JUDGMENT : B.K. Ray, J. - The Plaintiff in three rent suits claimed arrear rent against the Defendant who is recorded as a Sthitiban tenant in respect of the land for which arrear rent was claimed in the suits. Rent suit No. 4064 was for recovery of Rs. 152.52 as arrear rent for plot Nos. 454 and 455 -under khata No. 879. Rent suit No. 4065 was for recovery of Rs. 117.65 for plot Nos. 2932, 3387 and 3440 under Khata No. 878. Rent suit No. 4066 was for recovery of Rs. 21.42 for plot No. 588 under khata No. 877. 2. The common defence in all the suits was that the Plaintiff was a Tanki Baheldar, in other words, an intermediary in respect of the land in suit which appertained to the estate of the Plaintiff. On the vesting of the estate by Gazette notification dated 13-4-1961, the Plaintiff lost its intermediary right and consequently its right to collect rent from the Defendant for the land in suit. This plea was accepted by the trial Court which accordingly dismissed the three suits by a common judgment. The Plaintiff, there after, carried two appeals before the District Judge, Puri. These two appeals related to Rent Suit Nos. 4064 and 4065. In the Court below, the Plaintiff filed the order of the Tribunal under O.E.A. Act (hereinafter to be referred to as the 'Act') dated 24-4-1965 in E.A.A. Case No. 25 of 1963 and a certified copy of the Plaintiff's petition before the Tribunal. The Court below accepted the documents as additional evidence. In spite of this, it dismissed the two appeals by a common judgment. It is against this judgment and decree, two Second Appeals have been filed, viz., Nos. 317 and 318 of 1969. As these two second appeals are between the same parties and involve common questions of law and fact, they have been tagged and heared together with the consent of learned Counsel for both parties. This judgment, therefore, will govern both the appeals. 3. 317 and 318 of 1969. As these two second appeals are between the same parties and involve common questions of law and fact, they have been tagged and heared together with the consent of learned Counsel for both parties. This judgment, therefore, will govern both the appeals. 3. The Appellant has filed a certified copy of judgment in three suits between the same parties for the very same lands which are the subject-matter of the present two appeals to show that on an earlier occasion in spite of the fact that the Appellant's estate had vested on 13-4-1961, its suits for recovery of rent for period subsequent to 13-4-1961 have been decreed in its favour. Along with the aforesaid document, the Appellant has filed a common application for both these appeals under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC for accepting the document as additional evidence in this Court in both the appeals. This application is resisted by learned Counsel for Respondent on the ground that a case for acceptance of additional evidence has not been made out and that the Respondent will be seriously prejudiced if the aforesaid document is accepted. 4. The first point which arises for consideration is whether during the period of which arrear rent has been claimed by the Appellant against the Respondent, the former was the landlord under whom the latter was a tenant in respect of the lands which are the subject matter of these appeals. There is no dispute that the Appellant was an intermediary under whom the Respondent was an occupancy raiyat for the land prior to the vesting of the estate. There is also no dispute that by notification dated 13-4-1961 u/s 3-A of the Act, the estate of the Appellant vested in the State of Orissa. Consequently, the Appellant ceased to be an intermediary since 13-4-1961 and lost all right to realise rent from the Respondent for the land in question from the aforesaid date. The period for which rent is claimed by the Appellant in the cases before me is subsequent to the vesting of the estate, and hence, it has no right to realise rent from the Respondent. Mr. The period for which rent is claimed by the Appellant in the cases before me is subsequent to the vesting of the estate, and hence, it has no right to realise rent from the Respondent. Mr. L.K. Dasgupta learned Counsel for Appellant, however, contends that by the final order passed by the Tribunal u/s 13-G in Chapter II-A of the Act, the estate of the Appellant had been exempted from vesting notification u/s 3-A of the Act and that even before final order of the Tribunal as soon as there was publication of claims and references u/s 13-E of the Act, by virtue of the provision contained in Section 13-F of the Act, the estate of the Appellant was taken out of the vesting notification. This contention of Mr. Dasgupta has no substance for the following reasons; Chapter II-A of the Act relating to trust estates was incorporated into the Act by Orissa Act 5 of 1963 Section 13-A(e) of the Act defines a 'trust estate'. It is admitted that the Appellant's estate is a trust estate as per this definition, There is also no dispute that the vesting notification u/s 3-A of the Act, so far as the Appellant's estate is concerned, is dated 13-4-1961 and that from this date the Appellant's estate vested. The question is if under the provisions contained in Chapter II-A of the act introduced into the Act in 1963, the vesting of the Appellant's estate which took place on 13-4-1961 could be annulled. Section 13-D of the Act clearly provides that a trustee in respect of a trust estate shall upon the issue of the notification u/s 3-A of the Act make an application in the prescribed form and manner to the Tribunal within three months from the date of such notification claiming the estate to be a trust estate. It is, therefore, clear from the above provision that Chapter II-A of the Act has no application to the trust estate of the Appellant which vested in 1961. Chapter II-A of the Act is not retrospective. 5. Mr. It is, therefore, clear from the above provision that Chapter II-A of the Act has no application to the trust estate of the Appellant which vested in 1961. Chapter II-A of the Act is not retrospective. 5. Mr. Dasgupta then urges that the plea taken by the Respondent that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties is barred by principles of res judicata, because in a previous rent suit for recovery of rent relating to a period subsequent to the vesting of the estate, it has been held by a Court of competent jurisdiction that the Defendant is a tenant under the Plaintiff, as the Plaintiff's estate has been declared to be a trust estate under Chapter II-A of the Act. To support the stand, Mr. Dasgupta wants the judgment in a previous rent suit to be accepted as a piece of additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27, CPC which he has filed in this Court along with a petition. Hence, it is necessary to find out if the application filed by him under Order 41, Rule 27, CPC discloses a case for acceptance of additional evidence. First of all, it has to be borne in mind that the decision of the Tribunal, if any, declaring the Plaintiff's estate to be a trust estate under Chapter II-A of the Act is without jurisdiction, in as much as the Plaintiff's estate having vested in 1961, the provision contained in Chapter II-A of the Act has no application to it, because Chapter II-A of the Act came into existence in 1963, i.e., a bout two years after the Plaintiffs estate vested. Therefore, Section 13-D of the Act can have no application to the Plaintiffs estate which provides for filing of claims within a period of three months, from the date of notification u/s 3-A of the Act under which vesting of an estate takes place. In this view, the Tribunal constituted under Chapter II-A of the Act can have no jurisdiction to entertain the Plaintiff's claim, and even assuming that the Tribunal entertained the Plaintiff's claim and allowed the same, it must be held that the decision of the Tribunal is without jurisdiction. Consequently, such a decision cannot operate as res judicata in a subsequent proceeding. Consequently, such a decision cannot operate as res judicata in a subsequent proceeding. It appears that the judgment in the previous rent suit which is sought to be introduced as a piece of additional evidence in these appeals is based upon the, decision of the Tribunal which as pointed out earlier is one without jurisdiction. It follows therefore that by the time the dispute regarding relationship between the parties in the previous rent suit came up for decision, even though there was in fact no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, the Court in the previous suit on an erroneous view that the Plaintiffs estate, was a trust estate and that it had been exempted from vesting by the Tribunal under the Act decreed the suit in favour of the Plaintiff. Mr. Dasgupta argues that the Court in the previous suit had jurisdiction to decide if there was relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, and in exercise of such jurisdiction if the Court erroneously decided the question in favour of the Plaintiff - Appellant, still then, the said decision would be res judicata in a subsequent suit. There may be some force in this argument. But the previous suit decided in favour of the Appellant was for recovery of rent for a particular period and the subsequent suits out of which the present appeals arise are for recovery of rent for periods different from that covered by the previous suit. Therefore, merely because in the previous rent suit the Appellant was held to be the landlord of the Respondent for a particular period, it cannot be said that suits for rent-for periods not covered by the previous decisions would operate as res judicata. See Raja Jagdish Chandra Deo Dhadal Deb Vs. Biseswar Lal Agarwalla and Others. That apart, from the averments in the petition under Order 41 Rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure, it is clear that the Appellant wants to make out a case either under Order 41 Rule 27(1)(b) or (1)(c). Code of Civil Procedure. So far as the requirements mentioned in Clause (b) are concerned the Appellant Court must be satisfied that the additional evidence sought to be produced in spite of exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge or could not be produced by the Applicant at the time the order or decree was passed or made. Code of Civil Procedure. So far as the requirements mentioned in Clause (b) are concerned the Appellant Court must be satisfied that the additional evidence sought to be produced in spite of exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge or could not be produced by the Applicant at the time the order or decree was passed or made. The document sought to be introduced is a judgment inter-parties and by no stretch of imagination it could be said that the Appellant was not aware of it when the judgment in the suits out of which these appeals arise was passed. The further plea taken by the Appellant in his petition under Order 41 Rule 27, CPC that the document in question was lying in a big bundle of papers and hence could not be traced earlier, does not appear to be genuine. The averment in the petition does not disclose as to when actually the document was discovered and by whom. In these circumstances, I held that the Appellant has failed to make out a case under Order 41 Rule 27(1)(b), Code of Civil Procedure. Regarding the requirement of Order 41 Rule 27(1)(c), Code of Civil Procedure, what is to be established is that the appellate Court requires the document to be produced to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. It has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court as well as by this Court that the aforesaid provision does not enable the appellate Court to accept additional evidence when it can pronounce judgment without it. Merely because the appellate Court would like the appeal to be disposed of in a particular way, a case for accepting additional evidence at the appellate stage is not made out See Municipal Corporation for Greater Bombay Vs. Lala Pancham of Bombay and Others. The document sought to be introduced was not only in the possession of the Appellant but its existence was within its knowledge. The plea for non-production of it at the trial stage has already been rejected by me. This document is sought to be introduced in order to enable the Appellant to raise a plea of res judicata which it did not raise either in the trial Court or in the lower appellate Court. In this Court the document is filed three years after the filing of the present appeals. This document is sought to be introduced in order to enable the Appellant to raise a plea of res judicata which it did not raise either in the trial Court or in the lower appellate Court. In this Court the document is filed three years after the filing of the present appeals. Admittedly, no issue has been framed on the question of res judicata and no finding has been recorded by the Courts below. The plea of res judicata has also not been taken in the memorandum, of appeals in this Court. To admit the document in these circumstances would amount to allowing the Appellant to raise the plea of res judicata for the first time at the hearing of these appeals. It has been held by this Court in the decision reported in Gurrala Jaggarao and Others Vs. Gopisetti Bhaaskara Ramchandra Rao Dora, that a new plea of res judicata should not be allowed to be raised at the appellate stage when further materials may be necessary to determine the question. See Mt. Batul Begam Vs. B. Hem Chandar Mukherji Neelakanta v. Neelamma AIR 1952 TC 452 and (Srimathu) Muthu Vijiaraghunatha Duraisingam Vs. Venkatachalam Chettiar and Others. On the basis of the aforesaid decisions, I am of the view that the Plaintiff is not entitled to raise the plea of res judicata for the first time in this Court by introducing a judgment in a previous suit by way of additional evidence. Once this conclusion is reached, it cannot be said that this Court requires to be document to be introduced as additional evidence for pronouncement of judgment or for, any other substantial cause. Taking into consideration all the circumstances relied upon by the Appellant to make out a case for acceptance of additional evidence. I do not find any reason to allow the application which is therefore rejected. 6. In the result therefore, the appeals fail and are accordingly dismissed with costs.