JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - The appellant, Sarfaraz Ahmad Khan filed a writ petition challenging an order of the Election Tribunal whereby his election as Chairman, Town Area, Bugarasi district Bulandshahr, was set aside. For the said office of Chairman there were three candidates, the appellant Sarfaraz Ahmad Khan, and respondent Nos. 2 and 3, Mohammad Abdul Salam Khan and Ausaf Ahmad Khan. The appellant secured 1265 votes while the second and the third respondents secured 780 and 703 votes respectively. The appellant was declared elected. Thereafter Mohammad Abdul Salam Khan, respondent No. 2 filed an election petition. The election petition was allowed on the ground that the appellant was disqualified from being chosen as Chairman in view of the provisions of Sec. 6-K of the Town Area Act inasmuch as he had been dismissed from service under the Delhi Police Force. The Election Tribunal further directed respondent No. 2 to be declared elected. The writ petition filed by the appellant was dismissed. The learned Single Judge also set aside the order of the Tribunal directing respondent No. 2 to be declared elected and directed the Tribunal to decide the question as to whether respondent No. 2, was entitled to be declared elected or not in the light of the observations made by him in the judgment. Against this judgment two appeals have been filed. Sarfaraz Ahmad Khan filed Special Appeal No. 34 of 1973 while Mohd. Abdul Salam Khan filed Special Appeal No. 36 of 1973. 2. Learned counsel for Sarfaraz Ahmad Khan has made two submissions in support of his appeal. Firstly that under Rule 48-C the Election Tribunal had jurisdiction to set aside the election of a candidate elected as a Chairman only on the ground that he was not qualified to be nominated as a candidate. It was urged that the words "not qualified to be nominated as a candidate" do not include the person who was disqualified for being chosen. According to him the question as to whether any candidate was fit for being chosen as a candidate exclusively fell within the jurisdiction of the Returning Officer and it could not be made the subject-matter of an election petition. Secondly that the appellant could not be said to be a dismissed servant within the meaning of Sec. 6-K of the Act. Secondly that the appellant could not be said to be a dismissed servant within the meaning of Sec. 6-K of the Act. With regard to the first submission it is to be pointed out that Sec. 6-K of the Act which provides for the disqualification in this regard is in these terms : - "A person, notwithstanding that he is otherwise qualified, shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member or Chairman of a Committee if he - (a) is a dismissed servant of a local authority, the State or Central Government and is debarred from reemployment therein, or (b) ..................." 3. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon Sec. 6-J and Sec. 8-A(l) of the Act. The relevant portion of Sec. 6-J provides that:- "A person shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill a seat on a committee, unless - (a) ....................... (b) in the case of any other scat, he is an elector for any ward in the Town Area. " Section 8-A(l) provides: "The chairman of every committee shall be an elector of the town area." According to learned counsel for the purposes of determining whether the appellant was qualified for being elected as a Chairman the only thing required to be looked into was whether the appellant was an elector for any ward in the Town Area or not and this was the limited question which could have been gone into by the Election Tribunal. He tried to draw a distinction in the phraseology of Rule 22(2) and Rule 48-C. Rule 22(2) provides:- "The Returning Officer shall then examine the nomination papers and shall decide all objections which may be made to any nomination, and may, either on such objection or on his own motion, after such summary enquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary, rejected any nomination on any of the following grounds, namely - (a) that on the date fixed for the scrutiny of nominations the candidate either is not qualified to be chosen to fill the seat under the Act or is disqualified for being chosen to fill the seat under the Act; or (b) .................." Rule 48-C on the other hand uses only the words "was not qualified to be nominated as a candidate.". On the distinction of the phraseology between the two rules it was submitted that whereas the Returning Officer was given the authority to reject a nomination paper on both these grounds, namely, that he was not qualified to be chosen and also on the ground that he was disqualified for being chosen, whereas Rule 48 does not provide for the latter contingency. We are, however, not impressed by this argument. The rules are framed for carrying out the intention of the Act. The relevant portion of Sec. 6-K a quoted above specifically provides for a disqualification for being chosen or for being a member or Chairman. In other words if a candidate comes within the purview of Sec. 6-K he is not entitled to be chosen or for being a member of the Committee. It is in this -context that the rules have to be interpreted. Viewed from this angle there seems to be no manner of doubt that the language used in Rule 48-C is comprehensive enough to include even such candidates who are disqualified under Sec. 6-K. In this view of the matter the first submission made by the learned counsel has no substance. 4. In support of his second submission learned counsel again placed reliance on Sec. 6-K. It was urged that upon a reading of the said section the disqualification of a person who was dismissed servant of a local authority or the State or Central Government would operate only if he was debarred from re-employment therein. According to the learned counsel simply because the appellant had been dismissed from Delhi Police Force it cannot be said that he was debarred from re-employment in any service under the Delhi State. In this connection reliance was placed on Section 7 of the Police Act. The relevant portion of Section 7 reads : - "Subject to the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution, and to such rules as the State Government may from time to time make under this Act, the Inspector-General, Deputy Inspectors-General, Assistant Inspector-General and District Superintendents of Police may at any time dismiss, suspend or reduce any Police Officer of the subordinate ranks whom they shall think remiss or negligent in the discharge of his duty or unfit far the same; or may award any one or more of the following punishments ............... (c) removal from any office of distinction or special emolument." Sec. 7 of the Police Act does not make any distinction between an order of dismissal or removal except in the cases of removal from any office of distinction or special emolument. In this view of the matter it is clear that the word `dismiss' used in Section 7 includes removal also. Every case of dismissal, therefore, would not be one where the dismissed employee would be debarred from being re-employed. It would have to be determined whether his dismissal was a dismissal as such within the meaning of Art. 311 of the Constitution or it was a case of removal. Rule 16(2) (iii) of the Punjab Police Rules provides:- "When a Police Officer is convicted judicially and dismissed, or dismissed as a result of a departmental enquiry, consequence of correct practices, the conviction and dismissal and its cause shall be published in the Police Gazette. In other cases of dismissal, when it is desired to ensure that the officer dismissed shall not be re-employed elsewhere, full descriptive roll, with particulars of the punishments, shall be sent for publication in the Police Gazette." Subsequent portion of the aforesaid rule makes it clear that in cases of dismissal other than mentioned the earlier part when it is desired to ensure that the officer dismissed shall not be re-employed elsewhere, a full it descriptive roll has to be sent for publication in the Police Gazette. It implies that there can be cases where even though an order of dismissal of a Government servant was passed yet it was not desired to ensure that he may not be re-employed elsewhere. The question as to whether the appellant had been dismissed in such a manner that he was not desired to be re-employed elsewhere cannot be made the subject matter of surmises. It has to be proved as a fact that he was a person who had been dismissed with the desire not to be re-employed elsewhere. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on Rule 16(2) (1) of the said Rules which reads : - "Dismissal shall be awarded only for the gravest acts of misconduct or as the cumulative effect of continued misconduct proving incorrigibility and complete unfitness for police service. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on Rule 16(2) (1) of the said Rules which reads : - "Dismissal shall be awarded only for the gravest acts of misconduct or as the cumulative effect of continued misconduct proving incorrigibility and complete unfitness for police service. In making such an award, regard shall be had to length of service of the officer and his claim to pension." On the basis of this rule it was urged that an order of dismissal could be passed only if the officer had been found unfit for police service. That may be true, but that is not enough to attract the provisions of See. 6-K of the Act which requires that the dismissal should be such which debars the person dismissed from re-employment in any service of the State and not only as a police officer. Rule 16(2) (1), therefore, can assist the respondents only to this extent that from the order of the dismissal it may be taken that the appellant was debarred from being re-employed in the police force having been found to be unfit for the said service, but nonetheless it cannot be deduced from the fact of dismissal of the appellant that he was debarred from being re-employed in any capacity in the service of the State. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant has urged that there was no evidence, before the Election Tribunal to indicate as to whether the appellant had been debarred from being re-employed in any service in the Stale Government. None has been brought to our notice. In this view of the matter we are of opinion that the necessary ingredients of Sec. 6-K of the Act were not proved and the Election Tribunal committed a manfiest error of law in taking the view that the appellant was disqualified for being elected as Chairman. In the circumstances, it is not necessary to decide the Special Appeal No. 66 of 1973 on merits because if the order passed in the Election Petition is quashed the said appeal automatically becomes infructuous. 7. In the result Special Appeal No. 34 of 1973, filed by Sarfaraz Ahmad Khan is allowed, the judgment oi the learned Single Judge is set aside, the writ petition is allowed, the order of the Election Tribunal is quashed and the election petition is dismissed. Special Appeal No. 66 of 1973 is dismissed. 7. In the result Special Appeal No. 34 of 1973, filed by Sarfaraz Ahmad Khan is allowed, the judgment oi the learned Single Judge is set aside, the writ petition is allowed, the order of the Election Tribunal is quashed and the election petition is dismissed. Special Appeal No. 66 of 1973 is dismissed. The appellant in Special Appeal No. 34 of 1973 will be entitled to his costs but there will be no order as to costs in Special Appeal No. 66 of 1973.