( 1 ) THIS appeal is by the plaintiff in O. S. No. 33/1 of 1964, on the file of the Court of the Civil Judge, at Raichur. The suit was originally instituted in the Court of the District Judge, Raichur, in O. S. No. 11-1-1960, and was later transferred to the Court of the Civil Judge, and registered as aforesaid. ( 2 ) THE facts relevant are briefly these: the suit was for a declaration of title in regard to the suit premises with fixtures and fittings and for possession of a portion thereof, among other reliefs. The premises in question is a cinema theatre formerly known as 'azam' Talkies and now renamed as 'janatha' Talkies. The plaintiff is the, natural born son of one Bansilal and alleged to be the adopted son of one Rai Munnalal. The property formerly belonged to one Peer Pasha, who it is undisputed, is an evacuee within the meaning of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act. ( 3 ) THE case of the plaintiff is that his natural father Bansilal purchased the property on 24-7-1948 from Peer Pasha, benami for himself. . The property was notified and declared as evacuee property by the authority constituted under the Act. On such notification one Dwaraka Pershad, examined as PW. 6 alleging to be the manager of the Talkies preferred an appeal which was dealt with and disposed of as a petition, before the Additional custodian, on the ground that Bansilal was a person interested in the property and that he had not been heard. The Additional Custodian by his order dt. 20th May 1953 (vide Ey. D12), remanded the case to the deputy Custodian with a direction that the said Dwaraka Pershad be afforded an opportunity to plead against the declaration of the property in question as an evacuee property. After remand, the Deputy Custodian, after enquiring into the matter made an order on 27-1-1959 (vide Ex. D13), holding that the property was clearly an evacuee property, and declared it as such. After that order, for the first time, the appellant came into the picture, and preferred an appeal against the said order along with Dwaraka pershad, to the Deputy Custodian General of India. That appeal stood dismissed (vide Ex. D14) on 20-11-1959. D13), holding that the property was clearly an evacuee property, and declared it as such. After that order, for the first time, the appellant came into the picture, and preferred an appeal against the said order along with Dwaraka pershad, to the Deputy Custodian General of India. That appeal stood dismissed (vide Ex. D14) on 20-11-1959. ( 4 ) IN the meanwhile, the appellant had filed a suit in the City Civil Court of Hyderabad against his natural father Bansilal for a declaration that he was the real owner of the suit property and Bansilal was only a benamidar. That suit was decreed ex par-te, on 18-9-1955. This decree has been, pressed into service in support ot the case of the appellant, and considered by rhe Deputy Custodian General in the course of the order in appeal preterred before him. It is alleged that some time subsequently to the order of the year 1959 (vide Ex. D14), in or about the year 1960, some portion of the suit premises was taken possession of on behalf of the Custodian. It is atler such possession was taken that the present suit came to be filed by the appellant. ( 5 ) THE appellant, without specifically questioning the validity of those two orders, namely Exs. D13 and D14, has sued for declaration of his title and possession as aforementioned principally on the ground that on account of the non-compliance with the procedure enjoined under Ss. 7 to 9 of the act, the property ought to be deemed never to have vested in the Custodian, and therefore, his title to the property must be upheld. There ara 'several other grounds raised in the plaint, which have been elaborately set out in the judgment in appeal, but which are unnecessary to be set out for the purpose of this appeal in the light of the principal proposition formulated on behalf of the appellant by Sri Appa Rao, the learned Counsel. Cn behalf of the respondents herein, it is contended that the proceedings before the Custodians, were all regularly and properly done and therefore the declaration made puruant thereto is clearly valid and does not suffer from any error affecting the exercise of jurisdiction by such authorities. Cn behalf of the respondents herein, it is contended that the proceedings before the Custodians, were all regularly and properly done and therefore the declaration made puruant thereto is clearly valid and does not suffer from any error affecting the exercise of jurisdiction by such authorities. It is also contended that the remedy of the appellant was be-fore the Tribunals and Authorities constituted under the Act itself, and the Act had made elaborate provisions for appeals and revision providing for ample opportunity to those who might be interested in any evacuee property, to urge their claims. It is on this basis that it is contended that ss. 28 and 46 of the Act would operate as a clear bar to the maintenance of this suit. ( 6 ) THE trial Court after framing relevant issues and alter trial, after recording its findings on these issues, dismissed the suit. Hence this appeal by the plaintiff. Before us the principal contention urged by Sri Appa Rao is this ; s. 7 of the Act provides, under sub-sec. (3) thereof, that after, a property is declared to be an evacuce property pursuant to the procedure contemplated under sub-sec. (1) of S. 7 and the Rules made in that behalf, a publication of a declaration in the Official Gazette or in such other manner as may be prescribed that the property is evacuee property, requires to be made. It is only after such publication that the property vests in the custodian pursuant to sub-sec. (1) S. 8 of the Act. So long as there has been no such vesting, and it is not in dispute that there has been no such publication as contemplated under sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 7, the appellant would be entitled to a decree as prayed for. He submits further that if the answer to this question is to be against the appellant it would be unnecessary to go into other questions arising in the case. On behalf of the respondents, it is contended that the appellant ought not to be permitted to raise such a question for the first time in an appeal. Even otherwise such a contention cannot be raised by the appellant, who has no locus standi to maintain the suit itself, as his claim-that he was the real owner cannot at all be accepted. Even otherwise such a contention cannot be raised by the appellant, who has no locus standi to maintain the suit itself, as his claim-that he was the real owner cannot at all be accepted. ( 7 ) IT seems to us that the appellant cannot be allowed to raise the above point for the first time in this appeal. This question has neither been; raised specifically in the plaint nor urged in any other manner in the court below. Moreover, this involves a question of fact. There has also been no issue specifically adverting to this point. We, therefore, accept the contention urged on behalf of the respondents and decline to permit the appellant to raise the question for the first time in this appeal. Moreover, it is clear from the evidence on record that the appellant had failed to establish that his father Bansilal was only benamidar for him when the suit property was purchased in the name of Bansilal. We are satisfied that the evidence adduced in this regard is not such as would inspire con- fidence. Bansilal has not been examined at all, although it is stated that the appellant and he were living together. The conclusion of the Court below on this aspect clearly does not call for interference. In this view, the above contention, even if it were to be permitted, would not be open for the appellant to urge, in the absence of any right in him to the suit property. It follows from this conclusion and also in the light of Exs. D13 and D14 the orders made by the Deputy Custodian and the Deputy Custoidan general, declaring the suit property as evacuee property, that the appellant would not be entitled to a decree of the declaration of his title to the suit property. Once this relief does not fall to be granted, the other reliefs would necessarily have to be refused in the facts and circumstances of the case. In this view of the matter, it is unnecessary to examine the other contentions urged on behalf of the appellant. ( 8 ) ALTHOUGH the above discussion is sufficient to dispose of the appeal, we consider it relevant to refer tc one other contention urged on behalf of the respondents, that the suit as framed would not be maintainable in view of the bar enacted under S. 46 of the Act. ( 8 ) ALTHOUGH the above discussion is sufficient to dispose of the appeal, we consider it relevant to refer tc one other contention urged on behalf of the respondents, that the suit as framed would not be maintainable in view of the bar enacted under S. 46 of the Act. On behalf of the respondents, in support of the contention, reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Ram Gopal Reddy v. Addl. Custodian, Evacuee property, air 1968 SC. 1438 . . The relevant enunciatioin occurs at paragraph 4 in the above report and reads thus :"it is admitted that the appellant had received notice from the Deputy Custodian under S. 7 (1) of the Act but had neglected to appear before him and it was in those circumstances that the Deputy custodian declared the property to be evacuee property. That order of the Deputy Custodian could be taken in appeal under S. 24 by the appellant to the authorities provided under the Act, and if necessary the appellant could also go in revision to the Custodian General under s. 27. The scheme of the Act clearly is that where the property admittedly belongs to the evacuee any person claiming the property or any interest or right therein has on receipt of a notice under S. 7 (1) to appear before the authorities entitled to deal with the matter under the Act. Any person aggrieved by an order of such an authority made under S. 7 has the right to appeal under S. 24 and if necessary to go in revision under S. 27. The Act thus provides a complete; machinery for a person interested in any property to put forward his claims be-fore the authorities competent to deal with the question and to go in appeal and in revision if the person interested feels aggrieved. Having provided this complete machinery for adjudication of all claims with respect to evacuee property, the Act, by S. 46 bars the jurisdiction of civil or Revenue Courts to entertain or adjudicate upon any question whether any property or any right to or interest in any property is or is not evacuee property. Having provided this complete machinery for adjudication of all claims with respect to evacuee property, the Act, by S. 46 bars the jurisdiction of civil or Revenue Courts to entertain or adjudicate upon any question whether any property or any right to or interest in any property is or is not evacuee property. Where therefore the property or right to or interest in any property undoubtedly belonged to the evacuee and any transferee from the evacuee claims the property or any right to or interest therein he has to avail of the remedies provided under the Act. If he fails to do so he cannot file a suit in the Civil or Revenue court to have the question whether, any property or any right to or any interest therein is or is not evacuee property decided in view of the clear provision of S. 46 (a) of the Act. " ( 9 ) VIEWED in the light of the above enunciation the contention urged on behalf of the respondents by Sri Ramachandra Rao the learned Central government Counsel, that the suit would not be maintainable must be accepted as well founded. The appeal therefore has to fail on this ground also. For the above reasons, this appeal deserves to fail and is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances, parties are directed to bear their own costs in this Appeal. --- *** --- .