JUDGMENT : R.N. Misra, J. - This is an application of the landlord for a writ of certiorari challenging the appellate order made under the Orissa House Rent Control Act (4 of 1968). The Petitioner is the owner of two separate houses standing respectively on holding Nos. 643 and 644. He alleged that he was in occupation of the three rooms in the first floor of the house on holding No. 643. The ground floor rooms had been let out. The opposite party No. 1 is a tenant of the house standing on holding No. 644. The Petitioner applied to the Controller - opposite party No. 3 for eviction of the opposite party No. 1 on two grounds - (1) The tenant was a habitual defaulter, and (2). The landlord required the house in good faith for his occupation. The plea of default, was not pressed. Bona fide need of the landlord was seriously denied by the tenant. According to the tenant the landlord was anxious to let out the house at a higher rent after obtaining eviction. 2. According to the landlord Petitioner the accommodation available to him and the members of his family was inadequate. The family consisted of the landlord, his wife, four grown-up daughters and four sons. Two of the elder sons have been living outside, but the members of their family used to come and go. It was stated that the three rooms in the first floor of the house standing on holding No. 643 were not sufficient for living. 3. The Controller was of the view that it was open to the landlord to ask for eviction of the tenant from the ground floor of the house standing on holding No. 643 and the application was, therefore, not bona fide. The appellate authority relied upon the evidence of the Petitioner's son who was the sole witness examined in support of the petition. He found on the basis of some alleged admission that some rooms in the ground floor of the house occupied by the Petitioner were also available for the landlord's occupation. Accordingly he did not find any bona fides in the need of the Petitioner. Thus both the Controller and the appellate authority have negatived the plea of the Petitioner that in good faith he required the house for his occupation. 4. Accordingly he did not find any bona fides in the need of the Petitioner. Thus both the Controller and the appellate authority have negatived the plea of the Petitioner that in good faith he required the house for his occupation. 4. There is no dispute that at present the landlord, his wife, two sons and four grown-up daughters are living in the house, one of the sons living with the Petitioner is also said to have been married. Thus the family is large enough. The three rooms in the first floor of the house on holding No. 643 which at present is in their occupation indeed would not be sufficient for such a large family. It can, therefore, be not doubted that if the landlord asks for more accommodation such claim would be in good faith. 5. Ordinarily the owner is entitled to occupation and enjoyment of his house and he would have full freedom to decide as to which house he would reside in. The House Rent Control Act seeks to control and regulate eviction from tenanted promises and thereby imposes a reasonable restriction on such freedom of the landlord. Sub-section (4) of Section 7 of the Act allows eviction if the need of the landlord for the occupation of the landlord for the occupation of the tenanted premises is in good faith. If the ground floor of the house on holding No. 643 is actually tenanted out the choice of the landlord in asking for eviction of the opposite party No. 1 from the house on holding No. 644 cannot be challenged if his need for more accommodation is bona fide merely because he has not been asking to evict the tenant from the ground floor in the house on holding No. 643. Which house would be more convenient to the landlord for his residential purpose is a matter for the landlord to decide and is not certainly a dispute for the Court to determine. 6. The only question therefore, is to find out whether the ground floor of the house now occupied by the landlord is indeed free or already let out. The evidence led by the Petitioner's son and the tenant should have been weighed carefully by the fact finding authorities under the statute. We find that there are also categorical statements in the evidence of the tenant. The evidence led by the Petitioner's son and the tenant should have been weighed carefully by the fact finding authorities under the statute. We find that there are also categorical statements in the evidence of the tenant. Paragraphs 28, 29 and 30 of the tenant's evidence should have been considered juxtaposed to the evidence of p.w. 1. If both had been taken into account the truth of the matter could have b en found out. We are satisfied that the statutory authorities had not considered the two sets of evidence together and since it is not for us to appreciate evidence in a certiorari petition we think it appropriate to vacate the appellate order and remit the matter to the appellate authority under the statute to consider both the pieces of evidence and come to his conclusion. When relevant evidence is available on record and is omitted from consideration in coming to the conclusion on the only material point and infirmity creeps in it requires correction. 7. We accordingly allow the writ petition issue a writ of certiorari quashing the appellate order of the learned Additional District Magistrate (Judicial) and require him to decide the appeal afresh keeping in view what we have stated above. We direct the parties to bear their own costs. B.K. Ray, J. 8. I agree.