Judgment S.SARWAR ALI, J. 1. The petitioner was a candidate for the office of the Mukhia of Kasba Gram Panchayat in the district of Bhagalpur. He filed his nomination paper, which was proposed and seconded. The nomination paper has been rejected on the ground that the proposer does not fulfil the requirement of Rule 21 (4) of the Bihar Panchayat Election Rules, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). Rule 21 (4) is as follows : "Any person entitled to vote under these rules and who is not subject to any disqualification under Section 79 or under sub-rule (1) shall be qualified to subscribe as proposer of any one candidate only." It is not in dispute that if this rule is applicable, the nomination paper has been tightly rejected. 2 The petitioner in this case was represented by Mr. L. K. Bajla, who contended that Rule 21 (4) is illegal and beyond the powers of rule-making authority. We had the able assistance of the Advocate-General in this case on behalf of the State, who combated the propositions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner. His clear enunciation of legal principles was of assistance to the Court. 3. Although the learned counsel for the petitioner did not put his argument in the form, in which I am enunciating, the points that do arise for consideration are two : (i) Whether Rule 21 (4) is a provision relating to essential legislative function and thus, is not contemplated to have been authorised by the sections giving authority to makes rules. (ii) Excessive delegation being not permissible in law, whether the rule was bad being a rule on a topic in respect of which there was no guideline provided in the Act. 4. The limitation on the power of delegation by the Legislature, broadly speaking, arises in two ways. There cannot be delegation of essential legislative functions. Secondly, where there is delegation by the legislature the delegates cannot be given naked or arbitrary power unaccompanied by guidelines, for if it is done the power contains within itself seeds of discrimination. 5. It is well-settled that essential legislative functions cannot be delegated. It is also well settled that "essential legislative functions consist in the determination or choosing of the legislative policy and of formally enacting that policy." (Delhi Laws Act case, AIR 1951SC 332 at p. 400). 5. It is well-settled that essential legislative functions cannot be delegated. It is also well settled that "essential legislative functions consist in the determination or choosing of the legislative policy and of formally enacting that policy." (Delhi Laws Act case, AIR 1951SC 332 at p. 400). The working out of details within the framework of the policy as laid down by the legislature is permissible. If there is no guessing about the principles and standards, the details within the framework of the policy can be left to other instrumentalities. It was pointed out by Hidayatullah J. (as he then was) in State of Nagaland V/s. Ratan Singh, AIR1967 SC 212 at p. 222 that it would be sufficient if "the nature of thing to be done and purpose for which it is to be done is clearly indicated." Tested in the light of these well-settled principles the question is whether the power to lay down qualification in respect of a proposer is an essential legislative function. I will refer to the preamble, object of the Act and some of the provisions later. At this stage I may say that I am clearly of the view that taking into consideration the object and purpose of the legislation and the scheme of the Act it cannot be said that the rule-making authority was encroaching in the fields of legislative policy or was embarking upon legislative function in laying down the qualification which a proposer should fulfil in order to be eligible to propose a candidate in the election. 6. So far as the second question for consideration is concerned, it is to be noted that in order to comply with the rule as to equal protection it is sufficient if there is guidance for the designated authority in respect of exercise of the power which is given to authority. As was observed by Ayyangar, J. in Jyoti Pershad V/s. Union Territory of Delhi, ( AIR 1961 SC 1602 at p. 1609) : "Such guidance may thus be obtained from or afforded by (a) the preamble read in the light of the surrounding circumstances which necessitated the legislation, taken in conjunction with well known facts of which the court might take judicial notice or of which it is apprised by evidence before it in the form of affidavits......... (b) or even from the policy and purpose of the enactment which may be gathered from other operative provisions applicable to analogous or comparable situations or generally from the object sought to be achieved by the enactment." 7. For the principle well-settled I will give two illustrations. In B. Y. Kshatriya V/s. S. A. T. B. Kamgar Union, AIR 1963 SC 806 , the question for consideration was whether Sec.3 (3) (iv) contravened the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The law there entrusted to the State Government power to fix minimum wages for any particular locality or localities. Considering the question whether sufficient guide line was available it was held that the object of the statute and principles inherent therein afforded sufficient guide line. It was observed in that case that "the object and policy of the Legislature appear on the face of the Act." 8. I have already referred to the case of AIR 1967 SC 212 and the observations made therein. In that case also it was held that there is no excessive delegation where the nature of the thing to be done and the purpose of the thing to be done is indicated. 9. In the light of these principles reference may be made to the Gram Panchayat Act and some of its provisions. The preamble itself states the object of the Act, which is : "to establish and develop local self-Government in the village communities of the province of Bihar and to organise and improve their social and also economic life." Sec.3 relates to establishment of Gram Panchayat. Sec.3 (b) gives power to the Government to order general election. Sec. 4 deals with the membership of the Gram Panchayat. It states that every Gram Panchayat shall consist of all persons enrolled as electors in so much of the electoral roll or rolls of an Assembly constituency of the State of Bihar for the time being in force, as relates to the local areas comprised within the limits of the Gram Panchayat. Section 8 deals with the duties and function of the Gram Panchayat. Section 9 states that the Executive functions of the Gram Panchayat shall be performed by an Executive Committee of which the head shall be known as the Mukhiya. Section 8 deals with the duties and function of the Gram Panchayat. Section 9 states that the Executive functions of the Gram Panchayat shall be performed by an Executive Committee of which the head shall be known as the Mukhiya. Sec.10 relates to election of Mukhia and is as follows : "As soon as may be after its establishment, every Gram Panchayat shall, in the prescribed manner, elect from among its own number, a Mukhiya." Section 80 provides for power to make rules. Sub-clause (1) which contains the general power (as explained in Emperor V/s. Sheo Nath Banerjees case, AIR 1945 PC 156) and sub-clause (2) is only illustrative. Reading Sections 10 and 80 it is clear that the State Government has got power to make rules so that election to the various offices including those of a Mukhiya are held. When rules are to be framed in that regard sufficient guide lines are afforded by the object and the preamble as also some of the provisions which I have already referred to Sec.10 speaks of election. Election has a defined connotation. It must be fair, free and held according to democratic principles. These are the guide lines which govern the exercise of power of the rule-making authority while laying down the various procedures and qualifications which have not been specifically laid down in the section. Thus, I am of the view that there is no delegation of arbitrary or uncanalised power to the executive. I am further of the view that the provision of Rule 21 (4) cannot be said to have been made in exercise of an unguided and arbitrary power. It is, therefore, not possible to hold that Rule 21 (4) is liable to be struck down on any ground whatsoever. 10 This application is, therefore, dismissed; there will be no order as to costs. LALIT MOHAN SHARMA, J. 11 I agree.