Judgement GEORGE VADAKKEL, J. - The husband whose petition under S. 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 (25 of 1955) was dismissed by the District Court is fee appellant before us. He sought a decree for judicial separation on the ground of desertion by the respondent-wife. While the appellant in his petition says that the marriage was on 18-4-1944. the respondent in her counter avers that it was on 6th medom 1121 corresponding to 19-4-1946. However, it is the common case that the respondent was a minor on the date of marriage. The parties follow Hindu Mitakshara Law and the marriage wag in accordance with Hindu Sastras. According to the respondent she was taken to the appellant's ancestral home at Porkalam on 8th Edavom 1121 (22-5-1946) and the nuptial ceremony was conducted there on 11th Dhanu 1124 (25-12-48). The appellant was employed in the Income-tax Department in 1947, and thereafter he was working in several places away from Porkalam. However, he did not take his wife along with him to any of these stations. 2. The appellant's case is that since he was getting only a very meager salary which was insufficient to maintain a home, he desired and directed the respondent to live in his ancestral home where his parents and brothers were residing. According to the appellant he used to go home every weekend and whenever he could obtain leave. It is averred that his intention was to make file ancestral home at Porkalam their matrimonial home. The appellant further avers that the respondent steadfastly and continuously refused to live there. This, according to the appellant, constitutes desertion as contemplated by Section 10(1)(a) of the Act. The respondent stoutly denies these allegations. She asserts that from and after 13-5-1124 (27-12-1948), she was permanently residing in the appellant's ancestral home at Porkalam along with his parents, and that she had gone to her parental home to spend a few days there only occasionally and that with the permission of title appellant's father (P.W. 4). It is also her case that the appellant was visiting his ancestral home only very rarely. The main question that arises for consideration is as to which of thaw two versions is factually true. 3. Ext. D-4 series are letters sent by appellant's fattier (P.W. 4) to the respondent's father. It is clear from Ext. It is also her case that the appellant was visiting his ancestral home only very rarely. The main question that arises for consideration is as to which of thaw two versions is factually true. 3. Ext. D-4 series are letters sent by appellant's fattier (P.W. 4) to the respondent's father. It is clear from Ext. D-1(a) which is the earliest of the letters and is dated 3-2-1128(19-9-1952), that the marital life of the appellant and respondent had become strained and unhappy acme time prior to that. P.W. 4 in his letter expresses his anguish and helplessness over the conduct of his son, the appellant. The tone of the letter is even apologetic. P.W. 4 has therein written that all attempts by himself and his friends in respect of his son were futile and that he is very much grieved over the unhappiness and sufferings of the respondent, as well as over the worry of her parents. Ext D-1(b) is a letter dated 23-4-1957. Here P.W. 4 refers to the respondent as having stated that he (P.W. 4) seems to be not anxious about his son, as otherwise he would have persuaded the appellant to come home. P.W. 4 in that letter reiterated his helplessness to persuade his son to visit the ancestral house. In that letter P.W. 4 writes, that he met his son at Ernakulam, and with tears in his eyes requested the appellant to go home and to pacify his mother. Ex. D-1(b) proceeds to say that though the appellant assured P.W. 4 that he (appellant) would be going home, he failed to go. Ext. D-1(c) is another letter by P.W. 4 to the respondent's father, and is dated 6-3-1987. That letter shows as to how much P.W. 4 and respondent's parents were grieved over the respondent's sufferings and heartburns. These letters written in 1952-1957 and 1967 also reveal that the appellant's parents were very affectionate towards the respondent and that they were really worried over the conduct (whatever that conduct be) of their son, the appellant before us. 4. The father of the appellant when examined as P.W. 4 has stated that he tried very much to get the respondent and appellant to reside together, but he was unsuccessful, and that he cannot say as to who was at fault. 4. The father of the appellant when examined as P.W. 4 has stated that he tried very much to get the respondent and appellant to reside together, but he was unsuccessful, and that he cannot say as to who was at fault. He has further deposed that the respondent has never stated that she will not reside in the ancestral home, and that she was always affectionate and respectful towards him and other Inmates of the house. He has also stated that he had never objected to the respondent going to her parental home, and that on return of the respondent from her parental home she was always gladly welcomed and received. The respondent as C. P. W. 1 has stated that she has not stayed for more than a week or 10 days in her parental house, when she occasionally visited her parents, it has also come out from her evidence that she had participated in almost all the functions in her husband's ancestral house. She also swears to the fact that she had often asked the appellant to take her also with him to the places where he was working, but he never cared to do so, pleading his inability to maintain a home on the very meagre salary he was drawing. Even when examined in court she has stated that she is willing to reside wherever the appellant directs. The respondent has further deposed that she went to her parental home for the last time only in Kumbhom 1141 and that was for nursing her father who was unwell She then stayed there for more than 10 days as her father had not recovered from the illness. According to her it was during this time that the appellant started the proceedings. 5. In the light of the evidence discussed above we are unable to come to the conclusion that the respondent declined and refused to live in the appellant's ancestral house at Porkalam with his parents and brothers, (Whether refusal by wife to live, not with her husband but with her husband's parents, even if established will amount to desertion, is another question altogether and we need not in, this case deal with that aspect). On the other hand, the documentary evidence consisting of Ext D-1 series letters, and the evidence of P.W. 4 supports the respondent's case that she was residing in the appellant's ancestral house at Porkalam respecting the wishes and obeying the directions of the appellant, though she very much wanted and desired to be, as a dutiful wife, with Trim in her rightful place wherever he was working. The evidence of P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 is not sufficient to dislodge this conclusion. These witnesses only say that the respondent was not present during the Shastipoorthy celebrations of the appellant's father (which fact is admitted by the respondent also as C. P. W. 1) and that she did not attend the marriage of the appellant's brother. As C. P. W. 1 the respondent has stated that she did attend the appellant's brother's marriage P.W. 2 in his cross-examination said that he did not go to Trichur where the marriage ceremony was conducted. P.W. 3 when cross-examined said that he went to Trichur for the wedding, that he did not see the respondent there, that he thereupon asked P.W. 4 about it, and that P.W. 4 told him that the respondent was not present However, it is surprising that P.W. 4 when examined was not asked anything about this. The Shastipoorthy functions were in 1961 April, and the marriage was in 1961 November. P.W. 4 in his deposition said that the respondent left his house only towards the close of 1964. The evidence of P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 is not therefore of any help to the appellant. There remains only the evidence of the appellant as P.W. 1. In the light of the evidence consisting of Ext. D-1 series letters, and the oral evidence already discussed, we do not think that any reliance can be placed on his statements in the box. In matrimonial causes the burden is heavy upon the petitioner to prove the matrimonial offence beyond all reasonable doubt. It is also well, settled that the court will not as a rule act upon uncorroborated evidence of the petitioner to find guilt of the respondent. In Bipinchandra Shah v. Prabhavathi. AIR 1957 SC 176 at P. 184. In matrimonial causes the burden is heavy upon the petitioner to prove the matrimonial offence beyond all reasonable doubt. It is also well, settled that the court will not as a rule act upon uncorroborated evidence of the petitioner to find guilt of the respondent. In Bipinchandra Shah v. Prabhavathi. AIR 1957 SC 176 at P. 184. Sinha, J. speaking for the court said :- "It is also well settled that in proceedings for divorce the plaintiff must prove the offence of desertion, like any other matrimonial offence, beyond all reasonable doubt Hence though corroboration is not required as an absolute rule of law the courts insist upon corroborative evidence unless its absence is accounted for to the satisfaction of the court. In this connection the following observations of Lord Goddard, C.J., in the case of Lawson V- Lawson, 1955-1 All ER 341 at p. 342 (A) may be referred to :- "These cases are not cases in which corroboration is required as a matter of law. It is required as a matter of precaution'." 6. In Rohinikumari v. Narendra Singh. AIR 1972 SC 459 the Supreme Court again held that, "The burden under the section (Section 10 (1) (a) of the Hindu Marriage Act) was on the husband (petitioner) to establish that the wife (respondent) had deserted him, for a continuous period of not leas than two years preceding the presentation of the petition." (Para 4 at p. 460.) Having anxiously considered the evidence in this case, and bearing in mind the rule of evidence laid down in the aforesaid Supreme Court decisions, we are of the view that the appellant has not succeeded in establishing that the respondent refused to live In the appellant's ancestral home at Porkalam. We therefore hold that no ground warranting a decree for judicial separation has been made out by the appellant. We are of the view that the respondent had at no time any intention to put an end to the marital relation and cohabitation. She had at no time 'animus deserendi' and as such the appellant cannot invoke Section 10(1)(a) of the Act. 7. Mr. T.N. Subramonia Iyer, the learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that the marital union between the appellant and the respondent has completely broken down and that therefore we should exercise our discretion in favour of the appellant. She had at no time 'animus deserendi' and as such the appellant cannot invoke Section 10(1)(a) of the Act. 7. Mr. T.N. Subramonia Iyer, the learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that the marital union between the appellant and the respondent has completely broken down and that therefore we should exercise our discretion in favour of the appellant. Section 10(1) of the Act numerates the several grounds upon which either party to the marriage may seek a decree for judicial separation. This section has to be read with Section 23 of the Act. This latter section rules out exercise of any discretion by Court. The court can grant a decree for judicial separation only on being satisfied that one or the other of the grounds mentioned in clauses (a) to (f) of Sub-Section (11 of Section 10 exists. The court should further be satisfied that conditions enumerated in Section 23 also exist. Then and then alone the court gets jurisdiction to grant a decree for judicial separation. This is clear from the concluding part of Section 23 which is as follows :- "then, and in such a case, but not otherwise, the court shall decree such relief accordingly." In view of the provisions of the Act discussed above there is no question of exercise of any. discretion by this Court. 8. No other point was raised before us. We dismiss this appeal, but in the circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.