JUDGMENT - G.N. VAIDYA, J.:---Respondent No. 1 Revachand Sanmukhadas Ramchandani is a manufacturer in milk ice-candies at Miraj. He was prosecuted by the Food Inspector-respondent No. 2---Babasaheb Gunvantrao Chavan under section 7(1) read with section 16(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, on the basis of the following allegations : 2. Respondent No. 2 is empowered by the Government of Maharashtra to Act as Food Inspector within the Miraj Municipal limits. On January 29, 1971, at about 8.45 a.m. he visited the shop of the accused and gave identity as Food Inspector. He served notice in form No. VI purchased for analysis 900 grams of kulfi for Rs. 1-25. In the presence of the panchas sample was collected in three dry empty bottles and formalin in adequate quantity was added to each bottle. The bottles were then labelled and sealed. A panchanama was also drawn. One sealed bottle was given to the accused and his signature was obtained on a receipt. One bottle was sent to Public Analyst and he reported that the sample did not conform to the standard of milk ice-candy or kulfi under P.F.A. Rules and was adulterated. That is how, the accused was prosecuted. The accused pleaded not guilty. He admitted that the complainant-respondent No. 2---went to his shop, gave his identity and served notice in From No. VI and purchased sample of Kulfi manufactured by him for sale. He also admitted that the sample was collected in the manner prescribed under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and Rules. He, however, contended that the complainant-respondent No. 2 was not duly qualified to Act as Food Inspector on the date on which he took the sample, that is, January 29, 1971, and on the date of his appointment. He, therefore, contended that he had no power to take sample under section 10 and the prosecution was illegal. The learned Magistrate upheld the contention of the accused. Although he recorded a finding against him on the second point with regard to the adulteration as " not proved " in the body of the judgment in paragraph 6, having regard to the admissions of the accused, he observed as follows :--- "....... The learned Magistrate upheld the contention of the accused. Although he recorded a finding against him on the second point with regard to the adulteration as " not proved " in the body of the judgment in paragraph 6, having regard to the admissions of the accused, he observed as follows :--- "....... I, therefore, safely conclude that the accused manufactured for sale and stored for sale kulfi which was adulterated....." He held that the sample collected from the accused was without any lawful authority as Food Inspector as on the date on which he collected the sample and on the date of his appointment as Food Inspector he was not qualified to be a Food Inspector as required by Rule 8(iii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955. He, therefore, acquitted the accused. The said acquittal is challenged by the State in the above appeal. The Food Inspector has filed an application under section 417 which is directed to be heard along with the appeal. Mr. Gambhirwalla, the learned Assistant Government Pleader, submitted that the acquittal is wrong because the Food Inspector was qualified to be a Food Inspector on the date when he took the sample on January 29, 1971. He also submitted that even assuming that he was not qualified as such, as any ordinary purchaser could file a complaint under section 12, even the complainant in the present case, though not authorised as Food Inspector, could file a complaint as an ordinary purchaser. There is no merit in the first contention urged by Mr. Gambhirwalla. He tried to support the statements made by respondent No. 2 in his evidence in the cross-examination by the accused which is as follows :--- "On 14-5-1970 the Government published in the Gazette notification in may case. There is no merit in the first contention urged by Mr. Gambhirwalla. He tried to support the statements made by respondent No. 2 in his evidence in the cross-examination by the accused which is as follows :--- "On 14-5-1970 the Government published in the Gazette notification in may case. In September, 1970 I went to take training of Food Inspector." Section 9 of the Act lays down :- " (1) The Central Government or the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint such persons as it thinks fit, having the prescribed qualifications to be food inspectors for such local areas as may be assigned to them by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be : Provided that no person who has any financial interest in the manufacture, import or sale of any article of food shall be appointed to be a food inspector under this section. (2) Every food inspector shall be deemed to be a public servant within the meaning of section 21 of the Indian Penal Code and shall be officially subordinate to such authority as the Government appointing him, may specify in this behalf." Section 10 of the Act gives power only to the Food Inspector to take sample and conduct investigation. Rule 8(iii) which, admittedly, is the only relevant rule in this case reads as follows :- "a person shall not be qualified for appointment as food inspector, unless he is a qualified sanitary inspector having the experience as such for a minimum period of one year has received at least 3 months training in Food Inspector and sampling work in any of the laboratories referred to in Clause (i) of Rule 6 are :- "(a) a Public Analyst under the Act, or (b) a chemical examiner to Government, or (c) a Fellow of Royal Institute of Chemistry of Great Britain, or (d) the Head of Institution specially approved for the purpose by the Central or State Government, or (e) Director, Central Food Laboratory. " Respondent No. 2 would have no locus standi to be a Food Inspector unless he establishes that he training for 3 months, that he was a Sanitary Inspector for more than a year and he had training in any one of these institutions. 2. " Respondent No. 2 would have no locus standi to be a Food Inspector unless he establishes that he training for 3 months, that he was a Sanitary Inspector for more than a year and he had training in any one of these institutions. 2. Notwithstanding the pertentuous question put to respondent No. 2 in the cross examination, he did not care to say, whether he was trained, how long he was trained and how long he was Sanitary Inspector. There is nothing on record to show that respondent No. 2 was a Sanitary Inspector for more than a year. There is also nothing in the notification, dated May 14, 1970, which is referred to by respondent No. 2 in the cross examination, to show that respondent No. 2 was qualified to be a Food Inspector. The notification or the contrary points out that it is a notification made in exercise of the powers conferred by section 9. It does not even refer to Rule 8 (iii) although section 9 requires the appointment to be made " if there are prescribed qualifications." 3. In the absence of any such material to show that respondent No. 2 was working as a Sanitary Inspector for a minimum period on one year or that he received training in one of the Laboratories mentioned above, the Court cannot recognise respondent No 2 as a Food Inspector within the meaning of the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act for any purpose. Merely because the State Government or the Municipality described him as a Food Inspector, he cannot become Food Inspector. He can become Food Inspector in the eyes of law only if he fulfils the definition and the requirements of the law. If the requirements are not fulfilled, it is necessary for the prosecutor or the Food Inspector to prove satisfactorily that the Food Inspector is a Food Inspector within the meaning of the definition of the Food Adulteration Act, 1954. Respondent No. 2 has not cared to produce any evidence that he is such. The learned Magistrate was, therefore, quite right in holding that the prosecution lodged by him was incompetent. 4. In this connection reference may be made to the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in (Municipal Board v. Behari Lal)1, A.I.R. 1960 All. Respondent No. 2 has not cared to produce any evidence that he is such. The learned Magistrate was, therefore, quite right in holding that the prosecution lodged by him was incompetent. 4. In this connection reference may be made to the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in (Municipal Board v. Behari Lal)1, A.I.R. 1960 All. 546 and decision of Single Bench of the Allahabad High Court in (Shabir Abdul Rehman v. State)2, A.I.R. 1969 All. 478. Turning now to the second contention of Mr. Gambhirwalla, it must be rejected on the short ground that the complainant in this case nowhere claimed to be an ordinary purchaser. His entire case was that he was a Food Inspector and he had filed the complaint qua Food Inspector. I do not think that it is open to him to turn round and say that he was an ordinary purchaser. The words " other than a Food Inspector " in section 12 have been rightly construed in (Public Prosecutor, Andhra Pradesh v. Narkidimilli Srirambhadrayya)3, A.I.R. 1960 A.P. 282 to exclude not merely a Food Inspector who is validly appointed but even the Food Inspector who poses to be a Food Inspector and whose appointment is held to be invalid. 5. It is true that a person cannot be a Food Inspector for some sections and not as Food Inspector who investigates under section 10 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. A person who acts as Food Inspector under section 10 and claims to be a Food Inspector, cannot turn round and say that he is an ordinary purchaser because his appointment is held to be invalid or his qualifications are not proved. Section 20 also makes a distinction between a purchaser referred to in section 12 and other persons appointed by the Government. Having regard to this distinction, respondent No. 2 who poses as Food Inspector, cannot ask this Court to deal with him as an ordinary purchaser. 6. Section 20 also makes a distinction between a purchaser referred to in section 12 and other persons appointed by the Government. Having regard to this distinction, respondent No. 2 who poses as Food Inspector, cannot ask this Court to deal with him as an ordinary purchaser. 6. Jagmohan Reddy, J. as he then was, in the above Andhra Pradesh case, has observed at page 286 in paragraph 19 as follows :- " In the circumstances, if the appointment of a Sanitary Inspector as a Food Inspector under section 9 is not valid, then he cannot be a purchaser within the meaning of section 12 and consequently he is not a person who is under contemplation of section 12 which Specifically excludes him from the the category of purchasers." The argument of Mr. Gambhirwalla that in view of the admission of the accused, the accused is not entitled to acquittal on the sole ground that the Food Inspector is not qualified, ignores Article 21 of the Constitution of India lays down that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure, established by law. 7. The procedure prescribed under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, requires a Food Inspector to have certain qualifications. Whenever the qualifications are challenged the prosecution must establish them. In the present case it has failed to do so. Therefore, merely because the accused admitted certain facts, he cannot be convicted, as the procedure for investigation of the offence disqualifies the Food Inspector in the present case to investigate the offence and file a complaint. At least the prosecution has failed to prove that he was qualified to investigate. In the result, I find no reason to interfere with the order of acquittal passed by the learned Magistrate, Miraj. The appeal is , therefore, dismissed. The bail bond shall stand cancelled. Criminal Application No. 270 of 1972 in rejected. -----