JUDGMENT S. K, Jha. J. Leave to appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent having been granted by G. N. Prasad J, this appeal was filed and is directed against the judgment and order dated the 1st February, 1967, passed by the learned Single Judge. The decree holder is the appellant. The appellant had instituted a suit for rent being Rent Suit No. 423 R. 8 of 1952-53 in the court of Rent Suit Deputy Collector under the-Chotanagpur Tenancy Act 1908 (Bengal Act 6 of 1908) [hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'] as amended by the Chotanagpur Tenancy (Amendment) Act 1947 (Bihar Act XXV of 1947) [hereinafter referred to as 'the Amending Act'.] The Rent Suit Deputy Collector dismissed the appellant's claim for rent of Sam bat 2008. The appellant filed an appeal before the Judicial Commissioner and his claim was decreed in appeal. On 27.2.1958 the decree-holder appellant filed an application being Execution Case No, 359 R. 9 of 1957•58 before the Rent Suit Deputy Collector for executing the aforesaid decree. That application was dismissed as being barred by limitation and the execution proceeding was, therefore, struck off by the Rent Suit Deputy Collector by an order dated 14. 7. 1962. Being aggrieved by this order the appellant filed Miscellaneous Appeal, No. 32 of 1962 in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Chotanagpur, Ranchi which was finally heard by the learned Additional Judicial Commissioner on merits held that if the appeal were maintainable, it was bound to 'succeed, but the appeal itself was misconceived and not maintainable after the amendment of the Act by the Amending Act. Having thus held, the appeal was dismissed as not maintainable by him by an order dated 17th December, 1963. Against the aforesaid order of the learned Additional Judicial Commissioner, the appellant preferred a miscellaneous second appeal being Miscellaneous Appeal No. 80 of 1964 in this Court. The learned Single Judge agreed with the reasons given by the first appellate court and held that the proper forum of appeal in this case was the court of the Deputy Commissioner and not that of the Judicial Commissioner. The decree-holder's appeal before this Court was accordingly dismissed by the learned Single Judge. 2. The learned Single Judge agreed with the reasons given by the first appellate court and held that the proper forum of appeal in this case was the court of the Deputy Commissioner and not that of the Judicial Commissioner. The decree-holder's appeal before this Court was accordingly dismissed by the learned Single Judge. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the view taken by the courts below that the Amending Act had made a change in the forum of appeal from orders in execution proceedings is not correct. It has been urged that is does not stand to reason that whereas the appeal from the decree of the Rent Suit Deputy Collector in suits of the present nature would still lie before the Judicial Commissioner, an appeal against an order passed in execution thereof would lie not to the Judicial Commissioner but to the Deputy Commissioner, It has been further contended that under the Act as it stood prior to the amendment, both the decree and order in execution thereof were admittedly appealable to the Judicial Commissioner, and there is nothing in the Amending Act which would go to show that the right of appeal to the Court of Judicial Commissioner with regard to orders passed in execution proceedings can be said to have been taken away and the jurisdiction to hear such appeals vested in that of the Deputy Commissioner, In order to examine the correctness of this contention, and as the matter is of considerable importance in so far as there is no authoritative pronouncement settling this question, it is necessary for me to set out in detail some of the provisions of the Act as they stood before the Amending Act and as they now stand. Since some of the provisions of the Act after its amendment are not very happily worded, a clue to their correct interpretation can be found from an historical analysis of the scheme of the Act. 4. Chapter XVI of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act has been divided into various groups of sections: (1) Sections 135 to 180 deal with judicial procedure in matters cognizable by the Deputy Commissioner; (2) Sections 181 to 198 deal with execution of decrees and orders of the Deputy Commissioner; (3) Sections 199 to 214 A deal with sales in execution of decrees of the Deputy Commissioner; and (4) Sections 215 to 229 deal with appeals. 5. It may be noticed that by the Chotanagpur Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1947 (Bihar Act XXV of 1947) the scheme and object of all these sections remained the same. Only minor changes were made here and there. In group (1) a new section, section 178A was inserted. By the insertion of the new section 178A a non occupancy raiyat against whom a decree or order of eviction had been made under section 178, was made entitled to cut and appropriate the crop grown by him on the holding or portion thereof before the delivery of possession through the Court but not thereafter. This was just a minor relief expressly granted to the non-occupancy raiyat which right although he impliedly had already before the amendment, had not been expressly incorporated in the Act. 6. In group (2) a very minor change in section 196 was made. In section 196 in the third paragraph, before the amendment, the sale of any tenure comprised in an undivided estate or tenure could not be sold in an execution of a decree without the previous sanction of the "Commissioner". The word "Commissioner" was substituted by the Amending Act by the word "Deputy Commissioner". 7. In group (3) sections 208A to 208D were inserted and consequential changes were made in section 208 (1). Section 208 as it originally stood dealt with the sale of a tenure or holding in execution of a decree for arrears of rent. The word "Commissioner" was substituted by the Amending Act by the word "Deputy Commissioner". 7. In group (3) sections 208A to 208D were inserted and consequential changes were made in section 208 (1). Section 208 as it originally stood dealt with the sale of a tenure or holding in execution of a decree for arrears of rent. "according to the provisions for the sale of under tenures contained in the Bengal Rent Recovery (under tenures) Act 1865, and all the provisions of that Act except sections 12, 13, 14 and 15 thereof, in" so far as they could be made applicable, By the Amending Act instead of the procedure prescribed in the quotation given above, it was laid down that such a sale in execution of the decree would be "according to the procedure laid down in sections 208B to 208D", and the provisos to section 208 as they originally stood were made more scientific and' systematic and were recast in a more simple manner, The new section 208A provided for the distribution of rent of a holding a portion of which was sold in execution of decree for arrears of rent' and sections 208B to 208D merely laid down the procedure to be followed in case of sales of tenures or holdings in execution of a decree for arrears of rent, which was previously determined with reference to another Act, namely, the Bengal Rent Recovery (under-tenures) Act 1865 (Bengal Act VIII of 1865). It would be seen that without effecting any substantial change in any substantive rights of either the decree-holder or the judgment-debtor the Amending Act brought about systematic changes in order to make the provisions of the Act themselves self-contained. It will thus be noticed that the powers of the Deputy Commissioner either in regard to the matters cognizable by him in relation to suits or in relation to execution of decrees or in relation to sales held in execution of decrees have been in no way affected or enlarged. 8. In group (4), namely, the sections relating to appeals, as I shall presently show, merely the arrangement of the sections was altered without affecting in substance the extent or purport of the provisions incorporated therein, The old section 215 (1) was re-arranged as section 215 (5). The old section 215 (2) was re-arranged as 215 (7). The old section 215 (3) was re-arranged as 215 (4). The old section 215 (2) was re-arranged as 215 (7). The old section 215 (3) was re-arranged as 215 (4). The old section 216 and section 219 were both incorporated in a single provision contained in the new section 216. The old section 217 retained its position as section 217. The old section 218 (1) was re-arranged as the first part of Section 215 (1) and the old section 218 (2) was replaced by the first part of new section 215 (2). Therefore, the old sections 218 and 219 were deleted as they had already been incorporated in new sections 215 (1) (first part), 215 (2) (first part) and 216 (later part). Old sections 220 to 223 retained their respective positions, even after the amendment. The old section 224 (1) was incorporated in the last part of section 215 (1). Thus the old section 224 (1) was deleted in the Amended Act and the old section 224 (2) retained its position as section 224 (2) and the old section 225, sub• sections (1) and (2) both retained their original position. Old section 226 was incorporated in the new section 216 (2) and, therefore, the old section 226 was deleted and the old sections 227 to 229 retained their original positions. Since no additional powers were conferred on the Deputy Commissioner nor his jurisdiction extended in any respect with regard to any of the matters covered by Groups (1) to (3), there does not seem to have been any occasion, much less necessity of effecting any corresponding change in his powers in Group (4), namely, in the matter of appeals. 9. In nut shell while absolutely no change was effected even in the arrangement of sections 217, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224 (2) 225, and 227 to 229, only the old sections 215, 216, 218, 219, 224 (1) and 226 were re-arranged in a more systematic and scientific manner. Two provisions of section 215 as they stand after the amendment with their corresponding counterparts in the original Act are necessary to be reproduced. Two provisions of section 215 as they stand after the amendment with their corresponding counterparts in the original Act are necessary to be reproduced. After the amendment section 215 (7) reads thus :- "No judgment of a Deputy Commissioner in any suit, and no order of a Deputy Commissioner passed in any suit and relating to the trial thereof, or after decree and relating to the execution thereof, shall be open to appeal otherwise than as expressly provided for in this Act." The corresponding provisions in the Act as it stood prior to the amendment was section 215 (2) which read as follows: "No judgment of a Deputy Commissioner in any suit, and no order of a Deputy Commissioner passed in any suit and relating to the trial thereof, or after decree and relating to the execution thereof, shall be open to revision or appeal otherwise than as expressly provided in this Act." It will thus be seen that there has been absolutely no change even in the language of the two provisions quoted above excepting that there is no reference to revision in section 215 (7) after the amendment. With regard to appeal the provisions before the amendment and after the amendment have been laid down in an indentical language to say that appeals against orders passed in any suit relating to the trial or relating to execution of the decree shall be open to appeal only in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The entire difficulty in the present case seems to have arisen on account of some ambiguity in the language of section 215 (4) as it stands today which is corresponding to section 215 (3) as it stood before the amendment. Both these provisions need to be re produced hereunder. New section 215 (4) "All orders p'1ssed by a Deputy Commissioner or a Deputy Collector in any suit relating to the trial thereof, shall be appealable to the Court to which an appeal from the decree itself would lie : Provided that there shall be no right of appeal against orders passed under section 206, or section 211, or under section 212, subsection (2) setting aside a sale, or under rule 60, rule 61 of or rule 62 or order XXI of the First Schedule to the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908), and against orders under section 213A". Old section 215 (3) "Orders passed after decree and relating to the execution thereof except orders passed under section 206, or section 211, or under section 212, sub-section (2) setting aside sale, or under rule 60, rule 61 or rule 62 of Order XXI of the First Schedule to the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 and orders passed under section 213A, shall be appealable to the Court to which an appeal from the decree itself would lie". It was contended on behalf of the judgment-debtor, respondent in the courts below as also before us that the omission of the words "orders passed after decree and relating to the execution thereof" in the new section 215 (4) should be construed to mean that any order passed after the decree and relating to the execution thereof would fall outside the purview of section 215 (4) and would not, therefore be appealable to the Court to which an appeal against the decree itself would lie. This construction in my view is not tenable for the simple reason that section 215 (4) has to be read in juxtaposition to section 215 (7). 10. It will be noticed that section 215 (2) as it stood before the amendment which is equivalent to section 215 (7) after the amendment has to be read along with section 215 (3) as it stood before the amendment which is equivalent to section 215 (4) after the amendment. Thus section 215 (7) and 215 (4) after the amendment must be harmoniously construed along with the proviso to sub-section (4) of section 215 which will in the present case certainly prove a good guide to the true meaning and scope of the provisions of section 215 (4) in order to be so harmoniously construed. It will be seen that the proviso to section 215 (4) put certain restrictions on the right of appeal against orders in relation to execution of decrees only. None of the parts of the proviso will be necessary to be retained on the Statute Book if sub-section (4) of section 215 be so construed as to be limited in its operation to appeals against orders before a decree is passed. Section 206 of the Act deals with the procedure where a third party claims interest in the properties seized in execution before the day fixed for the sale. Section 206 of the Act deals with the procedure where a third party claims interest in the properties seized in execution before the day fixed for the sale. Section 211 lays down the procedure where a third party claims to be in lawful possession of a tenure or holding before the day' fixed for the sale of such tenure or holding in execution of decrees for arrears of rent as prescribed in section 208, Section 212 (2) provides for setting aside the sale of any immovable property which has been sold in execution of a decree, if any person who owned such property immediately before the sale, or who claims an interest therein under a title lawfully acquired before the sale, deposits in the Court of the Deputy Commissioner a sum equal to five' per centum of the purchase-money plus the amount specified in the proclamation of sale less any amount which may have been received by the decree-holder since the date of such proclamation if such deposit is made within a period of thirty days from the date of the sale. Section 213 A provides that the sale in execution would be deemed to have been set aside if the rent decree itself were set aside and the restoration of the status quo ante must be made. Rule 60 or 61 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure all deal with matters arising after the passing of the decree and in Course of the execution proceedings. It is thus obvious that if section 215 (4) be so construed as to oust from its scope appeals against orders passed after the decree and in relation to the execution thereof, then the entire proviso to sub-section (4) of section 215 must be held to be completely redundant. It would also then have to be held that there was no contingency contemplated by sub-section (4) of section 215 to which any part of the proviso could apply to curtail its operation. 11. It is true that if the language of the enacting part of the Statute does not contain the provisions which are said to occur in it, one cannot derive these provisions by implication from a proviso. 11. It is true that if the language of the enacting part of the Statute does not contain the provisions which are said to occur in it, one cannot derive these provisions by implication from a proviso. But at the same time it is equally well settled that there may be and are many cases in which the terms of an intelligible provision may throw considerable light in the interpretation of the ambiguous expressions of the statute. As has been said in West Derby Union v. Metropolitan Life Assurance Co. 1, by Lord Watson: "I am perfectly clear that if the language of the enacting part of the statute does not contain the provisions which are said to occur in it, you cannot derive these provisions by implication from a proviso. When one regards the natural history and object of provisoes, and the manner in which they find their way into Acts of Parliament, I think your Lordships would be adopting a very dangerous and certainly unusual course if you were to import legislation from a proviso wholesale in to the body of the statute, although I perfectly admit that there may be and are many cases in which the" terms of an intelligible proviso may throw considerable light on the ambiguous import of the statutory words." and Lord Herschell in the same case at page 655 said. "I decline to read into any enactment words which are not to be found there and which would alter its operative effect because of the provisions to be found in any proviso", though he admitted that a proviso may be a useful guide in the selection of one or other of two possible constructions of words in the enactment or to show the scope of the latter in a doubtful case. As was observed by Lush, J. in Mullins versus Treasurer of Surrey2 :- "When one finds a proviso to a section, the natural presumption is that, but for the proviso, the enacting part of the section would have included the subject matter of the proviso". As was observed by Lush, J. in Mullins versus Treasurer of Surrey2 :- "When one finds a proviso to a section, the natural presumption is that, but for the proviso, the enacting part of the section would have included the subject matter of the proviso". Keeping in mind these well settled - principles of construction of statutory provisions and their provisoes, I have to examine whether by treating the proviso as a useful guide in the selection of one of the two possible constructions of the words in section 215 (4) it can be held that "all orders passed by a Deputy Commissioner or a Deputy Collector in any suit relating to the trial thereof" may be said to include "orders passed after the decree and in relation to the execution thereof". There seems to have been no change in the legislative intent in so far as the object and scope of section 215 (7), read with section 215 (4) with its proviso are concerned. In this connection, it is worth while noticing that section 647 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1882 which is equivalent to section 141 of the 1908 Code stood in these terms:- "The procedure herein prescribed shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of Civil jurisdiction other than suits and appeals". With regard "to the true construction of the aforesaid provision there was a divergence of opinion between different High Courts as to whether proceedings other than suits and appeal included proceedings in execution. While the High Courts of Allahabad and Bombay held that the section applied to applications for execution of decrees also, the High Court of Calcutta had held that the section did not apply to proceedings in execution. Due to this divergence of opinion an Explanation was added to section 647 or the old Code by the Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act 6 of 1892 which ran as follows :- "Explanation.- This section does not apply to applications for the execution of decrees which are proceedings in suits". The effect of the above Explanation was to supersede the view taken by the Allahabad and Bombay, High Court and to give legislative sanction to the Calcutta decision. But, in the meantime, one of the Allahabad cases went upto the Privy Council in the case of Thakur Prasad vs. Fakirullah3. The effect of the above Explanation was to supersede the view taken by the Allahabad and Bombay, High Court and to give legislative sanction to the Calcutta decision. But, in the meantime, one of the Allahabad cases went upto the Privy Council in the case of Thakur Prasad vs. Fakirullah3. In that case the Privy Council held that even without the Explanation inserted by the Amending Act of 1892, the meaning of the section as it stood before the amendment was still the same and that the Act of 1892 did nothing more than to express the true meaning of section 647 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus it will be seen that the Privy Council accepted the Explanation above mentioned as correctly interpreting the law, namely, that the proceedings in execution of decrees were generally proceedings in suits. This view of the Privy Council has also been approved by the Supreme Court in the case of Dokhu Bhushayya vs. Katragudda Ramkrishnayya and others. Generally, speaking, therefore, unless there be some thing to the contrary, either expressly or by necessary intendment in the Statute, the applications for execution of decrees are proceedings in suits. That view is all the more necessary to be taken in the instant case on the principle of harmonious construction to bring the provisions of section 215 (4) in conformity with the proviso thereto and section 215 (7) of the Act. I am accordingly constrained to hold that while saying in section 215 (4) that "all orders in any suit relating to the trial thereof shall be appealable to the Court to which an appeal from the decree itself would lie", the Legislature definitely intended that the term "all orders in any suit relating to trial thereof" would also include "in relation to the applications for the execution of decrees" which are proceedings in suits. In my view, this can be the only I possible intention of the Legislature, on which the proviso could operate and restrict the right of appeals in regard to matters covered thereby. 12. In this connection, reference may also be made to a Division Bench decision of this Court relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant. That case is Chintamani Saran Nath Sah Deo vs. Shyama Kumari Devi and others5. 12. In this connection, reference may also be made to a Division Bench decision of this Court relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant. That case is Chintamani Saran Nath Sah Deo vs. Shyama Kumari Devi and others5. Though the point in issue in the present case was not raised before the Division Bench deciding that case, yet the view that I have taken may impliedly find support from the above-mentioned case. In that case the appellant had filed a rent suit in 1949 for arrears of rent for the period 1946 to 1949. A decree in the rent suit was passed on 25.8.1953 for a sum of Rs. 80,185/- and odd. Thereafter the appellant filed an execution case in 1956 in the court of the Sub-divisional Officer, Khuti to realise the decretal dues by the attachment and sale of certain moveable and immoveable properties including the amount of compensation payable under the Bihar Land Reforms Act. On an objection being raised by the judgment-debtor in the execution proceedings, the Sub-divisional Officer held that the execution case was not maintainable. Against the aforesaid order of the Sub-divisional Officer in the execution case a miscellaneous first appeal was filed in this Court under section 215 (2) of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act. Obviously one claim for rent included the period after the coming into force of the Act as amended by the Amending Act of 1947, The suit was also filed after the amendment came into force and the execution proceedings were started in 1956. In spite of the coming into force of the Amending Act this Court entertained and allowed the miscellaneous first appeal. It may be pointed out that in that case since the value in dispute exceeded five thousand rupees, the appeal lay direct to this Court against the order of the Sub-divisional Officer. In the present case, however, since the value in dispute is less than five thousand rupees, the appeal would lie in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner. 13. It may be pointed out that in that case since the value in dispute exceeded five thousand rupees, the appeal lay direct to this Court against the order of the Sub-divisional Officer. In the present case, however, since the value in dispute is less than five thousand rupees, the appeal would lie in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner. 13. In the view that I have taken of the true meaning and purport of section 215 (4) read with the proviso thereto, the judgments and orders, passed by the learned single Judge of this Court in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 80 of 1964 and that of the learned Additional Judicial Commissioner, Chotanagpur, Ranchi, passed in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 32 of 1962, dated the 1st February, 1967 and the 17th December, 1963, respectively must be held to have been wrongly decided. The proper forum for appeal against the order dated the 14th July, 1962, passed by the Rent suit Deputy Collector, Ranchi in Execution Case No. 359 R. 9 of 1957-58 would be the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, Chotanagpur, Ranchi. The Learned Single Judge of this Court has held that the learned Additional Judicial Commissioner had taken the view that the decision of the executing court on the question of limitation was erroneous, as the application for execution was not barred by limitation. I also find that the learned Additional Judicial Commissioner has held:-"that if, however, the appeal were maintainable, it was bound to succeed, in view of the fact that ,the learned Deputy Collector has committed an error in taking the date of the judgment as the relevant date for the purpose of computing the period of limitation. The case reported in 5 P. L. T. page 364,6 settles the point. The date on whi.ch the decree is signed is to be taken as the relevant date in view of the aforesaid decision". 'In this view of the matter, on my finding that the appeal was maintainable before the learned Additional Judicial Commissioner, Chotanagpur, Ranchi, the decree-holder's appeal before us must succeed and this Letters Patent Appeal is bound to be allowed. This appeal is, accordingly, allowed and the judgments and orders of the Courts below are set aside and it is directed that the Rent Suit Deputy Collector, Ranchi will now proceed with execution case No. 359 R. 9 of 1957-58 in accordance with law. This appeal is, accordingly, allowed and the judgments and orders of the Courts below are set aside and it is directed that the Rent Suit Deputy Collector, Ranchi will now proceed with execution case No. 359 R. 9 of 1957-58 in accordance with law. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order 33 to costs. Untwalia, C. J. I entirely agree. Appeal allowed.