Gopalakrishnan v. State Of Kerala — 1973 DIGILAW 171 (KER)

JUDGMENT : M.U. Issac, J. The petitioners in these eleven cases are persons similarly situated, claiming more or less the same reliefs. These cases have, therefore, been heard jointly, and are being disposed of by this single judgment. The main arguments were advanced in O.P. 5165 of 1972; and I shall be referring in this judgment to the exhibits marked in that case. A common affidavit has been filed by the State Government in O.P. 3004 of 1972. Some of the other respondents have also filed counter affidavits in some of these petitions; but it may not be necessary to refer to the documents produced by them. The petitioners in these cases are either Deputy Surveyors come from Madras or 1st Grade Surveyors come from Travancore Cochin to the Kerala State consequent on the reorganisation of the States. According to the conditions of their service, they were entitled to promotion as Head Surveyors, provided they passed a particular test which had been prescribed in Madras for the Madras personnel, in Travancore for the Travancore personnel, and in Cochin for the Cochin personnel. In Kerala, the Deputy Surveyors of Madras were equated to the 1st Grade Surveyors of Travancore Cochin. The Governor of Kerala, in exercise of his powers under the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution of India, made Special Rules in respect of the members of the Kerala Survey and Land Records Subordinate Service. Those Rules were issued by a Notification, Ext. P 2 dated 30-9-1966. The said Rules added the passing of two more tests as qualifications for Deputy Surveyors and the 1st Grade Surveyors for promotion to the cadre of Head Surveyors. Before the above Special Rules were made the Government passed an order Ext. P3 dated 16-3-1966. It reads as follows: In the G.O. first read above, Government prescribed unified test in Office Procedure and Account Test (Lower) for the ministerial staff of the different Offices of this Government. According to the G.O. second read above the orders regarding unified tests were extended to the officers allotted to this State from the former Travancore Cochin State and the composite State of Madras subject to the conditions adopted by the Government of India for imposition of new tests or tests of a higher standard. According to the G.O. second read above the orders regarding unified tests were extended to the officers allotted to this State from the former Travancore Cochin State and the composite State of Madras subject to the conditions adopted by the Government of India for imposition of new tests or tests of a higher standard. Cases of imposition of new tests or tests of a higher standard on the officers allotted to this State from the former Travancore Cochin State or the composite State of Madras, passing of which may be a condition precedent for the benefits like increments, promotions etc., may arise in future also. In such cases, it is considered that there should be uniformity. Further, the Government consider that the necessity of obtaining the concurrence of the Government of India in each and every such case in order to satisfy the provisions of the State Reorganisation Act 1956 should also be avoided. The Government, therefore, in consultation with the Government of India and the Kerala Public Service Commission direct that in future, if it is proposed to impose any new tests of a higher standard on the officers allotted to this State from the former Travancore Cochin State or the composite State of Madras, passing of which may be condition precedent for the benefits like increments, promotion, completion of probation etc., such tests be imposed only subject to the following conditions: 1. Additional time, which may be double that of the ordinary permissible time for passing the tests, may be allowed to the allotted employees, in cases where tests of a higher standard are prescribed or where tests were not prescribed in the parent State. 2. Persons of the age of 45 years or more should be exempted from passing the departmental tests and when so exempted, they should be eligible for all benefits equally with the one who has passed the tests. It was in the light of the above Government Order which, as stated therein, was passed in consultation with the Government of India and the Kerala Public Service Commission, that the Government decided to impose additional qualifications for promotion to the cadre of Head Surveyors, and that the same was provided in the Special Rules, Ext. P2. 2. It was in the light of the above Government Order which, as stated therein, was passed in consultation with the Government of India and the Kerala Public Service Commission, that the Government decided to impose additional qualifications for promotion to the cadre of Head Surveyors, and that the same was provided in the Special Rules, Ext. P2. 2. R. 13A of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1958 provides, among other things, that where a pass in a special or departmental test is newly prescribed by the Special Rules of a Service for any category, grade or post therein or in any class thereof, a member of a service, who has not passed the said test but is otherwise qualified and suitable for appointment to such class, category, grade or post, may within 2 years of the introduction of the test be appointed thereto temporarily, and that, if the person so appointed does not pass the test within the said period he shall be reverted to his original post. But by virtue of Ext. P3, the petitioners got four years from the date of Ext. P2 to pass the two additional tests prescribed by Ext. P2. They were also entitled for temporary promotion as Head Surveyors, subject to the condition that they would be reverted, in case that they did not pass the tests within the said period of four years. This period was subsequently extended by the Government by an Order Ext. p5 dated 1-12-1971 as a concession till the allottees got eight chances to pass the above tests. These tests were conducted only yearly. Hence the allottees would get three more years to pass the above tests by virtue of Ext. P5. The result of this extension was that several persons who had been promoted regularly as Head Surveyors had to be reverted to promote temporarily persons who had not yet passed the tests, since they got three more years to pass them. The Government was, therefore, constrained to cancel that order by another order, Ext. P7 dated 1-11-1972. Consequently, the petitioners, who could not pass the tests in. spite of all efforts made by them within the period of six years from 1966 till "1972 had to be reverted. These petitions have, therefore, been filed to quash Ext. The Government was, therefore, constrained to cancel that order by another order, Ext. P7 dated 1-11-1972. Consequently, the petitioners, who could not pass the tests in. spite of all efforts made by them within the period of six years from 1966 till "1972 had to be reverted. These petitions have, therefore, been filed to quash Ext. P7, and also to quash the prescription of the two additional tests in the Special Rules as a requisite qualification for being promoted as Head Surveyors. 3. A preliminary objection has been raised by Shri Kalathil Velayudhan Nair, counsel appearing for some of the respondents, that the petitioners should not be allowed to attack the legality of the test qualification introduced by the Special Rules. He submitted that the said Rules were issued about six years before the petitioners came to this Court, the impugned provisions have been in force without any complaint, several persons have appeared for the tests, passed them and got promoted, and the petitioners themselves have attempted during all these years to pass the said tests, and that they cannot now be allowed to turn round and attack the validity of prescription of the tests, which, if allowed, would detrimentally affect with retrospective effect the conditions of service of numerous persons. In support of the above contention, counsel relied on the following passage in the decision of the Supreme Court in M.K. Krishnaswamy, etc. Vs. The Union of India (UOI) and Another, AIR 1973 SC 1168 . We do not believe that, if the High Court had applied its mind to the facts of these petitions, it would have ever entertained such state claims in service matters. The appellants had accepted the lower grade posts in 1950 and made their representation to the Government in 1951 and that representation had been rejected. Thereafter they served in class II, grade III posts. It may be that in due course they have been promoted to class I, grade II posts, and they still continue in the service. We asked learned counsel for the appellants what would have been the position of the appellants, if they had not accepted the posts in the lower grade then? It would have been impossible for them in 1963 to come forward with a claim that they should be deemed to have served in the posts denied to them in 1950. We asked learned counsel for the appellants what would have been the position of the appellants, if they had not accepted the posts in the lower grade then? It would have been impossible for them in 1963 to come forward with a claim that they should be deemed to have served in the posts denied to them in 1950. The mere accident that they are in the income tax service does not give them a better right. Even for a suit, the cause of action, if any would have arisen in 1950 and the suit would have been hopelessly time barred in 1963 when the petitions were filed. The plea that they came to know about certain facts in 1962 would have been of no avail in such a suit. We do not, therefore, think that these are fit cases for interference by this Court nearly 22 years after the alleged cause of action had arisen. The claim put forward by the petitioners before me is not as stale as the one before the Supreme Court. But the principle stated therein would apply to these cases as well. The Special Rules which the petitioners now attack were published as early as on 4-10-1966. Then they raised no objection to the additional tests prescribed by the Rules. They sat for the tests availing of the period of four years which they had to pass them, got themselves temporarily promoted, and also took advantage of the extension of the period as per the Government Order, Ext. P5, until it was subsequently cancelled by Ext. P7; and now they should not be allowed to turn round and attack the validity of the tests prescribed by the Rules, in which they have acquiesced all these years. 4. However, I do not want to rest my judgment on this preliminary point, since the question of the validity of the two additional tests prescribed by the Special Rules has been argued elaborately by counsel for both parties. Admittedly Sub-s. (7) of S. 115 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) applies to the cases. However, I do not want to rest my judgment on this preliminary point, since the question of the validity of the two additional tests prescribed by the Special Rules has been argued elaborately by counsel for both parties. Admittedly Sub-s. (7) of S. 115 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) applies to the cases. That sub-section reads: (7) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect after the appointed day the operation of the provisions of Chap.1 of Part XIV of the Constitution in relation to the determination of the conditions of service of persons serving in connection with the affairs of the Union or any State: Provided that the conditions of service applicable immediately before the appointed day to the case of any person referred to in sub-s.(1) or sub-s.(2) shall not be varied to his disadvantage except with the previous approval of the Central Government. The two additional tests introduced in the Special Rules as requisite qualification for the promotion of Deputy Surveyors and 1st Grade Surveyors to the cadre of Head Surveyors would certainly vary the conditions of service of the allottees to their disadvantage. Hence the introduction of those tests as part of the requisite qualification for promotion would be invalid, unless it has got the previous approval of the Central Government. 5. According to the State Government, it has got such a previous approval; and it relies on a memorandum S.O. SRDI-I.APM. 57 dated 11-5-1957 of the Government of India issued to all State Governments, agreeing with the views expressed by the State representatives that it would not be appropriate to provide for any protection in respect of rules and conditions of service in the matter of travelling allowance, discipline, control, classification, appeal, conduct, probation and departmental promotion. A copy of this memorandum has not been produced in any of the cases. Its relevant part has been quoted by the Supreme Court in its decision in N. Raghavendra Rao Vs. Deputy Commissioner, South Kanara, Mangalore, AIR 1965 SC 136 . Ext. P3, the G.O. dated 16-3-1966, which I have quoted earlier, states that the two conditions mentioned in the said order as concessions to the allottees who may be affected by imposition of any new tests as condition precedent for obtaining increments, promotions etc. Deputy Commissioner, South Kanara, Mangalore, AIR 1965 SC 136 . Ext. P3, the G.O. dated 16-3-1966, which I have quoted earlier, states that the two conditions mentioned in the said order as concessions to the allottees who may be affected by imposition of any new tests as condition precedent for obtaining increments, promotions etc. were laid down after obtaining the concurrence of the Central Government and the Public Service Commission. This means that the State Government again had the previous approval of the Central Government to impose new tests on the allottees as condition precedent for obtaining increments, promotions etc., subject to the two concessions mentioned in Ext. P3. This approval also, like the one contained in the memorandum referred in the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, was general in character. Neither of them related to any particular department or particular service. Nor did that previous approval specify the nature of the conditions or new tests that can be imposed on the allottees for obtaining benefits like increments, promotions etc. Counsel for the petitioners contended that such a general order of the Central Government would not satisfy the requirement of the proviso to S. 115(7) of the Act. It was precisely the same contention that was put forward before the Supreme Court in the above case. The contention was rejected; and in doing that, the Court said: In our opinion, the setting in which the proviso to S. 115(7) is placed, the expression 'previous approval' would include a general approval to the variation in the conditions of service within certain limits, indicated by the Union Government. It has to be remembered that Art. 309 of the Constitution gives, subject to the provisions of the Constitution, full powers to a State Government to make rules. The proviso to S. 115(7) limits that power, but that limitation is removable by the Central Government by giving its previous approval. In this context, we think that it could not have been the intention of Parliament that Service Rules made by States would be scrutinised in the minutest detail by the Central Government. Conditions vary from State to State and the details must be filled by such State according to its requirements. In this context, we think that it could not have been the intention of Parliament that Service Rules made by States would be scrutinised in the minutest detail by the Central Government. Conditions vary from State to State and the details must be filled by such State according to its requirements. The broad purpose underlying the proviso to S. 115(7) of the Act was to ensure that the conditions of service should not be changed except with the prior approval of the Central Government. In other words, before embarking on varying the conditions of service, the State Governments should obtain, the concurrence of the Central Government. In the memorandum, mentioned above, the Central Government, after examining various aspects, came to the conclusion that it would not be appropriate to provide for any protection in the matter of travelling allowance, discipline, control, classification, appeal, conduct, probation and departmental promotion. In our opinion, this amounted to previous approval within the proviso to S. 115(7). 6. If the above decision stood by itself, there would have been no scope for an argument before me to the contrary. This question has come up for consideration in the Supreme Court in a few later decisions. The first among them is the decision in Mohammad Bhakar v. Y. Krishna Reddy, 1970 Serv. LR 768. In that case, the provision in the Mysore Secretariat Services (Recruitment Amendment) Rules, 1966, which imposed the passing of departmental examinations as a condition for promotion of allotted persons in the service of that State was attacked on the ground that the said provision had no previous approval of the Central Government as required by the proviso to S. 115(7) of the Act. It was argued in defence to the above attack that the Central Government's Circular Memorandum relied on in N. Raghavendra Rao Vs. Deputy Commissioner, South Kanara, Mangalore, AIR 1965 SC 136 case would furnish such previous approval. The argument was repelled by the Court; and in doing so, it stated: It appears to us that the letter of 11th May, 1957 cannot be interpreted as sought by the State of Mysore on the strength of the observations of this Court in Raghavendra Rao's case. The argument was repelled by the Court; and in doing so, it stated: It appears to us that the letter of 11th May, 1957 cannot be interpreted as sought by the State of Mysore on the strength of the observations of this Court in Raghavendra Rao's case. Any rule which affects the promotion of a person relates to his conditions of service and it appears to us therefore that unless there be the approval of the Central Government in terms of the proviso to sub-S. (7) of S. 115, a rule which lays down the passing of certain departmental examinations as a condition for promotion to a person who was an allottee to the new State of Mysore would be in violation of sub-S. (7) of S. 115. Incidentally, it may here be pointed out that the Circular Memorandum of the Central Government mentioned in N. Raghavendra Rao Vs. Deputy Commissioner, South Kanara, Mangalore, AIR 1965 SC 136 case was dated 27-3-1957, and not 11th May, 1957, as mentioned in the judgment in that case, and that the latter date is the date on which the Mysore Government republished it. This is clear from the statement of facts in Mohammad Bhakar' s. 1970 Serv. LR 768 case 7. The next decision is State of Haryana, Vs. Shamsher Jang Bahadur, etc. etc., AIR 1972 SC 1546 . One of the questions which arose in that case was whether the advance approval accorded to the State by the Central Government in its letter dated 27-3-1957 regarding change of conditions of service of allotted employees in the matter of travelling allowance, discipline, control, classification, appeal, conduct probation and departmental promotions would amount to previous approval as required by the proviso to S. 115(7) of the Act. The Court said: The scope of that letter has been considered by this Court in Mohammad Bhakar's case, 1970 Serv. LR 768. Therein the Court held that the letter in question cannot be considered as permitting the State Government to alter any conditions of service relating to promotion of the affected Government servants. 8. The Court said: The scope of that letter has been considered by this Court in Mohammad Bhakar's case, 1970 Serv. LR 768. Therein the Court held that the letter in question cannot be considered as permitting the State Government to alter any conditions of service relating to promotion of the affected Government servants. 8. The next decision of the Supreme Court is Gurcharan Dass v. State of Punjab.5 One of the questions that arose in that case was whether a certain service rules made by the Government of Punjab in 1960 without the previous approval of the Central Government were valid in so far as they varied the conditions of service of allotted employees to their disadvantage. The impugned rules were sought to be supported on the authority of the decision in N. Raghavendra Rao Vs. Deputy Commissioner, South Kanara, Mangalore, AIR 1965 SC 136 case. The contention was rejected; and the decision in N. Raghavendra Rao Vs. Deputy Commissioner, South Kanara, Mangalore, AIR 1965 SC 136 case was explained as follows: The circumstances in which such a direction was given justified this Court from coming to the conclusion that 'previous approval' was given to the making of the rules. In any case in a subsequent decision of this Court in Mohammad Bhakar v. Y. Krishna Reddy, 1970 Ser. LR 768 (SC) it was explained that generally the remarks like that contained in Raghavendra Rao's case were not meant to lay down (the proposition contended for namely that the previous approval of the Central Government was not required for prescribing departmental examinations as a qualification for promotion. Any rule which affects the promotion of a person relates to his condition of service and therefore unless there be the approval of the Central Government in terms of proviso to sub-s.(7) of S. 115, a rule which lays down the passing of certain departmental examination as a condition for promotion of a person who was an allottee to the new State of Mysore would be in violation of sub-s.(7) of S. 115. There is in our view no force in the contention urged by the appellant before us that the rules of 1969 made by the Punjab Government must be deemed to have received the previous approval of the Central Government. There is in our view no force in the contention urged by the appellant before us that the rules of 1969 made by the Punjab Government must be deemed to have received the previous approval of the Central Government. The proviso to sub-S. (7) of S. 115 is clear and categorical, and therefore, previous approval, must not be presumed but must be either categorically given or that approval becomes unmistakably apparent from the correspondence between the State Governments and the Central Government. 9. With great respect, I find it difficult to follow how, if the general approval contained in the Government of India's Circular Memorandum dated 11-5-1957 mentioned in N. Raghavendra Rao Vs. Deputy Commissioner, South Kanara, Mangalore, AIR 1965 SC 136 case was good enough to save the rules made by the Mysore Government, whose validity was questioned in that case for want of previous approval as required by the proviso to S. 115(7) of the Act, the said memorandum would not be equally good to save the rules made by the Punjab Government, whose validity was questioned in the case of Gurcharan Dass Vaid Vs. State of Punjab and Others, AIR 1972 SC 1640 on the same ground. I shall only refer to a later decision of the Supreme Court in N. Subba Rrao etc. Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, AIR 1973 SC 69 wherein the decision in N. Raghavendra Rao Vs. Deputy Commissioner, South Kanara, Mangalore, AIR 1965 SC 136 case has been referred to, and the principles laid down in that decision have been almost verbatim adopted. It may be mentioned that the decisions of the Supreme Court in N. Raghavendra Rao Vs. Deputy Commissioner, South Kanara, Mangalore, AIR 1965 SC 136 and N. Subba Rrao etc. Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, AIR 1973 SC 69 were judgments of Benches of five Judges, whereas the decisions in Mohammad Bhakar v. Y. Krishna Reddy, 1970 Serv. LR 768 and State of Haryana, Vs. Shamsher Jang Bahadur, etc. etc., AIR 1972 SC 1546 were by three learned Judges, and the other decision in Gurcharan Dass Vaid Vs. State of Punjab and Others, AIR 1972 SC 1640 was by two learned Judges. LR 768 and State of Haryana, Vs. Shamsher Jang Bahadur, etc. etc., AIR 1972 SC 1546 were by three learned Judges, and the other decision in Gurcharan Dass Vaid Vs. State of Punjab and Others, AIR 1972 SC 1640 was by two learned Judges. I am bound to follow the last pronouncement of the Supreme Court in preference to its other decisions, particularly in view of the fact that that decision and the one which it followed were rendered by larger Benches of that Court. 10. The scope and ambit of the Central Government's Circular Memorandum dated 11th May, 1957 came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court, consisting of M.S. Menon, C.J. and Govindan Nair, J. in Madhava Iyer and another v. George and others, W.A. No. 71 of 1967, judgment dated 2nd November, 1967. In that case it was contended that the Special Rules made by the Governor of Kerala on 29-11-1965 under the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution fixing a proportion in the matter of promotion from the cadre of Junior Engineers to that Assistant Engineer among the degree holders, diploma holders and certificate holders, were invalid for want of previous approval of the Central Government as required by the proviso to S. 115(7) of the Act. The contention was rejected by the Division Bench, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in N. Raghavendra Rao Vs. Deputy Commissioner, South Kanara, Mangalore, AIR 1965 SC 136 case. The learned Judges stated: This portion of the circular was read by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court and it has been construed as doing duty for the previous approval insisted by the proviso to sub-s.(7) of S. 115 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956. Departmental promotion is one of the specific items referred to in that circular and as we read and understand the circular, we think that it grants full freedom to the State Government to frame rules regulating the manner in which departmental promotion should be effected. This must take within its ambit the power to group persons as have been admittedly done. 11. The very question that I am considering here arose before me in Ramakrishna v. State of Kerala and others, O.P. No. 4994 of 1968, which I decided by judgment dated 8th June, 1970. This must take within its ambit the power to group persons as have been admittedly done. 11. The very question that I am considering here arose before me in Ramakrishna v. State of Kerala and others, O.P. No. 4994 of 1968, which I decided by judgment dated 8th June, 1970. In that case it was contended that the Special Rules made by the Governor of Kerala under the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution in respect of the Kerala Public Health Engineering Service and issued by the Government by Notification dated 16th September, 1960, prescribing certain qualifications for promotion to the cadre of Executive Engineers were invalid on the ground that the said Rules had not the previous approval of the Central Government as required by the proviso to S. 115(7) of the Act. I rejected the contention following decision of the Supreme Court in N. Raghavendra Rao Vs. Deputy Commissioner, South Kanara, Mangalore, AIR 1965 SC 136 case. Unfortunately, I did not then have the advantage of noting the Division Bench decision of M.S. Menon, C.J. and Govindan Nair, J., which would fully support the view taken by me. However, my decision has been reversed by a Division Bench of this Court, consisting of Raghavan, C.J. and Unnikrishnan Kurup, J. in W.A. 134 of 1970 by their judgment dated 19th October, 1971 stating that the reasons would be given later. On the next day, the learned Chief Justice pronounced another judgment giving the reasons for the decision. After referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in N. Raghavendra Rao Vs. Deputy Commissioner, South Kanara, Mangalore, AIR 1965 SC 136 case. His Lordship stated that the same question was raised before a Division Bench of this Court in a similar case of Engineers in the Public Works Department in W.A. Nos. 136 and 149 of 1965, and that the same argument was advanced by the Government Pleader which was repelled by the Division Bench in Para. 14 of the judgment. Then the learned Chief Justice quoted the said paragraph, which reads: A desperate last minute attempt was made by the learned Government Pleader to spell out a previous approval, within the meaning of the proviso, on the strength of the decision of the Supreme Court just mentioned. (Raghavendra Rao's case). 14 of the judgment. Then the learned Chief Justice quoted the said paragraph, which reads: A desperate last minute attempt was made by the learned Government Pleader to spell out a previous approval, within the meaning of the proviso, on the strength of the decision of the Supreme Court just mentioned. (Raghavendra Rao's case). It was said that the memorandum of the Central Government referred to in that decision dispenses with that Government's approval in respect of prejudicial variations of certain conditions of service and that this amounts to previous approval for such variation within the meaning of the proviso. We do not think that this is what the decision lays down. But, however that might be, we do not find the determination of seniority in a service among the matters mentioned as not requiring the protection of the proviso and it is little use saying that a far more vital matter, namely, departmental promotion, is mentioned. That apart, these cases throughout proceeded on the admitted footing that there was no previous approval (the contention of the State Government being not that there was previous approval but that no such approval was necessary) and this last minute attempt cannot be countenanced. 12. The above judgment was rendered by Raman Nayar, C.J. sitting with Gopalan Nambiyar, J. From the above passage, it is clear that the Government had no case that it had obtained the previous approval of the Central Government for varying the conditions of service of the allotted employees, and that its contention was that no such previous approval was necessary. The judgment of Raman Nayar, C.J. would also show that it was a case where a provisional intergrated seniority list of the technical personnel of the Public Works Department of Travancore Cochin was drawn up in accordance with principles of integration settled by the Government before the reorganisation of the States, and then a particular principle was subsequently varied to the detriment of the Cochin personnel without the previous approval of the Central Government, with the result the Travancore personnel was given seniority over the Cochin personnel. That was clearly a case which offended the protection available to the allotted employees under the proviso to S. 115(7) of the Act, and it cannot also possibly fall within the ambit of the Circular Memorandum mentioned in the judgment of the Supreme Court in N. Raghavendra Rao Vs. That was clearly a case which offended the protection available to the allotted employees under the proviso to S. 115(7) of the Act, and it cannot also possibly fall within the ambit of the Circular Memorandum mentioned in the judgment of the Supreme Court in N. Raghavendra Rao Vs. Deputy Commissioner, South Kanara, Mangalore, AIR 1965 SC 136 case. That was why the learned Chief Justice characterised the attempt of the Government Pleader to rely on the said memorandum as "a desperate last minute attempt". Raghavan, C.J. has also sought support for his view from the decision of Balakrishna Eradi, J. in Joseph v. State of Kerala, 1970 KLT 1027 wherein the learned Single Judge followed the Division Bench decision of Raman Nayar, C.J. and Nambiyar, J. The facts of that case would show that it was also one exactly similar to the case before the Division Bench, where the State Government passed an order without the previous approval of the Central Government affecting the seniority of a class of allotted employees to their disadvantage. With great respect, I must point out the obvious, namely the two decisions relied on by Raghavan, C.J. had no application to the case that the learned Chief Justice was dealing with. I may also add with great respect that I would not have made these observations about the Division Bench decision of Raghavan, C.J. and Unnikrishna Kurup, J., and would have followed the decision but for the fact that the question in controversy is directly covered by the Division Bench decision of M.S. Menon, C.J. and Govindan Nair, J. in W.A. No. 71 of 1967, and that the view that these learned Judges have taken is in full accord with the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court as already indicated. Accordingly, I hold that the general approval contained in the Government of India's Circular Memorandum dated 11th May, 1957 would amount to previous approval as required by the proviso to S. 115(7) of the Act in respect of the matters mentioned in the said memorandum, and that the additional tests prescribed by the State Government in the Special Rules made in respect of the members of the Kerala Survey and Land Records Subordinate Service as a necessary qualification for promotion of Deputy Surveyors and 1st Grade Surveyors to the cadre of Head Surveyors are valid. 13. 13. I shall now deal with the last contention, viz., Ext. P7 is bad under law since it was passed without hearing the petitioners. Now all that the petitioners were entitled to get was 4 years to pass the additional tests prescribed by the Special Rules, this being the period when Ext. P3 is read in the light of R. 13A of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1958. So any further time allowed to the petitioners or persons similarly situated, apart from the question whether such an extention would be legally valid or act, would be only a concession in their favour. Ext. P7 itself shows that such a concession was granted on a misconception that the two additional tests which were prescribed by Ext. P2 were being conducted by the Government half yearly, while as a matter of fact it was not so. It was some other test mentioned in Ext. P2 that was really conducted half yearly. Ext. P7 also points out the serious administrative difficulty experienced by the Government by the extension of the period of 4 years to 8 years. All that was done by Ext. P7 was to terminate the further operation of that concession under the circumstances mentioned above. The petitioners had no right to get any concession; and they have, therefore, no right to be heard, before a decision is taken not to continue it. It was submitted at the bar on behalf of some of the petitioners that they are past 45 years of ago, and that under the G.O., Ext. P3, subject to which the impugned Special Rules were made they stand exempt from passing the additional tests. This is a matter which has not been specifically raised in any of the petitions; but the contention seems to be sustainable. The petitioners, who are entitled to any such exemption, may make representations to the Government in that respect and get their reversion cancelled, if warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case. Subject to the above observation, these writ petitions are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.