Judgment :- 1. The Respondent in this writ petition filed an application under S.75 (2) of the Land Reforms Act for the purpose of shifting the kudikidappu of the writ petitioner. On the day the application came on for hearing, the writ petitioner herein, (who was the Respondent in the application before the Land Tribunal) was absent. The Tribunal nevertheless heard the petitioner before it, examined the objections which had been filed by the Respondent before it (the writ petitioner); and allowed the application for shifting. The writ petitioner thereupon filed I. A. No. 6 of 1672 to re-open the ex parte decision of the Tribunal on the ground that he had not been heard, and should be afforded an opportunity of substantiating his objections. The application was dismissed by the Tribunal on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to set aside the order already passed, and that the said order was passed on the merits after giving due consideration to all the points raised in the objections. Ext. P2 is a copy of the order of the Tribunal. This writ petition has been filed to quash the same. 2. The question debated is whether a Land Tribunal has got the power to set aside an ex parte order passed by it. S.77 which is the relevant section dealing with the disposal of an application to shift the kudikidappu in so far as it is relevant, reads as follows: 77. Procedure to enforce shifting of kudikidappu in certain cases: (1) If the kudikidappukaran does not comply with the requisition made under sub section (2) or subsection (4) of S.75 by the person in possession of the land to shift to a new site, such person may apply to the Land Tribunal having jurisdiction to entertain an application under S.80B in respect of the kudikidappu to be shifted, to enforce compliance with such requisition: Provided that no application under this sub-section shall be made without giving the kudikidappukaran one month's notice by registered past. (2) The Land Tribunal, after such enquiry as it deems fit, and on being satisfied that the applicant has complied with all the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) or subsection (4). (2) The Land Tribunal, after such enquiry as it deems fit, and on being satisfied that the applicant has complied with all the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) or subsection (4). as the case may be, of S.75, may pass an order requiring the kudikidappukaran to shift the kudikidappu before such date as may be specified in the order: Provided that no such order shall be passed in any case where a certificate of purchase has been issued under S.80C in respect of the kudikidappu. (3) If the kudikidappukaran does not shift the kudikidappu before the date specified in the "order under sub-section (2), the' Land Tribunal shall cause the kudikidappukaran to be evicted from the kudikidappu." No rules have been framed defining the mode and manner of enquiry either under S.77 or under S.75 (which deals with an application for evicting the kudikidappukaran from the kudikidappu). S.101 confers on the Tribunal certain specifically enumerated powers of a civil court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of certain specified matters. But the power under 0.9, R.9, of setting aside an ex parte decree or order is not one of the specifically conferred or enumerated powers. S.101 (1) (e) provides that the Land Tribunal may have the powers of a civil court under the Civil Procedure Code in respect of any other matter which may be "prescribed"; but no such prescription was brought to my notice. In the face of these, the Land Tribunal, being essentially a statutory Tribunal with specifically enumerated powers, cannot have the power to set aside an ex parte decree or order. The Full Bench decision of this Court in Kalyani Amma Bhargavi Amma v. Ouseph Varkey (1967 KLT. 317), ruled, with respect to the provisions of S, 101, S.129 (2) (e) of the Land Reforms Act and R.59 of the Land Reforms Tenancy Rules that the Land Tribunal had power to set aside an ex parte order. The requisite power was found under the provisions of R.99. The Full Bench overruled the contrary view taken by three of us, each sitting alone. As the conclusion was rested solely on R.99 of the Rules, and as there is now no such or similar rule, Tarn unable to hold that there is a power in the Land Tribunal to set aside an ex parte decree. Myself and Mr. The Full Bench overruled the contrary view taken by three of us, each sitting alone. As the conclusion was rested solely on R.99 of the Rules, and as there is now no such or similar rule, Tarn unable to hold that there is a power in the Land Tribunal to set aside an ex parte decree. Myself and Mr. Justice Krishnamoorty Iyer in CRP. 270 of 1969 considered the Full Bench decision and held that the former part of 0.9, R.9 providing for the bar of a fresh suit on the same cause of action would not be attracted as far as the Land Tribunal is concerned. The Tribunal was correct in refusing to set aside the ex parte order passed by it, and in refusing to re-hear the application on which orders had been passed by it. I dismiss this writ petition, but in the circumstances without costs.