Judgment S.K.Jha, J. 1. The petitioner, Kusheshwar Singh, has made a prayer for issuance of an appropriate writ commanding respondents 1 and 2 to make settlement of the Ghat in question with the petitioner and fur an injunction restraining them from making any such settlement in favour of respondent No. 3 Ramanand Anarya. 2. The facts in this case are not very much in dispute. There is a Ghat named Ganjpathara to Chechar Khalsa on the river Gandak near Hajipur, of which the petitioner had taken settlement for three years from 1970-71 to 1972-73 on an annual jama of Rs. 25,205/-. The term of settlement in favour of the petitioner being due to expire on the 31st of March, 1973, in February. 1973 the Collector of Vaishali, respondent No. 2, invited the public by a public notice to participate in a public auction to be held on 26th February, 1973, for settlement of the said Ghat for the year 1973-74. A copy of the public notice has been annexed to the supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner as Annexure 4 to this petition, copy of which had been forwarded to each of many officers mentioned at the bottom of the notice, including the Commissioner of Tirhut Division. Copies of that notice were also forwarded, presumably, to persons who had already, somehow or offer, showed willingness to participate in any such public auction. The list of such persons shows the name of the petitioner as well as that of respondent No. 3, Ramanand Anarya. The public auction, for one reason or the other, could not be held on 26th February, 1973, as originally scheduler, and was postponed to 6th March, 1973. According to the case of the petitioner, many persons participated at the public auction and respondent No. 3 was also present at the auction, but ultimately the petitioners bid having been found to be the highest namely, Rs. 26,000.00 was accepted by the Collector, respondent No. 2 and in pursuance of the provisions contained in the public notice respondent No. 2 directed the petitioner to deposit half of the money plus the security money at the rate of 2 per cent at the knock of the hammer or soon thereafter. The petitioner deposited Rs. 13,000.00 being half of the auction money offered with the security money at the rate of 2 per cent. The petitioner deposited Rs. 13,000.00 being half of the auction money offered with the security money at the rate of 2 per cent. On 2nd April, 1973, the Collector, Respondent No. 2, issued a provisional Parwana of settlement to the petitioner and the petitioner was put in possession over the Ghat as settlee. Thenceforth the petitioner continued to realise the tolls as usual. It also appears from the statement made in paragraph 12 of the petition read with Annexure 2 to the writ application that the petitioner had invested huge sums of money over the improvement, running and management of the Ghat and also in making temporary constructions for keeping the persons employed by him. So far, there does not seem to be any dispute between the parties. 3. On the 9th of April, 1973, the petitioner learnt that the Ghat was being thought to be settled or had been decided by the authorities concerned to be settled with respondent No. 3. On further query, the petitioner found out that instruction had been issued by the State of Bihar, respondent No. 1, in their Revenue Department, that the Ghat in question should be settled with respondent No. 3, Ramanand Anarya, who claimed himself to be the Secretary of a Union called the All India Labourers Co-operative Union. On 12th April, 1973, the petitioner filed an application before the Collector, respondent No. 2, requesting him to inform about the actual state of affairs or developments which had taken place in the matter of settlement. And, in that application, a copy of which is Annexure 2 to the writ application, it was asserted in paragraph 10 that, if any fresh bid were going to he held, the petitioner was even prepared to participate at such a bid and he also gave an assurance that he would offer the highest amount at any bid, if re-held. The petitioner, of course, in that application protested against any justification for holding such a re-bid, his highest bid having been accepted, a provisional Parwana having already been granted to him on representation of the revenue authorities half the bid money along with 2 per cent security having already been deposited by him and huge expenses, as already indicated, having already been incurred for the purpose. After several pieces of correspondence, the petitioner ultimately found that orders have been issued by the Revenue Department of the State of Bihar, respondent No. 1, for the settlement of the Ghat in question in favour of respondent No. 3 for a sum of Rs. 26,500/-. 4. Two facts which have been clearly asserted by the petitioner in his petition are fi) that Ramanand Anarya, respondent No. 3, is not the secretary of any registered Co-operative Society and that the so-called All India Labourers Co-operative Union is a merely fake Union of which he alleges himself to be the Secretary and (ii) that at the public auction held on the 6th of March, 1973, respondent No. 3 was present but he did not choose to participate in the bid, leading to the inference that he was merely interested in seeing as to what was the maximum amount that was bid by the highest bidder at such an auction. The petitioners case, as argued by learned Counsel for the petitioner, is that having thus found out that the petitioners bid was the highest, namely, that of Rs. 26,000.00 respondent No. 3 managed somehow or the other to have an order from the Revenue Department in his favour for a settlement with him for a sum of Rupees 26,500.00 by private negotiation. Respondent No. 3 is represented by Mr. Rana Pratap Singh, II. No counter-affidavit has been filed on his behalf, denying the assertions made by the petitioner. Learned Advocate-General who appeared for respondents 1 and 2 produced the original records with regard to the settlement of the Ghat in question for perusal of the Court, and on the notings of the Revenue Department, when he was confronted with the position that the Government themselves were very much doubtful in regard to the genuineness of the claim of respondent No. 3 learned Advocate-General very fairly conceded that he was not in a position to support the stand of respondents 1 and 2 taken in the counter-affidavit to the effect that respondent No. 3 was the Secretary of a registered Co-operative Society. Quite obviously, this position could not have been contested by the learned Advocate-General, especially in view of Annexure 6 to the further supplementary affidavit filed by the petitioner, which purports to be the information given to the petitioner by the Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Hajipur, in response to a query made by the petitioner, that from a perusal of the register regarding registered Co-operative Societies, it is clear that there is no society registered in it of the name of All India Labourers Co-operative Union. The only ground of defence put forward on behalf of the learned Advocate-General was that it was in the financial interests of the State to accept a bid even by a private negotiation or treaty since an excess of Rs. 500.00 would be coming to the coffers of the State exchequer the amount in excess over the amount fetched by the bid held at the public auction. In face of the facts noticed above, namely, that respondent No. 3 was present at the public auction and did not choose to participate therein and that the petitioner had even subsequently intimated to the authorities concerned that if the pecuniary interest of the State were the sole concern of the Revenue Department he was prepared to re-bid at any public auction to be re-held, with an assurance that he would bid the highest amount, which facts are borne out by the different records brought to our notice as well as by the different annexures to the writ application, the argument with regard to any pecuniary benefit to the State has been advanced merely to be rejected. It goes without saying that the petitioner had acted on a representation made by the revenue authorities, presumably under the authority of the Commissioner of Tirhut Division and, acting on such representation, had altered his position to his prejudice. 5. Learned Advocate-General pointed out that no case of mala fide has been made out in this petition and that, therefore, the justiciability of settlement even by private treaty or negotiation was not entertainable. It is true that no case of mala fide has either been alleged or proved in this case. 5. Learned Advocate-General pointed out that no case of mala fide has been made out in this petition and that, therefore, the justiciability of settlement even by private treaty or negotiation was not entertainable. It is true that no case of mala fide has either been alleged or proved in this case. But it is a well settled principle of law that even administrative and executive acts are as much open to challenge as other acts, if a case as to their being mala fide or wholly arbitrary and high handed in nature is made out. As has been laid down by the Supreme Court in Union of India V/s. Indo Afghan Agencies Ltd., (1968) 2 SCR 366 = ( AIR 1968 SC 718 ), the Government are not exempt from the equity arising out of the acts done by citizens to their prejudice, relying upon the representation made by the Government. In the present case, such a representation will be deemed to have been made by the Commissioner who was the competent authority. Though the discretion to be exercised in writ jurisdiction has been repeatedly held not to be used loosely, it is also well settled that a party claiming to be aggrieved, by the action of a public body or authority on the plea that the action is unlawful or high handed or arbitrary or unjust is entitled to the exercise of such judicial discretion. The objection raised by the learned Advocate-General with regard to the maintainability of this writ application on the facts aforesaid can best be countered by using the language of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. V/s. Ulhasnagar Municipal Council, AIR 1971 SC 1021 at page 1024-- "A representation that something will be done in future may involve an existing intention to act in future in the manner represented. Ltd. V/s. Ulhasnagar Municipal Council, AIR 1971 SC 1021 at page 1024-- "A representation that something will be done in future may involve an existing intention to act in future in the manner represented. If the representation is acted upon by another person it may, unless the statute governing the person making the representation provides otherwi.se, result in an agreement enforceable at law: if the statute requires that the agreement shall be in a certain form, no contract may result from the representation and acting therefor but the law is not powerless to raise in appropriate cases an equity against him to compel performance of the obligation arising out of his representation." And, public bodies or Government have been treated at par with private individuals in the exposition of law aforesaid. A public body, it has been repeatedly held, is not exempt from liability to carry out its obligation arising out of representations made by it relying upon which a citizen has altered his position to his prejudice. 6 In the circumstances aforesaid, the petitioner, in my view, is fully entitled to call in aid the writ jurisdiction of this Court for the exercise of a judicial discretion to set right an injustice caused to him or sought to be caused on account of an arbitrary and high handed action of the revenue authorities. In the result, therefore, this application is allowed and a writ in the nature of mandamus shall issue to respondents 1 and 2 commanding them to make a settlement in due course with the petitioner of the Ghat in question and restraining them from giving effect to any decision or proposal to make any such settlement with respondent No. 3. In the circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to cost. N.L.Untwalia, J. 7 I agree.