V. CHIKKAVEEEAYYA v. TOWN MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, TUMKUR
1973-07-24
CHANDRASHEKARAIAH
body1973
DigiLaw.ai
( 1 ) THIS petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, is presented by a member of the Town Municipal Council, Tunkur (hereinafter referred to as the Muncipal Council), ana two other residents of Tumkur Town. Their grievance is in regard to disposal of two plots of land in an area which had been granted by the Government to the Municipal Council. They have assailed the order of the Assistant Commissioner, Tumkur, granting those two plots or and to respondents 3 ana 4 and tney have also assailed certain orders of tne Deputy Commissioner,- Tumkur, in respect or those two plots. ( 2 ) BY its order dated 22-7-1941, the Government granted to the Municipal council an area of land measuring 22 acres and 14 guntas, within the limits of Tumkur Town for the purpose ot formation of a park. That order contained a condition that it that land was converted for any other purpose, the Government would resume the land. Out of that land some plots had been given to individuals and institutions for construction of buildings. On 12-9-1968, the Asst. Commissioner, Tumkur Sub-Division, made an order granting two plots measuring two guntas each to respondents 3 and 4 at upset prices. It would appear that an officer of the Municipal council issued a license to respondent 3 to build a house on the plot so granted to him. The Municipal Council passed a lesolution and issued a notice to respondent 3 to show cause why that license should not be cancelled. The Deputy Commissioner, Tumkur District, made an order under S. 306 of the Mysore Municipalities Act, 1964, suspending the aforesaid resolution of the Municipal Council and issued a notice to the municipal Council to show cause why the land granted to it by the government should not be resumed to the Government for violation of the conditions of the grant. ( 3 ) THE Municipal Council filed a petition, W. P. No. 2889 of 1970, praynig for quashing the aforesaid order of the Assistant Commissioner and for certain other reliefs. Later, the Municipal Council passed a resolution on 14-10-1970 that the aforesaid writ petition should be withdrawn and later withdrew the writ petition. The present petitioner filed a petition, wp. No. 4145 of 1970, challenging the aforesaid resolution ot the municipal Council dt. 14-10-1970 and that petition came to be dismissed by this Court.
Later, the Municipal Council passed a resolution on 14-10-1970 that the aforesaid writ petition should be withdrawn and later withdrew the writ petition. The present petitioner filed a petition, wp. No. 4145 of 1970, challenging the aforesaid resolution ot the municipal Council dt. 14-10-1970 and that petition came to be dismissed by this Court. ( 4 ) THE learned Government Pleader, who appeared for respondents 2 and 5 raised a preliminary objection that the petitioners have no locus standi to bring this petition. He contended that they have not shown that they were in some way specially concerned with the impugned order (made by the Assistant Commissioner) or that they had any personal grievance in regard to that order. ( 5 ) MR. Mohandas Hegde, learned Counsel lor petitioners, contended that they were rate payers of the Municipal Council and had sufficient interest to set that the properties of the Municipal Council were properly utilised and were not frittered away so as to affect the assets of the Municipal council. Mr. Hegde also referred to sub-sec. (2) of 6. 31 of the mysore Municipalities Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), which provides, inter alia, that all properties of the Municipality of whatever nature or kind, shall be held and applied by the Municipal Council as trustee. Mr. Hegde argued that if the Municipal Council acts in breach of such trust, any rate-payer or any resident of the town has sufficient interest to challenge the action of the Municipal Council. ( 6 ) IN support of his contention Mr. Hegde relied on the decision of the Bombay High Court in Municipal Corpn,. Bombay v. Govind Laxman. Sarant, AIR. 1949 Bom. 229. There, a Bench consisting of Chagla, CJ. , and Gajendragadkar, j. , held that every rate-payer has a right to prevent the public body to which he pays the rates, from acting contrary to law or contrary to its own charter and that the law assumes that the member of the Municipal council or the rate-payer has a specific legal interest which entitles him to come to Court in support of his right and in preventing the corporation or the public body acting contrary of law or of its own charter. ( 7 ) FOLLOWING the above decision, the Calcutta High Court held in narendra Nath Chakravarty v. Corpn. of Calcutta, AIR. 1960 Cal.
( 7 ) FOLLOWING the above decision, the Calcutta High Court held in narendra Nath Chakravarty v. Corpn. of Calcutta, AIR. 1960 Cal. 102, that a rate-payer is not a mere stranger and can be said to he directly interested in the proper application of Municipal fund and as such is entitled to question its misapplication. ( 8 ) SUPPORT was also sought to be derived from the decision of the court of Appeal in Prescott v. Birmingham Corpn. , (1954) 3 All. E. R. 698, where certain action of Birmingham Corporation was challenged by certain rate-payers. But in that decision, there is no discussion of the question whether a ratepayer has locus standi to challenge the actions of a municipal corporation. ( 9 ) THE aforesaid decisions of the Bombay and Calcutta High Courts, were considered by a Bench of this Court, of which I was a member, in w. P. No. 4904 of 1970, WP. 4904/70 and the Bench observed that whatever might be the views of Bombay and Calcutta High Courts, so far as this Court is concerned, it is bound by the ruling of this Court in S. Janab v. Corpn. of the City of Bangalorekishan5. There, Narayana Pai, CJ. , who spoke for the Bench, referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Nagar Rice and Flour Mills v. N. Teekappa Gowda and Bros. kishan6 and said thus:'' Whatever may be the applicability of such principles in England, we have little doubt that the discretion under Art. 226 has to be exercised ordinarily, if not invariably, in favour of a person who ha. ; a personal grievance recognisable by law. "following the ruling in Janab's casekishan6, it was observed in W. P. No. 4904 of 1970kishan7 that the petitioner should have some personal grievance apart from his mere desire to see that the Municipal Council and its officers? function according to law. ( 10 ) IN M/s. Ennar Syndicate v. State of Mys. kishan8, another Bench of this court, of which I was also a member, held that the petitioner therein who was not directly and proximately affected by the rules impugned therein, had no locus standi to challenge the validity of those rules. ( 11 ) THE mere fact that the Muncicipal Council commits a breach ot its obligation under sub-sec.
kishan8, another Bench of this court, of which I was also a member, held that the petitioner therein who was not directly and proximately affected by the rules impugned therein, had no locus standi to challenge the validity of those rules. ( 11 ) THE mere fact that the Muncicipal Council commits a breach ot its obligation under sub-sec. (2) of S. 81 of the Act, to hold and apply the properties as trustee, does not necessarily result in a personal grievance of rate-payer or resident of the town. The petitioners have not shown that they arcin any way specially concerned with the two plots of land disposed of by the impugned order, apart from their general interests as citizens of the town to see that the properties of the Municipal Council are not misapplied. But, this cannot amount to a personal grievance recognizable by law so as to give locus standi to them to maintain this petition. Moreover, what they have challenged in this petition, is not any action of the Municipal Council, but the order of the Assistant Commissioner disposing of two plots in the land that had been granted to the municipal Council by the Government on certain conditions. ( 12 ) HENCE, I uphold the preliminary objections raised by the learned government Pleader and I dismiss the petition in limine on the ground that the petitioners have no locus standi. ( 13 ) IN the circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs in this petition. --- *** --- .