Judgment H.L.Agrawal, J. 1. This second appeal is by the defendants first party. The plaintiffs instituted a suit for a declaration that the deed of conditional sale dated 10-11-1951 executed by Bankey Singh (defendant No. 6), their uncle, and a deed of sale dated 17-3-1952 executed by one Ghanshyam alias Ghanraj Singh, uncle of their father, were not binding on them. In order to appreciate the facts, it is necessary to give a short genealogy of the family: OJHA SINGH | _____________________|_________________________ | | Buplal Singh Banjit Singh | | | Ghanraj Singh |___________________________ | | ____________________________|_______________________ | | Bhatu Singh Karu Singh | (Deft. No 7) Bankey Singh | (Deft.No.6) | | ______________________________| | _____________________|__________________________________ | | | Baleshwar Siggh Bambalak Singh Jagdish Singh (Plff. No. 1) (Plff No.2) (Plff No.3) 2 The case of the plaintiffs is that Ojha Singh had two sons.-- Ruplal Singh and Ranjit Singh. Ranjit Singh died leaving behid his son Ghanraj. Ghanraj Singh became a Bairagi Sadhu more than thirty years ago after renouncing the world and was known as Ghanshyam Das. Ruplal Singh had two sons-- Bhatu Singh and Kara Singh (defendant No. 7) Bhatu Singh had a son Bankey Singh (defendant No. 6). Plaintiffs are the sons of Karu Singh. According to the plaintiffs, Bankey Singh also became a Sadhu arid was known as Basudeo Ramanuj Das and lived at Jagganathpuri. In this way, according to the plaintiffs case, the entire family properties came in possession of the plaintiffs and their father Karu Singh. The plaintiffs at that time were minors. It is alleged that defendants Nos. 1 to 4, who are residents of the same village, with a view to grab the family properties of the plaintiffs, created a false document by bringing the aforesaid Ghanraj Singh and Bankey Singh in their collusion, although on account of renouncing the world, they had ceased to have any interest in the family properties and got a deed of conditional sale (Ext D) executed in their favour by Bankey Singh on 10-11-1951 in respect of some of the family properties described in Schedule 2 of the plaint in the name of defendant No. 5 for a nominal consideration of Rs. 1,000/-. It is further alleged that another collusive document, namely a deed of sale (Ext. 1,000/-. It is further alleged that another collusive document, namely a deed of sale (Ext. D/1) was got executed on 17-3-1952 by Ghanshyam Das with respect to some other family properties described in Schedule 3 of the plaint in favour of defendants Nos. 1 to 4. In order to legalise the aforesaid two deeds, Ghanraj was made to execute a deed of gift (Ext. B) in favour of Bankey Singh on 19-3-1952 in respect of his half share in the family properties. According to the plaintiffs, the aforesaid documents did not confer any right or title to the vendees and the same remained inoperative. On 18-2-1957, defendant No. 5 executed a deed of Entkalnama (Ext. A) in favour of the female members of the family of defendants Nos. 1 to 4 with respect to the properties covered by the deed of conditional sale in his favour. 3. After completing the aforesaid fraudulent and collusive transactions, defendants Nos. 1 to 4 got a fraudulent Title Partition Suit No. 22 of 1952 filed by Bankey Singh against the plaintiffs and their father Kara Singh for partition of the family properties claiming -/12/- annas share in the properties; -/8/- annas on the basis of the deed of gift executed by Ghanraj Singh and -/4/-annas on the basis of his own right. A guardian-ad-litem was appointed for the plaintiffs, who were then minors, in the said suit, but he did not take any interest or step in the suit on behalf of the minors. 4. The defence of Karu Singh in the said suit was that there was already a previous partition in the family and that the deed of gift executed in favour of Bankey Singh by Ghanraj Singh was of no effect and that the plaintiff of that suit had no right to bring the suit as he had become a Sadhu which amounted to his civil death. The said suit was dismissed by the trial Court on a finding that there was a previous partition in the family. The trial Court further held that although Ghanraj had become a Sadhu, Bankey Singh (the plaintiff of that suit) had not become Sadhu. An appeal was filed by Bankey Singh and the lower appellate Court allowed the appeal and decreed the suit holding that Bankey Singh had -/12/- annas share. The trial Court further held that although Ghanraj had become a Sadhu, Bankey Singh (the plaintiff of that suit) had not become Sadhu. An appeal was filed by Bankey Singh and the lower appellate Court allowed the appeal and decreed the suit holding that Bankey Singh had -/12/- annas share. A second appeal No. 1663/54 was filed by Karu Singh in this Court, but the appeal was dismissed. 5. Subsequently, the present plaintiffs filed Title Suit No. 44 of 1960 for a declaration that the decree passed in the aforesaid Title Suit No. 22 of 1952 was fraudulent and not binding upon them. In this suit, a compromise was entered into by the parties on 27-6-1961, by which the decree passed in the earlier Title Suit No. 22 of 1952 was held to be void. Soon after the aforesaid compromise, the present suit was filed by the plaintiffs on -16-12-1961 for the reliefs stated above on the ground that the deeds in question had cast a shadow upon their title and it was necessary for them to get the same declared as fraudulent, collusive and not binding upon them. In the plaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the documents executed by Bankey Singh and Ghanraj Singh, who had renounced the world, were inoperative and fraudulent and the decree passed in Title Suit No. 22 of 1952 was also not binding on them. Besides impleading defendants Nos. 1 to 4, the plaintiffs have also impleaded Pra-tap Narain Singh as defendant No. 5 in whose name the document of conditional sale was taken, Bankey Singh is impleaded as defendant No. 6 and their father Karu Singh as defendant No, 7. 6. The suit was contested only by defendants Nos. 1 to 4, who are defendants 1st party in the suit. According to them Ghanraj or Bankey never became Sadhus and, therefore, the documents executed by them were fully legal and binding upon the plaintiffs and their father and they derived perfect and valid title under the transactions in question and were coming in possession of the lands conveyed to them and were recognised as tenants by the landlords, who were granting receipts to them. It was further asserted that the decree passed in Title Suit No. 22 of 1952 was legal and valid and the interest of the plaintiffs was fully safeguarded and that the compromise decree passed in the subsequent Title Suit No. 44 of I960 was collusive and not binding upon them. A written statement was also filed by Bankey Singh in support of the case of the defendants first party. 7. The trial Court came to the following findings: (i) Ghanshayam Das and Bankey Singh (Basudeo Ramanuj Das) did not become Sadhus and did not renounce the world; (ii) The deed of sale and the deed of conditional sale were genuine, valid and operative; (iii) Defendants first party acquired valid title under the aforesaid deeds: (iv) The suit was barred by the principles of res judicata and limitation. The suit was, accordingly, dismissed. 8. On appeal by the plaintiffs, the lower appellate Court has decreed the suit and reversed the findings of the trial Court and came to the conclusion that Ghanraj Singh and Bankey Singh. became Sadhus and renounced the world and, therefore, the documents executed by them were inoperative and invalid in law and not binding on the plaintiffs. It further held that the suit was neither barred by res judicata nor by limitation because the plaintiffs hud no knowledge of the documents in question beyond the period of limitation. It also held that the plaintiffs had subsisting title in the properties in suit. 9. Mr. Prem Lall on behalf of the appellants has challenged the findings of the lower appellate Court and has raised the following contentions for my consideration; 1. The decision in Title Suit No. 22 of 1952 that Ghanraj Singh and Bankey Singh did not become Sadhus and did not sever their connections with their family properties would amount to a res judicta in the present suit and the effect of the said decision could not be taken away by a compromise decree in the subsequent Title Suit No. 44 of 1960, as the compromise was collusive; 2. The statements made by Ghanraj Singh and Bankey Singh, after having parted with their interests in the family properties long ago, would not be binding upon the defendants first party; and 3.The plaintiffs suit was barred under Section 7 of the Limitation Act, 1908, inasmuch as the father of the plaintiffs, who had a right to institute the suit, not having brought the suit within a period of six years from the dates of the execution of the documents in question, it would amount to giving of a discharge of this right, if any, in favour of the present plaintiffs. 10. In support of the first contention, learned counsel submitted that the decision in the earlier title suit, in which a contested decree was passed and findings were arrived at after consideration of the various materials on the record, would still govern the present suit, inasmuch as a decision given by a Court cannot be brought to naught by the act of the parties themselves by a contrivance such as an agreement or compromise, contrary to the findings in the earlier suit. Several decisions were cited to stress the proposition that a compromise decree is merely an agreement between the parties themselves and is not a decision by the Court, and that merely sets the seal of the Court on the agreement of the parties and the Court does riot decide anything; nor it can be said that the decision of the Court was implicit in it. And as the principles of its judicata apply only to a decision given by the Court, therefore, the earlier decision given in Title Suit No. 22 of 1952 would still be res judicata in the present suit with respect to the findings arrived at in the same. 11. This question has been considered in two Supreme Court decisions. In Shankar Sitaram Sontakke V/s. Balkrishna Sitaram Sontakke, AIR 1954 SC 352 , it has been clearly laid down that a consent decree is as much binding upon the parties thereto as a decree passed by invitum. A compromise having been found not to be vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation, misunderstanding or mistake, the decree passed thereon had the binding force of res judicata. A compromise having been found not to be vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation, misunderstanding or mistake, the decree passed thereon had the binding force of res judicata. In Sailendra Narayan Bhanja Deo V/s. The State of Orissa, AIR 1956 SC 346 , it was clearly held that a judgment by consent of the Court is as effective an estoppel between the parties as a judgement whereby the Court exercises its mind in a contested case. In this case, the plaintiff had lost in the trial Court on the question of his title and a compromise decree was passed in a First Appeal by the Patna High Court. The plaintiff in that suit subsequently tiled another suit and wanted to take a different position from that taken by him under the compromise decree. So far applying the theory of estoppel is concerned, there is no difficulty at all as the authorities are unanimous that a compromise between the parties to a suit is binding upon them in any subsequent proceeding and the stand taken by any of the parties to the compromise in the earlier proceeding cannot be varied in any subsequent proceeding. The facts of the present case, however, are different in this respect that the decision of a contested suit has been varied by a compromise decree arrived at between the parties subsequently. The question arises as to whether it was open to the parties to do that 12. I do not find that any distinction can be made in either of the situation. In the subsequent suit the plaintiffs plea was that their guardian did not protect their interest properly and, therefore, the earlier judgment was vitiated and not binding on them. By the compromise, this plea was accepted, and as is evident, the findings in the earlier suit not being separable are as much binding upon the majors as on the minors in the said suit and, could be validly set aside in the subsequent suit. A question then arises as to whether, instead of taking a decision on contest from the Court to the effect that the earlier decree was vitiated, was it open to the defendants themselves, instead of fighting a litigation, to suffer a consent decree admitting the infirmity in the earlier suit. A question then arises as to whether, instead of taking a decision on contest from the Court to the effect that the earlier decree was vitiated, was it open to the defendants themselves, instead of fighting a litigation, to suffer a consent decree admitting the infirmity in the earlier suit. If it is not permissible for the parties to do so in a subsequent proceeding, it should also not be permissible for them to do that even in the same proceeding at any subsequent stage after one judgment as it can very well be argued on the same reasonings that if the trial Court has either dismissed or decreed the suit on contest, those findings cannot be upset or undone by the action of the parties themselves by entering into a compromise at an appellate stage. In the Supreme Court decisions referred to above, there is enough foundation for rejecting the contention of Mr. Prem Lall. It might be open to a person to get a compromise decree set aside on the allegation that it was obtained by fraud or collusion as contemplated under Sec. 44 of the Evidence Act, but unless that is done, it has got all the force of a binding effect and of a decree passed by a competent Court. In this view of the matter, the decision in the earlier Title Suit No. 22 of 1952 no longer existed and for all purposes it will be deemed to have been set aside by the compromise decree passed in Title Suit No. 44 of 1960 and, therefore, it was open for the Courts below to decide independently and arrive at their own findings on the question raised before them. 13. 13. The next contention raised by learned counsel for the appellant that the admissions made by Bankey Singh and Ghanraj Singh in the said compromise petition in Title Suit No. 44 of 1960 would not be binding upon the defendants first party, inasmuch as Bankey Singh and Ghanraj Singh had made those statements at a time when they had already parted with their interest in the suit properties, is also of no avail to the appellants, inasmuch as the compromise decree has not been relied upon the Court of appeal below as an admission of the makers of those statements, but only for the purpose of testing the effect of the compromise decree on the question of res judicata of the earlier decree in Title Suit No. 22 of 1952. 14. The lower appellate Court took the view that by the compromise decree passed in Title Suit No. 44 of 1960, the decree in the earlier suit was set aside and, therefore, that decree did not exist for application of the principles of res judicata. It has further held that it could not be shown by the contesting defendants that the said compromise decree was either collusive or fraudulent. Thereafter, it has proceeded to examine the most important issue in this case as to whether Ghanraj Singh and Bankey Singh had renounced the world and, therefore, had no saleable interest in the properties covered by Exts. D and D-1. The lower appellate Court on a consideration of the evidence of the various witnesses examined on behalf of the plaintiffs and the defendants and on an appreciation of the various documentary evidence relating to the dealings of the family properties, has recorded a finding that the aforesaid two persons Ghanraj Singh and Bankey Singh had renounced the world, ceasing all their connections with their family and their properties and that all the ceremonies, including Brija Home Sradh were performed. This finding is essentially a finding of fact, supported by sufficient materials on the record in this case and, could not be challenged in this Court in a second appeal. This finding is essentially a finding of fact, supported by sufficient materials on the record in this case and, could not be challenged in this Court in a second appeal. The disputed transactions are of a period even prior to the institution of the Title Suit No. 22 of 1952 and it cannot be said that the appellants were led to any belief or acted on the basis of the judgment of the said title suit which would attract the principles of estoppel or the like against the transferors. 15. Now remains the last point urged on behalf of the appellants, namely, the question of limitation. Learned counsel in support of the proposition has cited a series of decisions, namely, Sarda Prasad V/s. Lala Jamuna Prasad, AIR 1961 SC 1074 ; Madhusudan Mohapatra V/s. Gobind Sabat, AIR 1965 Orissa 54 and Jagdish Narain V/s. Bishun Datt, AIR 1941 Oudh 165. In all the above cases it has been laid down that the word "discharge" occurring in Section 7 of the Limitation Act includes discharge of a right to sue and also the right for recovery of property and was not merely confined to monetary claims. In all the cases referred to by the learned counsel, the rights which were held to be barred on account of the application of the theory of discharge were the rights which were necessary to be avoided by a suit. That is, the transactions in question were not void but voidable, and an action within the period of limitation was necessary to be brought by the person to whom the right of relief was available and against whom also the period of limitation had started to run. In the instant case, however, in view of the finding of the Court of appeal below that Bankey Singh and Ghanraj Singh had become Bairagi Vaishnava Sadhus after performing all the rituals and ceremonies and after complete renunciation of the wordly interest, the transaction of the conditional sale dated 10-11-1951 (Ext. D) and the sale dated 17-3-1952 (Ext. D-l) executed subsequent to that, were void ab initio and, therefore, it was not necessary for Kara Singh, the father of the plaintiffs, to institute any suit within a period of six years and, therefore, the present suit is not barred by limitation. 16. The Court of appeal below has also recorded a finding that the aforesaid two documents (Exts. D-l) executed subsequent to that, were void ab initio and, therefore, it was not necessary for Kara Singh, the father of the plaintiffs, to institute any suit within a period of six years and, therefore, the present suit is not barred by limitation. 16. The Court of appeal below has also recorded a finding that the aforesaid two documents (Exts. D and D-1) were also without consideration and inoperative, and in view of this finding the defendants 1st party did not derive any legal title in the suit land, and on this ground also the appeal should fail. 17. All the points raised on behalf of the appellants having been found to have no substance, this appeal fails. It is, accordingly dismissed with costs.