Judgment :- 1. Both these appeals are from preliminary findings in petitions under the Employees' State Insurance Act pending before the Employees' Insurance Court, Alleppey. The only question urged in these appeals relate to a plea of limitation raised before the Employees' Insurance Court, a plea which did not find favour with that court. A. S.178 of 1969 relates to a claim made by the Employees' State Insurance Corporation for recovery of the contribution for the period from 111959 to 15 91963, whereas A. S.163 of 1969 relates to the claim for the period from 111959 to 30 111963. The applications in both these cases were filed only in 1968, beyond a period of one year from the date when the amounts became due. The State Government had, in purported exercise of the powers under S.96 of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 framed rules and it is R.17 of these rules that is relied on by the Employer in support of the plea of limitation. This rule enabled claims to be made by the corporation only within one year of the date the cause of action arose. If this rule was to apply then of course the entire claim in both the cases should be barred. This rule was deleted by amendment in 1971. But during the relevant time, according to the counsel, the rule was in force and therefore the question of limitation should be adjudged accordingly. 2. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider the power of the State Government to frame rules prescribing a period of limitation for an application by Employees' State Insurance Corporation for recovery of contribution from the employer. It was found in the decision in Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Labour Court, Hubli (AIR. 1969 SC. 1335) that the Act itself has nude provisions concerning limitation wherever the legislature deemed it necessary and therefore the rule making authority cannot assume any power of limiting actions by way of prescribing a period of limitation. A similar rule was considered by the Supreme Court in the decision adverted to and it was held that the rule will not be operative. Of course in the light of this decision it is not open to counsel for the appellant to contend that R.17 should nevertheless operate. 3. A similar rule was considered by the Supreme Court in the decision adverted to and it was held that the rule will not be operative. Of course in the light of this decision it is not open to counsel for the appellant to contend that R.17 should nevertheless operate. 3. Another contention urged by counsel for the appellant in both these cases is that even assuming that at the relevant time there was no period of limitation prescribed under the provisions of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 the residuary article of limitation Art.137 in the schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 must apply to the case. Of course a period of limitation was prescribed in the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 by Act 44 of 1966 by incorporating S.77(1A) in the enactment. That provided that every application shall be made within a period of three years from the date on which the cause of action arose. But this provision came into force only from 281 1968 and therefore that will have no application to the case before us. The position then would be that there is no period of limitation prescribed under the provisions of the Act on the relevant date. Nevertheless, according to counsel for the appellant there is limitation as Art.137 of the Limitation Act 1963 would apply. Art.137 could not be read restricted in its application to petitions filed under the Code of Civil Procedure. It is the counsel's case that it should be considered applicable to an application pending before the Employees' State Insurance; Court. 4. The scope of Art.181 of the Limitation Act, 1908 which, more or less, corresponds to the provision under Art.137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 had been the matter of interpretation by the High Courts in India. The controversy was set at rest by the decision in Sha Mulchand & Co. v. Jawahar Mills Ltd. (1953 SC. 98). It was held that the article applied only to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure. It was then that more or less in the same form the article was included in the new enactment, Limitation Act, 1963. On the scope of that article again the Supreme Court had occasion to pronounce in the decisions reported in Athani Municipality v. Labour Court, Hubli (AIR 1969 SC. 1335) and in Nityanand v. L. I. C. of India (AIR. 1970 SC. 209). On the scope of that article again the Supreme Court had occasion to pronounce in the decisions reported in Athani Municipality v. Labour Court, Hubli (AIR 1969 SC. 1335) and in Nityanand v. L. I. C. of India (AIR. 1970 SC. 209). On the question [whether this article would apply to applications other than applications under the Code of Civil Procedure there seems to be no finality yet because it would appear from the later decision of the Supreme Court that the court is of the view that the question requires consideration. But the court has expressed itself very clearly that an application otherwise than to a court will not be one to which Art.137 will apply. Applications such as those before Labour Courts would not be applications to which the period of three years prescribed under Art 137 would apply. So would be the case with an application filed before the Employees' State Insurance Court. We think that in the light of the Supreme Court decision we have to hold that Art.137 has no application. It necessarily follows that the appeals have to be dismissed. We do so. But in the circumstances direct the parties to suffer costs in both these appeals. A. N. K. Dismissed.