JUDGMENT M.N. Shukla, J. - The petitioner was originally appointed as a Welfare Officer in the Kanpur Chemical Works Private Limited (hereinafter referred to as the respondent) by an order dated 1-7-1965. Later it was discovered that the said appointment was irregular as he had not completed the age of 21 years on the date of appointment. Hence, the appointment was regularised by a second order of appointment passed on 20-11-1965 which was to take effect from 4-10-1965. Thus, in supersession of the earlier order the petitioner stood appointed with effect from 4-10-1965. It is alleged that he incurred the displeasure of the management and hence they were anxious to remove him from service on some pretext or the other. This resulted ultimately in the impugned - order dated 31-5-1972 (Annexure-V of the writ petition) whereby the management terminated his services. It directed that he would not work from 1-6-1972. The relevant portion of the order runs as follows - "We regret to inform you that your services would no longer be required and they are hereby terminated with effect from the close of working hours today, i.e., 31st May, 1972. You will not be working on and from tomorrow i.e., 1st June, 1972. You will be paid one month's salary in lieu of notice in addition to other dues whatever they may be, besides gratuity payable to you under Rule 8-A of the U.P. Factories Welfare Officers Rules, 1965." It is not disputed that the respondent had not obtained the concurrence of the Labour Commissioner for passing the order terminating the petitioner's services. 2. The aforesaid order has been challenged on a number of grounds. It was contended that the petitioner enjoyed a statutory status and consequently his services could not be terminated at the pleasure of the respondent; they would be dispensed with only in accordance with the statute governing the appointment and conditions of his service; that there was no power in the respondent to terminate the services unless it was intended to do so by way of punishment or penalty, in which case the concurrence of the Labour Commissioner was an essential condition and hence the order of termination was void and illegal. 3. The main reliefs claimed by the petitioner are: "1. To issue a writ, order or direction to quash the order dated 31st May, 1972; and 2. 3. The main reliefs claimed by the petitioner are: "1. To issue a writ, order or direction to quash the order dated 31st May, 1972; and 2. to issue a suitable Writ, order or direction commanding the respondent not to give effect to the order dated 31st May, 1972 and not to interfere with the petitioner discharging his duties as a Welfare Officer." 4. Two preliminary objections were raised on behalf of the respondent against the contention of the petitioner. The allegations on facts as regards the motive leading to the passing of the order were also controverted but it is not necessary to refer to those factual allegations as the main arguments addressed at the bar were confined to questions of law. In the first place, the respondent's objection was that the impugned order had been passed by the respondent which was a private corporation and hence the petitioner was not entitled to the issue of a writ of mandamus. Secondly, it was contended that the relationship between the petitioner and the respondent was a contractual relationship and so the petitioner should be relegated to the remedy of suing for damages and the bar created by Section 21 (b) of the Specific Relief Act would operate and even the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution was restricted by that provision. 5. In support of his contention the learned Counsel for the respondent mainly I placed reliance on two decisions of the Supreme Court namely, AIR 1972 SC 1450 : 1972 Lab IC 829, Vidya Ram v. S.J.N. College and AIR 1964 SC 1680 , S.R. Tewari v. District Board, Agra. In Vidya Ram's case the services of the petitioner who was a lecturer were terminated by the Managing Committee of the Jain Narain College. Lucknow. It was held that the petitioner had been appointed by reason of a contract between himself and the Managing Committee, hence he had a remedy only by way of a suit and not by way of an application under Article 226 of the Constitution. The finding recorded in that case was that the relationship between the petitioner and the Managing Committee of the College was purely contractual and had no statutory flavour. The finding recorded in that case was that the relationship between the petitioner and the Managing Committee of the College was purely contractual and had no statutory flavour. Reference was made to statute 151 framed under the provisions of the Lucknow University Act (1920) which provided that teachers of an Associated College shall be appointed by means of a written contract which shall, inter alia, provide the conditions mentioned therein in addition to such other conditions not inconsistent with the Act and the Statutes as an associated college may include in its own form of agreement. Statute 151 did not provide for any particular procedure for dismissal or removal of a teacher for being incorporated in the contract. Nor did the model form of contract lay down any particular procedure for that purpose. On that basis it was held that the relationship between the parties was founded on a contract and the terms and conditions mentioned in Statute 151 had no efficacy unless they were incorporated in a contract. It was observed by Mathew, J., (para. 11) - "On a plain reading of Statute 151, it is clear that it only provides that the terms and conditions mentioned therein must be incorporated in the contract to be entered into between the college and the teacher concerned. It does not say that the terms and conditions have any legal force, until and unless they are embodied in an agreement. To put it in other words, the terms and conditions of service mentioned in Statute 151 have proprio vigore no force of law. They become terms and conditions of service only by virtue of their being incorporated in the contract. Without the contract, they have no vitality and can confer no legal rights." 6. Therefore, I am of the opinion that Vidya Ram's case AIR 1972 SC 1450 : (1972 Lab IC 829) can be of no assistance to the respondent, in view of the finding that the cause of action in that case was founded on a contract and not on any statutory relationship as such and the writ was refused to the petitioner. The decision did not proceed on the basis that the Managing Committee of the College was not a statutory body and, therefore, the petitioner was not entitled to the relief claimed. The decision did not proceed on the basis that the Managing Committee of the College was not a statutory body and, therefore, the petitioner was not entitled to the relief claimed. On the other hand, the ratio of the case was- that where the Terms and conditions of service were governed by a contract between the parties and not by a statute, a writ could not be issued for quashing the order terminating the services of the petitioner. 7. The learned Counsel for the respondent referred to paragraph 13 of Vidya Ram's case AIR 1972 SC 1450 : (1972 Lab IC 829) which noticed the decision in S.R. Tewari's case, AIR 1964 SG 1680. It was observed - "Besides, in order that the third exception to the general rule that no writ will lie to quash an order terminating a contract of service, albeit illegal, as stated in (1964) 3 SCR 55 : ( AIR 1964 SC 1680 ) might apply, it is necessary that the order must be the order of a statutory body acting in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by a statute. The college, or the Managing Committee in question is not a statutory body and so the argument of Mr. Setalvad that the case in hand will fall under the third exception cannot be accepted. The contention of counsel that this Court has sub silent sanctioned the issue of a writ under Article 226 to quash an order terminating services of a teacher passed by a college similarly situate in (1965) 2 SCR 713 and, therefore, the fact that the college or the Managing Committee was not a statutory body has no hindrance to the High Court issuing the writ prayed for by the appellant has no merit as this Court expressly stated in the judgment that no such contention was raised in the High Court and so it cannot be allowed to be raised in this Court." It was submitted before me that the general rule - that in case of termination of service the proper remedy for the employee was to claim damages and no writ could be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution - could be departed from only if the order had been made by a statutory body. This contention is not well founded. This contention is not well founded. The above quoted observations can be properly appreciated only by examining S.R. Tewari's case AIR 1964 SC 1680 in some detail and the context in which the three exceptions were set out to the general doctrine of the bar of Section 21 (b) of the Specific Relief Act. 8. In S.R. Tewari's case, AIR 1964 SC 1680 (supra) the petitioner was an Engineer in the employment of the District Board which was admittedly a statutory body. The District Board by a resolution passed an order terminating his employment which was challenged by him. The High Court dismissed the writ petition and that Judgment was affirmed in appeal by the Supreme Court. In paragraph 5 of the judgment their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered the three exceptions to the general rule that a contract of service would not ordinarily be specifically enforced. They were (1) a public servant who is dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311, (2) the jurisdiction of the Labour and Industrial Tribunals under the industrial law to compel the employer to employ a person whom he does not desire to employ and (3) the courts are also invested with the power to declare invalid the act of a statutory body, if by doing the act the body has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by statutes, even if by making the declaration the body is compelled to do something which it does not desire to do. In the last exception adverted to above it is not possible to read any pronouncement to the effect that a writ cannot issue against a non-statutory body. In fact, the two propositions are entirely distinct from each other. One proposition can be that the powers of a statutory body are always subject to a statute and must be exercised consistently with the statute. In such case the Courts have the power to declare the action of the statutory body illegal or ultra vires, if it is inconsistent with the statute even though the action may relate to the termination of the employment of a servant. The other proposition can be that no writ as such can issue against a non-statutory body. In such case the Courts have the power to declare the action of the statutory body illegal or ultra vires, if it is inconsistent with the statute even though the action may relate to the termination of the employment of a servant. The other proposition can be that no writ as such can issue against a non-statutory body. In S.R. Tewari's case AIR 1964 SC 1680 their Lordships of the Supreme Court were only dealing with the first objection, namely, that the power of a statutory body must be exercised consistently with the statute and if it was exercised in breach thereof, a writ of mandamus could be issued even though the matter related to the termination of employment of a servant. They were not deciding the second proposition. namely, whether a writ of mandamus could issue against a non-statutory body. Obviously, therefore, neither S.R. Tewari's case AIR 1964 SC 1680 nor Vidya Ram's case AIR 1972 SC 1450 : (1972 Lab IC 829) is an authority for the proposition that' a writ of mandamus cannot issue against a non-statutory body. I have already observed that in S.R. Tewari's case some well recognised exceptions to the general bar to specific enforcement of contract of service were noticed. In my opinion there is nothing in that judgment to indicate that those exceptions were intended to be exhaustive. On the other hand, from certain decisions of the Supreme Court it becomes clear that other exceptions may also arise in proper circumstances. 9. In AIR 1970 SC 1244 : (1970 Lab IC 1044), U.P.S.W. Corpn., Lucknow v. C.K. Tyagi, the three exceptions enumerated in S.R. Tewari's case AIR 1964 SC 1680 were reiterated and it was observed in paragraph 23: "From the two decisions of this Court referred to above, the position in law is that no declaration to enforce a contract of personal service will be normally granted. But there are certain well-recognized exceptions to this rule and they are: To grant such a declaration in appropriate cases regarding (1) a public servant, who has been dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311. (2) Reinstatement of a dismissed worker under Industrial Law by Labour or Industrial Tribunals. (3) A statutory body when it has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation, imposed by statute." It is. (2) Reinstatement of a dismissed worker under Industrial Law by Labour or Industrial Tribunals. (3) A statutory body when it has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation, imposed by statute." It is. however, necessary to advert to another passage in the same case which puts the matter beyond doubt that the aforesaid exceptions were not intended to be exhaustive and that other contingencies may also arise where an employee may be entitled to claim the relief of a declaration that the order is null and void and that he continues to be in service. In paragraph 20 of the reports the law on the subject was summarised as follows: "From a review of the English decisions referred to above, the position emerges as follows - The law relating to master and servant is clear. A contract for personal service will not be enforced by an order for specific performance nor will it be open for a servant to refuse to accept the repudiation of a contract of service by his master and say that the contract has never been terminated. The remedy of the employee is a claim for damages for wrongful dismissal or for breach of contract. This is the normal rule and that was applied in Barbar's case, (1958) 1 All ER 322 and Francis case (1962) 3 All ER 633. But, when a statutory status is given to an employee and there has been a violation of the provisions of the statute while terminating the services of such an employee, the latter will be eligible to get the relief of a declaration that the order is null and void and that he continues to be in service, as it will not then be a mere case of a master terminating the services of a servant. This was the position in Vine's case, (1956) 3 All ER 939." 10. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 330 of 1967 Sirsi Municipality v. Gecelia Kom Francis Tellis decided on 18-1-1973 : (1973 Lab IC 453) (SC) the same inference was arrived at. In that case the respondent was an employee of the Municipality. Her services were terminated by a resolution of the Board. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 330 of 1967 Sirsi Municipality v. Gecelia Kom Francis Tellis decided on 18-1-1973 : (1973 Lab IC 453) (SC) the same inference was arrived at. In that case the respondent was an employee of the Municipality. Her services were terminated by a resolution of the Board. She filed a suit for declaration that the resolution of the Municipality dismissing her was void and that she continued to be in service of the Municipality and was entitled to the emoluments up to the date of the suit. It was observed by Ray, J., that the cases of statutory status of an employee could also form the subject-matter of protection of the rights of an employee under the statute. In Vine v. National Dock Labour Board, (1956) 3 All ER 939 the removal of Vine's name from the register was held to be a nullity since the statutory scheme of employment was held to confer on the worker a status. An unlawful act of the Board was found to be interference with status. The status of the dock worker was recognised by the Supreme Court in Jaffer Imam's case (Calcutta Dock Labour Board v. Jaffar Imam, (1965) 3 SCR 453 : ( AIR 1966 SC 282 ). In that case the termination of the employment in breach of clause 36 (3) of the Scheme made by the Central Government in exercise of the power conferred on it by Section 4 (1) of the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948 was held to be bad. 11. In Sirsi Municipality's case A. No. 330 of 1967, D/- 18-1-1973 : (1973 Lab IC 453)(SC) (supra) Beg, J., gave a still broader meaning to the term "statutory status" of employees whose dismissal may be adjudicated void on the ground of breach of the principles of natural justice, even though there may be no violation of any express provision. He observed - "If a guaranteed "statutory status" means only an express statutory protection, such as the one found in Article 311 of the Constitution. and a rule made under a statutory power is not enough to confer it, there was none either in Tyagi's case AIR 1970 SC 1244 : (1970 Lab IC 1044) (supra) or in the case before us. and a rule made under a statutory power is not enough to confer it, there was none either in Tyagi's case AIR 1970 SC 1244 : (1970 Lab IC 1044) (supra) or in the case before us. An express statutory provision or guarantee is not the only basis of a mandatory duty or obligation. It can be imposed either by a rule made in exercise of a statutory power or it may arise by implication while exercising a quasi judicial function. Even where there was no specific rule on the subject, like Rule 143 in the case before us, this Court has held that violation of implied rules of natural justice, in exercise of a quasi judicial statutory power, re-, suits in a legally void decision. It was so held because the obligation to observe rules of natural justice was imperative in such a situation." The following passage from AIR 1967 SC 1269 , State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Devi was made the basis of the decision - "The rule that a party to whose prejudice an order is intended to be passed is entitled to a hearing applies alike to judicial tribunals and bodies of persons invested with authority to adjudicate upon matters involving civil consequences. It is one of the fundamental rules of our constitutional set up that every citizen is protected against exercise of arbitrary authority by the State or its officers." 12. Thus, it becomes abundantly clear that the three exceptions formulated in S.R. Tewari's case AIR 1964 SC 1680 and adverted to in Vidya Ram's case AIR 1972 SC 1450 : (1972 Lab IC 829) were only illustrative of a situation where there could legally be a departure from the general rule that no writ can issue where an order of termination of service is challenged. C.K. Tyagi's case contains substantially the dictum that where there is interference with the "statutory status" a declaration may be granted to the effect that the order of dismissal is null and void. 13. C.K. Tyagi's case contains substantially the dictum that where there is interference with the "statutory status" a declaration may be granted to the effect that the order of dismissal is null and void. 13. In (1965) 2 SCR 713 , Prabhakar Ramakrishna Jodh v. A.L. Pande the appellant was a teacher in a college, affiliated to the University of Saugor and managed by the Governing body established under clause 3 of the College Code, which is an ordinance made under the provisions of the University of Saugor Act, The Principal of the College served the appellant a charge-sheet and asked him to submit his explanation. The appellant denied all the charges and requested for supply of the particulars on which one of the charges was based. The appellant alleged that this was not supplied and the Governing Body terminated his services without holding any enquiry. Thereafter the appellant moved the High Court for a writ quashing the order of the Governing Body and prayed for his reinstatement. The High Court rejected the contention of the appellant on the ground that the conditions of service of the appellant were governed not by the `College Code' but by the contract made between the Governing Body and the appellant. The Supreme Court reversed this decision and held that the provisions of the College Code had the force of law. It conferred legal rights on the teachers of the affiliated colleges and the legal relationship between the appellant and the Governing Body was not based on contract. 14. The learned Counsel for the respondent has not been able to cite any authority before me in support of the proposition that a writ of mandamus cannot issue against a non-statutory body. The consistent view of the Supreme Court appears to be to the contrary. The law on the point was stated in these words in AIR 1969 SC 1306 , Praga Tools Corpn. v. C.V. Imanual, "Therefore, the condition precedent for the issue of a mandamus is that there is in one claiming it a legal right to the performance of a legal duty by one against whom it is sought. An order of mandamus is, in form, a command, directed to a person, corporation or an inferior tribunal requiring him or them to do a particular thing therein specified which appertains to his or their office and is in the nature of public duty. An order of mandamus is, in form, a command, directed to a person, corporation or an inferior tribunal requiring him or them to do a particular thing therein specified which appertains to his or their office and is in the nature of public duty. It is, however, not necessary that the person or the authority on whom the statutory duty is imposed need be a public official or an official body." In that case the Supreme Court refused a writ seeking to restrain a private agreement between the company and its workmen from being given effect to. It was, however, made clear that the order of mandamus could be directed to a person or corporation and that it was not necessary that the person or the authority must be a public official or an official body. In fact, Article 226 or the Constitution which is the pivotal provision for the issue of two kinds of writs empowers the High Court to issue writs or directions etc., to any person or authority. 15. Thus, the twin conditions for] issuing a writ of mandamus are that the petitioner must have a statutory right and sufficient legal interest in claiming relief and there must be a corresponding statutory duty in the performance of which the person against whom the writ is sought has failed. In other words, the petitioner should have a legal right and the opposite party against whom the relief is sought must have a duty to perform under some statute. This analysis of the nature and conditions of the writ of mandamus reveals that there is no inherent bar to the issue of such writ against a person or a private corporation. The crucial tests are whether there is a legal right and a legal duty cast by a statute. Where these conditions are wanting and a person does not enjoy a "statutory status" or does not hold an "office" a writ of mandamus may be refused even against a statutory body as happened in the case of (1964) 3 All ER 865, Vidvodaya University v. Silva 16. The relevant criterion for determining whether a writ of mandamus can issue or an order of termination of service can be quashed are not whether the employing authority is a statutory body or not. The relevant criterion for determining whether a writ of mandamus can issue or an order of termination of service can be quashed are not whether the employing authority is a statutory body or not. The proper tests to be applied are whether in a particular case' there is an element of public employment and the petitioner holds an office or enjoys a statutory status which is capable of protection. Where the relationship between the parties is that of master and servant, certainly the remedy would be a suit for damages and not a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In substance the same propositions were also emphasised in a Division Bench decision of this Court in (1972) 25 Fac LR 146 (All), Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. v. G.C. Kumar Speaking for the Court Dwivedi, J., after reviewing all the English and Indian authorities held that the following principles emerged - (1) Mandamus may issue to a trading corporation to compel it to do its duty which is of a public nature. (2) A duty is of a public nature if it is imposed by charter, common law or statute. (3) Mandamus may issue to restore a person to a corporate office if the office is of a public nature. (4) The office is of a public nature if it is created by a statute and the duties of the office affect the general public or a section thereof. (5) Article 226 empowers the High Court to issue a writ in the nature of mandamus. The power may be exercised, keeping in regard the broad and fundamental principles which guide the issue of mandamus." 17. Applying the above proposition to the facts of the present case there appears to be no doubt that the petitioner enjoyed a statutory status and his employment was of a public nature. The conditions of service of Labour Welfare Officers are governed by the Factories Act, 1948 and the rules framed thereunder. Section 49 of the Act reads as under: "S. 49. Welfare Officers. (1) every factory wherein five hundred or more workers are ordinarily employed the occupier shall employ in the factory such number of welfare Officers as may be prescribed. The conditions of service of Labour Welfare Officers are governed by the Factories Act, 1948 and the rules framed thereunder. Section 49 of the Act reads as under: "S. 49. Welfare Officers. (1) every factory wherein five hundred or more workers are ordinarily employed the occupier shall employ in the factory such number of welfare Officers as may be prescribed. (2) The State Government may prescribe the duties, qualifications and conditions of service of officers employed under sub-section (1)." The State Government has framed the U.P. Factories Welfare Officers' Rules, 1955 in exercise of the powers conferred by Sections 49, 50 and 112 of the Factories Act, 1948. The rules therefore have the force of a statute and are to be deemed a part of the Act, Rule 8 provides that the Welfare Officer "shall have the status of an Officer of the factory". His appointment must be on permanent basis vide Rule 10. His probation and confirmation are strictly governed by the provisions in the rules 10 and 11. Various punishments and penalties are prescribed by Rule 15 and the duties of a Welfare Officer are also defined by Rule 17. Evidently a Welfare Officer cannot be made to perform any duties according to the choice of the management but he can be assigned only those duties which are expressly provided by the rules. A list of his duties is contained in Rule 17. Evidently a Welfare Officer cannot be made to perform any duties according to the choice of the management but he can be assigned only those duties which are expressly provided by the rules. A list of his duties is contained in Rule 17. The said rule says that the duties of a Welfare Officer shall be: (a) to promote harmonious relations and act as a liaison Officer between the workers and the management; (b) to get the grievances and complaints of workers with regard to their working conditions redressed as expeditiously as possible; (c) to bring the breaches of Labour laws and orders and statutory obligations concerning the health, safety and welfare of the workers to the notice of the manager or occupier, and to take suitable steps for the provision of amenities, such as canteens, shelters for rest, crhches, adequate latrine facilities, drinking water, etc.; (d) to study the temper of the workers by friendly contact with them (inside and outside the precincts of the establishment) and bring the cases of discontent likely to result in dispute or strained relations, to the notice of the management, with a view to maintaining harmonious relations; (e) to encourage the formation of - (i) Joint Production Works Committees, (ii) Works Committees, (iii) Co-operatives, (iv) Safety-First Committees, and (v) Welfare Committees and to asset the management in the proper maintenance of discipline, and in the promotion of all measures designed to improve the lot of workers. (f) to organise and supervise labour welfare work, and to see that statutory requirements with regard to working conditions are enforced: (g) to advise the management in matters requiring special knowledge of labour conditions and labour welfare and to take suitable steps to improve the living conditions of workers; (h) to maintain a neutral attitude during legal strikes or lock-outs; (i) to exercise a restraining influence over workers in going on illegal strike and over management in declaring illegal lockout, to help in preventing sabotage and other illegal activities; (j) to detect and check bribery and corruption and to bring such cases to the notice of the management of the factory; (k) to make representations to the authorities concerned in regard to conditions of roads, bridges, etc., used by labour in proceeding to and from their work; and (1) to look after the implementation and due enforcement of the provisions of - (i) the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948; (ii) the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952, and the scheme framed thereunder; (iii) the U.P. Industrial Housing Act, 1955; (iv) the National Small Savings Scheme; (v) the Workers Education Scheme framed by the Central Board of Workers Education." The above catalogue of the duties of a Welfare Officer leaves no room for doubt that not only he holds an office but that it is a public office and his functions are replete with all the elements of a public employment. In fact, his duties embody a High concept of social justice. He has to act as the Liaison Officer between the workers and the management. He has to endeavour to secure real welfare and amenities to the workers in the modern industrial set up and in so discharging his functions has certainly in a measure to act as a curb on the management which has to be kept within bounds. In these circumstances it cannot be contended with force thus a Labour Welfare Officer functions on the will of the employer. On the contrary, his office is created by the Act, It is of a permanent nature and it is a public office. In these circumstances it cannot be contended with force thus a Labour Welfare Officer functions on the will of the employer. On the contrary, his office is created by the Act, It is of a permanent nature and it is a public office. If, therefore, a Labour Welfare Officer has a right to continue in his post until he attains the age of superannuation and the management or the private company chooses to terminate his service prior to that contingency or without complying with the statutory procedure, the officer is entitled to ask for a writ of mandamus. He has a legal right to the office land the management is under an statutory 'obligation to retain him in office. 18. A feeble attempt was made by the learned Counsel for the respondent to argue that the relations between the petitioner and the respondent was based on contract. There was, however, no such pleading in the counter-affidavit filed by the respondent and I am unable to accept this contention. 19.The petitioner further assailed the impugned order on the ground that the management did not possess any power to terminate the services of the petitioner other- wise than by way of punishment. In other words, there was no power to pass the order of termination simplicities. The learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that since there was a power of appointment under the Act and the Rules, it necessarily carried with it also the power of termination of services. He placed reliance on the provisions of section 16 of the U.P. General Clauses Act, though in terms it will not be applicable to the facts of the present case. Section 16 provides; "Where, by any (Uttar Pradesh) Act, a power to make any appointment is conferred,! then, unless a different intention appears, the1 authority having power to make the appointment shall also have power to suspend or dismiss any person appointed by it in exercise of that power." It is thus clear such power of dismissal cannot be inferred if a different intention appears. The respondent therefore cannot rely on any inherent power of termination of service. The legal position with regard to such powers seems to be that even if there be an inherent power of dismissal such power cannot be available where a statute intervenes and governs the terms and conditions of service. The respondent therefore cannot rely on any inherent power of termination of service. The legal position with regard to such powers seems to be that even if there be an inherent power of dismissal such power cannot be available where a statute intervenes and governs the terms and conditions of service. Admittedly there is no rule under the Factory Rules indicating the condition for the termination of the services of a Labour Welfare Officer by giving one month's notice. The intention to take away the general power of termination if any is manifest from the fact that under R. 10 the appointment of a Labour Welfare Officer has to be made on a permanent basis. The same rule provides that the said Officer shall initially be placed on one years' probation which may be extended for a period not exceeding one year. The two provisos to the same rule are significant. Not only is there a guarantee in the initial appointment which cannot be on any other basis except a permanent basis but it is further provided that even if during the period of probation the officer fails to give satisfaction and it is decided to dispense with his services after giving one month's notice according to the rule, no such action can be taken without the written concurrence of the Labour Commissioner who shall also record his reasons therefor. In the second proviso the period of probation cannot be extended without the written concurrence of the Labour Commissioner who has also to record his reasons therefor. Rule 12 categorically provides that a probationer shall be confirmed in his appointment at the end of his period of probation, or at the end of the extended period of probation. Rule 21 provides that the age of superannuation of a Labour Welfare Officer shall be 58 years. Thus, the scheme of employment disclosed by the Factories Rules is that a Labour Welfare Officer is appointed on a permanent basis and he is entitled to confirmation at the end of his period of probation. There is no rule permitting that his services may be dispensed with after his confirmation except by way of punishment under Rule 15. Thus, the scheme of employment disclosed by the Factories Rules is that a Labour Welfare Officer is appointed on a permanent basis and he is entitled to confirmation at the end of his period of probation. There is no rule permitting that his services may be dispensed with after his confirmation except by way of punishment under Rule 15. Thus, the conclusion cannot be escaped that a confirmed Labour Welfare Officer has a legal right to continue in his office until he reaches the age of superannuation and his employer is also under a duty to retain him in service until the age of superannuation. 20. It cannot be doubted that the whole concept of permanency and superannuation destroys the doctrine of pleasure which cannot therefore be successfully [urged on behalf of the respondent. Where The statutory rules confer a right to continue in service till the age of superannuation the employers cannot claim any inherent right to terminate the services. In such cases the right to terminate the services must be looked for within the statutory provisions themselves. Rules 10 and 11 have the effect of abrogating the inherent right of termination of service, if any. 21. In AIR 1952 SC 362 , Hira Devi v. Dist. Board, Shahjahanpur it was held - "We are afraid we cannot agree with this line of reasoning adopted by the High Court. The defendants were a board created by statute and were invested with powers which of necessity had to be found within the four comers of the statute itself. The powers of dismissal and suspension given to the Board are defined and circumscribed by the provisions of Sections 71 and 90 of the Act and have to be culled out from the express provisions of those sections. When express powers have been given to the Board under the terms of these sections it would not be legitimate to have resort to general or implied powers under the law of master and servant or under Section 16, U.P. General Clauses Act." It is a settled principle that if the tenure of office is provided under the statute and its determination can also be "for cause" the doctrine of holding office during pleasure is ruled out. In AIR 1934 PC 60 . In AIR 1934 PC 60 . Clifford B. Reily v. Emperor Lord Atkin observed: "If the terms of the appointment definitely prescribe a term and expressly provide for a power to determine "for cause" any application of a power to dismiss at pleasure is excluded." In 1969 All LJ 612 Managing Committee of Meerut College. Meerut v. Dr. V. Puri, the facts were that statute 29 (1) provided that Principals and all other members of the staff of the colleges other than those maintained by the Government, shall be appointed on a definite written contract of permanent service. It was held: - "The words "definite" and "permanent service" are significant. The guarantee is that the Principal shall have a permanent service or a tenure not on pleasure but during good behaviour. This would be in consistent with the College Management having the power to terminate the service of a Principal at will without assigning any cause." It, therefore, follows that the respondent did, not possess any power to terminate the services of the petitioner otherwise than by way, of punishment and the impugned order is, therefore, void and ineffective. 22. It may be mentioned that while the respondent pleaded that the said order was an order of termination simplicities the case of the petitioner was that it had actually been inspired by an oblique motive and was an order of punishment. I have held that there was no power to terminate the services of the petitioner. Therefore, if the order is taken to be punitive in character, it can be passed only within the frame-work of Rule 15 which deals with punishment and is in these terms - "Punishments. - (1) The management may impose any one or more of the following punishments on a Welfare Officer - (1) Censure. (ii) Withholding of increments, including stoppage at any efficiency bar, (iii) Reduction to lower stage in the time-scale. (iv) Suspension, and (v) Dismissal or termination of service in any other manner - - Provided that no punishment shall be inflicted unless the Welfare Officer has first been informed of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action and has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself - Provided further that the management shall not impose any punishment other than censure except with the previous concurrence of the Labour Commissioner. (2) The Labour Commissioner shall give the Welfare Officer an opportunity to explain the circumstances appearing against him and, if necessary, of being heard in person, when a reference is made under sub-rule (1). Even though ostensibly the impugned order may appear to be a simple order of termination, its legal character in my opinion is that of a punitive order. If the services of a confirmed employee are terminated, it per se amounts to punishment. That proposition was emphasised by the Supreme Court in AIR 1958 SC 36 , L. Dhingra v. Union of IndiaAt page 48, S.R. Das, J., observed - "Shortly put, the principle is that when a servant has right to a post or to a rank cither under the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, or under the rules governing the conditions of his service, the termination of service of such a servant or his reduction to a lower post is by itself and prima facie a punishment, for it operates as a forfeiture of his right to hold that post or that rank and to get the emoluments and other benefits attached thereto 23. The same rule was reiterated in AIR 1964 SC 600 , Moti Ram v. N.E. Frontier Railway, It was laid down in paragraph 26 as under - "A person who substantially holds a permanent post has a right to continue in service subject of course, to the rule of superannuation and the rule as to compulsory retirement. If for any other reason that right is invaded and he is asked to leave his service, the termination of his service must inevitably mean the defeat of his right to continue in service and as such it has the nature of a penalty and amounts to removal. In other words, termination of the services of a permanent servant otherwise than on the ground of superannuation or compulsory retirement, must per se amount to his removal In paragraph 69 Subba Rao, J., ruled - "If an officer had a right to a post or rank and if the termination of his services deprived him of that right the said termination would be dismissal or removal as punishment. So too, if the termination had the effect of the officer being visited with evil consequences, then whatever may be the phraseology used for putting an end to his services, it would be dismissal as punishment. The motive operating on the mind of the authority concerned or the machinery evolved or the method adopted to put an end to his services are not relevant in considering the question whether he was dismissed, if he had a right to the office or if he had been visited with evil consequences, though the said circumstances may have some relevance as other decisions of this Court disclose, in ascertaining whether he was discharged with a stigma attached to him." 24. The petitioner being admittedly a confirmed officer initially appointed on probation basis the order terminating his services must be deemed to be one of punishment and hence Rule 15 is attracted and the proviso to Rule 15 (1) says that the management shall not impose any punishment other than censure except with the previous concurrence of the Labour Commissioner. It has been passed in utter disregard of the statutory procedure. It is, therefore, plainly illegal and liable to be quashed. 25. The learned Counsel for the respondent sought to justify the order under challenge on the ground that in the circumstances of the case it was a just and proper order, inasmuch as the petitioner had forfeited his right to continue in the post. Reliance was placed for this argument on Section 49 of the Act and Rule 3 of the Rules. Section 49 says, "In every factory wherein five hundred or more workers are ordinarily employed the occupier shall employ in the factory such number of welfare officers as may be prescribed. The State Government may prescribe the duties, qualifications and conditions of service of officers employed under sub-section (1)". Rule 3 is more or less to the same effect. It provides that he occupier of every factory wherein 500 or more workers are ordinarily employed shall appoint a Welfare Officer of the grade as hereinafter specified................. The learned Counsel for the respondent laid great emphasis on the word "ordinarily" occurring in the aforesaid provisions and said that the condition precedent being absent, the petitioner was not entitled to retain the post of Labour Welfare Officer. The learned Counsel for the respondent laid great emphasis on the word "ordinarily" occurring in the aforesaid provisions and said that the condition precedent being absent, the petitioner was not entitled to retain the post of Labour Welfare Officer. In paragraph 22 of the counter-affidavit it was averred - "That the Respondent does not ordinarily employ 500 or more workers and during the years 1970, 1971 and at all relevant times during 1972, the regular or ordinary employment of workers was less than 500 and as such the precondition for the employment of a Welfare Officer had ceased to exist, and in any case was not existent at the time of termination of the services of the Petitioner." It is significant that the said paragraph of the counter-affidavit was verified on legal advice. In the rejoinder affidavit the contents of paragraph 22 of the counter-affidavit were denied and it was stated - "The Inspection Note of the Inspector of Factories dated 26-7-1972 will show that the factory ordinarily has been employing more than 500 workmen." The register containing the inspection note of the Inspector of Factories was produced before me at the time of the hearing. On a perusal of the same I am satisfied that the respondent has failed to establish that at the relevant time the factory ceased to employ ordinarily 500 or more workers. The register also refers to five other dates in 1972 on which the number of workers was over 500 or more. The learned counsel for the respondent placed before me some other inspection notes in the same register. Thus, for instance, at page 45 there is an entry dated 3-11-1970 which mentions the figures 346 and 597 of workers, the latter signifying those who were on the muster roll. Similarly, at page 47 on 9-7-1971 the figures noted are 340 and 623 and at page 51 on 19-6-1972 the figures noted are 427 and 586. Even if it be assumed that on some date the number of workers fell short of 500 that is wholly immaterial. In my opinion the use of the word `ordinarily' in Section 49 and Rule 3 is very significant. That expression denotes a fluid concept of period a flowing stream of time, if I may say so. Even if it be assumed that on some date the number of workers fell short of 500 that is wholly immaterial. In my opinion the use of the word `ordinarily' in Section 49 and Rule 3 is very significant. That expression denotes a fluid concept of period a flowing stream of time, if I may say so. In view of the overall picture spread over a considerable length of time and the number of workmen as disclosed in the inspection notes it cannot be legitimately argued that the factory ceased to employ 500 or more workers. The learned Counsel for the respondent placed reliance on AIR 1969 Mys 300 : (1969 Lab IC 1216) G.V. Joshi v. State, wherein it was held that the employment of twenty persons in an establishment even for a single day will bring the establishment in question within the purview of the statute and once it enters the field of the statute that way, it can get out of it only if the conditions mentioned in the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 1 are satisfied. My attention was drawn to subsection (5) which provides that an establishment to which this Act applies shall continue to be governed by this Act notwithstanding that the number of persons employed therein at any time falls below twenty. It was argued that the Factories Act and the Rules in question in the instant case did not contain similar provision. Hence, the intention of the Legislature seemed to be that if at any time the number of workers in the factory fell below 500 the Labour Welfare Officer ceased to have a locus standi I am unable to accept this submission. The analogy of the Employees' Provident Funds Act cannot be applied to the case of appointment of Labour Welfare Officer under the present Act and Rules. Under the former Act a specific number i.e., 20 persons in an establishment was fixed by the Act and hence it could possibly be considered that on the non-existence of that condition the workers may be deprived of the benefit of the Employees' Provident Funds Act, It was, therefore, necessary for the Legislature to add a specific provision to sub-section (5) that the establishment would continue to be governed by the Act notwithstanding that the number of persons subsequently fell below 20. Under the Factories Act and the Rules applicable to the petitioner no such number is rigidly fixed and we have to bear in mind the implications of the use of the word "ordinarily" to which I have already adverted. Thus, on the facts of the case I am unable to hold that the petitioner lost his right to retain the post of the Labour Welfare Officer on account of the alleged fall in the number of workers. 26. For the reasons stated above I am of the Opinion that order of the respondent terminating the services of the petitioner is void and illegal. It is accordingly quashed and the respondent is commanded by a writ of mandamus not to give effect to that order. 27. In the result this writ petition succeeds and is allowed with costs.