( 1 ) THIS revision petition is by the Registrar of Trade Unions in Mysore, filed under S. 115 CPC. , against the order passed by the Prl. Dist. Judge, bangalore in Mis. No. 142 of 1969. ( 2 ) THE Mysore State Employees Provident Fund Employees Union (hereafter referred to as the Union), made an application for its registration in the year 1967 under the Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926 (hereafter referred to as the Act ). The Registrar of Trade Unions (hereafter referred to as the Registrar), on being satisfied that the applicant Union has complied with all the requirements of the Act in regard to the registration, registered it under S. 8 of the Act and issued a certificate of registration under S. 9 of the Act bearing No. 4 of 1967. The certificate issued is conclusvie evidence that the Union has been duly registered under the act. ( 3 ) ON the 18th of November, 1988, the Registrar issued a notice to the Secretary of the Union, requiring him to show cause why the certificate of registration should not be withdrawn on the ground that the activity of the Provident Fund Organisation, whose employees are the members of the Union, is neither a trade nor an industry and that therefore it is not entitled to be registered under the Act. The reply of the Union was given on the 26th of November, 1968, giving detailed reasons as to why the certificate of registration should not be withdrawn as proposed by the Registrar in his notice. On the 26th of October, 1969, the Registrar made an order withdrawing the registration certificate and the same reads as follows :"whereas a notice was issued to the Secretary of Mysore State employees' Provident Fund Empoyees' Union, Bangalore, by this office requiring him to show cause as to why the registration certificate should not be withdrawn on the ground that the activity of the Provident Fund Organisation is neither a trade nor an industry within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act and the Union of employees of this organisation cannot be registered under the Trade unions Act, 1926. And whereas the expalanation of the Union contained in its letter cited above is not acceptable the certificate of registration issued by mistake cannot be allowed to stand as the same is ab initio void and carries no legal value. And whereas the expalanation of the Union contained in its letter cited above is not acceptable the certificate of registration issued by mistake cannot be allowed to stand as the same is ab initio void and carries no legal value. I, therefore, withdraw the registration certificate bearing No. 4 1and67 dt. 11-7-1967 this day the 26-8-1969. The Secretary of the Union is hereby directed to surrender the certificate of registration. " ( 4 ) AGAINST the aforesaid order of the Registrar, the respondent preferred an appeal to the District Court at Bangalore under S. 11 of the Act. The Appellate Court, by its order dt. 18th of September, 1972, allowed the appeal and set aside the order of hte Registrar. Hence, this revision petition by the Registrar. ( 5 ) SHRI Annandanayya Puranik, learned High Court Government pleader appearing for the petitioner, contended that the learned District judge committed an error in holding that the Registrar had no jurisdiction to withdraw the registration certificate, on the ground that he had committed a mistake in registering the Union. He further contended that the learned District Judge committed an error in holding that the Union is a Trade Union as defined in S. 2 (h) of the Act. ( 6 ) TO appreciate the first contention, it is necessary to set out the provisions of S. 10 of the Act which gives power to the Registrar to withdraw or cancel a certificate of registration granted under Ss. 3 and 9 of the Act. The said section reads as follows :"10. ( 6 ) TO appreciate the first contention, it is necessary to set out the provisions of S. 10 of the Act which gives power to the Registrar to withdraw or cancel a certificate of registration granted under Ss. 3 and 9 of the Act. The said section reads as follows :"10. A certificate of registration of a Trade Union may be withdrawn or cancelled by the Registrar- (a) on the application of the Trade Union to be verified in such manner as may be prescribed, or (b) if the Registrar is satisfied that the certificate has been obtained by fraud or mistake, or that the Trade Union has ceased to exist or has wilfully and after notice from the Registrar contravened any provision of this Act or allowed any rule to continue in force which is inconsistent with any such provision, or has rescinded any rule providing for any matter provision for which is required by section 6 : provided that not less than two months' previous notice in writing specifying the ground on which it is proposed to withdraw or cancel the certificate shall be given by the Registrar to the Trade union before the certificate is withdrawn or cancelled or otherwise than on the application of the Trade Union. "we are concerned in this case only with clause (b) of S. 10 of the Act, as the withdrawal of certificate was not made on the application of the Union. It is also not the case of the petitioner that the certificate was obtained by the respondent by fraud. The order of the Registrar, in clear terms, states that the certificate is withdrawn as it was issued by mistake. It is cleai from the language of clause (b) of S. 10 that the Registrar can withdraw or cancel the certificate of registration, if he is satisfied that the same was obtained by fraud or mistake. As the word 'obtained' has been used, it obviously refers to the applicant who has secured the certificate of registration by fraud or mistake. The fraud or mistake is, therefore, one attributable to the applicant. It is, therefore clear that it is only if the certificate of registration was granted on. account of a mistake committed on the part of the applicant that the Registrar can withdraw or cancel, such registration. The fraud or mistake is, therefore, one attributable to the applicant. It is, therefore clear that it is only if the certificate of registration was granted on. account of a mistake committed on the part of the applicant that the Registrar can withdraw or cancel, such registration. If the mistake is committed by the Registrar in granting the certificate and no mistake is committed by the applicant in obtaining the certificate, the provisions of clause (b) of S. 10 for withdrawing or cancelling the certificate of registration cannot be invoked. The order of the Registrar nowhere states that it is on account of any mistake committed by the applicant Union that the certificate of registration was granted. The language employed in the order also clearly shows that it is on account of a mistaken view taken by the Registrar that the certificate of registration was granted to the Union. The mistake committed by the Registrar himself in' granting the certificate cannot be made a ground for withdrawing or cancelling the registration certificate under clause (b) of S. 10 of the Act. The first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, fails. ( 7 ) IT was next urged that the learned District Judge committed an error in holding that the Union is a Trade Union as defined in the act. S. 2 (h) of the Act defines the Trade Union as follows :"2 (h) 'trade Union' means any combination, whether temporary or permanent, formed piimarily for the purpose of regulating the relations between workmen and employers or between workmen and workmen, or between employers and employers, or for imposing restrictive conditions on the conduct of any trade or business, and includes any federation of two or more Trade Unions. "if the said section is analysed, it will be clear that any combination, whether temporary or permanent, will be a Trade Union, if it is formed primarily for one of the following purposes: - (1) To regulate the relations between workmen and employers; (2) to regulate the relations between workmen and workmen; (3) to regulate relations between employers and employers; (4) for imposing restrictive conditions on the conduct of any trade or business. The expression 'trade Union' also includes federation of two or more Trade Unions. The expression 'trade Union' also includes federation of two or more Trade Unions. It is clear from the definition of the expression ' Trade Union' that it could be a combination either of workmen or of employees or of both, provided it is formed primarily for one of the purposes mentioned in clause (h) of S. 2 of the Act. It is, therefore, possible to have a Trade Union consisting only of employers. The emphasis in S. 2 (h) is on the purpose for which the Union is formed and not so much on the persons who constitute the Union. The case of the respondent is that the Union in question is a combination of employees of the Provident Fund Organisation. It is not disputed that the primary purpose of the organisation is to regulate relations between the employees and the employer, viz. , the Provident Fund organisation. Pnma facie, therefore, the Union satisfies the conditions prescribed by S. 2 (h) of the Act. But, it was contended that the employees of the Provident Fund Organisation, not being workmen, the primary purpose of the Union is not for the purpose of regulating the relations between workmen and employer. It is not, however, disputed that the Employees' Provident Fund Organisation is an employer. S. 2 (g) or the Act has defined the expression ' trade dispute,'. In the same definition it is further provided that workmen means all persons employed in trade or industry whether or not in the employment of the employer with whom the trade dispute arises. Relying on the said definition of the word 'workmen' it was contended that the employees of Provident fund Organisation are not workmen as they are not persons employed in any trade or industry. It was contended that the activity of the Provident fund Organisation, which is charged with the duty of implementing and enforcing the provisions of the Employees' Provident Funds act, 1952 and the scheme, cannot be regarded as either a trade or industry. The expressions ' trade and industry' have not been denned in the Act. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, therefore, sought assistance from the decisions under the Industrial Disputes Act, wherein the expression 'industry' has been defined under clause (j) of S. 2 of the said Act, has been explained. The expressions ' trade and industry' have not been denned in the Act. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, therefore, sought assistance from the decisions under the Industrial Disputes Act, wherein the expression 'industry' has been defined under clause (j) of S. 2 of the said Act, has been explained. The learned District Judge has, in his judgment, relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. Hospital mazdoor Sabha, AIR. 1960 SC. 610. Construing S. 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Supreme Court held in that case that when the State runs group of hospitals for the purpose of giving medical relief to the citizens and for helping to impart medical education, their activity has to be regarded as an industry. As rightly pointed out by the learned High Court Government pleader, the Supreme Court has in its later decision in Management of Safdar Jung Hospital v. Kuldip Singh Sethikishan, AIR. 1970 SC. 1407 overruled this decision. In the Management of Safdar Jung Hospital's case the Supreme Court has affirmed the following observations made in Secretary, Madras gymkhana Club Employees Union v. Management of the Gymkhana club, AIR. 1963 SC. 554:". . . . . before the work engaged in can be described as an industry, it must bear the definite character of 'trade' or 'business' or 'manufacture' or 'calling' or must be capable of being described as an undertaking resulting in material goods or material services. " relying on the decision in Safdar Jung Hospital's case , Shri Narasimhan, learned Counsel for the respondent, contended tha,t as the activity of the Provident Fund Organisation results in material services, the same is an industry. Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Supreme court between the Management of the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Their Workmen, R. K. Mittal, AIR. 1972 SC. 763. That was also a case arising under the Industrial Disputes Act, in which the Supreme Court was required to determine the meaning of the word 'industry' as defined in S. 2 (j) of the said Act. 1972 SC. 763. That was also a case arising under the Industrial Disputes Act, in which the Supreme Court was required to determine the meaning of the word 'industry' as defined in S. 2 (j) of the said Act. In the said case, the Supreme court has observed in paragraph 27 of its judgment as follows : "in our view the Linch-pin of the definition of industry is to ascertain the systematic activity which the organisation is discharging namely whether it partakes the nature of a business or trade, or is an undertaking or manufacture or calling of employers. If it is that and there is co-operation of the employer and the employee resulting in the production of material services, it is an industry notwithstanding that its objects are charitable or that it does not make profit or even where profits are made, they are not distributed among the members. "in that case, the Supreme Court examined the activities of the Indian, chamber of Commerce and Industry and held that it is an industry as defined in S. 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In paragraph 29 of the 'judgment, this is what the Supreme Court observed :"these extracts have been given in some extenso to show that the Federation carries on systematic activities to assist its members and other businessmen and industrialists and even the non-members as lor instance in giving them the right to subscribe to their bulletin; in taking up their cases and solving their difficulties and in obtaining concessions and facilities for them from the Government. These activities are business activities, are material services which are not necessarily confined to the illustrations given by Hidayatullah, CJ. , in the Gymkhana case (1968-1 SCR 742) by way of illustration only, rendered to businessmen, traders and industralists who are members of the constituents of the Federation. There can in our view be no doubt that the Federation is an industry within the meaning of section 2 (j) of the Act. " ( 8 ) HAVING regard to the tests laid down in the aforesaid three decisions of the Supreme Court, let me examine the activities of the Provident fund Organisation. ( 9 ) THE preamble to the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952 reads as follows :"an Act to provide for the institution of provident funds for employees in factories and other establishments. "it is clear from sub-sec. ( 9 ) THE preamble to the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952 reads as follows :"an Act to provide for the institution of provident funds for employees in factories and other establishments. "it is clear from sub-sec. (3) of S 1 of that Act that subject to the provisions of S. 16, the Act applies to every establishment which is a factory engaged in any industry specified in Schedule I and in which twenty or more persons are employed and to any other establishment employing twenty or more persons or class of such establishments which the Central Government may be notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf, s. 5 of that Act provides that the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, frame a, Scheme for the establishment of provident funds under the Act for employees or for any class of employees and specify the establishments or class of establishments to which the said Scheme applies and that there shall be established, as soon as may be after the framing of the Scheme, a Fund in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the scheme. Ss. 5a and 5b empower the Central government to constitute Boards of Trustees. Sec. 5c provides that every Board of Trustees constituted under S. 5a or S. 5b shall be a body corporate under the name specified in the notification constituting it, having perpetual succession and a common seal and shall by the said name sue and be sued. The Employees' Provident funds Scheme, 1952 has been framed under the Act. The Scheme makes provision, among others, for appointment and powers of a Provident fund Commissioner and other staff of the Board of Trustees, the membership of the Fund, the method and manner of contribution of the provident fund, the administration of the fund accounts and its audit, nominations, payments and withdrawals from the fund by the members of the fund etc. Under the Scheme, advances are admissible to the members of the fund for the following purposes (vide clauses 68b to 68j): - (i) Financing of Life Insurance Policy; (ii) Purchase of a dwelling site house and or construction of dwelling house; (iii) Purchasing shares of Consumers co-operative credit Housing Societies; (iv) During temporary closure of an establishment; (v) For illness of the member as well as his family; (vi) Daughter's marriage or for post-matriculation education of children; (vii Damage to moveable or immoveable property of a member due to a calamity of exceptional nature; and (viii) Un-employment relief to individual retrenchee member etc. ( 10 ) IT is clear from the Act and the Scheme framed thereunder that this is one of the social security programmes tor the benefit of the employees of industries and other establishments to which the Act applies. It is a measure to give financial security to the employees. The activity of the Provident Fund Organisation also results in material services in that it gives financial security to the employees. ( 11 ) THE terms and conditions of service of an employee are ordinarily subject matter of contract between the parties. Such a contract may provide for financial security similar to the one contemplated by the Act and the Scheme for the benefit of the employees. What the Legislature has done is virtually to make this a statutory condition of employment for the benefit of the employees. It is in order to ensure its enforcement that a machinery has been constituted by the Act and the Scheme. The provident Fund Organisation, which enforces the scheme, in reality and in substance, discharges a part of the function of the employers. It is in order to ensure its enforcement that a machinery has been constituted by the Act and the Scheme. The provident Fund Organisation, which enforces the scheme, in reality and in substance, discharges a part of the function of the employers. This will be clear from the reading of S. 17 of the Act which gives power to the Government to exempt from operation of all or any of the provisions of the scheme, if in the opinion of the Government the rules of its provident fund with respect to the rates of contribution are not less favourable than those specified in S. 6 and the employees are also in enjoyment of the provident fund benefits which, on the whole, are not less favourable to the employee, than the benefits provided under S. 6 of the act or any scheme in relation to the employees in any other establishment of a similar character or any establishment if the employees of such establishment are in enjoymet of benefits in the nature of provident fund, pension or gratuity and the appropriate Government is of opinion that such benefits, separately or jointly, are on the whole not less favourable to such employees than the benefits provided under the Act or any Scheme in relation to employees in any other establishment of a similar character. It is, therefore, clear that the benefit of the scheme is necessary to be extended only if such benefit is not voluntarily given by the employer himself. The activity of the Provident Fund Organisaton in implementing the scheme is, therefore, a part of the activity of the employer himself. As already mentioned, the Act applies to every establishment which is a factory engaged in an industry specified in Schedule-I and in which twenty or more persons are employed and to any other establishment employing twenty or more persons or class of such establishments which the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf. The preamble to the Act itself states that it is an Act to provide for the institution of Provident Funds for employees in factories and other establishments It is, therefore, clear that the activity of the Provident Fund Organisation is really a part of the activity of the industries and other establishments similar to them. Even in respect of exempted factories sub-sec. Even in respect of exempted factories sub-sec. (3) of S. 17 requires the employer to maintain accounts, submit returns etc. For that purpose again the Employer has to employ staff, the members of which can undoubtedly be considered as workmen if the activity of the employer is an industry. If all those (employees who look after the work pertaining to provident fund of the employees in a particular industry can be regarded as workmen, entitled to form a Trade Union under the Act, there is no valid reason for not treating the employees of the Provident Fund Organisation as workmen, when in fact they perform a part of the activity of several employees engaged in different industries. As the activity of the Provident Fund organisation is ' industry' the members of the Union, who are its employees, have to be regarded as workmen. As the Union was formed primarily for the purpose of regulating the relations between the workmen and its employer, it is a Trade Union as defined in S. 2 (h) of the Act. Hence, the second contention of the learned High Court Government Pleader also fails. ( 12 ) FOR the reasons stated above, this revision petition fails and is dismissed. No costs. --- *** --- .