M. P. THAKKAR, J. ( 1 ) THE gaze may now be shifted to the legal riddle of considerable significance which has proliferated to the front line namely should a pilgrim seeking entrance to a temple who knocks at the door once instead of twice be turned back and asked to seek re-entry after knocking twice merely in order to make him conform to a supposed requirement ? Even those who discern no distinction between rituals on the one hand and real religion on the other might ponder twice before assenting to the proposition implicit in the aforesaid question. Would it then be right for a court to insist that a suit for redemption should be dismissed and the plaintiff should be asked to file a fresh suit for redemption even in respect of a subsisting mortgage admitted to be in existence by the other side (instead of granting appropriate relief in that very suit) if the plaintiff fails to prove the mortgage propounded by him initilally ? It is that question which clamours for attention in the present case. ( 2 ) IT was contended before the appellate court that the plaintiffs suit for redemption should have been dismissed because the relief claimed by him was in respect of a mortgage created under an unregistered document dated April 4 1945 and that he had not claimed any relief for redemption in respect of the mortgage created by the registered document dated May 4 1946 The appellate Court has negatived this contention. Counsel for the appellant-defendant No. 1 has argued with considerable vehemence that both the lower courts were in error in passing a decree for redemption in respect of a different mortgage though it was an admitted mortgage in in as much as the plaintiff had initially claimed redemption of not this but of different mortgage. It was argued that it was not competent to the Court to 8rant a decree for redemption in respect of a mortgage other than the mortgage in respect of which the suit for redemption was built. Reliance was placed on a number of decisions in support of this proposition. In Mt. It was argued that it was not competent to the Court to 8rant a decree for redemption in respect of a mortgage other than the mortgage in respect of which the suit for redemption was built. Reliance was placed on a number of decisions in support of this proposition. In Mt. Anaragi Kunwer v. Kashi Bai A. I. R. 1914 Allahabad 362 the learned single Judge expressed the view that even though the transaction of mortgage was admitted if the plaintiff had prayed for redemption in respect of a mortgage other than the one which was admitted the plaintiff would not be entitled to a decree for redemption. The view has been expressed that the plaintiff of course would be at liberty to file a separate suit in respect of the other mortgage admitted by the defendant A similar view has commended itself to the Oudh High Court in Gauri Shankar v. Lala and another A. I. R. 1938 Oudh 16. With respect to the Allahabad and the Oudh High Court this view is extremely narrow hyper-technical and conducive to multiplicity of proceedings and calculated to defeat rather than promote the ends of substantial justice. Pray why should a litigant be driven to a fresh suit if the existence of the other mortgage is admitted by the defendant ? Is any purpose served by obliging a plaintiff to file a different suit (other than to oblige him to incur avoidable expenses) for obtaining a relief which can be granted in the pending suit ? There is also little purpose in encouraging multiplicity of proceedings in disregard of the fact that litigation is time-consuming and no useful purpose is served (other than of adding to arrears of work and frustration of litigants) by insisting on a fresh suit if the same relief can be granted in the existing suit. Again neither the Allahabad nor the Oudh High Court has made explicit the rational essence of this view which view appears to be of an ipse dixit character The suit of a plaintiff cannot be defeated merely because he has not initially claimed a relief in respect of the admitted mortgage. Again neither the Allahabad nor the Oudh High Court has made explicit the rational essence of this view which view appears to be of an ipse dixit character The suit of a plaintiff cannot be defeated merely because he has not initially claimed a relief in respect of the admitted mortgage. The cause of justice is not at all and in any way advanced by insisting on a party filing fresh suit which is both time and money consuming particularly in the face of the fact that the defendant admits the existence of the mortgage in respect of which the plaintiff now claims a relief during the pendency of the suit. There is no conceivable legal bar or impediment to the Court granting a decree for redemption of an admitted mortgage merely because the plaintiff claimed relief in regard to a different mortgage when the suit was initially instituted. In my opinion this is the only correct view. But even if two views are equally possible the Courts must take the view which shortens the duration of litigation and saves the time and exasperation of the Courts as also of the seekers for justice and mitigates the burden of their costs. Else the citizens will become atheists and heretics from the point of view of their faith in the institution of Courts. I have therefore no hesitation in taking the view that a mortgagor can seek redemption of a different mortgage if the existence and subsistence thereof is admitted by the other side. The mortgagor need not be needlessly driven to a separate suit in order to obtain the relief which can be granted in the current suit itself. [rest of the judgment not material for reports]. Appeal dismissed. .