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1973 DIGILAW 182 (KER)

STATE OF KERALA v. MADHU ALIAS MADHAVI AMMA

1973-07-20

K.BASKARAN, P.SUBRAMONIAN POTI

body1973
Judgment :- 1. These ten appeals arise from the judgments in land acquisition cases decided by the Subordinate Judge's Court, Palghat. These relate to properties acquired for the same purpose under the same notification and the cases were disposed of by the court below by a common judgment. The notification under S.3 (1) of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act was on 8-10-1963. The lands were acquired for the construction of an approach road to the Railway overbridge at Olavakkode. 2. There are several questions arising in these appeals and therefore we will deal with particular questions which are common atleast to some of these appeals, first. 3. Some of the lands acquired are paddy lands and some are dry lands which could be used as house sites. These have been considered differently by the court below and in regard to the house sites the value has been awarded on the basis of value of similar lands while in regard to paddy lands value has been awarded on the basis of capitalisation of the income from these lands. The report of the commissioner Ext. Cl has been relied on by the court below for finding out the income from the paddy lands. Though there was a contention before the court below that even the paddy lands should be considered as potential house sites and their value determined accordingly the court below has not chosen to accept this and according to us, rightly. On that there is no appeal at the instance of the parties. In the case of the paddy land the only question is whether the capitalisation of income at 20 times to determine the market value is correct. In the case of dry lands the main question is whether the land value determined at Rs. 315.76 per cent is excessive. There are also claims for damages for severance of property which have been allowed by the court below. That is disputed in some of the appeals. There are other minor aspects also to which we will refer in due course. 4. Now we will consider whether the claim of the State that the land value awarded in regard to dry lands at R.315.76 per cent is excessive. Out of the 10 appeals before us, this question is raised in seven of the appeals, namely, A. S. Nos. 4. Now we will consider whether the claim of the State that the land value awarded in regard to dry lands at R.315.76 per cent is excessive. Out of the 10 appeals before us, this question is raised in seven of the appeals, namely, A. S. Nos. 275, 276, 282, 288, 289, 290 and 291 of 1969, All these, it is said, relate to building sites. These were said to have been paddy lands once but subsequently converted into such house sites. The court below has awarded the value which has been found by the Commissioner in his reports filed in court. The court has examined this properly. There is an attack by the State in the appeals to the propriety of the report. The main document on which reliance has been placed by the Commissioner is proved as Ext.B1. That is a registration copy of a sale deed dated 10-11-1961 in favour of one Nethiyar Amma wife of Achutha Menon examined as RW4.17 cents of land is valued at Rs. 5000/- in Ext. B1 This property is only a few yards away from the acquired property. According to the Commissioner, after deducting the value of the trees the value of the property covered by Ext. BI would work out at Rs. 287.06 per cent. Since the acquisition is about two years later 10 percent has been added to this value as according to the commissioner value of the house site in the locality increased subsequently as seen by him from documents produced before him. In fact according to the party the addition should have been 25 percent in respect of house site instead of 10 percent. It could not be said that there was no increase between the years 1961 to 1963 and the Commissioner who had occasion to gather material and see the property has fixed the percentage of increase at 10 percent. That appears to be fair enough. That means fixation of the value of the properties at Rs. 315.76 per cent in these cases is quite proper. No interference is called for, 5. In two of these, appeals, namely A. S.282 of 1969 and 276 of 1969 there are coconut trees standing in the property. 13 coconut trees are standing in the former and 2 in the latter. 315.76 per cent in these cases is quite proper. No interference is called for, 5. In two of these, appeals, namely A. S.282 of 1969 and 276 of 1969 there are coconut trees standing in the property. 13 coconut trees are standing in the former and 2 in the latter. Their value has been determined on the basis of income and the State complains that when so determined the value of the site also should not have been awarded. That contention is quite sustainable. The claimants will have to choose between either the land value and timber value of the trees or the value of the trees determined on the basis of its income. Counsel for the respondents in both these cases submitted that between the two, preference will necessarily be for the value of the land and not the value of the trees and therefore we should modify the decision of the court below in regard to these two cases by holding that only the value of the land is awarded and the value of the 13 coconut trees in A. S.282 of 1969 and 2 cocoanut trees in A. S 276 of 1969 shall not be awarded. That shall be deducted from the amount found due by the court below. 6. In four of these cases, namely A. S.290 of 1969, 289 of 1969, 291 of 1969 and 282 of 1969 and also in A. S.292 of 1969 the Court below has awarded compensation due to severance of land by the acquisition. That there is severance is not disputed and this severance will affect these properties is evident. There is no reason to hold otherwise. If so we do not think the court below was in error in taking due note of it. Therefore that ground fails.) 7. There are cross-objections in A. S.288 of 1969 and A. S.276 of 1969. These cross-objections relate to the depreciation adopted for certain structures in the acquired properties in these two cases. Whether the percentage adopted is high or excessive can be known only if there is an idea of the nature of the buildings. The value awarded for the buildings appears to indicate that they are not substantial buildings, and if that be the case, without anything mote we will not be in a position to say whether the depreciation now taken into account is excessive or not. The value awarded for the buildings appears to indicate that they are not substantial buildings, and if that be the case, without anything mote we will not be in a position to say whether the depreciation now taken into account is excessive or not. Hence we do not find any merit in this also. The cross-objections are dismissed. 8. The result is that in A. S. Nos. 275, 288, 289, 290 and 291 of 1969 there shall be no modification. These appeals are dismissed. The cross-objection in A. S 288 of 1969 and A. S.276 of 1969 is also dismissed. A. S.282 of 1969 and 276 of 1969 calls for only a slight modification. That is, the value of 2 and 13 cocoanut trees respectively awarded in these two cases shall be deducted from the amount due. The appeal by the State in these two cases are allowed to this limited extent and dismissed in other respects. In ail these seven cases both parties shall suffer costs. 9. Now we come to A. S.266 of 1969. There the only question is as to the value of the lorryshed standing in the property. The land value claimed is at Rs, 500/-per cent. Of course, that has not been awarded. There also Rs. 315-75 has been awarded as the land value. The dispute concerns the value of the building. According to the appellant the lorryshed was constructed in 1 cent of land at a cost of Rs. 6000/-. He would say that the value now found is quite inadequate. The land acquisition officer found the value only to be Rs. 2495-85. Of course, there is no support for this valuation in that the valuation statement has not been produced nor anybody concerned with valuing the buildings been examined. As such if there is any other basis, it is safer to accept it than to retain the Land Acquisition Officer's valuation. It has been found by the Commissioner that the rent for the lorry shed will be at Rs. 40/-per mensem. That appears to be fair enough. If we fix the rental value less at Rs. 40/- per mensem the question is, how many years' income should be considered as the purchase value of the building. On that there is considerable controversy. And we have to refer to that matter here. 10. 40/-per mensem. That appears to be fair enough. If we fix the rental value less at Rs. 40/- per mensem the question is, how many years' income should be considered as the purchase value of the building. On that there is considerable controversy. And we have to refer to that matter here. 10. It was usual for courts to apply the rule of capitalisation by 331/3 years' purchase in some cases, in some cases 25 and in some cases 20 years' purchase alone to determine the value of a property. This was so where it was a property with buildings or a property yielding income otherwise such as paddy lands. We find several reported decisions based on this approach and the basis for this is that any person who invests money in property would expect to get income from it the same way he would get it by investing in gilt-edged securities. A Full Bench of this court had occasion to consider this in the decision.in 1973 KLT. 573. That the interest from gilt-edged securities has no application to the present day conditions has been held by this court in that decision. This is because investment in land is no longer considered to be the most attractive form of investment. It does not have the same appeal as it had some years ago. With the increasing spate of legislations to control rent in regard to buildings in cities and legislations with regard to conferring fixity of tenure to tenants in regard to agricultural properties one does not feel it as much safe to invest in properties as he would have considered some time back. That is the reason why investment in land cannot be equated in these days with investment in gilt-edged securities. The matter has to be viewed from the standpoint of a prudent investor. That is the reason why investment in land cannot be equated in these days with investment in gilt-edged securities. The matter has to be viewed from the standpoint of a prudent investor. Market value being the value that a willing purchaser may pay to a willing seller the question would be whether a person would be prepared to purchase a property in recent times on the anticipation of a return at 3 percent or 4 percent or even S percent, if be would get a return of 6 to 7 percent by way of interest from fixed deposits in a Scheduled Bank or Nationalised Bank and further get such benefit in the matter of Income tax or wealth tax as may be allowed from time to time. Therefore even the rule of taking 20 years' net income as the market value adopted in some cases may not be appropriate in the present context. 11. Determination of the market value may be by adopting one of the several accepted modes. A comparison with the value of similar properties about which there is evidence of dealings in or about the period concerned may be a method of determining the value. The method of capitalising the income is also very often adopted because it is likely that a purchaser may go in for a property taking into account the return from it. As the Full Bench has pointed out there may be cases where more than one of these methods have to be applied, where the adoption of any one of these methods by itself may not be appropriate. The potential of the property may also have to be taken into account when determining what should be the number of years' net income that is to be reckoned for the purpose of finding the market value. 12. Now, we are dealing with a case of the year 1963. It is agreed that on the basis of return on a Bank deposit Chat a prudent investor would obtain at that time 16 years' net income would be a proper value to be adopted in the case of a property well situate and having sufficient potential. Possibly it would not be 16 years but less in cases of properties yielding income by reason of buildings standing thereon since, unlike land, building is a wasting asset. Possibly it would not be 16 years but less in cases of properties yielding income by reason of buildings standing thereon since, unlike land, building is a wasting asset. We may have also to take into account, in regard to subsequent years, the fact that the interest rate on deposits was higher possibly and therefore the number of years to be reckoned must necessarily be less. For the present we shall take note of the fact that we are dealing with a case of 1963 and the properties with which we are concerned in the two appeals, A.S. 287 of 1963 and A S.292 of 1969, are paddy lands which have excellent potential and situation. Therefore it would be proper to adopt in these eases 16 times the net annual income as the value for capitalisation. That, of course, is no doubt the maximum. But it has been pointed out that the properties are situate very near the Trunk road though separated from it by a channel and a municipal lane. It is no doubt not a building site but by expending money it is said that it could be converted into building site. It is also said that it has the advantage of the Malampuzha Scheme and there is considerable potential for increase of yield in due course. Taking note of these facts we think any purchaser would purchase this at an yearly return of 6 and 1/4 percent. That means 16 years' net income may be taken as the market value in these two cases. The court below has adopted 20 years' value as appropriate. But we find that this may be true of an acquisition, say, 10 years earlier but not of an acquisition of the year 1963. Hence we find that A.S. 287 of 1969 and 292 of 1969 have to be allowed by reducing the market value of the properties acquired. In place of 20 years' net income 16 years' net income should be taken as the market value of the properties. Of course, the usual solatium and the interest as decreed by the court below on the amount a warded will be due. The appeals are allowed to the above extent. In place of 20 years' net income 16 years' net income should be taken as the market value of the properties. Of course, the usual solatium and the interest as decreed by the court below on the amount a warded will be due. The appeals are allowed to the above extent. Coming to A.S. 266 of 1969 to which we have already referred, the question that has to be considered is how many years' income should be taken for the purpose of fixing the market value. Taking note of the fact that there is a building therein which is liable to deterioration and it is not a building put up just then we consider that in the circumstances it would be proper to adopt 12 years' return as the market value. The yearly return after deducting for maintenance and tax would be Rs. 360/-. That means its value will be determined at Rs. 4320/-. This value of Rs. 4320/- together with 15 percent solatium and interest at 4 percent from the date of taking possession will alone be due. There is no separate land value to be awarded as the basis is capitalisation of income. A S.286 of 1969 by the party is allowed to the above extent. In all the three appeals the parties will suffer costs.