabhadra Beharilal v. Premchand Lalchand (1953 NLJ 233 = AIR 1953 Nag. 144.) interpreting clause 13 (3) (vi) of the C. P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949, made the following observation after referring to the earlier case of V. M Deshmukh v. K. M. Kothari (supra): "as this Court has pointed out in B. M. Deshmukh v. K. M. Kothari the word his as used in clause 13 (3) (vi) of the Central Provinces and Berar Letting of Houses and rent Control Order, 1949, must be interpreted liberally and not in a narrow way. So interpreted, we are of opinion that it would include not only the members of the landlords family but also all those persons who are dependent on him and whose responsibilities he has accepted. Language similar to that used clause 13 (3) (vi) of the Rent Control Order-has been interpreted liberally in England as would appear from the decision in smith v. Penny and jones v. Whitehill ( (1950) 11 All. E R 71. ). In the first of these cases, the words for himself were interpreted to include the members of the landlords family. In the other, a niece of the tenants wife was regarded as falling within the meaning of members of the tenants family. There are two Indian decisions which we may also refer to. One of them is reported in Institute of Radio Technology v. Pandurang (AIR 1946 Bom. In the other, a niece of the tenants wife was regarded as falling within the meaning of members of the tenants family. There are two Indian decisions which we may also refer to. One of them is reported in Institute of Radio Technology v. Pandurang (AIR 1946 Bom. 212.) In that case the words his own occupation in section 11 of the Bombay Rent Restriction Act, 1939, were interpreted to mean the occupation of the landlord and all persons who are dependent on him. A wider interpretation has been given to these words by Chagla C. J. , in Parikh v. Occhhalal Parikh cited at page 257 of the Principles of Rent Control by B. B. Andhyarajina. According to the learned Chief Justice, looking to the customs of the Society and the nature of social ties which subsist between the different members of the family in india, a member of the family of the landlord, for whom the premises are required, need not necessarily be dependent upon the landlord. The view we are taking is thus in line with that taken by other Courts. " ( 9. ) THUS, there can be no doubt that the words his own need occurring in Clause 13 (3) (vi) of the O. P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949, have been liberally interpreted by the Nagpur High Court. The eviction in respect of residential and also non-residential accommodation could be sought by a landlord not only for his own use, but also for a member of his family and the words person of his family were specifically included in section 4 of the M. B. Accommodation Control Act, 1955. ( 10. ) HOWEVER, a different provision has been made in the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, and we have already reproduced subclauses (e) and (f) of section 12 (1) of that Act. The essential difference between the two provisions is that regarding residential accommodation eviction can be sought not only for the residence of the landlord but also for the residence of any member of his family ; while in respect of nonresidential accommodation, the legislature has avoided the phrase member of the family and instead put certain categories, namely, major sons or unmarried daughters. The question, therefore, arises whether the words his business should be liberally interpreted on the same lines as was done by the Nagpur High Court with reference to the provisions of the C. P. and Berar Letting of Houses and berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949. In this connection we may observe that section 2, sub-section (e) of the M. P. Accommodation control Act, 1961, has also defined the phrase member of the family as follows : In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,- (e ). member of the family, in the case of any person means the spouse, son, unmarried daughter, father, grandfather, mother, grandmother, brother, unmarried sister, paternal uncle, paternal uncles wife, or widow, or brothers son or unmarried daughter living jointly with or any other relation dependent on him. " ( 11. ) THE implication of section 12 (1) (e) appears to be that eviction from residential accommodation for residential purposes can be sought by the landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any member of his family as defined in that Act. But a different provision is made in subclause (f) of section 12 (1) of the Act, wherein only in addition to the landlord, two other categories are mentioned, namely major sons or unmarried daughters. Therefore, the question arises whether the phrase his business would include the spouse of the landlord. The respondent had sought eviction on the ground that her husband needed the premises for business purposes. ( 12. ) IN Nathuram v. Smt. Tarabai (Second Appeal No. 711 of 1965, dated 24-12-1965, (1966 MPLJ Note 93.)), Bhave J. was required to consider the implication of section 12 (1) (f) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. In that case the wife was the landlord and she had filed a suit for eviction on the ground of her own business need. She had stated that she was carrying on the business of Halvai at Raghogarh along with her husband. As such, it was a joint business carried on by the husband and wife and the wife being the landlord wanted eviction on the ground of her own business need. She had stated that she was carrying on the business of Halvai at Raghogarh along with her husband. As such, it was a joint business carried on by the husband and wife and the wife being the landlord wanted eviction on the ground of her own business need. In view of the fact that the husband and wife were carrying on the joint business, Bhave J. expressed the view that the word his own business should be liberally interpreted so as to include the spouse of the landlord. The learned Judge preferred to follow the view of the Nagpur High Court as laid down in V. M. Deshmukh v. K. M. Kothari (supra) and in Balabhadra biharilal v. Premchand Lakhand (supra ). In that view, the appeal filed by the tenant was dismissed by the learned Judge. ( 13. ) HOWEVER, a contrary view was taken by Raina J. in Dharmadas v. Kasturibai (Second Appeal No. 258 of 1968, dated 1-7-1971, (MPLJ Note 9.) ). In that case the respondent Mahila Kasturibai was the landlord. She filed a suit for eviction on the ground that the shop was required for carrying on the business of her husband and son. The Courts below had decreed the suit. The plaintiff could not establish that her son had any proprietary interest in the business. However, the question was with reference to the need of the husband. Raina J. interpreting section 12 (1) (f) of the m. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, laid down that the need of the landlord would not include the need of the spouse of the landlord. Comparing the language of clause (e) of section 12 (1) of the Act with that of clause (f) of that section the learned Judge observed that the Legislature had made a deliberate distinction and had accordingly provided for different results. The learned judge was of the view that the Legislature wanted to restrict the right of eviction of the landlord so as to limit it to the bona fide need of himself, his major sons and unmarried daughters only. For that reason the words his business occurring in clause (f) could not include the business of the spouse. The position might be different where the spouse might jointly be interested in the business. On that ground Raina J. distinguished the case of Nathuram v. Smt. Tarabai (supra) decided by Bhave J. ( 14. For that reason the words his business occurring in clause (f) could not include the business of the spouse. The position might be different where the spouse might jointly be interested in the business. On that ground Raina J. distinguished the case of Nathuram v. Smt. Tarabai (supra) decided by Bhave J. ( 14. ) THE learned counsel for the appellants urged that the words his business occurring in section 12 (1) (f) of the M. P. Accommodation Control act, 1961, ought to be liberally interpreted so as to include the need of the spouse of the landlord. In this connection he invited attention to the observations of a learned single Judge of the Madras High Court in K. B. Saraswathi v. Vadivelu Chettiar ( AIR 1968 Mad. 70 .) In that case by the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent control Act), 1960, section 10 (3) (a) (iii) had been amended. Previously the word used was landlord. By the amendment the word son had been added. The learned Judge held that the interpretation put previously would still be valid even though the word son might have been added and in that view it was held that where a landlady required the premises for the purpose of business carried on by her husband, she was entitled to seek eviction of the tenant. The learned Judge preferred to follow the earlier view of that High Court. ( 15. ) IT was urged by the learned counsel for the appellants that the language leading to manifest contradiction should be avoided and the interpretation should be made on rational basis, as laid down by their Lordships of the supreme Court in Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh (A I B 1955 SC 830. ). Further our attention was invited to the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in N. T. Veluswami Thevar v. Raja Nainar ( AIR 1959 SC 422 .) wherein their Lordships laid down that the rule of harmonious construction of statute ought to be followed. We may observe that as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the said cases, the salutary rule of harmonious construction so as to avoid manifest a contradiction ought to be followed while interpreting all statutes. We may observe that as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the said cases, the salutary rule of harmonious construction so as to avoid manifest a contradiction ought to be followed while interpreting all statutes. But we are of opinion that the question of interpretation would arise where the language of a statute is not very clear and some room is left for interpretation. Where the provisions of a statute are very clear and they are a pointer to the clear and unambiguous intention of the Legislature, the question of interpretation would not at all arise. Analysing section 12 (1) (e) and section 12 (1) (f)of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, the clear intention of the legislature is that so far as the residential accommodation for residential purposes in concerned, the landlord can either for his own use or for the use of any member of his family seek eviction of the tenant. The word family has been defined by section 2 (e) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. In clause (f) of section 12 (1) of the Act the words his family have been deliberately omitted and on the other hand the right of eviction in respect of nonresidential accommodation is restricted to the landlord for his own use or for the use of his major sons or unmarried daughters. This departure is deliberate and we would endorse the view of Raina J. that the Legislature wanted to restrict the right of eviction regarding the non residential accommodation. Under the circumstances, there is no scope for a liberal interpretation of the phrase his business so as to include the business of a spouse. That interpretation might have been valid if the Legislature had not at all mentioned the word family in the provision as in the C. P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control order, 1949, or when the Legislature as in the M. P. Accommodation Control act, 1955, had included the word family in both the sub-sections regarding residential and non residential purposes. But where there is a deliberate departure and the Legislature has used some other phrases so as to distinguish subsection (e) from sub section (f) we do not think that there is any scope for interpretation. But where there is a deliberate departure and the Legislature has used some other phrases so as to distinguish subsection (e) from sub section (f) we do not think that there is any scope for interpretation. The language of the two sub-sections is very specific and very unambiguous, which clearly points out to the intention of the Legislature. Therefore, we do not think that the phrase his business can be interpreted to include the business of a spouse of the landlord. In view of the fact that in sub-section (e) the words any member of his family have been mentioned, and in sub-section (f) major sons and unmarried daughters have been bracketed with the landlord, there is no scope for holding that the need of the landlord for his business would include the business of his spouse. If that interpretation were to be adopted, that will clearly be contrary to all rules of interpretation and it would be indulging in judicial legislation even in a case where the Legislature has unambiguously expressed its intention by using the phrases and by making a distinction in the language occurring in the two sub sections. ( 16. ) AS a result of the discussion aforesaid, we are of the opinion that although the respondent could claim eviction of a tenant for the residential nead of her husband, she could not evict a tenant for the non-residential need of her husbands business. In this view of the matter, the view taken by the learned single Judge cannot be sustained and though he was right in passing a decree in respect of residential accommodation, but was in error in upholding the claim so far as the non-residential accommodation was concerned. It is not a question of any hardship being caused. That consideration would be out of the picture in view of the specific and deliberate language used in the two sub-sections as also addition of the words member of his family in one sub-section and major sons and unmarried daughters in the other sub-section. In the view we take, this appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The decree passed by the learned single Judge affirming the decree of the first appellate Court is set aside and the respondents claim for eviction in respect of non-residential accommodation is dismissed. In the view we take, this appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The decree passed by the learned single Judge affirming the decree of the first appellate Court is set aside and the respondents claim for eviction in respect of non-residential accommodation is dismissed. However, under the circumstances, we direct that there shall be no order as to costs throughout, which shall be borne as incurred. Appeal allowed.