Judgment Madan Mohan Prasad, J. This is an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for the purpose of setting aside an order of the President of the District Appeal Committee re-instating the previous Head Master of the School whose services had been terminated by its Managing Committee and in which vacancy the first petitioner was working as such. 2. There are two petitioners; the first one claiming to be the Head Master and the second one to be Assistant Teacher of the Makatpur High School in the town of Giridih as also to be a guardian of some students of the school. Briefly stated their case is that petitioner no. 1 joined the aforesaid school as an Assistant Teacher on 16th of August, 1944. On 20th of February, 1971, he was appointed to act as the officiating Principal of the aforesaid school. On 30th of November, 1971, he was appointed as the Head Master and has since then been working as such. It is said that the third respondent, Shyam Kant Sahay, was appointed as a Principal of the aforesaid school on a purely temporary basis by a letter dated 18th of February, 1969 for a period of six months and was asked to join the post on 7th of March 1969. This appointment of the respondent aforesaid was terminated on 12th of August, 1969 because the department of education had not approved of his appointment. Later however, the approval was received and he was reinstated by resolution of the Managing Committee dated 29th of November, 1969 for a period of one year from the date of his first appointment, again on temporary basis. The Managing Committee in its meeting held on 14th of May 1970, decided to terminate the service of the aforesaid respondent which was done by a communication dated 16th of May, 1970. As against this order of termination, the respondent preferred an appeal before the District Appeal Committee on 1st of June 1970. The aforesaid Committee gave its decision on 24th of November, 1971 holding that the termination of service of the third respondent by the Managing Committee was illegal and directed his reinstatement in office. Meanwhile, after the filing of the appeal, the District Education Officer had asked the Secretary of the school to allow the third respondent to continue in office. The aforesaid Committee gave its decision on 24th of November, 1971 holding that the termination of service of the third respondent by the Managing Committee was illegal and directed his reinstatement in office. Meanwhile, after the filing of the appeal, the District Education Officer had asked the Secretary of the school to allow the third respondent to continue in office. But before this direction was received, the third respondent had already made over charge of office to the acting Principal. The aforesaid order of the District Education Officer for continuing the third respondent in office was the subject matter of an application for writ filed by the Secretary of the Managing Committee which was numbered as C.W.J.C. No. 1333 of 1970. This application was ultimately withdrawn. After the final order passed by the Appeal Committee on 28th of November, 1971, again an application for issue of a writ was filed by the Secretary of the Managing Committee and was numbered as C.W.J.C. No. 785 of 1972. Ultimately this application was dismissed on 28th of September, 1972. It is said that in spite of the order of the Appeal Committee, the first petitioner continued to be the Head Master. The third respondent, however, claimed to have joined the school as Head Master on 8th of May, 1972 and since then has been forcibly coming to the school and claiming to be the Head Master and interfering with the petitioner's working as Head Master on account of the order of the Appeal Committee passed in his favour. This application is accordingly directed against the aforesaid order of the Appeal-Committee, contained in Annexure 6. 3. The only ground on which the order has been attacked is that the District Appeal Committee had no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a temporary teacher and the order passed by them was therefore, without jurisdiction. 4. The third respondent has filed a counter-affidavit which is rather lengthy one and does not need to be reproduces. 3. The only ground on which the order has been attacked is that the District Appeal Committee had no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a temporary teacher and the order passed by them was therefore, without jurisdiction. 4. The third respondent has filed a counter-affidavit which is rather lengthy one and does not need to be reproduces. The main points raised therein are (i) that in view of the previous application for writ having been dismissed the present one is not maintainable (ii) that the application has been filed after a long delay (iii) that the Managing Committee has not been properly impleaded, (iv) that the petitioners have no locus standi to file the present application, (v) that he had been appointed against the permanent post of Principal and was not temporary, (vi) that the termination of his service was absolutely illegal and the appeal by him to the District Committee was maintainable and (vii) that he had been allowed to join the post after the aforesaid order of the Appeal Committee and is functioning as the Head Master. In this connection, it is said that the Managing Committee had terminated his service at a meeting which was neither convened on a proper notice nor had the requisite quorum. With regard to the right of appeal, it is also said that the Secretary had framed grave charges and wild allegations against him and had asked him to show cause which had cast a stigma on him and he had, therefore, a right to appeal against the termination of his service. It is said that the present application is really an application by the Secretary, Shambhu Sharan Sinha, through the petitioner. 5. There is also a counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 which is more argumentation than factual and has the effect of supporting the stand taken by the third respondent. 6. The petitioners have filed a reply to the counter affidavit of the third respondent controverting certain facts which it is not necessary at this stage to state in detail. After the case was heard for a couple of days, the third respondent has again filed a supplementary affidavit annexing certain documents. I will refer to them at the proper stage. 7. After the case was heard for a couple of days, the third respondent has again filed a supplementary affidavit annexing certain documents. I will refer to them at the proper stage. 7. As indicated earlier, the only point which has been raised by learned counsel for the petitioners is that the order is without jurisdiction, the third respondent not having a right to appeal, as' he was a temporary teacher. It is said that the facts which are admitted and the annexure will show that the third respondent had been appointed temporarily and continued to be so. I have already recited the statements in this behalf made by the petitioners. To refer to the counter-affidavit it will appear from paragraph 5 that the first two respondents have admitted that "It is true that Sri Sahay had been appointed Principal on a temporary basis......." The admission has been reported again in paragraph 9 of the aforesaid counter-affidavit wherein it is said that "although the appointment of Shri Sahay was temporary it had been made after due advertisement and interview and had due approval of the competent authority." To turn to the counter-affidavit filed by the third respondent himself, it appears that in paragraph 10 he has made out a case that although he had been appointed on 18th of February, 1969 for a period of six months, the appointment was of a permanent nature subject to his work being found satisfactory. A copy of the relevant resolution of the Managing Committee is in annexure A. This resolution of the Managing Committee is dated 17th of February, 1969 and states in clear terms that the appointment of the respondent was absolutely temporary and his services could be dispensed with even without any cause being assigned therefore after the expiry of the period of six months. The interpretion put upon the language of the resolution by the third respondent cannot be accepted. In fact, even before the expiry of the period of six months aforesaid his services had been terminated on 12th August, 1969 because the department had not given its approval. 8. When the approval was received and he was reinstated, again, the appointment was temporary. In fact, even before the expiry of the period of six months aforesaid his services had been terminated on 12th August, 1969 because the department had not given its approval. 8. When the approval was received and he was reinstated, again, the appointment was temporary. It appears from annexure C a copy of the resolution of the Managing Committee dated 9th of September, 1969 that since the approval of the department had been received he was being reinstated with effect from 12th August 1969. The petitioners dispute the genuiness of this resolution. Be that as it may it is obvious that there is nothing in this resolution to show that the respondent was appointed on any term other than a purely temporary basis, the term of the initial appointment. It appears next from Annexure 4, containing another resolution of the Managing Committee dated 29th of November, 1969 that the term of the respondent as Head Master was extended for one year in accordance with the instruction of the Education Department with effect from the earlier date of appointment on the same terms. Obviously therefore, the term of the respondent was extended again on a temporary basis. It appears from Annexure 5, a letter from the Secretary to the respondent that the Managing Committee terminated his services as they were not required with effect from 16th of May, 1970. It is obvious from this that the Committee treated the respondent to be a temporary servant. There is nothing on the record, therefore, to show that the respondent was appointed permanently or that he was ever made permanent on the post aforesaid. 9. In this connection, learned counsel for the respondent has urged that even though he was temporary since the Education Department had recommended for keeping him on probation for a period of one year and by the resolution dated 29th of November, 1969, the term was so extended and that he was not removed' after the period of probation was over even in the absence of any express order of confirmation he should be deemed to have I been confirm ad as a permanent Head Master. I am unable to accept this argument. In the absence of any express order of confirmation, the respondent cannot be deemed to have been so confirmed. I am unable to accept this argument. In the absence of any express order of confirmation, the respondent cannot be deemed to have been so confirmed. It is well known that it is open to the appointing authority to extend the period of probation if it so likes. In my view, an express order of confirmation was necessary before the respondent could be deemed to have been made permanent. In the case of Rajendra Jaibhadra Jha V. J.P. Choudhary a similar argument was advanced before a Bench of this Court and was repelled. The learned Judges held that in the absence of an express order' of confirmation, the period of probation will be deemed to have been extended and the petitioner before their Lordships could not be deemed to have been confirmed. This argument of learned counsel has, therefore, no substance. 10. The question now arises whether the respondent had the right to appeal against the termination of his service with effect from 16th of May, 1972. Admittedly he had filed such an appeal and the result was the order of the appeal committee reinstating him resulting in removal of the petitioner. It is not contended nor could it be done in view of clause 14 of the Rules relating to appointment and service conditions of teachers contained in Notification issued by the Education Department No. II R4-01/55-E-5172 dated the 7th September, 1955, Clause 14 is as follows: "The termination of service of a person- (i) during the period of probation; (ii) during the period in which he holds temporary appointment; (iii) on retrenchment of a post; will not amount to discharge or dismissal. In such cases, however, the teacher or Headmaster shall be apprised of the grounds on which it is proposed to terminate his services and- his reply considered by the Managing Committee before orders are passed." All that this clause requires is that the person concerned shall be apprised of the grounds on which it is proposed to terminate his services and he has a right of reply and the reply has got to be considered by the Managing Committee before orders are passed. There is no appeal provided against the order. There is no appeal provided against the order. Learned counsel has, however, urged that even when the service of the temporary teacher is terminated on the grounds mentioned in clause 15, it will be deemed to be an order of discharge or dismissal and such a temporary teacher will have the right of appeal. Clause 15 is as follows :- "A teacher shall not be discharged or dismissed save and except on ground of proved inefficiency, conduct involving moral turpitude or gross negligence of duty or behaviour likely to prove subversive of discipline, or any other good or sufficient reasons which may make his retention on the school staff no longer desirable. In the last case, the prior approval of the Department is necessary." Learned counsel is fortified in this submission by a Bench decision of this court in the case of Kailash Chaudhary V. The President, Board of Secondary Education, Bihar. He has also placed reliance on the case of Madan Mohan Prasad V. State of Bihar. In the Patna case, a teacher had been discharged on the ground that while he was on invigilation duty, he had tried to copy out the questions and pass [hem out of the centre premises. It was held that if the termination of service of a temporary teacher arises from some charges being levelled against the teacher concerned, which would cast stigma on his character, it must be held that he had a right of appeal. The learned Judges considered clause 15 of the Rules aforesaid. The Supreme Court case related to a Munsif appointed temporarily to a temporary post which had subsequently been made permanent. The Chief Minister had made statement on the floor of the Bihar legislative Assembly that his service was not satisfactory. The learned Judges of the Supreme Court held that a stigma was cast on his character of course, they were considering the provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India and that case is not similar to the present one on facts. It is only relevant for the purpose of showing circumstances in which it must be held that stigma is cast on the character of a person. In view of the Bench decision of this court, the proposition of law put forward by learned counsel for the respondent has not been disputed. It is only relevant for the purpose of showing circumstances in which it must be held that stigma is cast on the character of a person. In view of the Bench decision of this court, the proposition of law put forward by learned counsel for the respondent has not been disputed. The learned counsel for the petitioners has urged that in the present case, there is nothing to show that any such stigma was cast on the character of the respondent which would entitle him to make an appeal to the District Appeal Committee. I will address myself to this question. 11. It must be said at the outset that the respondent in his counter-affidavit did not say anything more than merely that which appears in paragraph 23 thereof, which is as follows : "The deponent had right of appeal against the termination of his service because the then Secretary had framed certain graver charges and wild allegations in show cause notice against the deponent which cast stigma on deponent and the same was admitted by the then Secretary in C.W.J.C. No. 1333 of 1970 and the appeal preferred by him before respondent no.2 was quite competent and the statement to the contrary is neither factually correct, nor legally tenable." The respondent did not produce any document along with his counter-affidavit to show as to what were the charges levelled against him, what reply had been given thereto and what decision, if any, had been arrived at by the Committee in respect of those charges. 12. It is relevant to mention that until after the petitioner's argument has been concluded and the case has been argued even on behalf of the respondent 3rd party, no document was forthcoming nor any affidavit giving in detail the facts• relating thereto. The case had been heard for a couple of days immediately before the closing of this Court for Summer Vacation and with the consent of the parties, it was fixed for the 16th July, 1973, when arguments were resumed by learned counsel for the respondent. On that day a supplementary affidavit was filed on behalf of the third respondent annexing thereto some documents. The affidavit appears to have been sworn on the 18th May, 1973, the last working day before the vacation. On that day a supplementary affidavit was filed on behalf of the third respondent annexing thereto some documents. The affidavit appears to have been sworn on the 18th May, 1973, the last working day before the vacation. This supplementary affidavit contains statements with regard to ,the charges, the cause shown in that respect and the termination of his service on that account and produces some documents in that respect. The learned counsel for the petitioners has objected to the reception of this affidavit on the ground that it has been filed much beyond the time prescribed by law and in particular because it has come after his arguments were over and he has no further opportunity for rebutting the evidence. My attention has been drawn to Rules 21 and 23 contained in Chapter III of the Rules of this Court. They are as follows :- "21. No affidavit shall be read at the hearing of any appeal application or other proceeding unless a copy thereof has been served upon the other party or his pleader at least seven days before the hearing or if the affidavit is only in answer to the opponent's affidavit, at least 24 hours before the hearing; Provided that this rule shall not apply to urgent motions or applications or to motions or application made exparte." "23. No petition or affidavit shall be read or used in the High Court which does not comply with the provisions of this Chapter." It is said that this affidavit has not been filed within the time mentioned in Rule 21 before the hearing started and since it has been filed after the close of the argument of the petitioner, it should not be read at the hearing. There is force in this contention. As I have said earlier the respondent has made a passing mention of this fact in his first counter-affidavit. It is not a case of his being unaware of the f6\cts or of the question having arisen during the course of argument. It was the definite case of the respondent that he had a right of appeal because charges had been levelled against him. It was, therefore, obligatory on his part to make the necessary recitals and produce documents at the earliest stage. There is no justification whatsoever for the respondent filing this supplementary affidavit at this late stage. It was the definite case of the respondent that he had a right of appeal because charges had been levelled against him. It was, therefore, obligatory on his part to make the necessary recitals and produce documents at the earliest stage. There is no justification whatsoever for the respondent filing this supplementary affidavit at this late stage. On that ground it ought not to be considered. 13. I must, however I point out that even though it be admitted and read, it does not improve the case of the respondent. In the supplementary affidavit, first he has said that charges had been levelled against him and he has produced the letter of the Secretary containing the charges Annexure 1/3. Secondly he has stated about the reply given by him and produced the reply Annexure M/3. Next he has said that without giving him an opportunity of hearing, his services had been terminated and he has produced the resolution of the Managing Committee Annexure N /3. The resolution of the Managing Committee (Annexure N/3) says that the Committee considered the letter of the Secretary asking him to show cause and the cause shown by the respondent. It then says that the Committee does not consider it necessary to retain the services of the respondent as Head Master and accordingly terminates his services with effect from 18th of May, 1970. It is significant that the committee did not express any opinion whatsoever on the charges and the reply. They do not say that they found the charges to be proved or the cause shown to be unsatisfactory and terminated the services of the respondent by way of punishment. It may be that the committee did not consider it necessary to come to a finding on the point in view of the fact that they considered the services of the respondent to be unnecessary. It is in this view of the matter that the position of the respondent is not improved even if this order be taken into consideration. In the two aforesaid cases of Kailash Choudhary and Madan Mohan Prasad which have been cited, there were circumstances which clearly showed that the termination of services was for the reason which did cast a stigma on the character of the persons concerned. In the two aforesaid cases of Kailash Choudhary and Madan Mohan Prasad which have been cited, there were circumstances which clearly showed that the termination of services was for the reason which did cast a stigma on the character of the persons concerned. It appears next from the order by which the service of the respondent was terminated (Annexure 5) that nothing more is said than merely that the managing committee does not require your services in the school and as such it has terminated your services with effect from the 16th May, 1970. Neither the order of termination nor the resolution of the Managing Committee arriving at that decision contains anything which can be construed to cast stigma on the character of the third respondent. 14. In this connection, it will be relevant to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of I.N. Saksena V. The State of Madhya Pradesh In that case one of the arguments was that the order requiring the Government servant to retire compulsorily cast a stigma on him and it amounted to removal within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. It was argued that even though the order in question contained no express words from which any stigma could be inferred to have been cast, the court should look to the memorandum which had been referred to in the order and hold that such stigma had been cast. Their lordships said that it had been consistently held by the Court that where the order directing compulsory retirement expressly contained words which cast a stigma on a Government servant, the order is equivalent to an order of removal, but they were not prepared to extend the decision of this court on this aspect of the matter in the manner contended for by the appellant". Their lordships said- "But where there are no express words in the order itself which would throw any stigma on the Government servant we cannot delve into Secretariat files to discover whether some kind of stigma can be inferred on such research". There is another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of The State of Uttar Pradesh V. Madan Mohan Nagar. In that case the order by which the Government servant was compulsorily retired said "he had outlived his utility". There is another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of The State of Uttar Pradesh V. Madan Mohan Nagar. In that case the order by which the Government servant was compulsorily retired said "he had outlived his utility". It was held that it did cast a stigma on his character. The observation of their lordships of the Supreme Court in the first mentioned case is opposite in the circumstances of the present case. As I have shown neither the order nor the resolution of the Managing Committee casts any stigma on the character of the third respondent. It is not open to the respondent to ask the court to read the charges and the cause shown by him and then to infer that the respondent's services had been terminated as they had accepted the charge to have been proved and the cause shown to be unsatisfactory. The law cannot be stretched so far in this matter, and even if it could be done the inference aforesaid can not logically be drawn in the circumstances mentioned above. 15. In view of the aforesaid, I find that the respondent was merely a temporary teacher and that the order terminating his service did not cast any stigma whatsoever on his character. It follows logically that he had no right to present an appeal to the District Appeal Committee on account of clause 15 aforesaid which had no application to the circumstances of this case. It is not urged .by anybody that the District Appeal Committee had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal otherwise than as provided in clause 16. Clause 16 provides for an appeal against the decision of the Managing Committee under clause 15. It is quite obvious therefore that the District Appeal Committee had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and pass the impugned order. On that ground the impugned order must be struck down. 16. There are a few other points raised by the learned counsel for the third respondent which I will deal with briefly. Learned counsel has urged that he could file an application for issue of a writ against the decision of the managing committee terminating his services and, therefore, it is open to him in the present proceeding to assail the resolution of the Managing Committee by which his services had' been terminated. The argument is two-fold. Learned counsel has urged that he could file an application for issue of a writ against the decision of the managing committee terminating his services and, therefore, it is open to him in the present proceeding to assail the resolution of the Managing Committee by which his services had' been terminated. The argument is two-fold. It is said that the decision aforesaid taken in the meeting of the Committee on 14th of May, 1970, could not be legal; firstly because there was no proper notice for the meeting and secondly because there was no proper quorum. It is said that the notice for the meeting aforesaid was issued on 13th of May, 1970 and the meeting was held the very next day. For such a meeting, it is said, there should have been at least a week's notice. Reliance has been placed on a note appended to clause 12 of the Rules relating to appointment and service conditions of teachers clause 12 provides that the Managing Committee may impose the various punishment mentioned therein on any member of the staff after having finally considered his explanation and the charges. The Note is as follows :- "Note :- (1) Proceedings are to be started against teachers concerned by the Secretary on the report of the Headmaster or by the President, on the report of the Secretary, or by the President himself, or by the Managing Commit tee as a whole. Ordinarily the Managing Committee as a whole has the power to suspend the teachers but in case of urgency the Secretary in consultation with the President may suspend a teacher but this must be approved by the Managing Committee within a fortnight. Charges must be handed to the teacher in writing within two days of the suspension order. The teacher concerned must submit his explanation within seven days of the receipt of the charges. A meeting of the Managing Committee shall be convened within a fortnight from the date of suspension order for which a clear seven days' notice shall be given to every member. Such meetings should have a quorum of two third of the total number of members (that is, eight members). If the teacher member or the Headmaster himself is involved, he shall not attend the meeting. Orders of discharge or dismissal shall be valid only if they have been passed by the Managing Committee. Such meetings should have a quorum of two third of the total number of members (that is, eight members). If the teacher member or the Headmaster himself is involved, he shall not attend the meeting. Orders of discharge or dismissal shall be valid only if they have been passed by the Managing Committee. In no case however, shall a teacher be kept under suspension for a period exceeding 30 days or in case he has filed an appeal up to two months or till the disposal of his appeal. (2) During the period of suspension the teacher shall be allowed to draw half his salary plus dearness and upon exoneration, the balance shall be paid to him". Reading the aforesaid note it appears that it is concerned with the case where a teacher is suspended. In such a case charges have to be handed over to the teacher within two days of the suspension order, he is to submit his explanation within seven days of the receipt of the charges and the meeting is to be convened within a fortnight from the date of suspension order for which a clear seven days notice has to be given. It is also for such meeting that a quorum of two-third of the total number of members, that is, eight members, is necessary. This does not appear to have relevance to the circumstances of the present case. It is not any body's case that the third respondent had been suspended or that the meeting aforesaid had been called for the purpose of considering alone the charges against him and the punishment which ought to be awarded. Only an extract of the proceeding of that meeting has been produced in this court and it does not show whether this was the only item on the agenda or the main item thereon or one of the several items of the meeting aforesaid. Ordinarily, rule 22 of the Bihar High School (Constitution, Powers and Functions of Managing Committee) Rules, 1964 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Managing Committee Rules) provides that in case of an emergent meeting, notice shall be served on every member at least 24 hours before the time appointed for the meeting. As appears from the resolution of the Managing Committee itself, the meeting at which this resolution was passed was an emergent meeting. As appears from the resolution of the Managing Committee itself, the meeting at which this resolution was passed was an emergent meeting. If the notice had, therefore, been issued and served on 13th for the meeting to be held next day, it is not possible to say that there was any illegality. 17. With regard to the question of quorum again as I have said, the note to clause 12 of the Rules relating to appointment and service conditions of teachers provides a quorum of two• third of the total members. Since that has no application to the circumstances of the present case, rule 26 of the Managing Committee rules which provides a quorum of one half of number of the members entitled to participate and vote in such meeting applies. The total strength excluding the Headmaster being admittedly eight and there were four members of the Managing Committee present at the meeting it cannot be said that there was want of proper quorum. Even on this ground, therefore, it cannot be said that the meeting of the Managing Committee was illegal. 18. Another ground raised by learned counsel for the respondent is that one Devendra Kumar, a guardian representative, who had ceased to have that representative capacity, his ward having ceased to be a student with effect from 1st. April, 1970, had taken part in the meeting aforesaid and it was illegal on that account. In reply the petitioners have stated in their affidavit that there was still another son of the aforesaid guardian who was still a student in that school and he could not then have ceased to be a guardian. The respondents have not controverted the statement that another son of Devendra Kumar was still a student. The learned counsel has, however; urged that a guardian has a representative capacity only so long as that ward continues to be a student on whose account he had become a guardian at the relevant date of his election. It is contended that Devendra Kumar continued to be such a guardian only so long as his son who had left the School continued to be the student. It is contended that Devendra Kumar continued to be such a guardian only so long as his son who had left the School continued to be the student. It is well known that a person can be a guardian at one time of more than one student and obviously therefore, he can be treated to be a guardian as long as any or more of his sons continue in the School as student. If a person is a guardian of two students at one time and if he is selected guardian member in the Managing Committee can it be said when one of .them ceases to be a student, that guardian has ceased to have that capacity of a guardian? Obviously not. I am not prepared to entertain this argument at all. 19. Next point urged on behalf of the respondent is that the present, application is not maintainable, firstly because the petitioner does not have any legal right to the office and secondly because the Managing Committee has not been properly represented. With regard to the first contention, it is said that the petitioner had ceased to be the Headmaster at least after the third respondent had been reinstated in that office by the order of the District Appeal Committee and as such, he has no locus standi. In the circumstances of the present case, it appears that the first petitioner had acted as Principal even on earlier occasion in the year 1970 and again he was appointed to act as an officiating principal by the resolution dated 30th of November, 1971 and was working as such. There is a dispute between the parties on the question as to whether he, handed over charge on account of the order reinstating the third respondent. There is, however, no dispute that the petitioner was acting as the Headmaster until 8.5.1970 on which date the third respondent claims to have joined the post. It is pointed out that the Managing Committee by its resolution (Annexure 1) had considered the matter arising out of the dispute relating to the appointment of the Headmaster. There is, however, no dispute that the petitioner was acting as the Headmaster until 8.5.1970 on which date the third respondent claims to have joined the post. It is pointed out that the Managing Committee by its resolution (Annexure 1) had considered the matter arising out of the dispute relating to the appointment of the Headmaster. The resolution is dated 15th of December, 1972 and says that the terms of appointment of the first petitioner as the Headmaster having come to an end on 30th of November, 1970, being only for a period of one year, the period of appointment is extended until after the decision of the case relating thereto pending in the High court. It is said on behalf of the petitioner, therefore, that he is continuing. Further it is said that in any case, had the order of the Appeal Committee not been passed in this case, he would have continued on the post of the Headmaster and it was on account of that order that he is said not to continue therein, and he is, therefore; directly prejudicially affected by the aforesaid order and has a legal right or interest which would give him locus standi to file the present application. Apart from that it is said that any teacher or a guardian interested in the Management of the school could maintain an application. 20. There is no escape from the fact that after the termination of the service of the third respondent the petitioner was appointed as a Headmaster, that he was to continue in that post and that it was only the order of the District Appeal Committee which came in his way of such continuance. In fact, on two previous occasions, the Managing Committee came up to this court against both the relevant orders which were in favour of the third respondent the first being an order passed by the District Education Officer asking him to continue (the third respondent) in service during the pendency of the appeal and the second being the final order passed by the District Appeal Committee. It is another thing that the application for writ against the final order was dismissed, the petition having been filed by a person who was held to be no more the Secretary of the Managing Committee. It is another thing that the application for writ against the final order was dismissed, the petition having been filed by a person who was held to be no more the Secretary of the Managing Committee. The fact which emerges out of this proceeding is that the Managing Committee was not satisfied with the order of the District Appeal Committee and did not want to give effect to it. In such circumstances, it is difficult to say that the petitioner has no interest as would enable him to maintain an application for issue of a writ. It is well settled that where a person is prejudicially affected by an order and more so where an order has been passed absolutely without jurisdiction and is likely to affect a person adversely such person has a right to come to this court for issue of a writ. In this connection it will be worthwhile referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Gadde Venkateswara Rao. V. Government of Andhra Pradesh. In this case, the Supreme Court held that ordinarily a petitioner who makes an application under Article 226 of the Constitution should be one who ha5 a personal or individual right in the subject matter of the petition but in exceptional cases, a person who has been prejudicially affected by the act or omission of an authority can file a writ even though he has no proprietary or even fiduciary interest in the subject matter thereof. Another decision which has been relied upon in this behalf is the case of Dr. N.V. Subba Rao V. The Government of Andhra Pradesh. In that case, it was held that where the question of total or inherent lack of jurisdiction of a tribunal is involved, and the court is satisfied that the tribunal has usurped jurisdiction which it did not have, this Court would not hesitate even at the instance of a stranger to issue a writ of certiorari. In the present case, the first petitioner was very much interested in the matter of his own service as a Headmaster depending upon the decision of the question by the District Appeal Committee. I am not prepared to hold that it was not open to him to file the present application or that it is not maintainable because he has ceased to be the Headmaster. 21. I am not prepared to hold that it was not open to him to file the present application or that it is not maintainable because he has ceased to be the Headmaster. 21. The next point raised is, that the Managing Committee is not properly represented in as much as it has been impleaded through its Ex-Secretary, Shambhu Sharan Sinha. In this connection, learned counsel asked me to rely on Annexure O-3 containing the resolution of the Managing Committee dated 1st, of November, 1972 which is annexed to the supplementary affidavit referred to above. It is said that in the Managing Committee there were two vacancies in respect of the guardians since long and that the educationist member Sri Shambhu Sbaran Sinha's selection not having been approved by the department, there was a vacancy since 8th of May, 1972. On this basis and also on the basis of the decision of this court in C.W.J.C. No. 785 of 1972, it has been urged that Sri Shambhu Sharan Sinha had ceased to be an educationist member of the Managing Committee. It is true that the application by the Managing Committee through Sri Shambhu Sharan Sinha as its Secretary in the aforesaid case was dismissed on the ground that his term had expired before the date of the presentation of the application. Learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, drawn my attention to an order (Annexure 8) of the Secondary Education Board, Bihar. It appears there from that after the term of the Managing Committee as a whole had expired an ad hoc committee had been appointed in its place, by a letter dated 22nd of June, 1972. By this order the Board suspended the working of that ad hoc committee and authorised the old Managing Committee itself to work as an ad hoc committee. The terms of Sri Shambhu Sharan Sinha is said to have expired on 22nd. of May, 1972, but not only his term expired the terms of the -Managing Committee as a whole was taken to have expired on that date, three years having lapsed since the date' of its constitution. By this letter dated 6th of August, 1972, contained in Annexure 8, the Board had appointed the old Managing Committee as ad hoc committee. of May, 1972, but not only his term expired the terms of the -Managing Committee as a whole was taken to have expired on that date, three years having lapsed since the date' of its constitution. By this letter dated 6th of August, 1972, contained in Annexure 8, the Board had appointed the old Managing Committee as ad hoc committee. Obviously therefore, each and every person who was a member of the Managing Committee at the date of its expiry, i.e. 22nd May of 1972 became a member of the ad hoc Managing Committee on 6th of August, 1972, the date of the present letter of the Board. The present application for writ was filed on 11th of November, 1972 It cannot, therefore, be said that Sri Shambhu Sharan Sinha was no more the Secretary of the Managing Committee on that date. There is thus no substance in the objection that the Managing Committee has not been properly represented in this case. 22. I may mention that from the order passed in C.W.J.C. No. 785 of 1972 which has been produced as Annexure 7, it does not appear that the letter of the Board dt. 6th of August, 1972 was ever produced before this court. Learned counsel appearing in this case have not been able to tell me as to why and under what circumstance, the aforesaid order of the Secondary Education Board was not brought to the notice of his Lordship, Be that as it may the genuineness of Annexure 8 has not been challenged by any of the respondents and if the situation be as it was at the date of the filing of the present application for writ there can be room for objection that the Managing Committee is not properly represented. 23. The last point raised by the learned counsel for the respondents is that there has been inordinate delay in filing the application and it ought to be dismissed. It is said that the impugned order of the District Appeal Committee is dated 24th of November, 1971, whereas the writ application was filed on 11th November, 1972 hearly one year after. Learned counsel for the petitioners has drawn my attention to the reasons given, which explain the delay. It is said that the impugned order of the District Appeal Committee is dated 24th of November, 1971, whereas the writ application was filed on 11th November, 1972 hearly one year after. Learned counsel for the petitioners has drawn my attention to the reasons given, which explain the delay. In the petition they have mentioned that soon after 'the passing of the impugned order, the Managing Committee has filed the application (C.W.J.C. No. 785 of 1972) on 31st. of May, 1972, it was admitted on 1st. of June, 1972 and the operation of the order was stayed. This application, it must be noted was directed against the very order against which the present application is directed. Since stay had been granted, the petitioner was not called• upon to move into the matter. Ultimately this application was dismissed on 28th of September, 1972. Therefore, the present application was filed only nearly a month and half thereafter. Such a delay cannot be said to be inordinate. This court granted a writ after the expiry of the period of six months and the matter went up to the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India. V M/s. Khas Karanpura Colliery Co. Ltd.s and the delay by itself were not considered to be a good ground for refusal of the writ. The six months delay in that case was held by their lordships to be not sufficient to refuse the relief prayed for. This contention also must, therefore, fail. 24. Another point which had been taken up in the counter affidavit, namely, that the present application is barred by principles of res judicata in view of the earlier application having been dismissed, has been given up by learned counsel for the respondent and need not therefore be considered. 25. In the result, I find that the order passed by the District Appeal Committee on 24th of November, 1971 (Annexure 6) is absolutely without jurisdiction. Accordingly, I quash the order. It will now be for the Managing Committee or the ad-hoc committee which has taken the place of the Managing Committee to decide and act as they like ignoring the aforesaid order passed by the District Appeal Committee. The application is accordingly allowed. Let a writ of certiorari be issued against Respondent nos. 1 and 2 accordingly. In the circumstances, of this case, however, there will be no order for costs. Application allowed.