JUDGMENT : D.M. Sen, J. 1. We shall dispose of by this common judgment appeal Nos. 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 and 46 of 1966 against the judgment and award passed by the learned Member, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Gauhati in Misc. Case Nos. 29 to 33 of 1964. The first five appeals are by the State of Assam while the last one, namely, appeal No. 46/66 has been preferred by Mr. Lakheswar Sharma, one of the claimants. 2. Before we deal with other points and enter into the merit of these appeals, we shall first deal with the preliminary submissions made by Mr. K. Sarma, learned Counsel appearing for the State of Assam, regarding the maintainability of the compensation applications, u/s 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). Mr. Sarma submits that the provisions of Section 80 of the CPC have not been complied with before the applications were preferred and on that ground alone they should be dismissed as not being maintainable in law. We are, therefore, required to examine whether the provisions of Section 80 of the CPC are required to be complied with in the matter of an application u/s 110-A of the Act. Section 80 of the CPC deals with the institution of a suit. The question, therefore, that falls for determination is whether the compensation application can be said to be a suit within the meaning of Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We may here look into Section 4 of the CPC and examine whether the CPC is at all applicable to claims under Sections 110 to 110-F of the Act. We find that u/s 110-C, only certain provisions of the CPC have been made applicable to a proceeding before a Claims Tribunal. Where any special law or a particular procedure is provided, the provisions of the CPC are to that extent excluded and as we have already stated, Section 80 of the CPC primarily deals with institution of a suit. We are fortified in taking this view by the decision of Khairunnissa A.K. Saddiki and Ors. v. Municipal Corporation, Bombay and Ors. Where any special law or a particular procedure is provided, the provisions of the CPC are to that extent excluded and as we have already stated, Section 80 of the CPC primarily deals with institution of a suit. We are fortified in taking this view by the decision of Khairunnissa A.K. Saddiki and Ors. v. Municipal Corporation, Bombay and Ors. 1966 A.C.J. 37, where their lordships have held that a Claims Tribunal is not a Court and that applications u/s 110 for compensation before such Claims Tribunal are not suits and that the proceedings before these Tribunals are not governed by the statutory provisions applicable to Civil Courts. We are of the opinion that Section 80 of the CPC is not attracted to an application made u/s 110-A of the Act, since such application is not a plaint on the presentation of which a suit can be held to have been instituted. 3. Mr. K. Sarma, the learned Counsel appearing for the State has made a further submission that even if it be held that the driver was negligent in driving the vehicle and that his state of drunkenness led to such negligence, the State cannot be made liable for such act of negligence. We are therefore, required to consider whether a master is liable for his servant's negligence in the course of employment and if so, if there are any limitations to such liability. It is now well settled that the careless acts of a servant or even the mistake of a servant in course of employment will fasten vicarious liability for consequences thereof on the master. Even a wilful wrong of a servant will fasten such vicarious responsibility on the master. Again, where a servant does an act which he is only conditionally authorised to do, without or beyond the conditions, the employer is liable for the wrongful act AIR 1945 168 (Privy Council) In the instant case, the driver, in course of his employment under the master, caused the accident; and the mere fact that he had consumed liquor, which would possibly have incurred the displeasure of the master if the master had known of it or was even beyond the terms of conduct specified for him, would not exempt the master from his vicarious liability. The master to decide is whether the driver was acting in course of his employment or was acting on his own. The master to decide is whether the driver was acting in course of his employment or was acting on his own. In the instant case, the driver of the vehicle was certainly in the course of the master's employment and in the discharge of his duties. Any negligence in such driving would therefore impose vicarious liability on the master. We, therefore, cannot accept the submission of Mr. Sarma that merely because the driver had consumed liquor, which contributed to his negligent driving, the master (State) would be exempted from the vicarious liability. The position would remain the same even if the consumption of liquor had been expressly forbidden by the master under the relevant conduct rules. 4. We may now briefly narrate the incident which unfortunately led to the accident and gave rise to these claims. On 16th June, 1964 while the claimants were proceeding to Shillong from Gauhati in Car No. ASE-1587 belonging to Mr. L.P. Dutta, Respondent in M.A. (F) No. 29/66, they met with an accident with a Government truck No. ASX-1306 driven on duty by an employee of the State of Assam and coming down from Shillong. As a result of the impact of the two vehicles, Mrs. Urmila Dutta (Respondent in M.A. (F) No. 26/66) Miss Lanu Dutta (Respondent in M.A. (F) No. 27/66), Mr. Gopinath Bordoloi (Respondent in M.A. (F) No. 28/66) Shri L.P. Dutta (Respondent in M.A. (F) No. 29/66) and Mr. Lakheswar Sharma (Respondent in M.A. (F) No. 30/66) sustained several injuries, which will be described later on. 5. Mr. Lakheswar Sharma preferred a claim for Rs. 1,00,000/- before the Claims Tribunal under different headings but the Claims Tribunal awarded an amount of Rs. 44,554.32 to him. Mrs. Urmila Dutta claimed compensation for a sum of Rs. 40,000/-, but the Claims Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 25,302.87. Miss Lanu Dutta claimed a sum of Rs 15,000/-. But the Claims Tribunal awarded compensation for a sum of Rs. 15,250/-. Mr. Gopinath Bordoloi, the driver of the vehicle, claimed compensation for a sum of Rs. 10,000/- but the Claims Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 7667.75. Mr. L.P. Dutta claimed compensation for a sum of Rs. 77,000/-, but he was awarded compensation by the Claims Tribunal for a sum of Rs. 24,104.98. 6. As we have already stated earlier, Mr. Mr. Gopinath Bordoloi, the driver of the vehicle, claimed compensation for a sum of Rs. 10,000/- but the Claims Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 7667.75. Mr. L.P. Dutta claimed compensation for a sum of Rs. 77,000/-, but he was awarded compensation by the Claims Tribunal for a sum of Rs. 24,104.98. 6. As we have already stated earlier, Mr. Lakheswar Sharma has filed an appeal against the award by M.A. (F) No. 46/66, whereas the other claimants did not prefer any appeal against the compensations, as awarded to them by the Claims Tribunal. We shall, therefore, first deal with the facts of M.A. (F) 30/66 and M.A. (F) 46/66, that is to say relating to the claim of Mr. Lakheswar Sharma. 7. We shall first examine whether there is at all any negligence on the part of the driver of the vehicle ASX-1306, giving rise to any vicarious liability on the State Government. 8. P.W. 1, Lakheswar Sharma, stated in his evidence before the Claims Tribunal: After crossing the army Hospital and near the mile post in between 15/2 and 15/3 I saw a fully loaded truck coming down towards Gauhati at a speed of about 34 to 40 miles. That part of the road was straight and open. The car was proceeding at a speed of about 25 miles in that portion. The truck was coming unsteadily. The number of the truck was ASX-1306. On seeing the truck the driver of our car took the car to the extreme left of the pucca portion of the road which was about 22 ft. wide and further the driver just stopped the car. At the very moment the truck came down on the car and dashed against the car with violent force and momentum severally damaging the car. P.W. 2, Mr. Nripendra Kumar Chakravorty who was the officer-in-charge of Nongpoo Police Station, stated in his evidence: The Driver was prosecuted u/s 117 Motor Vehicles Act as he was found driving under influence of liquor. P.W. 3, Ganesh Chandra Phukan, who was the Secretary to the Government of Assam, Medical Department, stated in his evidence before the Claims Tribunal: The Driver was badly drunk and struggled to get out and run away when the jeep stopped. However the Excise peons kept him secured. P.W. 5, Mr. Sitanath Sarma, stated in his evidence: Simultaneously I saw a car coming from Gauhati side. However the Excise peons kept him secured. P.W. 5, Mr. Sitanath Sarma, stated in his evidence: Simultaneously I saw a car coming from Gauhati side. The truck was driven at a high speed and in an unsteady manner, but the car was going slowly. The truck was going on the wrong side. The truck knocked the car, which was standing on the extreme left of the road. As a result the car was pushed back to a distance of about 20 ft., when the car struck into a boulder on the road. P.W. 7, Karunakar Dowerah, who was the Assistant Surgeon in-charge of Burnihat State Dispensary, stated in evidence: On being asked by police I examined one Franklin Laloo at 4 p.m. that day. I found him under the influence of liquor. There was smell of alcohol in his mouth and breath. He could not walk steadily, speech was slurred and pupils dilated. He was struggling with the police when the police wanted to take him inside the dispensary for examination. Our attention has also been drawn to a sketch map at Ext. A and we find that the place of impact of Government vehicle No. ASX-1306 with Car No. ASE-1587, in which the claimants were travelling, was on the left of the road, as facing towards Shillong. The car of the claimants after the collision was pushed back to the extreme left of the road on its kutcha portion. It is therefore apparent that the collision took place on the wrong side of the road so far as ASX-1306 was concerned. Also from the evidence, as discussed above, it is clear beyond any doubt whatsoever that the driver of ASX-1306 was in a drunken state and that collision took place on that part of the road where the car No. ASE-1587 had its right of way. Therefore, there is no room for any doubt that the accident in question was caused by the negligence of the driver of the Government vehicle in question, and that the State of Assam was vicariously liable for the consequences of such negligence. 9. We shall now deal with the amounts of compensation claimed by Mr. Lakhes war Sharma and granted by the Claims Tribunal and determine whether these are fair or require any reassessment or modification. 10. Mr. Sharma claimed a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- under different headings which are as follows: Rs. 9. We shall now deal with the amounts of compensation claimed by Mr. Lakhes war Sharma and granted by the Claims Tribunal and determine whether these are fair or require any reassessment or modification. 10. Mr. Sharma claimed a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- under different headings which are as follows: Rs. P. (1) For medicine 500.00 Diet and passage money 1,200.00 Teeth surgery 1,000.00 Loss by way of salary 431.00 (2) Loss of expectation of life by ten years. (a) Loss by way of pension @ Rs. 630/- p.m. 75,600.00 (b) Anticipated loss from literary work and profession @ Rs. 500/- p.m. 60,000.00 (3) Loss of salary as a senior Executive Officer Under Oil India Ltd. for 5 years @ Rs. 3,000/- p.m. after deduction of his salary of Rs. 57,000/- as a Member of Revenue Board upto the age of 60 years and pension of Rs. 18,900/- @ Rs. 630/- p.m. for two and a half years thereafter. 1,04,100.00 (4) For purchasing a car because of his inconveniences arising out of the accident 15,000.00 Salary of an attendant for ten years at Rs. 100/- p.m. 12,000.00 (5) (a) For mental and nervous shock 10,000.00 (b) Pain 15,000.00 (c) For disfiguration and deformities 25,000.00 The learned Claims Tribunal had awarded a sum of Rs. 303.32 as against his claim of Rs. 500/- for medicine. The learned Advocate General is not pressing for any revision of this amount, nor has Mr. Sarma canvassed for any revision. This amount, therefore is upheld. The next item which is in dispute is the amount of Rs. 300/- awarded by the Claims Tribunal towards diet and passage money against a claim of Rs. 1200/-. It is in evidence that Mr. Sharma was an indoor patient for 23 days in the Gauhati Medical College Hospital. Although the State, particularly a welfare State like ours, makes every endeavour within its limited resources to provide adequate and satisfactory food to all its patients in a Government Hospital, it is well known that its efforts do not or may not always come up to the required standard, because of various limiting factors imposed upon it. In that view of the matter, we do not think that the claim for expenses incurred under this head is totally unreasonable. For a stay of 23 days it is quite likely that Mr. In that view of the matter, we do not think that the claim for expenses incurred under this head is totally unreasonable. For a stay of 23 days it is quite likely that Mr. Sarma had to spend a fairly large amount for providing himself with supplementary diet, particularly in the delicate state of his health. For bringing such diet to the hospital he also had to spend a fair amount. Considering all this we grant a sum of Rs. 500/- under this head. 11. We next come to the claim for teeth surgery. The learned Claims Tribunal allowed a sum of Rs. 300/-against the claim of Rs. 1,000/-. We have the evidence of Dr. Mahanta, P.W. 12, who stated in his evidence: I also found loss of three teeth from both upper and lower jaws and shaking of most of the other teeth. I treated him. There is, thus sufficient evidence to show that a number of teeth of Mr. Sarma were dislocated or set loose by the impact of the collision and that he required dental treatment and a set of false teeth. There is, however, no evidence in support of his claim for compensation of Rs. 1,000/-, but at the same time we do not see any reason to hold that the award of Rs. 300/- is excessive. We are accordingly of the opinion that the amount of Rs. 300/- as awarded is sufficient and just on the facts and circumstances of the case. 12. We now come to the next item of his claim, that is to say, the claim for Rs. 431/- awarded as compensation for loss of salary. This amount is not disputed and is therefore upheld. 13. We then come to the next item of claim, that is, a sum of Rs. 1,35,600/-, claimed for loss of expectation of life by ten years. It may be noted that the claims Tribunal has not awarded any amount whatsoever on account of this item. As is well known, compensation in connection with personal injury is classified under two heads (i) Non pecuniary loss and (ii) pecuniary loss. The loss of expectation of life is classified under non-pecuniary loss. It may be noted that the claims Tribunal has not awarded any amount whatsoever on account of this item. As is well known, compensation in connection with personal injury is classified under two heads (i) Non pecuniary loss and (ii) pecuniary loss. The loss of expectation of life is classified under non-pecuniary loss. The principles for assessment of loss of expectation of life have been set out in Winfield on Tort, 8th Edition (page 682) as follows: ...in Benham v. Gambling (1941) 1 All E.R. 7 : 1941 A.C. 157 the House of Lords laid down rules with respect to this which may be thus summarised: (a) The thing to be valued is not the prospect of length of days but of a predominantly happy life. Therefore the acturial test is not of much value, though it may be relevant, e.g. in cases of extreme old age. (b) The capacity of the deceased to appreciate that his further life would bring him happiness is irrelevant; the test is objective, not subjective. (c) Damages are in respect of loss of life, not of loss of future pecuniary prospects. (d) Assessment is so difficult that very moderate damages should be given and even less for a very young child, because its future it so uncertain. (e) Wealth and social status must be ignored, for happiness does not depend on them. As Salmond in his book "Law of Torts," Fifteenth Edition (page 776) has stated: The principle laid down in Benham v. Gambling is logically applicable whether the victim has died before action brought or before judgment (as in Benham v. Gambling itself), or is alive and suing in his own right. In the instant case, we find from the evidence of P.W. 1. Mr., Lakheswar Sarma: Even today I walk limping with my right leg. With my right hand I cannot lift any heavy weight. My right shoulder is locked with the result that I can make only a limited movement. I cannot raise it up and take it backwards. I am to be helped in the application of oil on my head in bath, in dressing the hairs putting on or putting off clothes. I also want to be helped while boarding or coming out of a car. I cannot raise it up and take it backwards. I am to be helped in the application of oil on my head in bath, in dressing the hairs putting on or putting off clothes. I also want to be helped while boarding or coming out of a car. I am susceptible to cold and headache due to reduction of the nasal passage, for which I am to apply inhaler constantly to keep the passage free. My nose is presenting an ugly appearance due to budging out of the nose towards the right and sinking of the bridge.... Several teeth on the upper jaw are also shaken by the accident making gaps between the teeth because of knocking out of one tooth in the accident.... Due to the cramping over my forehead I feel constant restlessness, requiring constant massage all through. Before the accident I was in excellent health. I used to do lot of physical exercise, including walking and tennis playing occasionally.... As a result of the accident the nerves became weaker and I feel uncomfortable in motor journey.... Dr. Mahanta, P.W. 12, in his evidence has stated: I have seen Mr. Sarma today and found the same disfiguration of his nose in my opinion as it is, disfiguration is permanent. I found him walking with a little limp. The limp is due to the stiffness of the right knee. When I found that the above treatment did not respond.... There is every possibility of Mr. Sarma's life being shortened as a result of the injuries, residual effect of which is still persisting. Dr. Guha, P.W. 11, stated in his evidence: The deviation of the nose is permanent. It will not go. Pain on the forehead is also permanent. Locking of the right shoulder joint and limping are also permanent deformities and disabilities. Because of the obstruction of the nostril, he suffers constantly from cold and as a result he is susceptible to lung infection. It is a permanent risk on his life. As a result of the injuries the expectancy of life of Mr. Sarma has been reduced by ten years. We may also refer to Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Volume 11 (Page 256) where it has been stated: The shortening or loss of expectation of life is a separate head of damage which enters into the assessment of damages in cases of serious personal injury. Sarma has been reduced by ten years. We may also refer to Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Volume 11 (Page 256) where it has been stated: The shortening or loss of expectation of life is a separate head of damage which enters into the assessment of damages in cases of serious personal injury. It is clear from the evidence of the two renowned physicians that as a result of the injuries sustained by Mr. Sarma, his prospects of happiness of life have been considerably reduced. Mr. Sarma has to walk with a limp, he cannot drive and cannot play tennis. Both these doctors are also quite certain that his life has been shortened due to his injuries. Dr. Guha stated that as a result of the injuries the expectancy of life of Mr. Sarma has been reduced by ten years. In any view, it is apparent that his prospect of a happy life has been reduced due to the injuries he has sustained and which were caused by the negligence of the driver of the Government vehicle. Mr. Sarma is, in our opinion, certainly entitled to compensation on account of loss of expectation of life. The computation of any compensation for shortened expectation of life depends upon several circumstances. In putting a money value on the prospective balance of happiness in years that the claimant might otherwise have lived, the judge is attempting to equate incommensurables. It is a difficult task, but the judge has to do his duty, as imposed on him by law. Every case must ultimately be decided on its own facts and the choice of the right order of figure is empirical and in practice results from a general consensus of opinion of damage-awarding tribunals juries, judges and appellate courts. Taking all the factors into consideration, we are of the opinion that a sum of Rs. 10,000/- (ten thousand) should be awarded as compensation on account of this item. 14. The next item of claim for compensation is loss of salary as a Senior Executive Officer in the Oil India, which post was offered to Mr. Sarma in letters Exts. 12 and 13 and which had to be declined by Mr. Sarma in his letter Ext. 14. It is not disputed that post as Senior Executive Officer had been offered to Mr. Sarma by the management of Oil India Limited at a salary of Rs. Sarma in letters Exts. 12 and 13 and which had to be declined by Mr. Sarma in his letter Ext. 14. It is not disputed that post as Senior Executive Officer had been offered to Mr. Sarma by the management of Oil India Limited at a salary of Rs. 2,250/- together with various facilities as stated therein. A no objection certificate had been granted in his favour by the Government for acceptance of that post by him. Mr. Sarma in his evidence has stated: The offer was initially for three years with an understanding for extension afterwards. I could not accept the offer on account of the accident. I declined the offer finally. Mr. K. Sarma, learned Counsel, has submitted that it is not on account of the injuries the claimant had sustained from the accident that Mr. Sharma declined this post, but it was due to extraneous reasons which are not evident and which possibly would have been disclosed had the letter dated 22nd June, 1965 referred to in Mr. Kanuga's letter at Ext. 14 been brought on record. This, however, is a hypothetical submission. In view of the categorical statement made by Mr. Sarma that he could not accept the Oil India Limited on account of the accident and in absence of any evidence to controvert the same, we have no reason to disbelieve Mr. Sarma. We find that there is no cross-examination whatever on this point suggesting that Mr. Sarma declined the post due to some extraneous reasons and not due to the injuries he sustained. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that he did, infact, suffer damages on account of loss of salary, which he would have earned as Senior Executive Officer of Oil India Limited for a period of three years. We find that the learned Claims Tribunal had awarded a sum of Rs. 34,620/- on account of loss of salary, after taking into consideration the salary which he would have received as a Member of Assam Board of Revenue and pension which would have accrued to him thereafter. We, therefore, find no reason to interfere with this item of award, that is, the sum of Rs. 34,620/- on account of loss of salary which Mr. Sarma sustained as a result of this injury. 15. We now come to the item of claim for compensation for purchasing a car. We, therefore, find no reason to interfere with this item of award, that is, the sum of Rs. 34,620/- on account of loss of salary which Mr. Sarma sustained as a result of this injury. 15. We now come to the item of claim for compensation for purchasing a car. This, in our opinion, was rightly disallowed by the Claims Tribunal. The amount of Rs. 3,600/- for maintenance of an attendant for ten years was however rightly allowed, in view of the permanent disabilities resulting from the accident. 16. We now come to the last item, that is to say, claim for compensation for mental and nervous shock, pain and disfiguration and deformities. That Mr. Sarma did suffer acute mental and nervous shock as a result of the accident is abundantly clear from the evidence on record. In point of fact a person, unless he is impervious to all senses, would, in the circumstances as have emerged from the evidence, be bound to suffer considerable nervous shock, for which damages may be properly recoverable. The law with regard to compensation for nervous shock has been stated by Winfield in his Law of Torts (pages 126-127) as follow: In the existing state of the authorities any propositions regarding liability in negligence for nervous shock must be put forward only with considerable diffidence. With this caveat it is submitted that the law may be summarised as follows: 1. If it was not reasonably foreseeable that the Plaintiff would suffer injury of any kind as a result of the Defendant's negligent act, then he cannot recover. 2. If it was reasonably foreseeable that the Plaintiff would suffer nervous shock as a result of the Defendant's negligence, but only by being informed of it after the event, then again he cannot recover. 3. If it was reasonably foreseeable that a normally susceptible person placed in the Plaintiff's position would have suffered nervous shock from what he observed by his own unaided senses as a result of the Defendant's negligence, or if the particular susceptibility to shock of the Plaintiff was known to the Defendant, then probably the Plaintiff can recover. 4. If it was reasonably foreseeable that the Plaintiff would suffer physical injury as a result of the Defendant's negligence, i.e., if he was himself placed in danger of physical injury, then probably he can recover even though he suffers only nervous shock. 5. 4. If it was reasonably foreseeable that the Plaintiff would suffer physical injury as a result of the Defendant's negligence, i.e., if he was himself placed in danger of physical injury, then probably he can recover even though he suffers only nervous shock. 5. If the Plaintiff suffers shock through reasonable fear for his own safety as a result of the Defendant's negligence, then he can certainly recover. In all the above propositions it is presumed that the Defendant failed to exercise due care and that the damage was not, on general principles, too remote. In short, if the ordinary principles of liability in negligence indicate that the Plaintiff has no cause of action, then he can no more recover for nervous shock than for any other injury. We are clearly of the opinion that in the instant case, as a result of the negligence of the driver, Mr. Sarma did suffer from mental and nervous shock and therefore he is entitled to damages on that account. Nervous shock is a form of personal injury for which damages may be recoverable in appropriate circumstances. The crude view that the law should take cognisance only of physical injury resulting from actual impact has been discarded, and it is now well recognised that an action will lie for injury by shock sustained through the medium of the eye or the ear without direct contact. The distinction between mental shock and bodily injury was never a scientific one, for mental shock is presumably in all cases the result of, or at least accompanied by some physical disturbance in the sufferer's system. There is also evidence that Mr. Sarma had permanent disfiguration and deformities. Dr. Mahanta in his evidence has stated: I have seen Mr. Sarma today and found the same disfiguration of his nose. In my opinion as it is, disfiguration is permanent.... I found him walking with a little limp. The limp is due to the stiffness of the right knee. Dr. Guha (P.W. 11) stated in his evidence: I tried to move the right hand of Mr. Sarma upwards, but could not as the movement of the hand was limited. The disfiguration and deformities are as a result of the injuries which Mr. Sarma had sustained and should be duly compensated for, apart from the pain and mental and nervous shocks. The amount awarded by the Claims Tribunal is Rs. Sarma upwards, but could not as the movement of the hand was limited. The disfiguration and deformities are as a result of the injuries which Mr. Sarma had sustained and should be duly compensated for, apart from the pain and mental and nervous shocks. The amount awarded by the Claims Tribunal is Rs. 5,000/- as against his claim of Rs. 50,000/-. In our opinion, this amount is inadequate in view of the nature of the injuries, which on their own would entitle a person to compensation. There was also considerable mental and nervous shock as well as pain. We are of the opinion that the sum of Rs. 10,000/- should be awarded against this item. In the result we award a total sum of Rs. 59,754.32 to Mr. Lakheswar Sharma. 17. We shall now discuss the evidence regarding the claim of Mrs. Urmila Dutta. The Claims Tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs. 12,000/- as compensation for the loss of personal income for 30 years at the rate of Rs. 50/- per month. Mrs. Dutta in her evidence stated: The broken bones were not set up properly. Still I am getting pain in my right hand, because of which I cannot pursue my normal avocation, including weaving, sewing and knitting. I cannot carry even a bucket of water. For doing my normal household works I am to engage a maid servant. I got shock which is still persisting. It was strenuously urged by Mr. K. Sarma, the learned Counsel, that Mrs. Dutta being a housewife could not have had any personal income of her own. We are unable to accept this submission. A lady, who is a house wife, can and does contribute to the income of the house by her own endeavours. Therefore, we find that Rs. 50/- per month will be a reasonable amount at which rate her diminished services to the family could have been computed. We accordingly uphold the amount of Rs. 12,000/- under this head. 18. As against services of a maid servant, the need for that clearly emerges from the disability that has accrued to her on account of the injuries sustained. She cannot even raise her right hand properly to carry a bucket of water. In the circumstances, she cannot escape engaging a personal maid servant to look after her. A salary of a maid servant at Rs. She cannot even raise her right hand properly to carry a bucket of water. In the circumstances, she cannot escape engaging a personal maid servant to look after her. A salary of a maid servant at Rs. 30/- per month for a period of 20 years is, therefore, reasonable. A sum of Rs. 7,200/- as awarded by the learned Claims Tribunal against this item is just and fair. 19. As regards the compensation of Rs. 5,000/- awarded for pain and shock, we hold that this amount is also just and fair. That Mrs. Dutta suffered considerable degree of mental shock and also pain resulting from the injury, is obvious from the evidence on record. As regards the amount awarded towards compensation for purchase of medicine, treatment etc. a sum of Rs. 1,102.87 has been given. This has not been challenged, as it is supported by vouchers. In the result we award a total sum of Rs. 25,302.87 to Mrs. Urmila Dutta. 20. We now come to the case of Miss Lanu Dutta. She was awarded a sum of Rs. 10,000/- for loss of beauty and for prominent ugly marks on her right knee. There is abundant evidence on record to show that due to the injuries she had sustained, her superficial attractiveness has been diminished to a considerable extent. As matters now stand, the prospect of a happy marriage on basis of what is considered as physical beauty and attraction, although that need not be the criterion for a wise and discriminating husband, has considerably diminished. The evidence regarding the ugly scars left on her is quite clear from the testimony of Mr. Lakhiprosad Dutta, P.W. 1, who states: She (Miss Lanu Dutta) bears permanent ugly marks on her chin, and on her right knee. Due to the falling of the permanent prominent tooth her facial expression looks ugly. These marks and also falling of the tooth have seriously affected her beauty. She is now 12 years... In our opinion, the sum of Rs. 10,000/- awarded on account of loss of beauty and disfiguration of the right knee is really a nominal amount. There is no cross-appeal in the case. We are therefore not in a position to enhance this award. 21. With regard to the amount of Rs. 5,000/- awarded as compensation for pain and shock, the medical evidence of Dr. 10,000/- awarded on account of loss of beauty and disfiguration of the right knee is really a nominal amount. There is no cross-appeal in the case. We are therefore not in a position to enhance this award. 21. With regard to the amount of Rs. 5,000/- awarded as compensation for pain and shock, the medical evidence of Dr. Jain is quite clear that the injury caused her considerable physical and mental distress. The nature of the accident certainly would go to show that the amount of Rs. 5,000/- awarded on this ground is quite reasonable -and there is no valid reason for its interference in any manner. 22. A sum of Rs. 250/- has been awarded as compensation for purchase of medicine, diet etc. There are supporting vouchers to show that the amount of Rs. 250/- had been spent towards purchase of medicine etc. As such, this amount was rightly awarded. 23. We, however, note that the claim of Miss Lanu Dutta was only for Rs. 15,000/- whereas the compensation awarded under different heads comes to a total exceeding that amount by Rs. 250/-. Although, as observed earlier, we do not find that the award on any of the items was excessive or unjustified, per se, in view of the fact that in her application the claim was limited to a sum of Rs. 15,000/- only, we hold that the learned Claims Tribunal should not have exceeded that amount. We accordingly hold that the total amount of award as compensation should be reduced by a sum of Rs. 250/-. Also, in view of the submission made by the learned Advocate-General that the amount awarded to Miss Lana Data may be reduced by Rs. 250/-, so that it conforms to the claim, we shall not enter into merits of the submission made by Mr. K. Sara that in an application u/s 110A of the Act, the award should not exceed the amount claimed. We accordingly award Miss Lana Data a total sum of Rs. 15,000/-. 24. We now come to the claim of Mr. Goliath Borolo, the driver of the life tated vehicle. A sum of Rs. 4,320/- was allowed to him as compensation for loss of income. Mr. Bordoloi stated in his evidence that because of the pain he is still suffering as a result of the injury, he became unable to work as a driver. Goliath Borolo, the driver of the life tated vehicle. A sum of Rs. 4,320/- was allowed to him as compensation for loss of income. Mr. Bordoloi stated in his evidence that because of the pain he is still suffering as a result of the injury, he became unable to work as a driver. He has also stated that he has been advised by his Doctor not to work as driver. We see no reason to disbelieve his testimony and we are of the opinion that he was rightly granted compensation for loss of income for three years at the rate of Rs. 120/- per month. Similarly, an amount of Rs. 3,000/-as awarded to him for shock and pain is not at all excessive in the circumstances of the case and we confirm the same. 25. A sum of Rs. 347.75 was awarded towards compensation for expenses incurred for purchase of medicine. This claim was supported by necessary vouchers and there is no room for interference. In the result Mr. Gopinath Bordoloi is awarded Rs. 7,667.75. 26. We come to the claim of Mr. Lakshi Prasad Dutta. A sum of Rs. 7,200/- was awarded to Mr. Dutta as compensation for expenses that would be incurred by him for keeping an attendant, at the rate of Rs. 30/- per month for 20 years against his claim of Rs. 24,000/-. Dr. Mohanta, P.W. 12 stated in his evidence: The fracture was severe. As a result of the fracture though set up properly, the capacity of the hand is impaired and the life may be shortened. Mr. Dutta in his evidence stated- The fracture of the left arm permanently disabled the movement of my left hand.... Due to the shock I received in the accident, I am getting a permanent fear for motor journey which I cannot avoid. It is thus quite evident that due to the permanent effects of the injuries he sustained, he would require services of a personal attendant for at least 20 years. As such, the amount of Rs. 7,200/- allowed to him is not at all unreasonable. A sum of Rs. 5,000/- had been awarded as compensation for shock and pain. This amount is also quite reasonable in view of the mental anxiety and physical pain, which he undoubtedly suffered and sustained. 27. A sum of Rs. 3,000/- was granted to him for loss of earnings. 7,200/- allowed to him is not at all unreasonable. A sum of Rs. 5,000/- had been awarded as compensation for shock and pain. This amount is also quite reasonable in view of the mental anxiety and physical pain, which he undoubtedly suffered and sustained. 27. A sum of Rs. 3,000/- was granted to him for loss of earnings. There is evidence to show that Mr. Dutta was engaged in literary activities before he sustained the injuries in question. As a result of the injuries, his capacity to earn from literary writing has certainly diminished to a considerable extent and accordingly we hold that a sum of Rs. 3,000/- awarded for loss of his future earnings on this account is not at all unreasonable. 28. A sum of Rs. 7,465.98 had been awarded to him for compensation for damages to his car as a result of the accident. Mr. K. Sarma has very strenuously submitted that the Claims Tribunal is not competent to grant compensation for damages to property in an application u/s 110-A of the Act. The provisions of Section 110-A may be set out below: 110-A. Application for compensation (1) An application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in Sub-section (1) of Section 110 may be made: (a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or (b) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or (c) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured for all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be: Provided that, where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined shall be impleaded as Respondents to the application. (2) Every application under Sub-section (1) shall be made to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred, and shall be in such form and shall contain such particulars as may be prescribed (3) No application for compensation under this section shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident: Provided that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. 29. We form the provisions of Section 110, as it stood at the relevant time that a Claims Tribunal might adjudicate upon a claim for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles. In our opinion, whenever an accident involves the death or bodily injury to a persons, a Claims Tribunal may adjudicate upon a claim for compensation in respect of such accident, although it is also clear that an accident which does not cause death or bodily injury but only damages would not be within the scope of Section 110(1) of the Act as it then stood. Accordingly, whenever an accident has resulted in death or injury to a person, any damage which directly flows from that accident, may be compensated by the Claims Tribunal u/s 110A, upon a claim instituted u/s 110 of the Act. We are fortified in taking this view by the decisions in Joshi Ratansi Gopalji v. The Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. 1968 A.C.J. 338; M. Krishnappa v. Madras Motor and General Insurance Co. and Ors. 1972 A.C.J. 240 ; and Dr. Om Prakash Mishra Vs. National Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. and Others, Mr. K. Sarma has, however, drawn our attention to a decision in the case of B.S. Nat v. Bachan Singh 1971 A.C.J. 37, where a contrary view has been taken. Their Lordships, after taking note of the Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh decisions (supra) held: The opening sentence of the relevant extract from the statement of objects and reasons makes it clear that the Tribunals were being set up to determine and award damages in cases of accidents involving death of or bodily injury to persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles. In later portions wherever the words "the injury or death" occur they are apparently used in the same context and are not intended to enlarge the scope of the word 'injury' in the legal sense to include injury to property as distinguished from injury to human beings or their death. The use of the word 'injury' side by side with the word 'death' is a further indication that only bodily injury was within the contempation of the law. Moreover, it is indicated in the Statement of objects and Reasons and notes on the pertinent clauses of the Bill that the amendments were designed to remove the existing difficulties experienced by persons of limited means. Claims of richer section of the community owning motor vehicles or property were apparently not within the contemplation of the legislature. 30. In our respectful opinion, however the reading of Sections 110(1) and 110A makes it quite clear that once it is shown that death or bodily injury has resulted to a person out of the use of a motor vehicle, a Claims Tribunal would have the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon all claims set out on behalf of the deceased or injured person, for compensation in respect of such accident, whether it be for injury to the person or damage to the property of such claimant. There is no warrant, in our respectful opinion, for taking the view that compensation may be awarded only in respect of personal injuries and not damages to properties of the injured. We are, accordingly, unable to accept Mr. Sarma's submission that the Claims Tribunal had no jurisdiction to grant any compensation for damages to the car in an application u/s 110A of the Act, as it then stood. Of the sum of Rs. 7,465.98 that was awarded by the Tribunal as compensation for damage to the car, a sum of Rs. 6,165.98 has already been spent by Mr. Dutta, as evidenced by supporting vouchers and the remaining sum of Rs. 1,200/- would be required for the repairs that had since to be carried out. As such, we do not find that this amount can be interfered with. 31. The amount of Rs. 1,439.00 towards the cost of purchasing medicine and air tickets etc. is not disputed and is allowed. We accordingly award Mr. Lakshi Prasad Dutta a total sum of Rs. 24,104.98. 32. In the result, appeals Nos. As such, we do not find that this amount can be interfered with. 31. The amount of Rs. 1,439.00 towards the cost of purchasing medicine and air tickets etc. is not disputed and is allowed. We accordingly award Mr. Lakshi Prasad Dutta a total sum of Rs. 24,104.98. 32. In the result, appeals Nos. 26, 28, 29 and 30 of 1966 are dismissed; appeals Nos. 27 and 46 of 1966 are allowed to the extent, as indicated above.