Jugal Kishore v. State of Rajasthan — 1973 DIGILAW 17 (RAJ)

BERI, J.—This appeal and other 285 appeals detailed in Schedule A under sec. 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance are directed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this court dated 18-4-1972 holding that they never acquired any khatedari rights in the agricultural holdings in dispute. 2. The circumstances which it is necessary to notice for the disposal of these appeals briefly stated are these : In the erstwhile State of Bikaner there were two Jagirs called Chhattargarh and Sattasar. Under the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act (Act VI of 1952) these Jagirs were resumed on 1-7-1954, and 15-8-1954 respectively. It is alleged by the petitioners-appellants that prior to the resumption the Jagirdars had admitted them as tenants in their respective agricultural holdings on the rates of rent prevailing in the former State of Bikaner. After resumption the appellants contend that the State of Rajasthan entered the appellants names in the Revenue Record-Dhalband and continued to collect rents from them. 3. On October 15, 1955 the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (hereinafter called "the Tenancy Act") came into force. Under sec. 15 thereof any person who was a tenant became a Khatedar tenant entitled to the rights under the Tenancy Act and the appellants claim that they acquired such rights. On March 17, 1958 however, sec. 15 A was added to the Tenancy Act and it ordained that no Khatedari rights would ever be deemed to have accrued to any occupant of land in the Rajasthan Canal Area on any terms whatsoever notwithstanding anything contained in any law or document or in the Act and such lands shall be deemed to have been let out only temporarily. Sec. 15-A was clearly retrospective. 4. Some of tenants of the former Bikaner State challenged the validity of sec. 15 A of the Tenancy Act before this Court and by its judgment dated 18-7-1972 it declared (Jassuram vs. State AIR 1963 Rajasthan, 72) that the Khatedari rights under sec. 15 amounted to property which belonged to the petitioner and an acquisition of those rights under sec. 15 A offended Art. 31(2) of the Constitution and was ultra vires. 5. 15 A of the Tenancy Act before this Court and by its judgment dated 18-7-1972 it declared (Jassuram vs. State AIR 1963 Rajasthan, 72) that the Khatedari rights under sec. 15 amounted to property which belonged to the petitioner and an acquisition of those rights under sec. 15 A offended Art. 31(2) of the Constitution and was ultra vires. 5. By the 17th Amendment Act, 1964 of the Constitution, which came into force on the 23th June, 1964, the Tenancy Act was included as item No. 55 (with an Explanation added thereto) in the 9th Schedule of the Constitution which inclusions imparted the Act an immunity from attack under Art. 31-B of the Constitution. 6. The State of Rajasthan began to treat the appellants as unauthorised occupants and the authorities issued notices to some of the appellants under sec. 91 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act (hereinafter called "the Revenue Act") and ordered the attachment of appellants5 crop under secs. 22 24 of the Rajasthan Colonisation Act (hereinafter called "the Colonisation Act"). 7. The appellants contested the action of the State of Rajasthan and the Coloni-zalion Authorities; the eight respondents named in the writ petitions under Art. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, inter alia on the grounds that the appellants were Khatedar tenants and could not be described as unauthorised occupants; that they became Khatedar tenants prior to the enactment of sec. 15-A of the Tenancy Act; that sec. 15-A contravenes Art. 31 and 2nd proviso of Art. 31-A(1) because it does not provide any compensation much less compensation at the rate of market value; that the object of taking away the lands from the appellants was not a public purpose because the said lands were being sold at exorbitant prices and, therefore, an appropriate writ may be issued quashing the orders of the Deputy Commissioner Colonization and restraining the respondents from interfering with the appellants possession and then standing crops. 8. The State of Rajasthan contested the appellants writ petitions saying that till the formation of the State of Rajasthan there were only proposals for the Rajasthan Canal Project but in or about the year 1957 the Project was sanctioned and it began to take shape. As soon as the word went round people began to scramble for land likely to be benefitted by the Canal. As soon as the word went round people began to scramble for land likely to be benefitted by the Canal. In this great rush for lands, means, fair and foul, were not spared to grab land. The Jagirdars in the area found it a God sent opportunity to mint money, and by large scale manipulations admitted people to tenancy from back dates. Most of the petitioners were non-cultivators and they lived as far away from lands in question as 200 kilometres and some of them were millionaires who had nothing to do with cultivation as such. Documents were manufactured to show that the petitioners-appellants were admitted to tenancy prior to the coming into force of the Tenancy Act. The State further said that Jassuram vs. State(l) was covered by the Constitution (17th Amendment) Act, 1964 and the whole of the Tenancy Act was included in the 9th Schedule as Item No. 55 and Art. 31-B set at naught the effect of the judgment in Jassurams case (1) as it made provisions in respect of any judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal to the contrary with a non-obstante clause. Art. 31-B makes a special provision in respect of the Acts and Regulations specified in the 9th Schedule. It declares that none of these Acts or any of the provisions thereof shall be deemed to be void or ever to have become void on the ground that such Act or Regulation or provision being inconsistent with or taking any of the rights conferred by any provisions contained in Part III of the Constitution. 9. Before the learned Single Judge an argument was raised that sec. 15 A of the Tenancy Act could be declared as unconstitutional or void being violative of Art-31-A(I) or 19(1)(f) and 31-B of the Constitution despite the amendment of the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution of India by the Constitution (17th Amendment) Act, 1964. The learned Single Judge felt that the question raised was of great importance, as it was likely to have a bearing on the validity of other laws and he, therefore, referred it to a larger Bench. The question came to be considered before the Full Bench. The learned Single Judge felt that the question raised was of great importance, as it was likely to have a bearing on the validity of other laws and he, therefore, referred it to a larger Bench. The question came to be considered before the Full Bench. Jagatnarayan C.J. speaking for the Bench held on the basis of State of Maharashtra vs. Madhavrao ( AIR 1968 S.C. 1395 ) that if an Act is referred to by its title it is intended to refer to that Act with all the amendments made in it upto the date of the reference. It was also contended before the Full Bench that as sec. 15-A did not provide for the payment of compensation at market value for land included within the ceiling limit it was invalid in view of the explanation added to the 9th Schedule. The Full Bench expressed the view that sec. 15-A could not become invalid on that account. The explanation itself laid down that any acquisition made under the Tenancy Act in contravention of the second proviso to Cl. (1) of Art. 31-A shall he void to the extent of the contravention. Therefore only that acquisition to which the explanation applied would become void and not the provisions contained in Sec. 15-A. 10. After the decision by the Full Bench the matter was argued before the learned Single Judge and he by his judgment dated 18th April, 1972 held that he was not prepared to decide the controversial facts in the exercise of his extra-ordinary jurisdiction whether the Girdawaries or other records were manipulated as alleged by the State of Rajasthan. He also held that the protection provided by Art. 31 of the Constitution enures for the benefit of all the amendments to the enactments mentioned in the 9th schedule. The learned Single Judge further held that the provisions of sec. 15-A merely said that any lease, patta or other document in regard to the land situate in the Rajasthan Canal Area if leased out on any terms whatsoever shall be deemed to have been let out temporarily within the meaning of the proviso to the sub-sec. (1) of sec. 15 of the Tenancy Act and no Khatedari rights shall accrue or shall be deemed ever to have accrued in any such land. (1) of sec. 15 of the Tenancy Act and no Khatedari rights shall accrue or shall be deemed ever to have accrued in any such land. This provision in the opinion of the learned Single Judge did not amount to any acquisition of Khatedari rights because none ever accrued to the appellants. Keeping in mind the distinction between the expressions acquisition by the State of any estate or the extinguishment or modification of any such right as used in Art. 31 A the learned Judge held that on account of the operation of sec. 15 A of the Tenancy Act the State of Rajasthan did not acquire any Khatedari rights of the tenant and the same did not vest in the State and it was only a case of extinguishment or modification of certain rights of tenancy in the lands. The learned Single Judge expressed himself thus : "The effect of sec. 15-A is that after it was introduced in the Tenancy Act it shall be taken that no tenant in the Rajasthan Canal area ever acquired Khatedari rights in the lands held by him as tenant as it clearly speaks that no such rights shall be deemed ever to have accrued to him in any land leased out to him in that area. The position of the tenant in Rajasthan Canal Area after S.15-A was enacted was reduced to that of a Ghair Khatedar tenant from 15th October, 1955, when the Rajasthan Tenancy Act came into force as this provision of the law was applied with retrospective effect and therefore it shall be taken that Khatedari rights never accrued to the tenants in Rajasthan Canal area by virtue of sec. 15 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, and the the tenants never became Khatedar tenants and their status notwithstanding sec. 15 of the Act remained as that of Ghair Khatedar tenants." Because the Legislature had power to enact any statute with retrospective effect, in the ultimate analysis, he found that the petitioners who held lands by virtue of sec. 15-A were temporary lessees only in the capacity of Ghair Khatedar tenants. 11. In regard to the lack of the assent of the President, repelling the argument of the learned Advocate General that Art. 31B immunised sec. 15-A were temporary lessees only in the capacity of Ghair Khatedar tenants. 11. In regard to the lack of the assent of the President, repelling the argument of the learned Advocate General that Art. 31B immunised sec. 15 A from an attack on the ground of non-compliance with Art. 31(3) of the Constitution, the learned Single Judge held that no sanction was necessary because sec. 15-A did not relate to the question of acquisition of land as envisaged by Art. 31(3) of the Constitution. 12. As to the argument that the parent Act had received the assent of the President and, therefore, the amendment also needed it, the learned Single Judge held that as the amendment did not introduce any material change in the T. Act the amendt. did not call for any assent of the President. While dismissing the petitions of the appellants the learned Single Judge held that because they were cultivating the lands under the interim orders issued from time to time by the Court and as the petitioners had given an undertaking that they would hand over the lands to the State Govt. with standing crop if they did not succeed, the learned Single Judge did not strictly insist on this condition because the petitioners had been praying land revenue to the State Govt. and they would have to pay for the period during which they cultivated the lands under the interim orders of this Court he held that dictates of justice required that the petitioner should be ordered to handover the lands soon after the standing crop was harvested by them. 13. We have heard M/s B.L. Purohit, M. Mridul and M. B. L. Bhargava on behalf of the appellants. Because the arguments turn on common points, it will be convenient to discuss the arguments under convenient heads. 14. The principal attack against the validity of S. 15 A of the Tenancy Act was that the Raj. Tenancy Amendt. 13. We have heard M/s B.L. Purohit, M. Mridul and M. B. L. Bhargava on behalf of the appellants. Because the arguments turn on common points, it will be convenient to discuss the arguments under convenient heads. 14. The principal attack against the validity of S. 15 A of the Tenancy Act was that the Raj. Tenancy Amendt. Act, 1958, being Act No. VI of 1958 and which received assent of the Governor on the 7-3-1958 and which introduced the section under challenge was invalid because it did not receive the assent of the President, firstly, as required u/Art. 31(3) of the Constitution of India and secondly as required by Art. 31-A (1), 1st proviso and thirdly because u/Art. 254 of the Constitution the Parliament was competent to enact the Land Acquisition Act and S. 15-A ran contrary to it and therefore unless the Raj. Act 6 of 1958 received the assent of the President u/Art. 254(2) it was invalid. 15. Art. 31-B of the Constitution of India reads as under : "31-B. Validation of certain Acts and Regulations— Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in Art. 31-A, none of the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule nor any of the provisions thereof shall be deemed to be void, or ever to have become void, on the ground that such Act, Regulation or provision is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of this Part, and notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal to the contrary, each of the said Acts and Regulations shall, subject to the power of any competent Legislature to repal or amend it, continue in force." It would be necessary to recall the history of Art. 31-A and 31-B for an appreciation of the import of this important Article. Let us borrow the lucid summing up of their Lordships of the Supreme Court on the topic who while dealing with the background of this Article in Sajjan Singh vs. The State of Rajasthan (2), have observed : "It is a matter of general knowledge that it became necessary to add these two provisions in the Constitution, because it was realised that legislative measures adopted by certain States for giving effect to the policy of agrarian reform which was accepted by the party in power, had to face a serious challenge in the courts of law on the ground that they contravened the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens by Part III. These measures had been passed in Bihar, Utter Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, and validity was impeached in the High Courts in the said three States. The High Court of Patna held that the relevant Bihar legislation was unconstitutional, whilst the High Courts at Allahabad and Nagpur upheld the validity of the corresponding legislative measures passed in Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh respectively. (See Kameshwar vs. State of Bihar. AIR 1951 Pat. 91 (SB) and Surya Pal vs. U.P. Government, AIR 1951 All 674 FB.—) The parties aggrieved by these respective decisions had filed appeals by special leave before the Supreme Court...............It was at this stage that Parliament thought it necessary to avoid the delay which would necessarily have been involved in the final decision of the disputes pending before the Supreme Court, and introduced the relevant amendments in the Constitution by adding Art. 31 A and 31 B. That was the first step taken by Parliament to assist the process of legislation to bring about agrarian reform by introducing Art. 31-A end 31-B. The second step in the same direction was taken by Parliament in 1955 by amending Art. 31-A by the Constitution (4th Amendment) Act, 1955. The object of this amendment was to widen the scope of agrarian reform and to confer on the legislative measures adopted in that behalf immunity from a possible attack that they contravened fundamental alights of citizens. In other words, this amendment protected the legislative measures in respect of certain other items of agrarian and social welfare legislation, which affected the proprietary rights of certain citizens................... At this time. 19 Acts were listed in Schedule 9, and they were thus effectively validated. In other words, this amendment protected the legislative measures in respect of certain other items of agrarian and social welfare legislation, which affected the proprietary rights of certain citizens................... At this time. 19 Acts were listed in Schedule 9, and they were thus effectively validated. One more Act was added to this list by the Amendment Act of 1955, so that as a result of the second amendment; the Schedule contained 20 Acts which were validated. It appears that notwithstanding these amendments, certain other legislative measures adopted by different States for the purpose of giving effect to the agrarian policy of the party in power, were effectively challenged.......... Thus, it would be seen that the genesis of the amendments made by Parliament in 1951 by adding Arts. 31-A and 31-B to the Constitution, clearly is to assist the State Legislatures in this country to give effect to the economic policy in which the party in power passionately believes to bring about much needed agrarian reform. It is with the same object that the second amendment was made by Parliament in 1955, and as we have just indicated, the object underlying the amendment made by the impugned Act is also the same. Parliament desires that agrarian reform in a broad and comprehensive sense must be introduced in the interests of a very large section of Indian Citizens who live in villages and whose financial prospects are integrally connected with the pursuit of progressive agrarian policy. Thus, if the pith and substance test is applied to the amendment made by the impugned Act, it would be clear that Parliament is seeking to amend fundamental rights solely with the object of removing any possible obstacle in the fulfilment of the socio-economic policy in which the party in power believes. If that be so, the effect of the amendment on the area over which the High Courts powers prescribed by Art. 226 operate, is incidental and in the present case can be described as of an insignificant order." 16. If that be so, the effect of the amendment on the area over which the High Courts powers prescribed by Art. 226 operate, is incidental and in the present case can be described as of an insignificant order." 16. When analysed Art. 31-B, without shrinking the generality of the provisions contained in Art. 31-A, provides that none of the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule shall be deemed to be void or ever to have become void on the ground that anyone of them was (a) inconsistent with any provisions of Part III of the Constitution or (4) because it took away or abridged any of the rights conferred by any provisions of this part. In our view Art. 31-B protects all the Acts and Regulations specified in the 9th Schedule even if any provision thereof was inconsistent with any provisions of this part or it takes away or abridges any of the rights by any provisions of this Part. The words "any provisions of this Part" govern both the clauses separately. We are persuaded to this view because of the historical background and the need to immunise the measures of agrarian reforms from all possible attack. Our conclusion is strengthened because the clause "or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by" is preceded and followed by commas. It was urged by Mr. Bhargava, learned counsel for some of the appellants, that punctuation must be ignored. He relied on Maharani of Burdwan vs. Murtunjoy Singh(3), where their Lordships observed that it was an error to rely on punctuation in construing the acts of the legislature. In Lewis Pugh Evans Pugh vs. Ashutosh Sen (4) their Lordships observed that commas were no part of the statute. In Jupiter General Insurance Company Ltd., vs. Abdul Aziz(5) the learned Judges observed that it is not always safe to rely on punctuation as a deciding factor in a question of construction of a section. In Niaz Ahmad Khan vs. Parsottam Chandra(6) it is observed that punctuation is no part of the statute and a Court of law is bound to interpret the section without the commas inserted in the print. In Aswini Kumar vs. Arabinda Bose(7) their Lord of the Supreme Court have held that punctuation is after all a minor element in the construction of a statute and very little attention is paid to it by English Courts. In Aswini Kumar vs. Arabinda Bose(7) their Lord of the Supreme Court have held that punctuation is after all a minor element in the construction of a statute and very little attention is paid to it by English Courts. When a statute is carefully punctuated and there is doubt about its meaning, a weight should undoubtedly be given to the punctuation. Punctuation may have its uses in some cases, but it cannot certainly be regarded as a controlling element and cannot be allowed to control the plain meaning of a text. In India Sugars and Refineries Ltd. vs. State of Mysore(8) relying on the aforesaid Supreme Court case of Aswini Kumar vs. Arabindra Bose(7) the learned Judges of the Mysore High Court have observed that punctuation is after all a minor element in the construction of a statute, and very little attention is paid to it by English Courts. When a statute is carefully punctuated and there is doubt about its meaning, weight should undoubtedly be given to the punctuation. 17. In our opinion because the punctuation to which we have adverted earlier was contained in the Bill (See Gazette of India No. 16 Part II sec. 2, dated June 2, 1951 page 399) relating to the First Amendment of the Constitution, it deserves due weight because the Legislature was conscious of its existence at the time of passing the law. After all the object of Art. 31 A was to insulate statutory enactments, which advanced the implementation of the agrarian reform, from attack in courts of law so that the progress in the achievement of the goal which was sacred to the party in power, was not retarded by legal disputes. The plain meaning in these circumstances of Art. 31-B is that even if any provision of the Acts and Regulations of the Ninth Schedule was inconsistent with any provisions of Part III of the Constitution including the provision with regard to the obtaining of the assent from the President as envisaged by Art. 31(3); and Art. 31A(1) second proviso such an enactment shall not be void or ever deemed to be void on account of the non-compliance. It is a complete umbrella against judicial. scrutiny so far as the Act or its provision being inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in Part III of the Constitution was concerned. Therefore, assuming for the sake of argument, that sec. It is a complete umbrella against judicial. scrutiny so far as the Act or its provision being inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in Part III of the Constitution was concerned. Therefore, assuming for the sake of argument, that sec. 15-A of the Tenancy Act required Presidents assent under Art. 31(3) and 31A(1) the attack is effectively answered by the comprehensive protection provided by Art. 31-B of the Constitution. 18. Next comes the attack based on Art. 254 of the Constitution. The Article reads,— 254. Inconsistency between laws made by Parliament and laws made by the legislature of States—If any provision of a law made by the legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament which Parlia-is competent to enact, or to any provision of any existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent list, then, subject to the provisions of clause (2). the law made by Parliament, whether passed before or, after the law made by the Legislature of such State or as the case may be, the existing law. shall prevail and the law made by the Legislature of the State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void. (2) Where a law made by the Legislature of a State with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent list contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter, then, the law so made by the Legislature of such State shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, prevail in that State ; Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law with respect to, the same matter including a law adding, to amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the State." 19. The contention of Mr. Bhargava is that the Rajasthan Tenancy Amending Act (VI of 1958) whereby sec. 15A of the Tenancy Act was introduced was void under Art. 254 of the Constitution because it is a law of acquisition and falls under Entry 42 in the Concurrent list. There was in the field the Land Acquisition Act 1954, enacted by the Central Government, on which field intruded sec. 15A of the Tenancy Act was introduced was void under Art. 254 of the Constitution because it is a law of acquisition and falls under Entry 42 in the Concurrent list. There was in the field the Land Acquisition Act 1954, enacted by the Central Government, on which field intruded sec. 15-A of the Tenancy Act and it could not prevail the Amending Act received the assent of the President of India. As the VI of 1958 was repugnant to a Central law on the same subject it was void under Art. 254 because it did not receive the Presidents assent. The argument of the learned counsel for the State in answer was that the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 did not apply to the territories which immediately before the 1st of November, 1956 were comprised in Part B States and Rajasthan was one of them and, therefore, there was no Central Law in force regarding acquisition in the State of Rajasthan and consequently Art. 254 was not attracted. Mr. Bhargava rejoined that Ajmer was a Part C State upto the 31-10-1956 and it merged under the States Re-organisation Act, 1956 with the United State of Rajasthan on and from the 1-11-1956. The Act applied to that part of the State of Rajasthan which was originally a part C State and became merged in the? United State of Rajasthan from 1-11-1956. The existing law in this part was certainly, central, the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 and the Amending Act VI of 1958 was passed on the 17-3-1958 and it was, therefore, inconsistent and was thus void, unless it received the assent of the President. It is not necessary to examine the argument for the purposes of determining the validity of sec. 15 A of the Tenancy Act under Art. 254 of the Constitution of India because no territory of erstwhile State of Ajmer is involved in the present petitions. Any consideration in regard to that territory would be clearly irrelevant to the controversy before us. In so far as the State of Rajasthan including the area in which the lands in dispute are situate the land Acquisition Act, 1894 was not applicable and, therefore, the argument fails on that broad ground. We are in complete agreement with the learned Single Judge for the reasons given by him that sec. 15 A does not have the effect acquiring any property. We are in complete agreement with the learned Single Judge for the reasons given by him that sec. 15 A does not have the effect acquiring any property. It merely denied to the appellants the possibility of acquiring any Khatedari right. Therefore, if sec. 15 A does not amount to an acquisition the conflict of Central Law and the State law under entry 42 of the Concurrent List does not survive and it need not detain us. 20. It was urged by Mr. B. L. Purohit that sec. 15-A of the Tenancy Act is not applicable to the appellants, namely, his clients because the Rajasthan Canal area as employed in sec. 15-A has not been defined in the Tenancy Act. This ground has not been raised in all the petitions. It is correct that in some of the petitions such a ground has been taken. In the judgment of the learned Single Judge, however, this point appears to have been urged only by Miss Bhuvnesh Kumari, learned counsel for Lt. Col. Himmat Singh and others which five connected appeals are before us and which we propose to decide by separate judgment. As the point, had been taken in some of the petitions and urged before us without any objection from the State we think it necessary to decide it. 21. In the Government reply to the writ petition No. 1768/69 paragraph 1 it is clearly stated that there are 424 writ petitions pending in the Court which relate to the lands in certain villages of the erstwhile Jagir of Chhatargarh. The villages are as follows : S.No. Name of village. Name of Colonisation Tehsil. 1 Ghadsana Ghadsana 2 Momenwala —do— 3 Sutrana Ghadsana 4 Jeewandesar —do— 5 Chak Kamrana —do— 6 Sardarpura alias Phulewala —do— 7 Anand ka Bera —do— 8 Chaksera —do— 9 Kamrana —do— 10 Panpalia Ghadsana & Bijaynagar 11 Lunia Raisinghnagar 12 Deali Chhatargarh No. 1. In the affidavit filed by the State it is urged that these villages constitute a compact block and all of them are now being irrigated by the water of the Anuparh branch of the Rajasthan Canal, its distributaries and its minors. In answer to the writ petition No. 484/70 the State in paragraph 1 has stated that there are 68 writ petitions pending in this Court which relate to the lands in certain villages of erstwhile Jagir of Sattasar. In answer to the writ petition No. 484/70 the State in paragraph 1 has stated that there are 68 writ petitions pending in this Court which relate to the lands in certain villages of erstwhile Jagir of Sattasar. These villages are :— S.No. Name of Village. Name of Colonisation Tehsil 1 Sattasar Chhatargarh No. 2 2 Kakrala —do— 3 Hasiawas Nil 4 Anandgarh Chhatargarh No. 1 5 Meergarh —do— 6 Phulsar —do— 7 Rawala —do— It is stated on behalf of the State that these 68 writ petitions relate to lands situate in only 4 out of the aforesaid 7 villages. The number of writ petitions is shown against the name of such villages. These four villages are comprised in a compact block in the Jagir of Sattasar. In paragraph 18 of the reply it is stated that through these 4 villages viz. Anandgarh, Meergarh, Phulesar and Pawala "the Anupgarh Branch of the Rajasthan Canal, with its distributaries and minors passes." From this Branch no less than 4 distributaries spread out through these villages. Quite a good number of minors have also been constructed for irrigating fields in these villages. This statement has been supported by an affidavit sworn by the Deputy Commissioner Colonization, Jaipur, and we have no reason to disbelieve the correctness thereof. These two statements cover the entire 492 writ petitions filed before the learned Single Judge out of which the present 286 appeals arise. 22. The learned Single Judge in his judgment under appeal has referred to two Notifications, the one is dated May 10, 1956 published in Part I (kha) of the Rajasthan Gazette dated July 14, 1956, whereby the Rajasthan Colonization Act, 1954 was applied to the villages where petitioners lands are situate. By another Notification issued in exercise of the powers conferred under sec. 106 of the Land Revenue Act, 1956 the Rajasthan Government directed the resurvey of the area mentioned in the said Notification. This Notification is dated November 15, 1957 and was published in the Rajasthan Gazette of July 10, 1958 Part I (Kha). By another Notification issued in exercise of the powers conferred under sec. 106 of the Land Revenue Act, 1956 the Rajasthan Government directed the resurvey of the area mentioned in the said Notification. This Notification is dated November 15, 1957 and was published in the Rajasthan Gazette of July 10, 1958 Part I (Kha). In this Notification the villages that have been mentioned are shown as the villages coming under the Rajasthan Canal Project and the villages relating to which these appeals have been filed have been shown in this Notification and, therefore, the learned Single Judge concluded that it is not open to the petitioners to say that the Rajasthan Canal Area has not been notified by the State Government. 23. The argument of Mr. Purohit is that those Notifications were published prior to the Rajasthan Tenancy Amendment Act, 1958, in which the term "Rajasthan Canal Area" has been used and, therefore, these Notifications are of no help. 24. It would be correct to say that there is neither any Notification nor any statutory provision which precisely demarcates the Rajasthan Canal Area. We have, however, not been shown any law which requires the State Government to delineate the exact boundaries of the Rajasthan Canal Area. There are two methods available for ascertaining the meaning of the expression. The one, which has been adopted by the learned Single Judge, namely, by reference to the Notifications and the other is to give the expression its natural meaning. 25. If we were to read these Notifications that have been referred to by the learned Single Judge alongwith another Notification in this context the term "Rajasthan Canal Area" is fairly ascertainable. By a notification of the 10th May, 1956 published in Part I (Kha) of the Rajasthan Gazette dated July 14, 1956 Rajasthan Colonization Act, 1954 was applied to the villages where the appellants lands are situate. This Notification is No. F(513) Rev. (B)/55 dated 10-5-1956. There is another Notification bearing No. 6(513) Rev.(b)/55 dated the 10th May, 1956 published in the Rajasthan Gazette dated May 19, 1956 Part 1(b), which reads,— "In exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to sec. 15 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (No. 3 of 1955), the Govt. of Rajasthan is pleased to order that no khatedari rights shall accrue under sec. 15 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (No. 3 of 1955), the Govt. of Rajasthan is pleased to order that no khatedari rights shall accrue under sec. 15 of the said Act to any tenant to whom land is or has been let temporarily in the area notified as colony by this Government notification No. F. 6(513; Rev. (B;/55 dated the 10th May, 1956." The above notification has a reference to the earlier notification No. F.(513) Rev. B/55 of 10-5-1956. The combined effect of these two notifications is that no Khatedari rights shall accrue under sec. 15 in favour of those to whom lands had been let out temporarily in the area notified as colony. These two notifications do not employ the term"Rajasthan Canal Area" as such. The term, however, is indirectly ascertainable by reference to the notification of July 10, 1958 published in Part I (Kha) of Rajasthan Gazette where under the table of Rajasthan Canal Project the villages in question have been included and from these three notifications it is permissible to conclude what the Rajasthan Canal Area implies. The argument of Mr. Purohit that these notifications came into being earlier than the expression Rajasthan Canal Area" by the Rajasthan Tenancy Amendment Act, 1958 is chronologically correct. The Legislature employed the expression in 1958 obviously assuming that it was a very well understood term. 26. Mr. Bhargava and Mr. Purohit contended that the plain meaning of the term Rajasthan Canal area should mean the land on which the canal flows. We have no difficulty in rejecting the contention. It is plain that the lands in the area had little value prior to the arrival of the precious water of the canal. The land on which the water flows could not but be a small strip of land. Could it be this strip of land laden with water wherein Khatedari rights were intended to be excluded. ? The answer is plainly in the negative. An interpretation before it is acceptable has to be reasonable. However, the plain meaning of the term "Rajasthan Canal Area" can be ascertained in the context in which it has been used in the statute like any other expression. Rajasthan Canal is the name given to a canal project which has to pass through Rajasthan and is very easily ascertainable. An interpretation before it is acceptable has to be reasonable. However, the plain meaning of the term "Rajasthan Canal Area" can be ascertained in the context in which it has been used in the statute like any other expression. Rajasthan Canal is the name given to a canal project which has to pass through Rajasthan and is very easily ascertainable. The word which calls for interpretation is "area." The plain meaning in this context of the word "area" is "a part of the earth surface, region or track" (See Websters New Twentieth Century Dictionary, 2nd Edition, page 99). The part of the earth surface will have to take its colour from the preceding words "Rajasthan Canal." In our opinion so far as the lands of the appellants are concerned which are served by the Rajasthan Canal or its distributaries or its minors there can be no doubt they are situated in that part of the earths surface which can legitimately be called Rajasthan Canal area. We have no reason to disbelieve the affidavits filed by the Deputy Commissioner Colonisation, Jaipur, who says that the villages covered by the 492 petitions, from which these 286 appeals arise, are clearly covered by the expression "Rajasthan Canal Area." 27. The last argument urged by the learned counsel for the appellants was that even assuming that See. 15-A was valid the petitioners could not be described as unauthorised occupants or trespassers and they could not be ousted except by ordinary process of law. The learned Single Judge has treated the petitioners as persons to whom the lands had been leased out temporarily. In our opinion that conclusion is correct because that precisely is the language of sec. 15-A which lays down that notwithstanding anything contained in sec. 15 of the Act or any other law for the time being in force or in any lease, patta or other document, land in the Rajasthan Canal area leased out on any terms whatsoever shall be deemed to have been let out temporarily within the meaning of the proviso to the said sub-section of the said sec. 15 of the Tenancy Act. Sec. 14 of the Tenancy Act speaks of four classes of tenants, namely, (a) Khatedar tenants, (aa) Maliks, (b) Tenants of Khudkasht, and (c) Ghair Khatedar tenants, Under sec. 15 of the Tenancy Act. Sec. 14 of the Tenancy Act speaks of four classes of tenants, namely, (a) Khatedar tenants, (aa) Maliks, (b) Tenants of Khudkasht, and (c) Ghair Khatedar tenants, Under sec. 17 the Ghair Khatedar tenant has been defined to mean every tenant of land in any part of the State other than a Khatedar tenant, a tenant of Khudkasht or a sub-tenant shall be a Ghair Khatedar tenant. Under sec. 38 the interest of a tenant in his holding is heritable but not transferable. In sec. 45(3) it is provided that no Ghair Khatedar tenant shall sub-let the whole or any part of his holding for a term exceeding one year. Under sec. 161 no tenant shall be ejected from his holding otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Under sec. 180 there are additional provisions for ejectment of Ghair-khatedar tenants. Sec. 181 provides for application and notice for ejectment and sec. 182 provides for the procedure subsequent to the issue of notice. Sec. 183, however, provides that notwithstanding anything to the contrary! in any provision of this Act, a trespasser who has taken or retained possession of any land without lawful authority shall be liable to ejectment, subject to the provision contained in sub-sec. (2), on the suit of the person or persons entitled to admit him as tenant, and sub-sec. (2) of sec. 183 provides that in case of land which is held directly from the State Government is entitled to admit the trespasser an tenant the Tehsildar shall proceed in accordance with the provisions of S. 91 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956. 28. The question is whether the appellants could be treated as trespassers. The petitioners claim to have been admitted to tenancy by the former Jagirdar and in many cases land revenue was collected by the State from them. The learned Single Judge has given them the label of Ghair Khatedar tenants. We are unable to call the appellants as trespassers nor did learned Single Judge consider them to be so. The law makes a clear and sharp distinction between a trespasser and an erstwhile tenant. The possession of the trespasser is never juridical and never protected by law while the possession of the erstwhile tenant is juridical and he can only be ejected in accordance with the process of law. 29. The law makes a clear and sharp distinction between a trespasser and an erstwhile tenant. The possession of the trespasser is never juridical and never protected by law while the possession of the erstwhile tenant is juridical and he can only be ejected in accordance with the process of law. 29. The learned Single Judge in the last paragraph of his judgment observed that notwithstanding the fact that the appellants had given an undertaking that if their petitions were ultimately dismissed by this court, they will hand over the lands to the State Government with the standing crop, the learned Single Judge directed that the petitioners appellants shall hand over the lands held by them to the Government soon after the present standing crop is harvested by them. On the question of fact whether the appellants had given any such undertaking there is a dispute. The learned Single Judge had passed on order on 5-5-1971, whereby in the interest of justice he extended the operation of the stay order passed in each case from time to time and allowed the petitioners to cultivate the lands for kharif crop provided they kept the account of the produce harvested by them from the lands and he made it clear that if the petitions were not decided in favour of the petitioner before the harvesting of the next Kharif crop, then the petitioners shall have to handover the standing crops to the Government as agreed before. An application dated 8-5-1971 was moved in writ petition No. 375/70 seeking a clarification of the order dated 5-5-1971 passed in the case of Maharaja Himmat Singh vs. State of Rajasthan : S.B. Civil writ Petition No. 1127/70 and the learned Judge clarified the position in his order dated 14-5-1971 in the following words— "The order passed by this court on 5-5-71 shall govern those eight cases only in which Mr. Chhagla and Princess Bhuvnesh Kumari appeared. In other cases the old stay order shall continue for the next Kharif crops only." We asked the learned counsel for the State if there was any undertaking by the appellants to hand over the land in their possession in the event of their petitions failing and he could not point out to us any such order. Therefore it appears that there is some factual error. Therefore it appears that there is some factual error. At no point of time did the appellants in these appeals give any undertaking to hand over the possession of their lands should their petitions fail. This part of the judgment of the learned Single Judge, which proceeds on the basis of the assumed undertaking given by the appellants before us, is set aside. 30. The learned Single Judge in the penultimate paragraph of his judgment dated 18-4-72 has observed that the petitioners have been cultivating the lands under the interim orders issued from time to time by this court. They had given a definite undertaking that if their petitions were ultimately dismissed by this Court, they would handover the lands to the State Government with the standing crop, but looking to the circumstances that the petitioners have been paying land revenue to the State Government and that they would pay the land revenue for the period for which they have been cultivating these lands under the interim orders of this Court, he felt that it will be in the interest of justice if the petitioners were to hand over the lands held by them to the Government soon after the present standing crop was harvested by them." As we have noticed earlier, such an undertaking was not given by the appellants before us and the learned Single Judge has proceeded under an erroneous impression. On 1-11-1972 we had asked the learned counsel for the parties to give us a detailed analysis of the petitions in which notices under sec. 22 of the Rajasthan Act, 1954 were issued and the cases in which notices under sec. 91 of the Rajasthan Revenue Act were given in these bunch of appeals. The details were submitted on 27-11-72, 29-11-72 and 6-12-72. The details given by the learned counsel far the State have not been contested. Incidentally, some of the learned counsel have tried to introduce certain new arguments in the garb of presenting the analysis. We regret, we cannot entertain those arguments at this stage. From the analysis given by the learned counsel for the State it appears that in writ petitions from which appeals are before us and which are detailed in Schedule B to this judgment, notices under sec. 22 of the Colonisation Act were issued. These notices have been challenged in the petitions. From the analysis given by the learned counsel for the State it appears that in writ petitions from which appeals are before us and which are detailed in Schedule B to this judgment, notices under sec. 22 of the Colonisation Act were issued. These notices have been challenged in the petitions. While disposing of the D. B. Special Appeal No. 578 to 577 of 1972 we have found that sec. 22 of the Colonisation Act is ultra vires being violative of Art. 14 and 19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India, because the power conferred by this section is unguided and absolute, discriminatory and violative of the right of equality guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution. This is manifest also on the ground that on the showing of the learned counsel for the State, in 13 cases proceedings were initiated under the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956, while in 14 cases action was taken under sec. 22 of the Colonization Act. These two powers residing in the Executive Officers are materially different. There are two appeals provided in proceeding initiated under sec. 91 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, while no appeal is envisaged under the provisions of sec. 22 of the Colonisation Act. In fact, an action under sec. 22 of the Colonisation Act does not require even a notice to the party whose land is sought to be re-entered upon. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the proceedings under sec. 22 of the Colonisation Act in the 14 appeals detailed in Schedule B to this judgment must be and are hereby set aside and quashed. 31. In 13 appeals detailed in Schedule C to this judgment, the proceedings under sec. 91 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act have been taken. The appellants desired us to hold that they are not unauthorised occupants to whom sec. 91 would apply. A number of documents for the payment of revenue and abiana (water charges) have been filed. These are matters of detail and the procedure provided by the Revenue Law with a right of two appeals is the place where questions relating to the applicability or otherwise of sec. 91 could be decided. 91 would apply. A number of documents for the payment of revenue and abiana (water charges) have been filed. These are matters of detail and the procedure provided by the Revenue Law with a right of two appeals is the place where questions relating to the applicability or otherwise of sec. 91 could be decided. We express no opinion whether that section is applicable to the appellants or not, because several questions of facts will have to be gone into, which we are not inclined to entertain in these special appeals. It is not for us to advise the Government as to what action it will take in case it desires to evict the appellants. We modify the judgment of the learned Single Judge by holding that in the 14 appeals detailed in Schedule B to this judgment the proceedings under sec. 22 of the Rajasthan Colonization Act are quashed and that the appellants if they are to be evicted shall be evicted only in accordance with law. 32. To the extent indicated above, these appeals are allowed and the costs shall be easy.