JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - The appellants are the tenants of an accommodation situate at Mussoorie. Respondents 4 to 6 who are the land-lords of the premises, applied before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for permission to file a suit for the ejectment of the appellants on the ground that they needed the accommodation for their personal use. On May 17, 1969 the Rent Control and Eviction Officer passed an order granting the requisite permission. Aggrieved, the appellants filed a revision before the Commissioner, Meerut. The Commissioner held that the revision was barred by time and on that ground he dismissed it. Aggrieved, the tenants instituted a writ petition in this Court. A learned single Judge was not impressed by the various submissions raised in the writ petition and dismissed the writ petition. Hence the present appeal. 2. It appears that the appellants presented a revision application in the Court of the Additional Magistrate (Judicial), Debra Dun on June 16, 1969. The reader of the Court accepted the revision and after making a note of presentation transmitted it by post to the Court of the Commissioner Meerut. The office of the Commissioner at Meerut made the usual report regarding the limitation, the sufficiency of the court fee and the requisite copy of the order appealed against and notice was issued to the revisionists. When the revision came up for hearing before the Commissioner an objection was raised that the revision was barred by time. The Commissioner held that the memorandum of revision was received in the office of the Court on July 4, 1969, that is to say, much beyond the prescribed 30 days period of limitation. He refused to entertain an application for condonation of delay as well as the point whether the tenants were entitled to the exclusion of time requisite for obtaining Me copy of the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. 3. It appears that before the Commissioner the appellants had filed an affidavit of Shri M. M. L Khanna, chief reader of the District Magistrate, Debra Dun. In this affidavit it was stated that the Commissioner had issued a letter to the District Magistrates, including the District Magistrate, Debra Dun allowing all of them to accept the appeals and revisions on behalf of the Commissioner, Meerut Division. In this affidavit it was stated that the Commissioner had issued a letter to the District Magistrates, including the District Magistrate, Debra Dun allowing all of them to accept the appeals and revisions on behalf of the Commissioner, Meerut Division. According to these instructions the reader of the District Magistrate was accepting appeals and revisions to be presented to the Commissioner, including revisions under the Rent Control Act. The Commissioner did not disbelieve this affidavit. A perusal of his order shows that he avoided dealing with it directly. The Commissioner observed that in the year 1946 the Rent Control Act did not contemplate the hearing of any revision by a Commissioner and, therefore, the acceptance of revisions at the district level and their presentation to the Commissioner was only a figment of the imagination of Shri Khanna. We do not read these observation to the effect that the Commissioner had not issued instructions to the District Magistrate directing them to accept the revisions as deposed by Shri Khanna. Adverting to this affidavit, the learned Single Judge observed that there was no prevailing practice of entertaining the revisions by the Additional District Magistrate (Judicial), Dehra Dun. We thus find that there is no finding disbelieving the affidavit of Mr. Khanna. On the contrary, the fact that the appellants were led by information of a prevailing practice to present the revision before the Additional District Magistrate (Judicial) the fact that the Court of the Additional District Magistrate (Judicial) accepted the revision and transmitted it to the Commissioner at Meerut, coupled with the fact that the office of the Commissioner at Meerut accepted the presentation of the revision at Debra Dun to be proper, show that the affidavit of Shri Khanna was true on facts. It appears that the Commissioner was only indicating the place and the manner of presentation of the revisions. Since the Rent Control Act did not either by itself or rules framed under it lay down the precise procedure in regard to the presentation of the revision, the Commissioner who was the authority entitled to entertain and decide the revisions was within his rights to prescribe the procedure in respect of presentation of the revisions. The direction given by the Commissioner in 1946 with regard to the presentation of revisions was valid and enforceable. 4. The direction given by the Commissioner in 1946 with regard to the presentation of revisions was valid and enforceable. 4. In accordance with those directions the courts of the District Magistrate were validly accepting the presentation of the revision, meant for the Commissioner. In this view the presentation of the revisions to the court of the Additional District Magistrate (Judicial) Debra Dun was valid institution thereof. In the present case the revision was presented on June 16, 1969 within thirty days of the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on May P, 1969. 5. It was urged that the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to hear or decide the revisions under the Rent Control Act in the year 1946 This jurisdiction was conferred on the Commissioner for the first time by an amendment of 1952. That may be so. In National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd v. James Chedwick and Brothers, AIR 1953 Supreme Court 357 it was held that a court can lay down its practice and procedure and such practice and procedure also governed subsequent jurisdiction conferred upon that Court. If the Commissioner had indicated the manner and place of presentation of the revisions to it, that procedure would equally apply to the revisional jurisdiction conferred on the Commissioner afterwards. 6. Our attention was invited to a decision of a Single Judge in Seth Bal Gopal Das v. State of U. P., 1973 R.C.J. 391. In that decision it was recognised that the Commissioner could authorise the Additional District Magistrate to receive revision applications on his behalf but it was held that there was no evidence to prove that there was any such practice. The case is clearly distinguishable on facts. The materials an record of our case do show that there was a prevailing practice in regard to the presentation of revisions to the Court of the Additional District Magistrate (Judicial), Debra Dun. It appears that the Court of the Additional District Magistrate, Debra Dun had been adopting this practice under the instructions issued by the Commissioner in 1946. The decision in Seth Bai Gopal Das's case was also from Debra Dun. In that case the revision was presented before the Additional District Magistrate. The conduct of the office of the Commissioner and the acceptance of the presentation of the revision by the court of the Additional District Magistrate corroborate the prevailing practice. The decision in Seth Bai Gopal Das's case was also from Debra Dun. In that case the revision was presented before the Additional District Magistrate. The conduct of the office of the Commissioner and the acceptance of the presentation of the revision by the court of the Additional District Magistrate corroborate the prevailing practice. In our opinion, it is clearly established that at Dehra Dun there was a prevailing practice of the presentation of the revisions meant for the Commissioner. Even revisions under the Rent Control Act were presented before The Additional District Magistrate (Judicial), if such was the prevailing practice and if a litigant follows it the principle that a litigant should not suffer by the act of the Court will be applicable. In Kedar Nath Marwari v. Jai Berham, 1922 P.C. 269 it was held that one of the first and highest duties of all courts is to take care that the act of the Court does no injury to any of the suitors and when the expression 'the act of the Court' is used, it does not mean properly the act of primary Court, or of any intermediate Court of Appeal, but the act of the Court as a whole from the lowest Court which entertains jurisdiction over the matter up to the highest Court which finally disposes of the case. 7. In Zajaruddin Ahmad v. Madan Mohan, 1960 A.L.J. 678 a Division Bench of this Court held that where the applicant had done all the could do within the period of Limitation, his right could not be defeated simply because that Court itself delayed the making of the direction which was sought by an application made within time. These principles are well applicable to the instant case. Led by the prevailing practice the appellants presented the revision within time to the proper court. They had done all that was required of them ; they should not be made to suffer even if it ultimately be found that the practice was invalid. In our opinion, the presentation of the revision was valid. The revision was presented within limitation. It was not liable to be dismissed on the ground that it is time barred. They had done all that was required of them ; they should not be made to suffer even if it ultimately be found that the practice was invalid. In our opinion, the presentation of the revision was valid. The revision was presented within limitation. It was not liable to be dismissed on the ground that it is time barred. In this view it is unnecessary to decide when her the appellants were entitled to the exclusion of requisite time for obtaining a copy of the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer or they were entitled to the benefit of section 14 of the Limitation Act. We leave those questions open. 8. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside and the writ petition is allowed. The order of the Commissioner is quashed and the matter is sent back to him for decision of the revision on merits and in accordance with law. The parties may, however, bear their own costs.