JUDGMENT Narain, J. For an offence under section 16 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, hereinafter to be referred to as the “Act”, the petitioner was convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default, to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for three months. This was affirmed on appeal by the Sessions Judge of Monghyr. The present revision application is directed against the conviction and sentence as set out above. 2. The petitioner has a grocery shop in village Pursottampur Katoria, within police Station Mufassil, district Monghyr. On the 11th January, 1967, Bishwanath Prasad (P.W. 1), Food Inspector, purchased sample of Haldi from the shop of the petitioner after observing due formalities and sent the same to the Public Analyst for examination and report. The Public Analyst found 4.0 parts per million of lead in the sample of Haldi sent to him and in his opinion the sample was adulterated due to its containing excess of lead. On this report, the Administrator, District Board, Monghyr, by his order dated the 8th March 1967 (Ext. 3/1) sanctioned prosecution, and on the 1st July, 1967, Bishwanath Prasad (P.W.1), the Food Inspector, filed a complaint against the petitioner before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr Sadar, who took cognizance. 3. Mr. Debendra Narain Sinha appearing on behalf of the petitioner has argued that the order of conviction recorded against the petitioner cannot be sustained, in as much as the sanction was not valid and the documents produced to prove this, are not admissible in evidence and were brought on record after the close of argument, without affording an opportunity to the petitioner to meet them. Learned Counsel conceded that there was an excess of lead, but according to him, the excess was too small, being only 1.5 parts per million, and as such negligible to be detected by the petitioner who himself purchased these articles and sold them. 4. Section 20 lays down, inter alia, that no prosecution for an offence under the Act shall be instituted except by or with the written consent of a local authority. It has been argued that there was no legal evidence to show that the District Board, or for the matter of that, the Administrator thereof, was a local authority. 4. Section 20 lays down, inter alia, that no prosecution for an offence under the Act shall be instituted except by or with the written consent of a local authority. It has been argued that there was no legal evidence to show that the District Board, or for the matter of that, the Administrator thereof, was a local authority. In order to prove the validity of the prosecution, reliance was placed upon three Gazette notification Exts. 5, 6 and 7 Ext. 5 is a true copy of an extract from the Bihar Gazette dated the 15th March 1958, under which all qualified Health Inspectors of District Boards have been appointed Food Inspector for the purpose of the Act. Ext. 6 is the true copy of an extract from the Bihar Gazette dated the 30 July, 1965, by which the District Development Officer, Monghyr, was appointed to perform the powers, functions and duties conferred on the Monghyr District Board. Ext. 7 is the true copy of an extract from the Bihar Gazette dated the 6th June, 1956, by which under sub clause (2) of clause (VIII) of section 2 of the Act, all District Boards in the State of Bihar, which have been declared to be local areas under clause (vii) of section 2 of the Act, have been prescribed to be local authorities within their respective jurisdictions for the purposes of the Act. 5. The argument advanced by Mr. Debendra Narain Sinha is that the District Board cannot be deemed to be a local authority in as much as the notification Ext. 7 does not fulfill the requirements of law, and that the aforesaid documents which are extracts from the Bihar Gazette and have been certified to be true copies, are not admissible in evidence. He has further argued that under Ext. 6, it was the District Development Officer who had been appointed to exercise and perform the powers, functions and duties of the Monghyr District Board, but in the present case the Food Inspector was authorised by the Administrator and there is nothing on the record to show that the District Development Officer and the Administrator of the Monghyr District Board are one and the same person. No doubt, in his judgment the learned Sessions Judge has stated that they are one and the same person, but the grievance of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there is no material on the record to warrant such a conclusion. 6. In order to appreciate the contention raised, it would be relevant to refer to section 2 (VIII) by which "local authority" has been defined in the Act. It runs as follows:- “(viii) ‘local authority' means in the case of (1) a local area which is- (a) a municipality, the municipal board or municipal corporation; (b) a cantonment, the cantonment authority; (c) a notified area, the notified area committee; (2) any other local area, such authority as may be prescribed by the Central Government or the State Government under this Act;” The word “prescribed” under section 2 (xii) of the Act means prescribed by rules made under this Act. The Bihar Government have framed rules, but there is no rule by which the District Board has been declared to be local authority for the purpose of the Act. A notification (Vide Ext. 7) only seems to have been issued in this regard in the Bihar Gazette on the 6th June, 1956. Regard being had to the definition of the word “prescribed” manifestly, a notification in the Official Gazette does not fulfill the requirements of law. It may be mentioned that Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Himachal Pradesh, Madras, Rajasthan and the Punjab Governments seem to have already framed rules in this regard. 7. Learned Government Advocate in this connection, however, invited my attention to section 3 (d) of the Bihar Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1947 (Bihar Act 5 of 1948), by which the words “local authority” means “in any local area situated within the jurisdiction of a District Board, the District Board.” He submitted that this being the state of law prior to the commencement of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (Act 37 of 1954) enacted by the Parliament the aforesaid definition of “local authority” was saved. This submission cannot be upheld in view of the provisions of section 25 (2) of the Act. This submission cannot be upheld in view of the provisions of section 25 (2) of the Act. Subsection (2) provides that all rules, regulations and bye-laws relating to prevention of adulteration of food, made under such corresponding law and in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall, except where and so far as they are inconsistent or repugnant to the provisions of this Act, continue in force until altered. Admittedly, there existed no rule, regulation or bye-law immediately before the commencement of this Act and then again the definition relied upon by the learned Government Advocate is inconsistent with the present Act and that being so, sub-section (2) of section 25 cannot be pressed into service for the prosecution. For the above reasons I find substance in the contention that upon a complaint filed under the above circumstances, no prosecution would lie. 8. The next argument of Mr. Sinha is that Exts. 5, 6 and 7, details of which have been given above, are not admissible in evidence, in as much as they purport to be extracts from the Bihar Gazette and are certified to be true copies of the original by the District Medical Officer of Health, Monghyr. Under section 78 of the Evidence Act, notification of the State Government or any department of the State Government may be proved by the records of the department certified by the head of that department. In the present case the true copies that have been filed, have not been certified by the head of the department concerned; rather, they have been certified by the District Medical-Officer of Health That being so, these true copies can not be taken in evidence and looked into. A notification issued by the State Government or a department of the Government is a public document and a certified copy of it may be taken in evidence to prove the contents of that document, but before it can be done, the method of proof as contemplated by section 78 of the Evidence Act must be complied with. Disregard of such a method of proof makes the document inadmissible in evidence. As such, no reliance should have been placed on these documents to support the prosecution case. 9. It was next argued by Mr. Sinha that the learned trying Magistrate took the three Gazette notification (Exts. 5, 6 and 7) and the supplementary report (Ext. Disregard of such a method of proof makes the document inadmissible in evidence. As such, no reliance should have been placed on these documents to support the prosecution case. 9. It was next argued by Mr. Sinha that the learned trying Magistrate took the three Gazette notification (Exts. 5, 6 and 7) and the supplementary report (Ext. 3/2) of the Public Analyst into evidence after the conclusion of the arguments of both the parties and without affording any opportunity to the petitioner to say what he had to say in this regard, and as such, serious infirmity has crept in the procedure adopted. The order sheet of the learned Magistrate shows that the prosecution case was closed on the 16th of May 1968 and the petitioner was examined under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the 18th of June 1968. Arguments were heard on the 19th of August 1963 and the case was adjourned to 30th of August 1968 for judgment. On the 19th of August, 1968, the aforesaid four documents were filed by the prosecution and they were taken in evidence by the learned Magistrate, and relying on them the order was recorded. It has been argued on behalf of the State that on the 19th of August 1968, when these documents were taken in evidence by the trying Magistrate, the petitioner was present in court, and as such these documents must be deemed to have been brought on record in his presence. This argument, however, cannot avail the prosecution. The petitioner disputes all this and contends that after he came to know about the filing of these documents, he filed a written statement on the next date wherein he contended that these documents could not he taken in evidence as he had no opportunity to lead rebutting evidence or cross-examine the prosecution witnesses on the point. Apart from this aspect of the matter, it is common ground that after taking these documents in evidence, the petitioner was not examined under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and as such, there has been disregard of this provision of law and it has resulted in grave prejudice to the petitioner. 10 Regard being had to the various infirmities set out above, the conviction and the sentence recorded against the petitioner cannot be sustained and they are accordingly set aside and the application is allowed. 11. 10 Regard being had to the various infirmities set out above, the conviction and the sentence recorded against the petitioner cannot be sustained and they are accordingly set aside and the application is allowed. 11. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Department concerned of the State Government to frame the relevant rules. Application allowed.