( 1 ) IN these petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution, the validity of sub-rules (3) and (7) of Rule 154 of the Mysore Motor Vehicles Rules, 1963, (hereinafter reared to as the Rules), has been assailed. ( 2 ) THE petitioners are operators of stage carriages. They intended to display advertisement signboards on their stage carriages. They feel aggrieved by the requirement to pay (i) licence fee to obtain licences to carry such signboards on their stage carriages, and (ii) fee for renewal of such licences. ( 3 ) THE Government of Mysore made the Rules in exercise of the powers conferred by Secs. 21, 21 (j), 41, 65, 68, 70, 91, 105 and 111 (A) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). Rule 154 purports to have been made under S. 68 of the Act. The material portions of that Section, as it stood in the year 1963 when that Rule was made, reads :" 68. Power to make rules for the purpose of this Chapter : (1) A State Government may make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this chapter (Chaptier IV ). (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, rules under this Section may be made with respect to all or any of the following matters, namely : (c) regulating the painting or making of transport vehicles and the display of advertising matter thereon and in particular prohibiting the painting or marking of transport vehicles in such colour or manner as to induce any person to believe that the vehicle is used for the transport of mails. " ( 4 ) THE relevant portions of Rule 154 read :" 154. Licence for Advertisement : - (1) No advertisement board shall be carried, on any stage carriage, except under a licence obtained under this Rule. (2) Any permit holder desirous of obtaining licence for exhibiting advertisements in any stage carriage shall make an application in form No. 80 L. Ad. A to the Regional Transport Authority of the region by whom the permit to ply the vehicle is granted. (3) The fee for issue of a licence shall be Rs. 50 and a separate licence shall be obtained in respect of each vehicle. A to the Regional Transport Authority of the region by whom the permit to ply the vehicle is granted. (3) The fee for issue of a licence shall be Rs. 50 and a separate licence shall be obtained in respect of each vehicle. (4) * * * * * (7) Every application for the renewal of a. licence shall be made before the expiry of the period of licence and accompanied by a fee of Rs. 25 and in Form 80 L. Ad. A and any application made after the expiry of the period shall be considered as an application for a fresh licence. " ( 5 ) SEC. 73 of the Motor Vehicles (Amendmet) Act, 1969, (Central act 56 of 1969) (hereinafter referred to as the Amending Act) inserted a new S. 132a, in Chapter X of the Act. S. 73 of the Amendment Act came into force on 2-3-1970. The material part of S. 13. 2a reads : " 132a. Power to levy fee-Any rule which the Central Government or the State Government is empowered to make under this Act may, notwithstanding the absence of any express provision to that effect, provide for the levy of such fees in respect of applications, amendment of documents, issue of certificates, licences, permits. . . . . . " ( 6 ) MR. Shivashankar Bhat, learned Counsel for the petitioners, contended that sub-rules (3) and (7) of Rule 154 were ultra vires of the Act, as it stood before the insertion of S. 132a, in as much as none of the provisions of the Act specially empowered making rules for levying fee either for grant of licence or for renewal thereof, that hence those sub-rules were non est when they were made and that subsequent conferment on 2-3-1970 by S. 132a, of the power to make rules for levy offees, could not vitalise those sub-rules. ( 7 ) ANOTHER ground on which Mr. ( 7 ) ANOTHER ground on which Mr. Sivashankar Bhat assailed sub- rules (3) and (7) of Rule 154, was that the levy of licence fee without the authority of law, would amount to imposition of an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of a citizen to carry on business, trade or profession and that as the Government had, when it made sub-rules (3) and (7) of Rule 154, no authority to make rules levying fee, those sub-rules which were violative of the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19 (1), (g) of the Constitution, were null and void and did not get validity after s. 132a empowered rules being made for levy of fee. ( 8 ) IN B. C. Banerjee v. State of MP. , AIR. 1971 SC. . 517. the Supreme Court held that no tax can be imposed by any bye-law or rule or regulation unless the statute under which the subordinate legislation is made, specially authorises such imposition, even if it be assumed that the power to tax can be delegated to the executive. Their Lordships adored that the rule- making authority has no plenary power, but has to act within the limits of the power granted to it. ( 9 ) FOLLOWING the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, a Bench of this Court of which I was a member, held in Bombay Saw Mills v. State of Mysore, (1972) 1 Mys. L. J. 164. that sub-rules (2) and (4) of Rule 163 of the Mysore forest Rules, 1963, which provided for levy of fea for grant and renewal of licences for saw mills and other saw contrivances, were ultra vires of the Mysore Forest Act, 1963, and hence void. ( 10 ) BEFORE S. 132a was inserted in the Act, there was no provision in s. 68 or any other Section of the Act which specially authorised levy of fee for grant or renewal of licences for carrying advertisement signboards on stage carriages. Hence, sub-rules (3) and (7) of Rule 154 were undoubtedly ultra vires of the Act when they were made by the Government in the year 1963. ( 11 ) THE question is whether those two sub-rules were revived and restored to life when S. 132a came into force on 2-3-1970. ( 12 ) NEITHER Mr. Hence, sub-rules (3) and (7) of Rule 154 were undoubtedly ultra vires of the Act when they were made by the Government in the year 1963. ( 11 ) THE question is whether those two sub-rules were revived and restored to life when S. 132a came into force on 2-3-1970. ( 12 ) NEITHER Mr. Shivashankar Bhat nor the learned Government advocate was able to place any decision directly on the question whether a rule which is ultra vires of an Act of the legislature when it is made, can be revived and resuscitated subsequently when the rule making authority gets power under that Act to make such rules. It appears to me that we can look for guidance on this question from the analogy of the legislative power. The legal position when a legislature purports to enact a law on a topic not within its legislative competence, and subsequently the legislature is conferred the legislative competence to make such law, has been explained in the following decisions of the Supreme Court. ( 13 ) IN M. P. Sundararamier and Co. v. State of AP. , AIR 1958 SC. 468 Venkatarama aiyar, J. , who spoke for the Court said at page 489 that if the unconstitutionally of a statute arises because the law is in respect of a matter not within the competence of the legislature, then such law is absolutely null and void, that a subsequent cession of that field to the legislatures will not have the effect of breathing life into what was a still-born piece of legislation and that a fresh legislation on the subject would be requisite. ( 14 ) IN Deepchand v. State of UP. , AIR. 1959 SC. 648. Subba Rao, J. , (as he then was), who delivered the majority judgment, said at page 657 that the validity of a statute has to be tested by the constitutional power of a legislature at the time of its enactment by that legislature and that if thus tested, it (the statute) is beyond the legislative power, it is not rendered valid without re-enactment, if later, by a constitutional amendment, the necessary legislative power is granted. His Lordship added that an after acquired power cannot ex proprio vigro, validate a statute void when enacted. His Lordship added that an after acquired power cannot ex proprio vigro, validate a statute void when enacted. ( 15 ) THE Supreme Court has consistently held that a law on a topic not within the competence of a legislature, is absolutely null and void, that a subsequent cession of that legislative topic to the legislature, would hot revive the law which was still born and that the law would have to be re-enacted. What applies to a law made by the legislature when it lacks the legislative competence, must, in my opinion, equally apply to a rule made by thja rule-making authority at a time when it had no power to make such rules. Such a rule is absolutely null and void and subsequent conferment on that authority the power to make such rule, would not revive the rule which was still born and that rule will have to be made again by that authority after it is conferred such power. ( 16 ) WHEN sub-rules (3) and (7) of Rule 154 were made in the year 1963, they were ultra vires and hence absolutely null and void for want of power to make them and the subsequent conferment by S. 132a of the Act on. 2-3-1970 the power to make them, did not revive them. The only way in which those sub-rules could be rendered valid and effective, was to make them again on or after 2-3-1970. But the State Government has not done so. ( 17 ) HOWEVER, the learned Government Advocate contended that s. 132a of the Act must be regarded as a declaratory piece of legislation which is. retrospective in operation and that hence sub-rules (3) and (7) of Rule 154 should be regarded as being intra vires and having been validly made from their inception. According to the learned Government Advocate, section 132a was enacted to remove any ambiguity or doubt as to the competence of the rule-making authority to make rules providing for levy of fee. He referred to the Statement of objects and reasons appended to the; Motor Vehicles Amendment Bill which ultimately became the Amendment Act. According to the learned Government Advocate, section 132a was enacted to remove any ambiguity or doubt as to the competence of the rule-making authority to make rules providing for levy of fee. He referred to the Statement of objects and reasons appended to the; Motor Vehicles Amendment Bill which ultimately became the Amendment Act. According to that statement, the validity of rules levying fee for various purposes connected with the administration of the Act, was open to doubt in the absence of the specific provision in the Act authorising the levy of fees for those purposes and the proposed S. 132a sought to remove sueh doubt. ( 18 ) IN Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arvind Bose, AIR. 1952 SC. 369. Patanjali Sastri, cj. ; who spoke for the Court, said that the statement of objects and reasons appended to a legislative Bill, seeks only to explain what Reasons induced the mover of the Bill in the House of Legislature and what objects he sought to achieve and that such statement should be ruled out as an aid to construction of a statute. ( 19 ) THE legal position that no tax can be imposed by any rule unless the Act under which such rule is made specially authorises such imposition, did not, in my opinion, admit of any doubt at any time. The addition, of S. 132a by the Amendment Act, cannot be said to be a declaratory piece of legislation to remove any doubt or ambiguity. That Section was enacted to confer for the first time, on the rule making authority the power to make rules for imposition of fee. Hence, S. 132a is only prospective in operation and had not validated rules which were invalid when they were made. ( 20 ) IN the view I have taken, it becomes unnecessary to consider the second ground urged by Mr. Sivashankar Bhat, namely, that sub-rules (3) and (7) of Rule-154 are void as they infringe the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution by imposing an unreasonable restriction in the form of an unauthorised licence fee, on the right to carry on trade, business or profession. ( 21 ) THE learned Government Advocate however contended that these petitions were liable to be dismissed in limine on account of inordinate delay on the part of the petitioners in approaching this Court. ( 21 ) THE learned Government Advocate however contended that these petitions were liable to be dismissed in limine on account of inordinate delay on the part of the petitioners in approaching this Court. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State, it was pleaded that though rule 154 was made as early as in the year 1963, it was challenged as lata as in the year 1969. ( 22 ) THE petitioner in WP. 6965 of 1969 has pleaded that he had no occasion to apply earlier for a licence under Rule 154 and that on the very first occasion when the authorities demanded fee for grant of a licence under Rule 154 and that on the very first occasion when the authorities demanded fee for grant of a licence under that Rule, he has challenged the validity of these sub-rules. ( 23 ) IT has not also been shown by the State that it has been levying' and collecting fee under Rule 154 since the year 1963. In the case of an illegal tax or fee, on each occasion when such tax or fee is demanded, there is a fresh grievance. Hence, in the circumstances it cannot be said that there has. been any inordinate delay on the part of the petitioners so as to disentitle them to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226. ( 24 ) IN the result, I allow these petitions and declare sub-rules (3) and (7) of Rule 154 of the Mysore Motor Vehicles Rules, 1963, as ultra vires of the Act and unenforceable. The Regional Transport Authorities are directed to forbear from levying and collecting any fee under those sub- rules eifher for grant or renewal of licences under Rule 154. ( 25 ) IN the circumstances of these petitions I direct parties to bear their own costs. ( 26 ) HOWEVER, I make it clear that nothing said in this order shall be understood as coming in the way of the Government making such sub- rules again after following the appropriate procedure. --- *** --- .