Judgment :- 1. The Revenue has raised the following questions of law for the decision of this Court: (1) Was the Appellate Tribunal justified in holding that the assessee/appellant need pay the admitted tax only before the appeal is taken up for consideration? Is not the said view clearly against the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 21 STC. 154 and the decision of this Honourable Court in TRC. No. 36 of 1969? (2) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was justified in allowing the appeal and directing the Appellate Assistant Commisioner to dispose the appeal on merits? (3) Are the reasoning of the Appellate Tribunal to come to the above conclusion based on any material? 2. The short facts are as follows: The respondent was assessed on a total turnover of Rs. 8,85,010 00 for the assessment year 1965-66, and the tax liability was fixed at Rs. 44,25050. The assessee bad as on the date of the assessment order (181 1967) paid Rs. 42,437.14 towards tax. The balance tax due as on that date was Rs. 1,813.36. Adjusting Rs. 109.50 paid in excess of the surcharge assessed, a sum of Rs. 1703.86 was due towards tax. The assessment order was served on the assessee on 3 31967 along with a demand notice to pay the aforesaid balance amount. The assessee filed an appeal on 27 31967 disputing a turnover of Rs. 21,494.44 on which turnover the tax assessable would be Rs. 1074.72. Thus an amount of Rs. 629.14 was due towards admitted tax. 3. The Sales Tax Officer on 20 41967 requested the assessee to pay the arrears tax. The assessee prayed for time as per his reply dated 4 51967. This request was rejected, and the order was served on the assessee on 12-6-1967. 4. The appeal filed by the assessee was adjourned at his request twice, viz , on 3171967 and 18101967. Thereafter notice dated 5 21968 was issued by the appellate authority to show cause why appeal should not be rejected for non-payment of admitted tax. In his reply dated 14 21968 the assessee stated that admitted tax was not paid because he honestly believed that the admitted tax had already been paid. In that statement he also stated that he is producing proof of balance tax. There is also a request there to condone the delay. In his reply dated 14 21968 the assessee stated that admitted tax was not paid because he honestly believed that the admitted tax had already been paid. In that statement he also stated that he is producing proof of balance tax. There is also a request there to condone the delay. Though it is not a proper application for condonation of the delay, it is agreed to by the Counsel for the Revenue that it can be treated as an application for condonation. The Additional Appellate Assistant Commissioner by his order dated 19 21968 rejected the appeal without considering whether the assessee had sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal within time. On further appeal by the assessee the Appellate Tribunal allowed the appeal and remanded the matter back to the Additional Appellate Assistant Commissioner directing to dispose of the matter on merits. The Appellate Tribunal's order says: "The second proviso to S.34 relates to the payment of the admitted tax and the term "admit" in this context means" acknowledge". The Department has no case that the appellant was aware of the balance amount due out of the tax payable on the admitted turnover. The assessing authority itself was under the impression that the entire tax had been paid. No notice demanding the balance tax on the basis of the return is seen to have been issued in the case also. There is therefore force in the contention that the admission or acknowledgement is a later event, that is to say when the letter from the A. A. C. was received. Taking all these aspects into consideration therefore, it is our definite view that the appeal should be allowed here." 5. We are in this case called upon to decide the scope and ambit of the two provisos to S.34 (1) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 which are as follows: "Provided that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner may admit on appeal presented after the expiration of the said period if he is satisfied that the appellant bad sufficient cause-for not presenting the appeal within the said period. Provided further that in the case of an order under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of S-17, sub-section (1), sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of S.18 or sub-section (1) or subsection (2) of S.19 no appeal shall be entertained under this sub-section unless it is accompanied by satisfactory proof of the payment of the tax or other amounts admitted by the appellant to be due or of such instalment thereof as might have become payable, as the case may be." One of us (Govindan Nair J. as he then was) had occasion to consider corresponding provisos to S.14 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1125 in Gangadharan Pillai v. Sales Tax Officer, (1965) 16 9. T. C. 578. Therein his Lordship said: "Proof of payment of tax is; therefore, one of the documents that must be filed along with the appeal memorandum. It appears to me that the mere presentation of an appeal petition without the necessary documents, will not amount to the preferring of an appeal as contemplated by S.14 (1). I further think that if an appeal petition has been filed without proof of payment of tax accompanying it, that appeal can be said to be preferred only when the proof of payment of tax is furnished. Such furnishing of the proof may take place within the period prescribed for preferring the appeal or after the lapse of that period- If the proof of payment of admitted tax is furnished within the period prescribed for filing the appeal, no question of not entertaining the appeal arises. If the furnishing of proof happens to be after the expiry of the period prescribed, the question will arise as to whether the appeal should be admitted or not. In such cases the first proviso to S.14 (1) will be attracted. And the question must be whether there has been sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the statutory period, viz., 30 days of the date of service of the assessment order." The decision was cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Lalta Prasad Khinni Lal v. Assistant Commissioner. (1972) 29 S. T. C. 201. And the question must be whether there has been sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the statutory period, viz., 30 days of the date of service of the assessment order." The decision was cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Lalta Prasad Khinni Lal v. Assistant Commissioner. (1972) 29 S. T. C. 201. Grover J. delivering the judgment of the Court said: "The decision of the Kerala High Court in Gangadharan Pillai v. Sales Tax Officer (Reserve), Ernakulam, (1965) 16 S. T. C. 578, is to this effect and we entirely agree with the reasoning and the conclusion therein". Earlier in that decision the Supreme Court said as follows: "It is true that an appeal filed under S.9 of the Act (U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948) cannot be entertained by the appellate authority unless satisfactory proof is adduced of the payment of tax admitted by the appellant to be due but in a case where the amount of admitted tax is deposited after the period of limitation has expired all that will happen is that the appeal will become entertainable only on the day on which satisfactory proof of payment of that amount is produced. In other words, the appeal will be deemed to have been properly filed on the date on which the amount of admitted tax is paid. If that is beyond the period of 30 days the appeal will be barred by time. S.9 (6) will immediately become applicable to that appeal and it will be open to the appellant to apply for condonation of delay under that provision. We are wholly unable to follow the argument thai the deposit of the amount of admitted tax must be made within 30 days even though the delay in filing the appeal can be condoned under sub-section (6). The correct approach is to treat the appeal as having been preferred on the date on which proof of payment of the tax was furnished and then to see whether under sub-section (6) of S.9, there was sufficient cause for excusing the delay in preferring the appeal." 6. In the light of the aforesaid Supreme Court decision and the decision of this Court in Gangadharan Pillai v. Sales Tax Officer (1965) 16 S. T. C. 578, we feel that the decisions of the Additional Appellate Assistant Commissioner and of the Appellate Tribunal are not correct. In the light of the aforesaid Supreme Court decision and the decision of this Court in Gangadharan Pillai v. Sales Tax Officer (1965) 16 S. T. C. 578, we feel that the decisions of the Additional Appellate Assistant Commissioner and of the Appellate Tribunal are not correct. The Additional Appellate Assistant Commissioner has not considered the question whether there was sufficient cause to admit the appeal presented after the expiration of the period prescribed under S.34 (1). For this purpose the appeal should be treated to have been presented only on the date on which proof of payment of admitted tax was furnished. Nor has the Appellate Tribunal borne in mind this aspect. Moreover it appears that the Tribunal was under the impression that "the Department had no case that the appellant was aware of the balance amount due out of the tax payable on the admitted turnover". The Appellate Tribunal also proceeds on the basis that no notice demanding the balance tax on the basis of the return had been issued to the assessee. As stated already the Sales Tax Officer has issued notice on 20-4-1967 and the assessee has prayed for time on 4 51967 which was rejected by the Sales Tax Officer by bis order dated 12 61967. We are therefore of the view that the question whether there is sufficient cause to condone the delay in presenting the appeal as provided for in the first proviso to S.34(1) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 has to be considered by the Appellate Authority, namely, the Additional Appellate Assistant Commissioner. 7. Our answer to the first part of the first question is as follows: The Appellate Tribunal is not justified in holding that the appellant need pay the admitted tax only before the appeal was taken up for consideration. The appeal becomes a proper appeal only on furnishing of proof of payment of tax, and if such proof is furnished only after the period prescribed under S.34 (1), the assessee (appellant) has to satisfy that be had sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal within the period of limitation, and only if the appellate authority is satisfied can he deal with the matter on the merits. 8. 8. The decision in L. Engineering Works Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner (1968) 21 S. T. C. 154, is to the effect that payment of tax can be proved in any manner. That decision does not deal with the question as to when the admitted tax is payable. In that case admitted tax was paid, within the time prescribed for filing the appeal, but proof thereof was furnished only after the expiry of such period. Before the hearing of the case the appellant produced a certificate from the Sales Tax Officer that the tax has been paid. It was held that that certificate is as good a proof as a chalan from the treasury production of which was the mode prescribed under the Rules. 9. As we understand it, the decision of this Court in T. R. C. No. 36 of 1969 is to the effect that the payment of admitted tax within the period of limitation for filing an appeal is a condition precedent for considering the appeal on merits. That decision, however, has not considered the question of condoning delay on being satisfied of sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal within the prescribed time. 10. In view of the above discussion, our answer to the second part of the first question is in the negative. 11. Our answer to the second question is that the Appellate Tribunal was not justified in allowing the appeal. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner should have been directed by the Appellate Tribunal to consider firstly the question whether the appellant has established sufficient cause for condoning the delay in presenting the appeal, and secondly, on being satisfied of sufficient cause to condone delay, and only then, to consider the appeal on merits. 12. Our answer to the third question is that the reasoning of the Appellate Tribunal to come to the conclusion which it has arrived at, is based not on relevant materials. 13. We set aside the order of the Tribunal and remit the matter to the Appellate Tribunal for disposal afresh in the light of what we have stated above. There will be no order to costs.