Judgment 1. This is an application in revision against an order passed by the District Judge of Singhbhum in his capacity as the appellate authority under Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (hereinafter referred to as the Wages Act). 2. The petitioners case is as follows. It is a proprietary firm engaged in securing contracts of civil construction works from different persons and authorities and executing the same. For this purpose the firm engages casual labourers for executing the contracts and their services come to an end automatically on the completion of the contract work. The petitioner got a contract from the Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd. at Jamshedpur for doing some casual construction work in its New Coke Oven Project. This work was started in the second week of April, 1966 and completed by the end of March, 1968. The opposite parties and a few others persons are said to have been employed for this contract work and their services had come to an end with the completion of the work in March, 1968 and they had been given a formal notice of termination of service. The opposite parties by their letter dated the 3rd. of March, 1968 complained to the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Chotanagpur Division that the petitioner was not paying their dues and the Labour Officer by his letter dated the 3rd of April, 1968 informed them that they were not entitled to retrenchment compensation or bonus, but they were entitled to get wages for annual leave which the petitioner was ready to pay. The opposite parties then filed an application under Sections 15 (2) and 16 of the Wages Act before the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court at Ranchi claiming (i) Notice pay. (ii) Retrenchment compensation. (iii) Bonus. (iv) Yearly leave wages and (v) Unpaid wages. In pursuance of a notice issued, the petitioner appeared before the Labour Court and contended that the opposite parties were not entitled to retrenchment compensation or bonus. An objection was raised by the petitioner that the Labour Court could not decide these two questions under the Wages Act. The Court decided the preliminary objection holding in favour of the petitioner. In pursuance of a notice issued, the petitioner appeared before the Labour Court and contended that the opposite parties were not entitled to retrenchment compensation or bonus. An objection was raised by the petitioner that the Labour Court could not decide these two questions under the Wages Act. The Court decided the preliminary objection holding in favour of the petitioner. The posite parties then preferred an appeal under Section 17 of the Wages Act and the learned District Judge set aside the order passed by the Labour Court and directed the Labour Court to allow the parties to produce before it all the relevant materials connected with the claims preferred under all the heads. Hence this application. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged firstly that bonus payable under the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the Bonus Act) is not covered by the definition of the term wages as given in Section 2 (vi) of the Wages Act. It is next contended that retrenchment compensation and notice pay also are not covered by the aforesaid definition. Consequently, it is said that the authority under the Wages Act could not enter into the question of payment of bonus or retrenchment compensation or notice pay. As an alternative argument it has been urged that assuming that these claims are covered by the definition of wages, they involve complicated questions of fact and law and are outside the Jurisdiction of the authority under the Wages Act. With regard to bonus the next point raised by learned counsel is that in view of Sec. 32 (vi) of the Bonus Act the opposite parties are not entitled to receive bonus. Thirdly, it is urged that in view of Section 22 of the Bonus Act, the dispute relating to payment of bonus is an industrial dispute and as such governed by the provision: of the Industrial Disputes Act. With regard to the payment of retrenchment compensation, it is urged that in view of sub-section (2) of S. 25-FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act, the opposite parties were not entitled to any such compensation. With regard to the payment of retrenchment compensation, it is urged that in view of sub-section (2) of S. 25-FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act, the opposite parties were not entitled to any such compensation. It is next urged in this connection that in view of Section 33-C the claim for such compensation ought to be made by an application to the Government in accordance with the procedure prescribed in that section and in no case, therefore, the matter could be decided by the authority under the Wages Act, with regard to notice pay also the argument is that the workers being casual, they were not entitled to notice or notice pay and the matter cannot be decided by the authority under the Wages Act and the arguments with regard to retrenchment compensation apply to notice pay as well. 4. On behalf of the opposite parties learned counsel has urged firstly that all the claims made are covered by the definition of wages and could be gone into by the authority under the Wages Act. It is said that Section 22 of the Bonus Act and Section 15 of the Wages Act are not in conflict with each other, but complementary and it is open to a worker to proceed for realisation of these claims under Section 15 of the Wages Act as much as under Section 22 of the Bonus Act. It is said that S. 32 (vi) of the Bonus Act has no application to the present case nor does Section 25-FFF (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act apply. In other words, it is said that the opposite parties arentitled to claim bonus, the petitioner not being exempted from paying it. 5. Before I take up the points raised before me, it will be appropriate to mention how the matter has been disposed of by the courts below. The Labour Court held firstly that bonus was not covered by the definition of wages; secondly, that it raised a complicated question to be determined and thirdly, that in view of Section 32 (vi) of the Bonus Act, the opposite parties were not entitled to claim bonus from the petitioner. With regard to retrenchment compensation, it was held that in view of Section 25-FFF (2) the opposite parties were not entitled to it. With regard to retrenchment compensation, it was held that in view of Section 25-FFF (2) the opposite parties were not entitled to it. It was held further that, the authority could not go into the matter of the payment of bonus or retrenchment compensation. The lower appellate Court, however, firstly held that the court below had inadvertently lost sight of the claim preferred under the head notice pay and this claim should have been entertained by it. With regard to bonus and retrenchment compensation it held that they are not merely questions of law, but also of facts and, therefore, the claims under these heads also should be gone into inasmuch as, no part of the claim could be excluded from consideration merely on the ground of law. He placed reliance on a decision in the case of A. R. Haju Bhai Shaukh v. S. K. Nadar, reported in 1968 Fac LR 393 (Bom). In this view of the matter, it directed the Labour Court to go into all the claims preferred by the opposite parties. 6. I propose to take up first the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner to the effect that assuming that bonus, retrenchment compensation and notice pay are covered by the definition of wages under sub-section (6) of S. 2 of the Wages Act, a determination of these questions in the present case involves complicated question of facts and law and are, therefore, outside the jurisdiction of the authority under the Wages Act. Reliance has been placed in support of this proposition on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Payment of Wages Inspector, Ujjain v. Surajmal Mehta, reported in AIR 1969 SC 590 = (1969 Lab IC 867). In this case their Lordships were concerned among others with the question of payment of retrenchment compensation. Having examined the provisions of the Wages Act, their Lordships held that "the only applications which the Authority can entertain are those where deductions. unauthorised under the Act are made fron wages or there has been delay in payment beyond the wage period and the time of payment of wages fixed or prescribed under Sections 4 and 5 of the Act. unauthorised under the Act are made fron wages or there has been delay in payment beyond the wage period and the time of payment of wages fixed or prescribed under Sections 4 and 5 of the Act. Section 15 (2) postulates that the wages payable by the person responsible for payment under Section 3 are certain and such that they cannot be disputed." On the question as to whether a claim for such compensation could be entertained under Section 15 (2) of the Act, their Lordships said that it could not be so entertained. The reasons given are many. Firstly, that it was not a simple case of deductions having been made or payment having been delayed, that it would lead to investigation into questions arising under the law, that the failure to pay compensation on the ground of the plea raised there could not be said to be a deduction which was unauthorised or delay of payment of wages. Their Lordships then go on to say "It may be that there may conceivably be cases of claims of compensation which are either admitted or which cannot be disputed which by reason of its falling under the definition of wages the Authority may have jurisdiction to try and determine. 3ut we do not think that a claim for compensation under Section 25-FF which is denied by the employer on the ground that it was defeated by the proviso to that section, of which all the conditions were fulfilled, is one such claim which can fall within the ambit of Section 15 (2). When the definition of wages was expanded to include cases of sums payable under a contract, instrument or a law it could not have been intended that such a claim for compensation which is denied on grounds which inevitably would have to be inquired into and which might entail prolonged inquiry into questions of fact as well as law was one which should be summarily determined by the Authority under Section 15. Nor could the authority have been intended to try as matters incidental to such a claim questions arising under the proviso to Section 25-FF. Nor could the authority have been intended to try as matters incidental to such a claim questions arising under the proviso to Section 25-FF. In our view it would be the Labour Court in such cases which would be the proper forum which can determine such questions under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act which also possesses power to appoint a commissioner to take evidence where questions of facts require detailed evidence." 7. It is true that in the case before their Lordships they were concerned with Section 25-FF, providing for compensation for retrenchment on account of transfer of an undertaking. In this present case, the employers objection is that the retrenchment had been made on account of the closure of the undertaking under Section 25-FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act. In fact reliance has been placed by the employer on the provisions of sub-section (2) of the aforesaid Section which is as follows: "(2) Where any undertaking set-up for the construction of buildings, bridges, roads, canals, dams or other construction work is closed down on account of the completion of the work within two years from the date on which the undertaking had been set-up, no workman employed therein shall be entitled to any compensation under clause (b) of Section 25-F, but if the construction work is not so completed within two years, he shall be entitled to notice and compensation under that section for every completed year of service or any part thereof in excess of six months." The determination of the question as to whether the workers in the present case are entitled to such claim will obviously lead to an inquiry into disputed and complicated questions of facts and law. It will have to be determined as to what is the meaning of the word undertaking used in sub-section (2). It will be relevant to mention in this connection that the case of the petitioner is that it is a firm doing business by taking contracts for buildings etc. at different places and that it thus has different under- . takings at different places for the completion of the work at such places, and in view of that when one undertaking is closed, sub-section (2) will apply and exempt the petitioner from payment of such compensation. at different places and that it thus has different under- . takings at different places for the completion of the work at such places, and in view of that when one undertaking is closed, sub-section (2) will apply and exempt the petitioner from payment of such compensation. It will thus appear that there is denial of the right to such compensation and an exemption is pleaded in view of sub-section (2) aforesaid. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court, it is obvious that the authority under the Wages Act are not supposed to enter into these complicated questions of fact and law and, therefore, even though retrenchment compensation may come within the meaning of the term wage under the Wages Act in view of the scheme of that Act, it cannot be gone into by the authority under the Wages Act. 8. It appears from the order passed by the appellate authority that it has placed reliance on the decision in the case of A. R. Haju Bhai Shaukh, 1968 Fac LR 393 (Bom) (Supra). It is true in this case it was held that claims for notice pay, retrenchment compensation and bonus were wages and it was within the jurisdiction of the authority under the Wages Act to decide. The case of Payment of Wages Inspector, AIR 1969 SC 590 = (1969 Lab IC 867) (Supra), had not till then been decided by the Supreme Court. It appears that the learned Judges who decided the case of A. R. Haju Bhai Shaukh. 1968 Fac LR 393 (Bom) did not consider that aspect of the question which had been considered by the Supreme Court, namely, the scheme of the Wages Act and what follows therefrom in respect of its jurisdiction with regard to the matter of retrenchment compensation. I am, therefore, unable to accept the law laid down in this respect in the aforesaid decision. 9. There is another ground for coming to the conclusion that it was not within the competence of the authority under the Wages Act to go into the matter and that is that Section 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act provides the procedure for recovery of money due from employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter VA of that Act. Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act is the provision under which the workmen in the present case are making their claim with regard to notice pay and retrenchment compensation. Therefore, the procedure prescribed in Section 33-C of that Act will govern the recovery of such claims. Section 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act is as follows: "33C. (1) Where any money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter VA, the workman may. without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the appropriate Government for the recovery of the money due to him, and if the appropriate Government is satisfied that any money is so due, it shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue. (2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, the amount at which such benefit should be computed may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be determined by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government, and the amount so determined may be recovered as provided for in sub-sec. (1). (3) For the purposes of computing the money value of a benefit, the Labour Court may, if it so thinks fit, appoint a commissioner who shall, after taking such evidence as may be necessary, submit a report to the Labour Court and the Labour Court shall determine the amount after considering the report of the commissioner and other circumstances of the case." It will appear from the aforesaid section that the Legislature has provided a procedure for the recovery of such amount due. It is thus obvious that even though retrenchment compensation may be covered by the definition of the term wages under clause (vi) of Section 2 of the Wages Act, the claim having been covered by Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act and that Act which is in the nature of a special provision, having provided for a particular procedure for the recovery thereof, it is not open to the authority under the Wages Act to entertain an application for such a claim. The law could not have intended to provide two forums for the purpose. The law could not have intended to provide two forums for the purpose. The special legislation on the point must prevail and the Wages Act must, therefore, be read subject to the relevant provision of the Industrial Disputes Act in this behalf. There will be no conflict if the provisions of the Wages Act and the Industrial Disputes Act are so interpreted. Retrenchment compensation may be covered by the term Wages and yet it need not be a matter which may be for the Authority under the Wages Act to determine considering that the Authority under the Wages Act, in view of the Supreme Court decision is concerned only with two kinds of applications, one relating to deductions and the other relating to delay in payment. 10. In my view, therefore, the claim relating to retrenchment compensation in the present case could not be gone into by the Authority under the Wages Act, firstly, because it involves complicated questions of law and fact and secondly because such a claim must be decided by the Authority under the Industrial Disputes Act, in view of Section 33-C of that Act. 11. The argument with regard to notice pay is similar to that. Notice pay also comes within Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. In the present case, the employers objection in this behalf is that the workmen being casual and employed in an undertaking which completed its work within two years from the date on which it had been set up, the workmen were not entitled" to notice or notice pay. As I have said in the case of retrenchment compensation the question will again arise whether the employer in this case is entitled to the protection of sub-section (2) of S. 25-FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act. The argument built on Section 33-C of that Act applies equally to notice pay as much as to retrenchment compensation. Further it is obvious that the determination of the claim on this score will also lead to a detailed investigation in res-i pect of the setting up of the undertaking, the closure thereof, the nature of the undertaking and other relevant matters. The claim to "notice pay also, in the circumstances could not, therefore, be gone into by the Authority under the Wages Act. 12. The claim to "notice pay also, in the circumstances could not, therefore, be gone into by the Authority under the Wages Act. 12. I now come to the question of bonus, assuming as urged that bonus is covered by the term wages as defined in the Wages Act, this matter also does not appear to me to be one which could be gone into by the Authority under the Wages Act because this also involves complicated questions of law and facts and it was not the, intention of the Wages Act that matters such as these could be gone into in a summary proceeding under Section 15 of the Wages Act. To refer to the question of law which Authority under the Wages Act would be called upon to decide if it were within its jurisdiction to do so, will be firstly as to whether or not the petitioner was exempted from payment of bonus on the ground of the exemption contained in Section 32 (vi) of the Bonus Act. Section 32 (vi) of the Bonus Act is as follows : "32. Nothing in this Act shall apply to x x x x (vi) employees employed through contractors on building operations. It would lead to an investigation of facts in order to arrive at a finding on the point. Another reason which indicates the ouster of the jurisdiction of the Authority under the Wages Act is that Bonus Act itself contains the provision relating to the recovery of the bonus due from an employer which is contained in Section 21 of that Act. Section 21 is as follows: "21. Where any money is due to an employee by way of bonus from his employer under a settlement or an award or agreement, the employee himself or any other person authorised by him in writing in this behalf, or in the case of the death of the employee, his assignee or heirs may. without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the appropriate Government for the recovery of the money due to him, and if the appropriate Government or such authority as the appropriate Government may specify in this behalf is satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue certificate for that amount to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue. Provided that every such application shall be made within one year from the date on which the money became due to the employee from the employer; Provided further that any such application may be entertained after the expiry of the said period of one year, if the appropriate Government is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not making the application within the said period. Explanation In this section and in Sections 22, 23, 24 and 25, "employee" includes a person who is entitled to the payment of bonus under this Act but who is no longer in employment." Then the next Section 22 reads thus: "22. Where any dispute arises between an employer and his employees with respect to the bonus payable under this Act or with respect to the application of this Act to an establishment in public sector, then, such dispute shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 , or of any corresponding law relating to investigation and settlement of Industrial disputes in force in a State and the provisions of that Act or, as the case may be, such law, shall, save as otherwise expressly provided, apply accordingly." It will thus appear that under Section 21 of the Bonus Act the speedy method of recovery has been provided for. Section 22, however, provides for a case where there is a dispute between an employer and his employees with respect to the bonus payable under the Act. In such a case it is to be treated as an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act and the law contained therein is to be applied to such a case. It is, therefore, obvious that the Bonus Act provides for, in cases of dispute, making of reference of the dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act. 13 It will be relevant to mention in this connection that Section 34 of the Bonus Act provides that the provisions of the Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other flaw for the time being in force. 13 It will be relevant to mention in this connection that Section 34 of the Bonus Act provides that the provisions of the Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other flaw for the time being in force. Therefore, Jeven if bonus be wages within the meaning of Section 2 (vi) of the Payment of Wages Act there being a special provision relating to the manner of recovery thereof contained in the Bonus Act itself and in the absence of any special provision relating to compensation, payment or recovery of bonus in the Wages Act, it must be held that the Authority under the Wages Act does not have jurisdiction to go into this matter. In the view which I have taken, I am supported by a Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of D. P. Kelkar v. Ambadas Keshav Bajaj, reported in AIR 1971 Bom 124 = (1971 Lab IC 429). The learned Judges placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme-Court in AIR 1969 SC 590 = (1969 Lab-IC 867) in the case of Payment of Wages Inspector (supra) and held that even the claim for bonus in that case, in view of the dispute could not be gone into by the Authority under the Wages Act. 14. In view of what I have said above, the Authority under the Wages Act was correct in its decision in respect of the question raised by the employer. The appellate authority, however, did not go into the merits of the case and based its decision on very weak foundation, namely, that the claims could not be dismissed only on the grounds of law without going into the facts. 15. The contention of learned counsel, raised by way of an alternative argument must, therefore, prevail and the order passed by the appellate authority must be set aside and that of the Authority under the Wages Act restored. 16. In the circumstances aforesaid, it is not necessary to go into the question as to whether bonus in covered by the definition of wages given in Section 2 (vi) of the Wages Act. 16. In the circumstances aforesaid, it is not necessary to go into the question as to whether bonus in covered by the definition of wages given in Section 2 (vi) of the Wages Act. So far as retrenchment compensation is concerned, it has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Inspector of Wages AIR 1969 SC 590 = (1969 Lab IC 867) (supra) that it is covered by the definition of the term Wages. On the question of notice pay a decision of learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court in the case of Varghese v. Garmal Coir Works, reported in (1964) 2 Lab LJ 368 (Ker) was cited in support of the argument that it is not covered by the definition of wages. As I have said earlier, it is not necessary for me to decide this question in the present case. 17. In the result, this application is allowed and the order passed by the appellate authority under Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act is set aside. In the circumstances of this case, there will be no order for costs.