JUDGMENT Untwalia, C. J. Although the brief of this case is bulky, the facts may be stated in narrow compass, as the point involved is a short one. Sri Ram Niwas Pandey (respondent No.5) was appointed a Headmaster of T.K. Ghosh Academy, Patna, in the, year 1963. Sometime later, he was confirmed. Several charges were framed against him by the then ad-hoc Managing Committee of the School which eventually led to the passing of a resolution dated 3rd September, 1970, a copy of which is Annexure 5 to the writ application. A detailed analysis of the finding arrived at by the Managing Committee is mentioned in Annexure 5. It is not necessary to refer to any of the details in this judgment. Respondent No. 5 was discharged from service by the resolution of the Managing Committee contained in Annexure 5. 2. In the Education Department's notification dated the 7th September, 1965 were incorporated rules 16 and 17 providing for the filing of an appeal by the discharged teacher of a recognized School. There was also a resolution of the Education Department of the Government of Bihar dated the 2nd April, 1957. As held by the Supreme Court in Dwarkanath Tewari V. State of Bihar, the so-called rules framed by the Education Department were not really rules framed under any statutory power, but they were held to be mere administrative instructions. All these rules and instructions were incorporated in the notification dated the 21st March 1959 published in the Bihar Gazette (Extraordinary) dated the 23rd March, 1959. The Bihar School (Central and Regulation of Administration) Act, 1960 (Bihar Act XIII of 1960) was passed. This Act will be referred to hereinafter as the Act. Under section 8 (2) of the Act, the rules and instructions incorporated in the notification published in the extraordinary issue of the Bihar Gazette dated 23.3.1959 were made statutory rules until the State Government made rules under section 8 (1). At the relevant time the State Government had not made any rules under section 8 (1). Respondent No. 5 therefore, filed an appeal in accordance with rule 16 of the rules contained in the Education Department notification dated 7.9.1955 which hereinafter in this Judgment will be referred to as the Rules. The name of the rules is Rules for Appointment, Departmental Approval, Discharge, Dismissal and Appeal of Teachers of non-Government Secondary Schools. Respondent No. 5 therefore, filed an appeal in accordance with rule 16 of the rules contained in the Education Department notification dated 7.9.1955 which hereinafter in this Judgment will be referred to as the Rules. The name of the rules is Rules for Appointment, Departmental Approval, Discharge, Dismissal and Appeal of Teachers of non-Government Secondary Schools. The President of the Board of Secondary Education nominated the Regional Deputy Director of Education to hear the appeal. That was heard on some dates by one Regional Deputy Director, but finally it was heard by Sri C.P. Sinha (respondent No. 6). He submitted his report dated 5.2.1972 (Annexure 6) to the President of the Board of Secondary Education. At that time, the President was Sri A.P. Srivastava (respondent No. 2). Respondent No. 2, it appears, did not feel inclined to accept the report contained in Annexure 6 without further hearing the appeal himself. Under his direction, therefore, the Secretary of the Board issued notice dated 4.4.1972 to the parties for appearing before the President for further hearing of the appeal on 20.4. 1972. The hearing was adjourned to 8.5.1972. The matter was heard by respondent No. 2 who passed an order (annexure 7) overruling the objection of respondent No.5 on the basis of two Bench decisions of this Court in Liladhar Jha v. Board of Secondary Education, Patna and Ajit Kumar Mukherjee alias A. K. Mukherjee V. The President, Board of Secondary Education, Bihar, Patna. It has been clearly pointed out in those cases that the final disposal of the appeal has to be made by the President, although, in the first instance, it may be heard by a person nominated by him. If the President agrees with the recommendation of the member hearing the appeal, he may not give any further hearing to the person concerned, but if he disagrees with him, rules of natural Justice would require the President to give a further hearing to the person concerned or give an opportunity to him to explain such matter as may be necessary to be explained in regard to which the President may feel inclined to differ from the views expressed by the member hearing the appeal. 3. Respondent No. 5 challenged the order of respondent No. 2 contained in Annexure 7 by filing C.W.J.C. 7 of 1972 in this Court. 3. Respondent No. 5 challenged the order of respondent No. 2 contained in Annexure 7 by filing C.W.J.C. 7 of 1972 in this Court. At the time of the hearing of the writ application, in view of the earlier two Bench decisions of this Court, the objection as taken before by respondent No. 2 was given up. A new objection was taken that the President alone could not hear and dispose of the appeal it had to be heard and disposed of by the whole Board of Secondary Education. I, sitting with Akbar Hussain, J. repealed this argument: and the decision is reported in Ram Niwas Pandey v. State of Bihar. The decision of this Court was given on August 7. 1972. It is stated in paragraph 5 of this writ application that Sri A.P. Srivastava, the President of the Board, fell ill and was hospitalised for some time. He took leave and was on leave. Sri S.N. Mishra, Deputy Secretary, Education Department, Government of Bihar, was made to officiate as President of the Board during the absence on leave of Sri Srivastava. Sri Mishra (respondent No. 3), during his period of officiation, passed the order dated 17.11.1972 communicated to the Managing Committee of the School by letter dated 26.11.1972. The impugned order of the officiating President of the Board, respondent No.3, is contained in Annexure 8. In this order, it is surprising to find that respondent No. 3 stated that his predecessor, the then President, had decided to hear the appeal himself once again and had fixed 20.4.1972 for the said purpose. He was also conscious of the fact that the objection of respondent No. 5 that the appeal should not be heard further had failed, yet it is curious to find that without hearing the Managing Committee and without issuing any notice to it, respondent No.3 took the view: "I find that this report is quite exhaustive in which the facts and circumstances of the case have been carefully analysed and the respective versions of the two sides given a balanced and judicious consideration. To me, therefore, a fresh hearing in the matter does not seem to be necessary and I think the appeal can very well be disposed of on the basis of the findings given by the Enquiring Officer." 4. To say the least, it was not quite legitimate and proper for respondent no. To me, therefore, a fresh hearing in the matter does not seem to be necessary and I think the appeal can very well be disposed of on the basis of the findings given by the Enquiring Officer." 4. To say the least, it was not quite legitimate and proper for respondent no. 3 to drop the matter of further hearing of the appeal when once a view had been taken by his predecessor that the matter had to be heard further. The proceeding under rules 16 and 17 of the Rules is a Judicial proceeding. The act of respondent No.2 in directing the further hearing of the appeal by him was a Judicial act. The said order or action could not be reviewed even by respondent No. 2, much less by respondent No. 3. There was no power to review after once the President had decided to hear the appeal further. It was always open to the President, either respondent No. 2 or respondent No. 3, to hear the appeal further and agree with the report contained in Annexure 6 or not to agree with it. But without hearing the matter further and without any notice to the Managing Committee, it is plain that the action of respondent No. 3, in dropping the matter of further hearing of the appeal was wholly illegal and improper. The impugned order contained in Annexure 8 clearly suffers from a serious infirmity in law and has got to be quashed. 5. During the hearing of this writ application, learned counsel for respondent No.5, drew our attention to the new rules framed by the State Government under section 8 (1) of the Act and published in the Bihar Gazette, Part II, dated 25.10.1972, at page 2276. Learned Counsel submitted that in view of the new rules, the old rules 16 and 17 are no longer in force. The appeal, therefore, has got to be heard now by the Divisional Appeal Committee appointed under the new rules. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted, in reply, that these new rules framed under section 8 (1) of the Act have not yet been laid before each House of the Bihar Legislature, as required by Sub-Section (3) of Section 8. The rules, therefore, are not yet effective. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted, in reply, that these new rules framed under section 8 (1) of the Act have not yet been laid before each House of the Bihar Legislature, as required by Sub-Section (3) of Section 8. The rules, therefore, are not yet effective. In the alternative, he submitted that the appeal filed by respondent No. 5 has got to be finally disposed of by the President, Board of Secondary Education; and cannot be transferred to or heard by the Divisional Appeal Committee, even if such a Committee has been appointed under the new rules. 6. Since facts concerning the new rules were not placed before us on any affidavit, we are not sure as to whether the rules are effective or not and whether they have been laid before each House of the Bihar Legislature in accordance with Section 8 (3) of the Act. If they have not been so laid, it is plain that the rules have not got the statutory force yet, because they may be rejected by the Legislature; they may be modified by the Legislature. Even assuming that they have been laid before each House of the Bihar Legislature and are effective, it is manifest that no provision has been made under the rules as to how pending appeals filed under the old rules will be disposed of. There may be many such appeals pending and the one such filed by respondent No. 5 will become pending on the quashing of the order of respondent No. 3 contained in Annexure 8. 7. In Saligram Singh V. King Emperor Meredith, J. (as he then was) with whom Varma, J. agreed, had pointed out: "statutory rules if validly made within the powers conferred by the Act must be regarded as part of the Act itself and made with the full authority of the legislature. The statutory rules must be held to be a part of the parent Act, and can do anything it can do if within its scope. Having regard to section 3 of the Defence of India Act any provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure inconsistent with anything in the Act or Rules must, therefore, be regarded as repealed. " Statutory rules, therefore, can have the force of repealing the Act of the Legislature, because they are part of the parent Act. Having regard to section 3 of the Defence of India Act any provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure inconsistent with anything in the Act or Rules must, therefore, be regarded as repealed. " Statutory rules, therefore, can have the force of repealing the Act of the Legislature, because they are part of the parent Act. That being so, there is no difficulty in invoking the provision of law contained in section 8 of the Bihar and Orissa General Clauses Act, 1917. The relevant portion of the section reads as follows: "Where any Bihar and Orissa Act or Bihar Act repeals any enactment hitherto made, or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not :- (e) after any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty forfeiture, or punishment as aforesaid, and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, contained or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act had not been passed." The legal proceeding, started under the old rules have got to be continued and brought to conclusion in accordance with them. The appeal which is to be filed before the Divisional Appeal Committee is not directly from the order of the Managing Committee. The Managing Committee has to take approval of the District Appeal Committee and then an appeal could lie to the Divisional Appeal Committee. The appeal filed by respondent No. 5 before the President, Board of Secondary Education, it is obvious, cannot be transferred to and heard by the Divisional Appeal Committee. In absence of any provision in the new rules, it is not possible to do so. And if recourse to law or the principle of law as engrafted in section 8 of the Bihar and Orissa General Clauses Act were not to be taken, the logical conclusion would be that there will be no competent authority to hear and dispose of the appeal filed by respondent No. 5. The appeal may; in that view of the matter, become in fructuous. Such a view, it goes without saying, will be unreasonably absurd to take and cannot be taken. Reference in this connection may also be made to the decision of the Mysore High Court in Syed Mustafa Mohammad Ghouse V. State of Mysore. 8. The appeal may; in that view of the matter, become in fructuous. Such a view, it goes without saying, will be unreasonably absurd to take and cannot be taken. Reference in this connection may also be made to the decision of the Mysore High Court in Syed Mustafa Mohammad Ghouse V. State of Mysore. 8. For the reasons stated above, this writ application is allowed, the order of respondent No. 3 contained in Annexure 8 is set aside by grant of a writ of certiorari and the President, Board of Secondary Education, whoever may be the incumbent of that office, is directed to hear further the appeal filed by respondent No. 5 and dispose of it in accordance with rules 16 and 17 of the Rules. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. S. K. Jha, J. I agree. Case remanded.